A/S ROOD MISSILE DEFENSE TALKS WITH RUSSIA IN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 003875 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/16/2017 TAGS: MARR PREL MCAP NATO RS FR SUBJECT: A/S ROOD MISSILE DEFENSE TALKS WITH RUSSIA IN FRANCE Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT FOR REASO NS 1.4 B AND D ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak hosted State/ISN A/S John Rood and a U.S. delegation including State/EUR A/S Dan Fried for U.S.-Russia bilateral missile defense talks in Paris on September 10. Rood and Kislyak welcomed this installment of on-going talks as a vital element to the strategic dialogue with regard to European missile defense. Kislyak described the talks as a path toward an alternative to U.S. anti-ballistic missile interceptors in Poland and the Czech Republic. Both countries provided updated threat assessments of Iranian capabilities, although the Russians' briefing focused primarily on critiquing the previous U.S. briefing and failed to provide an alternative explanation for what was occurring regarding North Korea and Iran's ballistic missile programs. The U.S. expert provided additional information that underscored Iranian trends that clearly demonstrated the capability to field longer-range and more threatening missiles. The U.S. described the close relationship between Iran and North Korea and the belief that Iran was gaining indigenous capability for more advanced missiles, far in excess of SCUD technology. Russian experts remain convinced that the U.S. threat assessment strongly over-estimates Iranian capabilities and Russia gave no credence to substantial cooperation between Iran and North Korea. The U.S. briefed the Russians in considerable detail with regard to why the locations in Poland and the Czech Republic were ideal for its system to intercept Iranian missiles and why it was not a threat to Russian strategic capabilities. Kislyak insisted that the U.S. installation of an anti-ballistic missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic was not consistent with either the current or projected threat from Iran; therefore Russia asserted that the U.S. missile defenses in Europe were aimed at Russia. The U.S. briefed the Russian delegation on a proposal for radar cooperation and outlined a separate proposal for a joint regional missile defense architecture. The Russian delegation reacted coolly to these proposals, although Kislyak said they would study them further in Moscow. The Russians stood firm in their position that they would only consider cooperating on surveillance activities if the U.S. froze negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic. At the end of the meeting, Kislyak made it clear that Russian patience for continued meetings would run out if the U.S. did not at least suspend our negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic. A/S Rood said the Russian request that the U.S. suspend pursuit of missile defenses in Europe was asking the U.S. and our allies to forgo defense against what we regard as a serious threat to our security. Instead of asking the U.S. and our allies to not defend ourselves against such a threat, Rood urged Russia to cooperate in a joint effort, which would ultimately provide Russia greater confidence in the intent and direction of U.S. missile defenses in Europe. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- DIFFERING VIEWS ON MD COOPERATION AND MD NEGOTIATIONS WITH POLAND AND THE CZECH REPUBLIC -------------- -------------- 2.(S) On September 10, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak hosted a U.S. interagency delegation led by Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and SIPDIS Nonproliferation, John C. Rood, for U.S.-Russia bilateral missile defense talks in Paris. The U.S. delegation included State/EUR A/S Daniel Fried, DASD(OSD) for Strategic Capabilities Brian Green, the Missile Defense Agency's Chief Engineer, Mr. Keith Englander, and Mr. Robert Kozlusky, a senior intelligence analyst. The Russian delegation was led by DFM Kislyak and included Lt. General Buzhinskiy, Colonel Ilin of the MoD and a senior intelligence official from the SVR, General Venevtsev. Rood and Kislyak welcomed this installment of on-going talks as a vital element of our strategic dialogue. A/S Rood explained that the U.S. was interested in discussing U.S. and Russian threat assessments and areas of convergence and divergence, but added that the U.S. believed we could move forward on missile defense cooperation even if we did not reach agreement on all aspects of our respective threat assessments. State/EUR A/S Fried framed the dialogue in the form of an overall, long overdue, U.S. desire for missile defense cooperation with Russia. A/S Fried added that the U.S. regarded missile defense cooperation with Russia as a serious matter and not directly connected to other bilateral disagreements. Kislyak offered a different view of the talks, arguing that, for the Russians, the talks were an attempt to find an alternative to the proposed U.S. installation of ballistic missile defenses PARIS 00003875 002 OF 004 in Poland and the Czech Republic. Kislyak chastised the U.S. for pursuing missile defense talks with Russia, while continuing to move forward on negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic about these installations, and asked that the U.S. freeze its efforts. Kislyak reasserted the well-established Russian position that, if the U.S. went ahead with its missile defense facilities in Europe, Moscow would be forced to respond asymmetrically. The U.S. and Russia would then enter a period we thought we left behind when the Cold War ended, and this will negatively affect our strategic relationship for decades to come. Kislyak opined that temporarily freezing talks with Prague and Warsaw would not damage our relationships with these two countries. -------------- THREAT ASSESSMENT -------------- ¶3. (S) U.S. senior intelligence analyst Robert Kozlusky briefed on the U.S. intelligence community's reaction to Moscow's July 30 presentation on Iranian ballistic missile capabilities. He challenged the GOR's assessment of Iran's current missile development program, particularly in the fields of more advanced solid propellant technology, the space launch program, the acquisition of BM-25s from North Korea, and Iran's notably large engine test stand which was much larger than their current needs. The U.S. noted that Russia was also underestimating the extent to which Iran could benefit from external assistance despite sanctions, notably from North Korea. If Russia underestimated Iran's current missile program, Kozlusky noted, Russia's estimation of Iran's future capabilities was also unlikely to be accurate. ¶4. (C) Russia's intelligence expert, General Venetsev, challenged the U.S. assessment by critiquing points in the U.S. July 30 presentation. The GoR also noted that they did not share the U.S. notion that Iran could acquire many of its needed technologies outside of sanctions and the MTCR framework. A/S Rood emphasized that MTCR and other non-proliferation programs were effective in greatly limiting assistance to Iran and continued cooperation was necessary. However, despite these programs, significant assistance was reaching Iran. The Russians stated that they did not have confirmation of much of the data provided by the U.S. and judged that Iran's missile program had encountered many more problems getting assistance than recognized by the USG. The GOR asserted that the missile system being created by Iran has a range of only 2,500 kilometers and is not a threat to either Europe or the U.S. ¶5. (S) When specifically questioned about whether Russia concurred with U.S. information that Iran has acquired BM-25 missiles derived from Soviet SS-N-6 (a submarine-launched, single stage ICBM) technology, the GOR strongly disagreed. The U.S. pointed out that it does not assess that the new North Korean missile on which the BM-25 is based is, in fact, the SS-N-6. Instead, the U.S. assesses that while the missile uses the SS-N-6 engine, it has been lengthened to increase the range over that of the SS-N-6. U.S. information was clear that Iran purchased these from North Korea and that its technology was far more advanced than SCUD technology. Russia stated that all Russian missiles of this kind were destroyed except for one that remains in a museum. The Russians defended themselves from what they saw as possible questioning about an illegal transfer of technology. A/S Rood explained that the U.S. delegation was not questioning whether the Russian government transferred this technology, but was instead asking if Russian information could shed light or provide a different perspective on the technology in the BM-25 missiles. The Russians appeared to have no knowledge of the missiles and did not offer an opposing view on the technology they may contain. The Russian delegation countered that the technology was too sophisticated for anyone but Russia and the United States to master, definitely not the North Koreans (or Iranians). The Russians stated the missiles were created to be launched underwater by submarines. The Russians felt it was impossible for the North Koreans to develop such technology, even if they had Russian technical specifications and plans (which they insisted they could not have). The Russians argued that the technology was customized for underwater use; and that the missile would not work without the water pressure at specific depths. In addition the Russians said that there is no way to create a two stage missile with the SS-N-6 engine. In the Russian view, constructing a BM-25 using SS-N-6 technology is "mission impossible." Buzhinskiy described the use of SS-N-6 technology as the most difficult way forward, and Kislyak stated that North Korea would not pick a way that is so PARIS 00003875 003 OF 004 difficult. The Russians added that they themselves discontinued further uses of the SS-N-6 technology because it was too complex. Further, the Russians had little interest in discussing North Korea because their view was that there has been no significant transfer of technology to Iran and the future possibility of such transfers was low. The U.S. disagreed with this assessment. -------------- -------------- U.S. REASONS FOR SITES IN POLAND AND CZECH REPUBLIC -------------- -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Mr. Englander provided the Russian delegation with a detailed briefing to demonstrate why the Polish and Czech locations were ideal to defend Europe and the U.S. from Iranian missiles. His briefing also explained how other locations would degrade our ability to defend Europe and the U.S., and why these locations were not a threat to Russian strategic capabilities. The U.S. showed intercept debris locations for the destruction of an Iranian missile targeting Washington, D.C., and showed the debris patterns to not only be well outside Russian territory but also as not affecting Europe. The Russians were interested in the graphic and asked about U.S. intercepts of North Korean missiles from Alaskan interceptor fields. (NOTE: Clearly the interest was in determining debris patterns that might affect Russian territory. END NOTE.) ¶7. (C) The Russian delegation asked several questions about technical details. Despite the detailed briefing showing degradation to the defense of Europe and the U.S. by using other locations, the Russians appeared largely unconvinced that other locations further from the Russian border should not be considered. General Buzhinskiy expressed concern that the U.S. could put multiple kill vehicles on the interceptors. Kislyak seemed to genuinely appreciate the briefing, and did not appear to specifically disagree with the points made by Mr. Englander, but said this system cannot be considered in a vacuum. Kislyak expressed concerns that the GBI is only part of a future larger, layered U.S. system; while ten interceptors are innocuous, Russia understood the U.S. was pursuing multiple technologies like the airborne laser, mobile systems, space-based systems, and could deploy additional MD elements elsewhere. Kislyak stated that this system creates a feeling of decreased security in Russia, and Moscow will not cooperate with the U.S. on any system that could be used to potentially decrease Russian security. -------------- -------------- U.S. OFFERS PROPOSALS FOR MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION -------------- -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Mr. Englander also provided the Russian delegation with a briefing with a U.S. proposal for radar cooperation. Under this proposal, radar data from the Russian-operated Qabala radar in Azerbaijan, as well as data collected by a radar under construction near Armavir in southern Russia would be shared with the United States via the Joint Data Exchange Center in Moscow and via a similar center in Brussels that would include NATO member nations. The U.S. would share data from an X-band radar in the Caspian region as well as other sensor data. The U.S. and Russia would also collaborate on command and control to enable this sharing of data. The brief provided detailed technical data that supported the U.S. assertions that X-band radars were necessary for the U.S. interceptors to successfully destroy Iranian warheads. Further, the U.S. attempted to show the value of the X-band radar as a complementary technology to Russia's Qabala radar. The X-band radar provides a narrow beam (similar to looking through a "soda straw") which provides fine detail of the missile's ballistic components. The Russian Qabala-type radars provide surveillance over large areas. (FYI: The U.S. and Russia signed an agreement in 2000 to jointly operate the Joint Data Exchange Center in Moscow, but it was not implemented and separate recent Russian statements effectively have held JDEC hostage to Russian demands that the U.S. stop plans for MD sites in Poland and the Czech Republic. END FYI.) Rood explained that if it was easier politically for Russia to accept the U.S. proposal while indicating that the cooperation was oriented at radar cooperation or joint monitoring of the threat vice missile defense that this would be acceptable to the U.S. Rood noted, however, that the U.S. would state that the cooperation was oriented at missile defense. The Russians asked questions about the presentation, but were unmoved from their position that Russian radars were being offered for surveillance of Iran in lieu of U.S. X-band radars, not in addition to U.S. radars. The Russians again made it clear that the Russian offer was only for PARIS 00003875 004 OF 004 surveillance since they did not recognize any imminent threat from Iran, and thus it was not pertinent whether the Russian radar could be used for high precision targeting for interceptors. Kislyak said the Russians would further study the proposal and give the U.S. further reaction at the next experts meeting. ¶9. (S) In addition to the radar cooperation proposal, Rood urged the Russians to consider cooperation with the U.S. on a joint regional missile defense architecture. Rood said the specific architecture would need to be jointly developed by U.S. and Russian specialists, but provided the outlines of what such an architecture could look like with interoperability between U.S. and Russian mobile, shorter-range defense systems like the S-300, S-400, Patriot (PAC-3),and THAAD; sharing of networked radar data; interceptors in Europe and Russia; centers for the passing of data; and command and control arrangements. Rood emphasized that this could be a real strategic partnership between Russia and the U.S. in countering one of the leading threats to international security posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. Kislyak responded coolly to the idea of a joint regional missile defense architecture. He said Russia did not agree with the U.S. threat assessment and that such discussions among experts could only be conducted once the U.S. suspended negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic. Rood pressed Kislyak on whether Russia would be open to such collaboration on missile defense if its threat assessments grew closer or equaled the U.S. assessment in the future. Kislyak demurred, saying that there were many ways to meet such threats in the future, which might or might not involve missile defense. -------------- ON-GOING DIALOGUE -------------- ¶10. (C) The delegations agreed that the upcoming September 18 visit to Qabala should be led and conducted by military experts. The U.S. side offered that the Deputy Director for the Missile Defense Agency, BG O'Reilly, would lead the U.S. delegation. Kislyak also noted that while Russia fully controlled the Qabala facility, the GOR intended to invite the Azeris to observe in the spirit of full transparency with the host nation. This was consistent with earlier U.S. requests. Kislyak also proposed October 10 in Moscow as the date and venue for the next installment of bilateral talks, just ahead of the visit of Secretaries Rice and Gates to Moscow on October 11 for the "2-plus-2" meeting with their Russian counterparts. The U.S. delegation agreed, in principle, to the proposed dates. In closing, Kislyak urged the U.S. to suspend or cease talks with Poland and the Czech Republic to allow more time for negotiations with Russia. He drew a parallel to the current situation with Iran, saying the U.S. was asking Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment activities to allow time for negotiations due to international concerns, and that the U.S. should act in a like manner by suspending its missile defense efforts in Europe. Rood responded by arguing that, as the U.S. had explained in sharing detailed intelligence with the Russians, we perceive a significant and growing threat from Iran to our security and that of our allies. In light of that threat, we feel it essential to take steps to protect ourselves. Rood said the Russian request that the U.S. suspend pursuit of missile defenses in Europe was asking the U.S. and our allies to forgo defense against what we regard as a serious threat to our security. Instead of asking the U.S. and our allies to not defend ourselves against such a threat, Rood urged Russia to cooperate in a joint effort, which would ultimately provide Russia greater confidence in the intent and direction of U.S. missile defenses in Europe. ¶11. (SBU) A/S Rood has cleared this cable. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm Stapleton