Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07PARIS3672
2007-09-05 13:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:
FRENCH MFA STAFF "REFLECTS" ON IRAQ: UNLIKELY
VZCZCXRO8613 OO RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHROV DE RUEHFR #3672/01 2481318 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 051318Z SEP 07 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9890 INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES IMMEDIATE RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 003672
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV FR IZ
SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA STAFF "REFLECTS" ON IRAQ: UNLIKELY
INCREASES IN ASSISTANCE TO INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES AND
DESIRE FOR REINFORCED UN
REF: PARIS 3534
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
ns 1.4. (B),(D).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 003672
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV FR IZ
SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA STAFF "REFLECTS" ON IRAQ: UNLIKELY
INCREASES IN ASSISTANCE TO INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES AND
DESIRE FOR REINFORCED UN
REF: PARIS 3534
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
ns 1.4. (B),(D).
1. (C) Summary: Franck Gellet, the French MFA's DAS
covering Iraq, stressed August 31 that the lack of progress
toward national reconciliation in that country is the main
obstacle to internal peace and reconstruction. In that
context, he believes the notion of France providing
assistance to internal security forces in the foreseeable
future as farfetched since it would only result in training
and equipping militias. France may be reluctant officially
to describe the situation in Iraq as a civil war, but Gellet
said that is exactly what it is. U.S. troops, in his view,
are increasingly viewed by all parties as a restraining force
in terms of the violence. An eventual U.S. withdrawal,
especially if signaled in advance, would lead to a likely
bloodbath given current trends, since, in Gellet's view, the
violence has not yet reached its apogee. The MFA is watching
the domestic debate in the U.S. on troop presence closely,
and Gellet hopes the Petraeus/Crocker report will not call
for an explicit timetable for a pullout. FM Kouchner has not
yet decided when he will reach out to EU counterparts but may
say something about Iraq at the upcoming Gymnich meeting.
France fully supports a reinforced UN presence, as Kouchner
has stated, but Gellet believes the UN is understandably
anxious about the security situation given the 2003 attack on
August 31, on the UN compound. End summary
2. (C) French MFA DAS for Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf Franck
Gellet described MFA views on the situation in Iraq and the
(currently) limited opportunities for France to play a role.
He indicated the previously reported "reflection" on how
France might re-engage with Iraq was still ongoing (see
reftel). FM Kouchner's determination, based on his firsthand
appreciation of the grave humanitarian situation in Iraq
during his visit, remains strong. The problem, as Gellet
(who was DCM at the French embassy in Baghdad 2003-2006) sees
it, remains the Iraqis themselves. As Kouchner has observed,
the will for national reconciliation is strongly lacking but
is the fundamental ingredient for the success of any effort
at reconstruction.
3. (C) We asked about France's reported willingness to
consider aid to Iraq's internal security and police forces.
We pointed to a recent statement by the MFA's spokesperson
the effect that this was under review as a possible area in
which France would offer tangible assistance. Gellet
suppressed a mild chuckle and explained that this matter has
a relatively long history dating to the early post-Saddam
period. At that time, France offered to train and equip
internal security forces but only in France. The Iraqis had
insisted the training occur in Iraq, and that ended the
conversation. Now, Gellet continued, the situation in Iraq
is out of control. Offering help to security forces now
would be little more than training and equipping militias.
4. (C) Speaking more broadly about the current situation in
Iraq, Gellet asserted that the country was in a "civil war
that no one dares label as such." Even the MFA declines to
describe the violence in Iraq in those terms lest it somehow
give the impression to any of the parties in conflict that
they are actually vying for control of the national
government. Nevertheless, in Gellet's view, the effective
destruction of the state as a viable national entity and the
inability of the parties singularly or collectively to agree
on reconciliation makes the conflict a civil war. He agreed
with analysts who have observed a lessening of the
Sunni-based insurgency and a rise of latent intra-Shi'a
conflict, especially in the south.
5. (C) Using ideas (if not the exact words) similar to
Kouchner's, Gellet called the U.S. military presence in Iraq
a crucial "interpositional force" that helps restrain the
parties and keep the violence within bounds. This is how the
contending Iraqi leaders and groups see the U.S. troops even
if some still refer to them as "occupiers" in their public
rhetoric. Gellet asserted that a free-for-all" of violence
that would surpass everything we are currently seeing would
follow a sudden U.S. pullout. In his personal opinion, the
Iraqi "civil war" has not yet reached its peak in terms of
the violence yet to be unleashed. He saw a situation in
which the growing domestic U.S. imperative to pull out of
Iraq was clashing with the Iraqi imperative that U.S. troops
remain to exert some measure of restraint.
6. (C) The MFA is watching the domestic debate in the U.S.
over the war with great interest, according to Gellet. He
expressed interest in reading the unclassified version of the
PARIS 00003672 002 OF 002
latest national intelligence estimate, about which he has
read a great deal. (Comment: We sent him a copy. End
comment) Gellet is waiting now for the Petraeus/Crocker
report and for the recommendations it might offer for the way
ahead, particularly during the 2008 election year. He hoped
it would not recommend a timetable for withdrawal that would
also, in his view, be a timetable for ratcheting up the
violence.
7. (C) Turning to the larger region, Gellet stated that the
response from Iraq's neighbors to FM Kouchner's trip was very
positive. France, as Kouchner has stated publicly, is
acutely aware of the stakes for the region as a whole. As he
did in a parallel conversation about Iran (septel),Gellet
referred to French interests via the Gulf States and Iran's
unhelpful involvement in Iraq. With respect to Europe, the
MFA was still deciding how much Kouchner would say at an
upcoming Gymnich meeting of EU foreign ministers, but there
would at least be some "mention" of Kouchner's visit and the
need for the EU to focus more attention on Iraq. Gellet was
not sure how much could be done to increase the UN's
importance in Iraq. The emotional scars of the 2003 bombing
are real, and it is hard to see, given the currently parlous
security situation in Iraq, how the UN will make good on its
reinforced mandate. Nonetheless, Gellet concluded, Kouchner
has made clear that France wants to UN to be a central part
of the eventual solution in Iraq.
8. (C) Comment: Gellet freely mixed his personal views,
informed by his relatively recent experience in Iraq, with
the MFA's official line. He thus occasionally reflected the
Quai's oldthink of Iraq as a situation beyond hope that was a
U.S. and not a French problem. Indeed, at one point Gellet
contended in a very matter of fact way that, heinous as the
Saddam regime had been, the overall situation was stable and
one understood the limits of acceptable behavior and assumed
the risk of going beyond them. Nevertheless, his remarks on
the U.S. troop presence reflect a more practical analysis of
what is happening today in Iraq and dovetail with Kouchner's
opinion that the fundamental factor blocking progress toward
normalcy in Iraq is discord among Iraq's leaders and not the
U.S. troop presence. Gellet's concern about the potential
bloodbath that could follow an eventual U.S. withdrawal, in
the absence of national reconciliation, is one that we
believe Kouchner shares. End comment
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV FR IZ
SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA STAFF "REFLECTS" ON IRAQ: UNLIKELY
INCREASES IN ASSISTANCE TO INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES AND
DESIRE FOR REINFORCED UN
REF: PARIS 3534
Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt for reaso
ns 1.4. (B),(D).
1. (C) Summary: Franck Gellet, the French MFA's DAS
covering Iraq, stressed August 31 that the lack of progress
toward national reconciliation in that country is the main
obstacle to internal peace and reconstruction. In that
context, he believes the notion of France providing
assistance to internal security forces in the foreseeable
future as farfetched since it would only result in training
and equipping militias. France may be reluctant officially
to describe the situation in Iraq as a civil war, but Gellet
said that is exactly what it is. U.S. troops, in his view,
are increasingly viewed by all parties as a restraining force
in terms of the violence. An eventual U.S. withdrawal,
especially if signaled in advance, would lead to a likely
bloodbath given current trends, since, in Gellet's view, the
violence has not yet reached its apogee. The MFA is watching
the domestic debate in the U.S. on troop presence closely,
and Gellet hopes the Petraeus/Crocker report will not call
for an explicit timetable for a pullout. FM Kouchner has not
yet decided when he will reach out to EU counterparts but may
say something about Iraq at the upcoming Gymnich meeting.
France fully supports a reinforced UN presence, as Kouchner
has stated, but Gellet believes the UN is understandably
anxious about the security situation given the 2003 attack on
August 31, on the UN compound. End summary
2. (C) French MFA DAS for Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf Franck
Gellet described MFA views on the situation in Iraq and the
(currently) limited opportunities for France to play a role.
He indicated the previously reported "reflection" on how
France might re-engage with Iraq was still ongoing (see
reftel). FM Kouchner's determination, based on his firsthand
appreciation of the grave humanitarian situation in Iraq
during his visit, remains strong. The problem, as Gellet
(who was DCM at the French embassy in Baghdad 2003-2006) sees
it, remains the Iraqis themselves. As Kouchner has observed,
the will for national reconciliation is strongly lacking but
is the fundamental ingredient for the success of any effort
at reconstruction.
3. (C) We asked about France's reported willingness to
consider aid to Iraq's internal security and police forces.
We pointed to a recent statement by the MFA's spokesperson
the effect that this was under review as a possible area in
which France would offer tangible assistance. Gellet
suppressed a mild chuckle and explained that this matter has
a relatively long history dating to the early post-Saddam
period. At that time, France offered to train and equip
internal security forces but only in France. The Iraqis had
insisted the training occur in Iraq, and that ended the
conversation. Now, Gellet continued, the situation in Iraq
is out of control. Offering help to security forces now
would be little more than training and equipping militias.
4. (C) Speaking more broadly about the current situation in
Iraq, Gellet asserted that the country was in a "civil war
that no one dares label as such." Even the MFA declines to
describe the violence in Iraq in those terms lest it somehow
give the impression to any of the parties in conflict that
they are actually vying for control of the national
government. Nevertheless, in Gellet's view, the effective
destruction of the state as a viable national entity and the
inability of the parties singularly or collectively to agree
on reconciliation makes the conflict a civil war. He agreed
with analysts who have observed a lessening of the
Sunni-based insurgency and a rise of latent intra-Shi'a
conflict, especially in the south.
5. (C) Using ideas (if not the exact words) similar to
Kouchner's, Gellet called the U.S. military presence in Iraq
a crucial "interpositional force" that helps restrain the
parties and keep the violence within bounds. This is how the
contending Iraqi leaders and groups see the U.S. troops even
if some still refer to them as "occupiers" in their public
rhetoric. Gellet asserted that a free-for-all" of violence
that would surpass everything we are currently seeing would
follow a sudden U.S. pullout. In his personal opinion, the
Iraqi "civil war" has not yet reached its peak in terms of
the violence yet to be unleashed. He saw a situation in
which the growing domestic U.S. imperative to pull out of
Iraq was clashing with the Iraqi imperative that U.S. troops
remain to exert some measure of restraint.
6. (C) The MFA is watching the domestic debate in the U.S.
over the war with great interest, according to Gellet. He
expressed interest in reading the unclassified version of the
PARIS 00003672 002 OF 002
latest national intelligence estimate, about which he has
read a great deal. (Comment: We sent him a copy. End
comment) Gellet is waiting now for the Petraeus/Crocker
report and for the recommendations it might offer for the way
ahead, particularly during the 2008 election year. He hoped
it would not recommend a timetable for withdrawal that would
also, in his view, be a timetable for ratcheting up the
violence.
7. (C) Turning to the larger region, Gellet stated that the
response from Iraq's neighbors to FM Kouchner's trip was very
positive. France, as Kouchner has stated publicly, is
acutely aware of the stakes for the region as a whole. As he
did in a parallel conversation about Iran (septel),Gellet
referred to French interests via the Gulf States and Iran's
unhelpful involvement in Iraq. With respect to Europe, the
MFA was still deciding how much Kouchner would say at an
upcoming Gymnich meeting of EU foreign ministers, but there
would at least be some "mention" of Kouchner's visit and the
need for the EU to focus more attention on Iraq. Gellet was
not sure how much could be done to increase the UN's
importance in Iraq. The emotional scars of the 2003 bombing
are real, and it is hard to see, given the currently parlous
security situation in Iraq, how the UN will make good on its
reinforced mandate. Nonetheless, Gellet concluded, Kouchner
has made clear that France wants to UN to be a central part
of the eventual solution in Iraq.
8. (C) Comment: Gellet freely mixed his personal views,
informed by his relatively recent experience in Iraq, with
the MFA's official line. He thus occasionally reflected the
Quai's oldthink of Iraq as a situation beyond hope that was a
U.S. and not a French problem. Indeed, at one point Gellet
contended in a very matter of fact way that, heinous as the
Saddam regime had been, the overall situation was stable and
one understood the limits of acceptable behavior and assumed
the risk of going beyond them. Nevertheless, his remarks on
the U.S. troop presence reflect a more practical analysis of
what is happening today in Iraq and dovetail with Kouchner's
opinion that the fundamental factor blocking progress toward
normalcy in Iraq is discord among Iraq's leaders and not the
U.S. troop presence. Gellet's concern about the potential
bloodbath that could follow an eventual U.S. withdrawal, in
the absence of national reconciliation, is one that we
believe Kouchner shares. End comment
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON