A/S FRIED DISCUSSES NATO, GEORGIA, KOSOVO, CFE

S E C R E T PARIS 003798 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR EUR/WE KALLEGRONE AND CPALMER AND EUR/RPM JLAURENDEAU E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/13/2017 TAGS: PREL NATO MARR PARM FR GG RS SR SUBJECT: A/S FRIED DISCUSSES NATO, GEORGIA, KOSOVO, CFE WITH THE GOF Classified By: Kimberly C. Krhounek for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (S/NF) Summary. On September 10, A/S Dan Fried met with Political Director Gerard Araud at the MFA to discuss developments on NATO, Georgia, Kosovo and the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. Araud welcomed the U.S. parallel action plans to move forward on the Adapted CFE treaty, but said he feared the Russian government has already decided to suspend participation in the treaty. On NATO, Araud said the GOF is reviewing ways to deepen and improve French participation; this remains a sensitive issue (domestically and within the GOF) on which tangible results cannot be guaranteed soon. The GOF is hesitant to give Georgia a MAP, but agrees that a positive signal at Bucharest is important; Paris is considering other incentives and approaches which would give Georgia a special status but fall short of membership. Finally, regarding Kosovo, Araud said it became clear at the recent Gymnich that the other European countries are coming to the recognition that Kosovo's supervised independence absent a UNSCR may be inevitable. It is therefore important to start planning a strategy to manage the modalities of a possible UDI and our support for it. End summary. -------------- -------------- SUPPORT FOR U.S. PROPOSALS ON CFE; PESSIMISM OVER OUTCOME -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Araud began the meeting by welcoming the U.S. "parallel actions" proposals on the Adapted CFE Treaty, which demonstrate that we are seriously engaged with the Russians. A functioning arms control system in Europe is an important component of strategic policy for the GOF, as is Russian adherence to the Istanbul commitments. At the same time, Araud stated that he had "no illusions" that our best efforts would succeed in keeping Russia in the CFE, as he was informed during his last visit to Moscow that the "decision was already taken" to suspend Russian participation in the CFE treaty. (NOTE: Araud added that his sense was that the Russian Presidency and upper-level MOD were making this decision, and that the Russian MFA has "lost" this policy battle.) Araud stated that the Russian approach to flank limits was critical to determining whether they are ready to seriously negotiate; a Russian demand to abolish the limits entirely would be unacceptable and prove that they have no intent to compromise. A/S Fried responded that the USG is ready to discuss the flank regime (which we had agreed to modify twice in the 1990's) but we are not ready to abolish the flank limits altogether, nor to abandon the requirement that the GOR honor its Istanbul Committments. ¶3. (C) The issue of "substantive combat forces" also remains important to the GOF. A/S Fried emphasized that the commitment from the NATO-Russia Founding Act from 1997 was quite specific: military assets need to be permanent, combat and substantial to be covered by it. The bases in Romania are temporary in nature and are therefore not covered and the forces we anticipated rotating in were brigade strength in total, and thus not "substantial." He added that the U.S. has never formally defined what we consider substantial, but generally speaking, a force would likely need to be larger than a brigade to be covered. We might agree to define it formally in response to Russian concerns, but only as part of a package, e.g., on the Adapted CFE. ¶4. (C) The GOF supports the Berlin Seminar in early October, as that will be an opportunity for substantive discussions about the U.S. parallel actions plan. Afterwards, Araud proposed a follow-on seminar to be held in Paris, suggesting that the Quint (or other smaller delegation) meet the first day, followed by consultations with all of the 34 countries the second day. A/S Fried agreed that the notion of a Paris Seminar was useful as it would allow alliance members to further demonstrate their solidarity and show the Russians that there would be a diplomatic cost to suspending their participation in the CFE. Neither venue should be an opportunity for the West to engage in serial caving before intractable Russian demands. -------------- STEPS TOWARDS GREATER NATO INTEGRATION? -------------- ¶5. (S/NF) A/S Fried noted that President Sarkozy's speech was well-received in Washington, as was the notion that a strong EU is compatible with a strong NATO. He asked Araud what were the next possible steps to move France closer to the Alliance. Araud responded that there is a strong political will within the GOF to deepen and improve France's relationship with NATO, including "going all the way." At the same time, there is some political concern over the possible domestic consequences of French re-engagement with NATO, especially in advance of an advance of the EU's military structure and sanctions, so the way forward is a delicate process. One way of smoothing over internal concerns was to emphasize the importance of EU defense at the same time. Indeed, France believes it must be "EU first." Araud stated that the GOF had been approached by the UK on re-integration and that Germany was also interested in raising this at the September 10 summit between Sarkozy and Merkel. He emphasized that no firm political decision had yet been taken and that nothing tangible was likely to appear soon. In the meantime, the French mission to NATO had received instructions "not to be a pain in the neck to the Americans" and to study ways to improve relations between the EU and NATO. ¶6. (C) A/S Fried said that the USG wants to have a robust package of ideas for the Bucharest summit, possibly including the launch of a new strategic concept. Araud agreed on this timing and added that the last European security strategy dated from 2003 and that one of the goals of the 2008 French presidency of the EU is to review and update this as well. Fried added that the USG also wants missile defense on the agenda and that we are interested in working with allies on the NATO role in missile defense. We wanted to work with France to craft a package for Bucharest. "EU first" should not mean postponing NATO to some distant date: it might well be that the UK needed movement on NATO to cover movement on the EU, just as France needs the reverse. This might mean that EU and NATO projects could proceed more or less together. -------------- ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL TO A GEORGIA MAP -------------- ¶6. (C) On Georgia, Araud agreed that Russian provocations were a major problem, but the GOF is unsure about giving a MAP to Georgia. First, NATO's doctrinal document states that NATO membership should not create new lines of division and that territorial conflicts should be resolved prior to membership; Georgia does not meet these criteria (Araud noted that NATO required that Hungary sign a border treaty with Romania prior to becoming a member). On the other hand, the GOF is ready to give a positive signal to Georgia at Bucharest, but perhaps "something less than membership." The GOF is considering whether NATO could define with Georgia a different kind of status and a different approach to security in their area. As an incentive, Araud suggested that it might be possible to agree on a package of measures to reward Georgia, such as abolishing visas with the EU. This could also affect support for separatist ambitions, as citizens in those areas would benefit from being "Georgian." Finally, Araud noted that any push for further rapprochement with Georgia will create tensions with Russia. The Russian geopolitical view of the world may be "outdated" but unfortunately, they see themselves as increasingly encircled by NATO. ¶7. (C) A/S Fried reiterated that turning away from Georgia would be a "strategic mistake" and that Georgia (and Russia) may read any alternative proposal as abandonment of Georgia by the West. This in turn could cause Russia to miscalculate and seek to pressure Georgia in dangerous ways. He stated that given its own reforms, Georgia deserved a MAP just as much (if not more) than other countries that have received an invitation, such as Macedonia. He compared the hesitation to giving Georgia a MAP to that which occurred over Baltic NATO membership in the early 1990's, and noted that these similar concerns were all overcome. The situation was more difficult: Georgia is further away and Russia is in a more truculent mindset than 15 years ago, but the principle of indivisibility of Europe and no "gray zone" ought to apply to Georgia, if (and only if) it met European standards at home, as it seemed on track to do. Finally, Fried added that it is not in anyone's strategic interest to "indulge the irrationality" of Russia's outdated world view. -------------- -------------- EUROPEANS INCREASINGLY ACCEPTING INDEPENDENT KOSOVO -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Araud said that at the recent informal Gymnich meeting, the EU member states had a good debate on the future of Kosovo. It remained important that the other EU countries see that we are engaged in a serious process and that we continue to work towards a possible compromise settlement. However, in the end it was recognized that a UDI was most likely "unavoidable" and the members agreed that the EU would have to prepare for the possible declaration of independence of Kosovo on or soon after December 10. Araud said that while German FM Steinmeyer was "very keen," Spanish FM Moratino remained very negative on this issue. The Dutch still have a constitutional problem with maintaining their presence in Kosovo in the event of a UDI, but they thought that perhaps a "declaration" (in support of Kosovo independence) by Ban Ki Moon would be sufficient to overcome their legal obstacles. Cyprus is reportedly under "great pressure" but due to their domestic situation they have said that recognition of an independent Kosovo by their government is impossible; however, they have not threatened to block any EU action. ¶9. (C) Araud said that the EU and U.S. need to work now on the modalities of such an event: What would be the closing event? How would the Troika work stop? Would ministers call the two parties? He said that something should be organized on the level of the Contact Group to coordinate next steps and agree on some confidence-building actions that Kosovo should take, such as high-level visits to Serbian villages and patrimonial sites. Araud said that some countries had raised the possibility of a "Rambouillet/Dayton" event as a final push for a negotiated settlement, but the GOF did not think this would work. He asked if we thought it would be possible to push a UDI back until after the Russian presidential elections in 2008, but A/S Fried stated firmly that this would not be possible (although he noted that Russian DUMA elections would be over on December 2),although he agreed on the necessity of coordinating actions and encouraging the Kosovars to engage in positive actions towards the Serbian minority. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm Stapleton