A/S FRIED CFE TALKS WITH RUSSIA IN FRANCE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 003808

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2017
TAGS: PREL PARM MARR NATO KFCE FR GG RU MD
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED CFE TALKS WITH RUSSIA IN FRANCE

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, for reas
ons 1.4 b and d.


1. (C) Summary. EUR Assistant Secretary Dan Fried and an
interagency team met with Russian DFM Kislyak September 11 in
Paris to discuss next steps on the U.S. parallel actions plan
for ending the current deadlock on fulfillment of Istanbul
commitments by Russia and ratification of Adapted CFE by NATO
Allies. Kislyak expressed appreciation both for the parallel
actions proposal itself and for the U.S. offer to provide
additional details regarding our plans for rotational
training in Bulgaria and Romania.


2. (C) Kislyak characterized his comments on the parallel
action plan as preliminary, warning that while he was not
prepared to embrace the U.S. paper as written, he recognized
it as addressing some core Russian concerns, in particular
regarding Allied ratification of Adapted CFE. Kislyak
objected that the approach gave no guarantee of ratification
by the U.S. and all 30 CFE states, and pushed the idea of
provisional application of the Adapted CFE Treaty to avoid
suspension of current CFE by Russia. Kislyak welcomed the
suggestion to discuss Baltic accession to CFE. He said
flatly that Russia wants to eliminate the flank regime for
Russia, and keep it for the other signatories.


3. (C) On Istanbul, Kislyak agreed to technical discussions
in the next two weeks of further steps regarding a
fact-finding visit to the Gudauta base. But he stonewalled
on Moldova, both on the idea of transforming the Russian
peacekeeping force, and on any movement on further withdrawal
of Russian munitions, insisting that Smirnov would not let
that work go forward in the absence of a Transnistrian
political settlement.


4. (C) Fried pushed Kislyak to accept that parallel actions
on CFE and Istanbul are the only way to end the current
deadlock and noted that NATO Allies support the U.S. plan.
Fried said that if Adapted CFE were provisionally applied
Russia would have no incentive to complete its withdrawal
from Moldova and Georgia; and the Senate would never accept
sidestepping its prerogatives, particularly with Istanbul
unfulfilled. He called on Russia to develop an alternative
if the U.S. idea for transforming the Russian PKF in Moldova
was insufficient, but said the U.S. did not accept that
Smirnov dictated Russia,s options. Fried said the flank
regime remained critically important for many Allies and the
Senate would not ratify a Treaty whose core provisions
appeared to be in dispute. After the Adapted Treaty had
entered into force Russia could raise its concerns, but it
seemed unlikely that such a one-sided proposal as Kislyak
outlined could be accepted.


5. (C) In addition to expert discussions on Gudauta, Kislyak
and Fried agreed to try to meet o/a September 21 on the
margins of Kislyak,s visit to Washington, and on the eve of
the 2 plus 2 meeting in Moscow, leaving open the possibility
of a further session as well. Kislyak also envisions that
Antonov, the head of their delegation to Germany,s CFE
seminar October 1-2, would be available for detailed
discussions.


6. (C) Comment: The (modest) good news is that despite
reservations, Kislyak is working off of the U.S. proposal.
But Moscow perceives divisions in the Alliance on the
essentiality of fulfilling Istanbul as a prerequisite for
ratification, and is prepared to exploit them. Nevertheless,
Kislyak,s reluctance to accept any of the specifics and his
hardline stance on the flank regime and Moldova suggests that
Russia is moving toward suspension come December 12. The
need to maintain a vigorous Alliance message of solidarity
was underscored by A/S Fried in his meetings with the UK,
France, and Germany on the margins in Paris, and will be a
core of the U.S. message to Allies at the HLTF September 13.
End comment.


7. (C) Meeting participants included, for the U.S.: EUR A/S
Dan Fried, VCI DAS Karin L. Look, Jennifer Laurendeau, Donna
Phelan, James Starkey, COL Jon Chicky and LTC Stephen
Olejasz. For Russia: DFM Sergey Kislyak, General Yevgeniy
Buzhinski, Oleg Burmistrov, Anton Mazur, Vladimir Vinevtsev,
Russian Embassy poloff Kondratski and Mr. Pavlov. End
Summary

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Russian Response to the Parallel Action Plan -- General
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8. (C) After greetings from both sides, Fried noted that the

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U.S. had developed the parallel actions concept in response
to Russian concerns related to the CFE Treaty, and that we
also wanted to see the Treaty modernized (i.e., move to the
Adapted Treaty, or A/CFE). He assured Kislyak it was not a
"take it or leave it" proposal, and expressed the hope that
before December, we will have reached agreement on the way
ahead. Fried invited Russia,s reaction to the U.S. parallel
action paper, noting that that the U.S. would also present
more information about our plans for rotational training in
Romania and Bulgaria, as requested by Kislyak on July 31.


9. (C) Kislyak began his commentary about the U.S. plan by
noting that it was still under interagency review in Moscow.
He welcomed the suggestion of a presentation on plans for
Romania and Bulgaria, noting that there was a lot of
confusion in Moscow about just what was happening. He
welcomed additional information regarding U.S. plans and how
they related to the NATO commitment regarding deployment of
"substantial combat forces" in the new NATO states.


10. (C) On the parallel action plan itself, Kislyak said
this was the first time in recent years that the U.S. was
willing to engage on CFE. He highlighted a number of
specific points in the U.S. paper, noting U.S. readiness:
- "not to obstruct the willingness of others to ratify" A/CFE;
- to engage on the question of the Baltic states joining CFE.
Here he emphasized that Russia was interested not only in
their general readiness to join, but in what their specific
plans for joining the Treaty would be, notably equipment
ceilings, for example;
- to discuss the meaning of "substantial combat forces";
- to offer financial assistance to Russian withdrawal of
forces from Georgia and Moldova (although Kislyak suggested
it was not needed); and
- to address issues related to the flank regime after entry
into force of A/CFE.


11. (C) Kislyak also observed that the U.S. paper did not
contain much detail regarding U.S. plans to ratify the
Adapted Treaty, a point to which he returned in discussion of
Georgia and Moldova.


12. (C) Regarding the flank issue, Kislyak went into some
detail to emphasize Russia,s position that the flank regime
should be eliminated for Russia, even while it is maintained
for others. He also noted that the Baltic States would have
to enter A/CFE under the constraints of the flank regime.
Kislyak commented that Russia has tried to understand Turkish
security concerns regarding the flank, but that Ankara had
not been able to articulate the basis for their desire to
retain the regime for Russia. Kislyak suggested that Turkey
wanted to retain the flank regime for reasons that had to do
with other countries; Norway, he argued, should be content
with the political commitments in effect with regard to
levels of Russian forces in the north. Kislyak reiterated a
point he made in July: that Russia had no plans for a
military buildup in the flank region -- it just wants the
freedom to move Russian forces anywhere it chooses. Later in
the meeting, Buzhinskiy reinforced this by noting Russia had
no security concern about the flank zone; it is a "matter of
principle."


13. (C) DAS Look responded that it was inconceivable that
the Senate would ratify the Adapted CFE if it was apparent
that a core provision of the Treaty was under renegotiation.
Fried concurred, recalling the point he had made at the CFE
Extraordinary Conference in June: after the Adapted Treaty
entered into force, any nation could raise concerns about its
provisions. That said, Fried continued, the Russian position
that the flank restrictions should be retained for Russia,s
neighbors, but not for Russia, was so one-sided that it was
not obvious how it could be agreed. If it was a question of
adjusting the flank, as had already been done (twice) at
Russia,s request, that might find broader sympathy. But no
step on this would be possible until after the Adapted Treaty
had entered into force. Russia,s other concerns (e.g., the
"principle" of movement of its forces on its territory) could
be discussed, as Secretary Gates has said during his trip in
Moscow earlier in the year.

--------------
Georgia and Moldova
--------------


14. (C) Kislyak observed that under the parallel actions
concept, one aspect of the U.S. position appeared unchanged:
the U.S. is still looking for Russia to complete fulfillment
of the Istanbul commitments first, and only then ratify the
Adapted Treaty. (Comment: it was conspicuous, however, that

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Kislyak did not use the meeting to decry continued U.S.
"linkage" between ratification of Adapted CFE and fulfillment
of the Istanbul commitments or allow that issue to derail
broader discussion of the U.S. paper. End comment.) He
suggested that the plan contained new prerequisites for
fulfillment of the Istanbul commitments, such as the
requirement to withdraw the pensioners from Georgia. A/S
Fried and team immediately and vigorously refuted this
assertion, noting that the paper made no mention of
"pensioners." Fried pointed out that Russia asserts the base
at Guduata has been closed; we are suggesting an
international fact-finding visit as a way to establish the
facts of the situation. The U.S. paper starts with a
fact-finding visit and ends with Russian-Georgian agreement.
Laurendeau said it was actually Russia that had provided the
basic facts regarding its presence at Gudauta: Russia said
it had peacekeeping forces at the base, as well as four
helicopters; Georgia said that this presence did not have its
consent. That is the issue, not pensioners. Fried
suggested that this was why a fact-finding mission could be
helpful.


15. (C) The Russian team shot back that they wanted a
fact-finding mission to "resolve" the issue, not just engage
in "military tourism." Fried said Georgia and Russia would
both have to agree on the terms of reference, and noted that
Laurendeau would shortly meet with Georigan officials to
discuss the issue next week. In the end, Kislyak agreed to
work by U.S. and Russian experts on terms of reference for a
fact-finding visit to Gudauta; it was agreed that the U.S.
would inform Russian Amb Chernov and CFE expert Mazur of the
results of Georgian-U.S. discussions, so that next steps
could then be identified.


16. (C) On Moldova, Kislyak complained that the idea of
replacing the Russian peacekeeping force with an
international force is a new requirement. He argued that
this would be changing the format of a force that is legally
present in a particular capacity, and was not prepared to
consider this ahead of a political settlement of the
Transnistrian conflict. Fried pointed out that the 5 2 talks
were making no progress and indicated that our suggestions
for an international peacekeeping force were an attempt to
find a creative way to break through the logjam. From the
U.S. perspective, we considered it a concession: this was a
solution that would permit Russian troops to remain, while
also allowing fulfillment of the Istanbul commitments related
to Moldova. Fried suggested that we could work out the
concept of such a force bilaterally, or in a multilateral
context -- as long as Russia was willing to engage. If this
did not meet Russia,s needs, Fried urged Kislyak to offer an
alternative suggestion. In the end, Kislyak was not willing
to discuss this point further.

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Assessing the Allies
--------------


17. (C) When it became clear that Russian forces in Moldova
would be a sticking point, DAS Look pointed to the upcoming
meeting of the NATO HLTF (Thursday, September 13),and our
hope for reporting to Allies on positive Russian engagement
on the parallel action plan. She pointed out that our plan
was to pursue discussions on ratification plans with Allies,
with a view toward early action as outlined in the U.S.
paper, and noted that Allies would be reluctant to develop a
concrete agreement on ratification timelines if she could
only report that Russia was willing to engage on one aspect
(Georgia) of the plan. Kislyak then noted that he had been
having his own consultations with NATO states, and that he
was fully aware of their plans for ratification. Kislyak
claimed that the U.S. position on CFE (not to ratify A/CFE
until after the Istanbul commitments are fulfilled by Russia)
is not one that all NATO Allies agree with, and he implied
the U.S. was bullying dissenters into agreement. Fried noted
that the Alliance has discussed this issue, and will continue
to do so, and all have agreed that the Istanbul commitments
must be fulfilled (before the A/CFE can be brought into
force). He pointed out that the parallel actions plan
reflected significant movement from the U.S. (and NATO) and
that we had hoped it would allow Russia to move forward also.
The bottom line was that we needed parallel action,
including from Russia, for this approach to work and for us
to preserve the benefits of CFE.


18. (C) Kislyak replied that Russia had already made a
proposal, in putting its six points on the table. Fried
noted that we have addressed those points and asked for
concrete suggestions for getting beyond where we are today.

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Kislyak complained that there is also an Istanbul commitment
by NATO states regarding ratification of A/CFE that has not
been met -- it is unfair to focus only on commitments by
Russia. Fried reiterated that we have discussed this at
length with Allies: they support the U.S. position and think
the parallel actions plan is a good way forward. Kislyak
then asked whether the U.S. would consider provisional
application of A/CFE. Fried and Laurendeau rejoined that
provisional application seemed likely to derail, probably
permanently, fulfillment of the Istanbul commitments.
Buzhinskiy replied that they would be accomplished "if
(political) conditions allow." Look said that any effort to
provisionally apply that Adapted Treaty would likely be
rejected by the U.S. Senate and could preclude ratification
by many Parliaments. Fried agreed. He reiterated Look,s
point that NATO Allies were unlikely to engage on
ratification as outlined in the plan, unless Russia has
agreed to the parallel action concept.

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JCS Briefing
--------------


19. (C) Joint Staff rep LTC Steve Olejasz provided an
overview of Joint Task Force - East (JTF-E). It will provide
a rotational training presence to conduct bilateral and
multilateral training with Romania and Bulgaria, and other
partners. Questions from the Russian team focused on the
anticipated size of U.S. deployments and whether equipment
would be left in place between deployments. Olejasz said
that deployments could be up to the level of one brigade,
split between the two countries. In the near term activities
would be at the battalion level. He noted that U.S.
deployments would be subject to inspection under CFE Section
VIII and Vienna Document provisions. He said that Russia has
been briefed before and that we would work with Romania and
Bulgaria to provide transparency about these activities. He
emphasized that deployments would be in accordance with arms
control agreements.

- Fried sought to put these U.S. activities into perspective:
CFE,s flank provisions had the effect of restricting
equipment that could be deployed into the region -- that was
one advantage to Russia of CFE. But it was also true that
U.S. equipment levels in Europe simply were not such as to
accommodate large deployments into Romania and Bulgaria.

- Fried asked Olejasz how much equipment the U.S. had in
Europe right now; Olejasz responded that U.S. equipment
levels had dropped dramatically since the 1990s. Right now,
the U.S. only has 130 tanks on the continent (less than
CFE,s limit for temporary deployment in the flank, which is
153 tanks). Body language suggested that Kislyak and
Buzinskiy got the point: Russia,s articulation of the
implications of the U.S. presence in Romania and Bulgaria was
overstated. Kislyak noted that JTF-E sounds less threatening
than Russia originally supposed, but they will remain
interested in future plans and rotations.

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Looking Ahead
--------------


20. (C) Discussing opportunities for further engagement,
Fried and Kislyak agreed that, in advance of the 2 plus 2
meeting in October, they would try to meet on September 21,
when Kislyak expects to be in Washington, and again on the
eve of the 2 2. Kislyak suggested that the German CFE
seminar in Berlin on October 1-2 might be another opportunity
-- Antonov will lead the Russian team and he could meet with
U.S. reps on the margins. (Fried noted that the U.S. team
was likely to include VCI A/S DeSutter and EUR PDAS Volker.)
This was in addition to expert discussions relating to
Georgia.


21. (C) Fried reiterated that if Kislyak did not like the
U.S. proposal on Moldova, Russia should come up with an
alternative idea and we would be willing to discuss it. The
important thing is to get away from the standard repetition
and move forward. Kislyak indicated that the parallel action
plan might be a way forward if it has the right content. He
said the Russian movement toward suspension of CFE was a
wake-up call, but noted that December 12 need not be the end
of constructive discussion.


22. (C) Fried observed that we could not be sanguine about
the calendar. It would be far more difficult to find
solutions to these issues once the political context had
changed, as it would if Russia took the step of suspending

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its implementation of the CFE Treaty. Suspension of a major
Treaty is a very serious action. It was not just Russian
constraints that would vanish if Russia destroyed the CFE
regime. Such Russian action would have implications for
Allied constraints as well. Fried noted that the security
portion of the NATO-Russia Founding Act was significantly
premised on full adherence by all partners to the CFE Treaty:
CFE was a main focus of the text. We needed to think
carefully about the choices made in the next weeks, and push
to resolve our differences constructively -- and soon.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


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