A/S FRIED-POLDIR ARAUD ON IRAN, KOSOVO, GEORGIA,

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 PARIS 000363 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016 TAGS: PREL KDEM EUN NATO UNO UNMIK FR KCFE RS SR YI, AF, GG, IR, MD SUBJECT: A/S FRIED-POLDIR ARAUD ON IRAN, KOSOVO, GEORGIA, MOLDOVA/CFE, NATO MINISTERIAL Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (B & D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: French Political Director Araud informed EUR A/S Fried during a January 25 meeting that Russian Security Council Chairman Ivanov had revealed to him the previous day while in Paris that he would travel to Tehran February 28 at the behest of President Putin. Araud said the Russians had promised repeatedly they would not be making any new proposals, and suggested they rather intended to caution the Iranians against overplaying their hand. Urged not to emulate the Russian example, Araud said there were no plans for a French mission over the short term, although he acknowledged that some other EU countries such as Italy, as well as Chirac himself (as conveyed to A/S Welch by Chirac's Middle East advisor January 24),continued to perceive a need to engage Iran on regional issues. ¶3. (S) SUMMARY CONT'D: Araud agreed with Fried that a UNSC Resolution on Kosovo should supersede UNSCR 1244, bless an international presence in Kosovo post-status, and endorse the substance of Ahtisaari's recommendations on minorities. Araud said he could agree with the U.S. approach and timing even though France would have preferred postponing Ahtisaari's presentation of his recommendations, and argued for tactics that would give the Serbs the burden for any future blockages, and give the Russians sufficient cover for an abstention on the UNSCR. If necessary, Araud indicated that France could live without an explicit reference to superseding UNSCR, but that passage of a UNSCR was a sine qua non for any subsequent ESDP mission as well as EU consensus on recognizing Kosovo's independence. Worried about the time required to persuade the Russians to abstain, Araud noted the Germans did not exclude having Kosovo on the agenda for the G-8 Summit (Fried cautioned against waiting so long). Araud called for continuing contact group meetings, possibly at ministerial level, to demonstrate continuing cooperation with Russia and prepare the political ground for Kosovo independence. He said the MFA was brainstorming on further steps the EU mighttake to encourage Serbia. On an eventual ESDP mission to Kosovo, he asked the U.S. to consider participation in a first-ever U.S.-EU operation. ¶3. (C) SUMMARY CONT'D: Both sides agreed it was difficult to judge at this stage whether Russia would use Kosovo as a precedent for Abkhazia, but they agreed that the Russians had recently shown themselves somewhat more cooperative on Georgia, with Fried adding that there was some evidence to suggest that the Russians might be reconsidering their pressure tactics. Citing the Russian-Georgian agreement on basing, the French side suggested that it was perhaps time for Allies to "think creatively" and reconsider their position on the linkage between Russian fulfillment of its Istanbul commitments and ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty. Fried countered that France and the EU would do better to consider the U.S. proposal for an EU multilateral force in Moldova/Transnistria. On Afghanistan, Araud indicated that any decision to bolster the French military presence was probably a decision for France's next president and assured Fried that the French proposal for an Afghanistan contact group was aimed at improving strategic/political coordination rather than creating new institutions. END SUMMARY. ¶4. (SBU) Accompanied by the Ambassador, EUR A/S Dan Fried met January 25 on the margins of the "Paris III" Lebanon donors' conference with MFA Political Director Gerard Araud to discuss primarily European issues (Kosovo),but also Iran. Araud was accompanied by Deputy Political Director Veronique Bujon-Barre, A/S-equivalent for Strategic Affairs Philippe Carre, DAS-equivalent for CFSP Jean-Louis Falconi, DAS-equivalent for Russia and the former Soviet Space Aurelia Bouchez, DAS-equivalent for NATO Nicolas Niemtchinow, DAS-equivalent for the Balkans Edouard Beslay, and Araud staffer Gael Veyssiere. Fried was also joined by DCM, PolMC and POL Deputy (notetaker). IRAN -------------- ¶5. (S) Araud began the meeting by informing Fried that Russian Security Council Chairman Igor Ivanov, visiting Paris January 24, had told him he, accompanied by DFM Sergei Kislyak, would be traveling to Tehran February 28 for consultations with Iranian officials at the behest of President Putin. Araud described Kislyak as going to great lengths to reassure the French that the Russians would abide by P5-plus-1 commitments, telling them several times that PARIS 00000363 002 OF 005 Russia would be offering no new initiatives and that Russia remained opposed to an Iranian nuclear weapons capability. He had also promised that Kislyak would debrief his P5-plus-one counterparts following the visit. ¶6. (S) Pressed by a clearly skeptical Fried about the ostensible purpose of the visit, Araud judged that the Russians intended to warn Iran that it was on a serious collision course with the U.S. Araud believed the Russians would urge the Iranians to be cautious and to avoid any miscalculations; this, he continued, corroborated what U/S Burns had recently told him, to the effect that Iran seemed to believe it had the upper hand but was in danger of overplaying it. ¶7. (S) Returning to Iran toward the end the meeting, Fried welcomed the recent EU conclusions on Iran and praised French Ambassador to the U.S. Levitte for providing a good operational channel for U.S.-French consultation on sensitive subjects. Araud said Iran was a difficult issue not only for the EU, but increasingly in Paris, and noted that the February 12 EU GAERC would feature a general debate on Iran. The Italians, he considered, continued to insist that discussion of Iran should go beyond the nuclear problem. They -- and the French Presidency (he was careful not to associate himself with this view) -- perceived a need to engage the Iranians on regional issues such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and, in particular, for the French Presidency, Lebanon. ¶8. (S) Fried expressed the hope that France would not emulate the Russian example. He noted that Arab countries were uncomfortable with outreach to Iran and that local Ambassadors were reporting that the Iranians were showing signs of nervousness and of feeling isolated. Araud assured Fried that there would be no mission "in the short term." (Separately, Chirac's diplomatic advisor for the Middle East, Dominique Boche, told NEA A/S David Welch January 24 that the Presidency still believed a "combination of pressure and openness to dialogue" might work with Iran and that the Chirac was still considering sending a high-level envoy to Tehran. He promised, however, that France would consult with its other partners before actually doing so.) KOSOVO -------------- ¶9. (C) Fried told Araud he had taken to heart Araud's points during their last meeting that a new UNSC Resolution on Kosovo was both "critical" and "needed to be short." Commenting that the recent elections had resulted in no surprises and left Kostunica in the position of king-maker, he said the U.S. approach remained to support Ahtisaari and his recommendations and to refrain from referring publicly and explicitly to independence over the coming weeks, although any leaks about the U.S. bottom line could eventually force adjustments. Ahtisaari planned to be in the region in February and intended to present his proposal at that time. The U.S. believed a subsequent four-to-six-week period of intense discussions between Ahtisaari and the parties made sense before going to the Security Council, and judged that it was important for Kosovar leader Ceku to be seen to be engaging Ahtisaari as well. ¶10. (C) On a UNSC Resolution, Fried noted that the U.S. had circulated a number of ideas but that only three were crucial: that a new UNSCR supersede UNSCR 1244; that it bless an international presence in Kosovo post-status, and that it endorse the substance of Ahtisaari's recommendations on treatment of minorities and other related issues. A UNSCR need not/not explicitly affirm Kosovar independence, which would also help avoid a direct confrontation with Russia. Fried assured Araud that the U.S. shared the French view that a UNSCR was essential to the process and said he preferred not to consider fall-backs at this time. The odds of passing a resolution, he continued, hinged on EU-U.S. unity; even if not all EU member states (Greece, for example) approved the UNSCR, building a critical mass of support would be essential to overcome Russian stalling. Fried said he expected Kosovo to declare its independence immediately following passage of the resolution, and the U.S. likely to recognize Kosovo immediately thereafter. He assured Araud that the U.S. would remain in KFOR. ¶11. (C) Araud expressed general agreement with the U.S. approach, including the timing, even if France would have preferred postponing Ahtisaari's presentation of his recommendations. He said it was essential that the Serbs be PARIS 00000363 003 OF 005 perceived as responsible for any blocages that followed; this was also desirable from the point of view of avoiding a Russian veto. Araud indicated that Ivanov had reiterated standard Russian talking points about mutually agreed solutions in his consultations of the previous day, while acknowledging that the Serbs had accepted independence for Montenegro, and argued for more time. On a UNSCR, Araud said it would be a "miracle" if it included the three elements identified by Fried, suggesting that it might be necessary to drop the explicit reference to superseding UNSCR 1444 and to argue after the fact that any new UNSCR automatically superseded what preceded it. But having a UNSCR was absolutely essential, Araud argued, if not for France, then for the EU. Failure to pass a resolution would be a disaster for the EU: Spain had already indicated that it would not recognize Kosovo without one, a position likely shared by Romania and Hungary; moreover, a resolution was a key precondition for deployment of an EU ESDP mission. ¶12. (C) For all those reasons, Araud argued, it would be necessary to do the utmost to obtain a Russian abstention. Fried responded that FM Lavrov had promised the Secretary about a year ago that Russia would not veto. This was not a guarantee, he quickly added, but suggested that it was still possible to persuade Russia to abstain. Araud suggested that it working the Russians would take time and wondered when would be the right moment to move to a vote, and whether this would involve calling their bluff. He said the Germans believed Kosovo could end up on the agenda for the G-8 summit in June. Fried cautioned against waiting this long, adding that raising the stakes might in the end prove necessary, but we should seek earlier resolution. It also ran the risk of undermining the G-8 as an institution. ¶13. (C) On Serbia, Araud doubted that the EU would take a decision at its February 12 GAERC on next steps, but suggested that decisions would be needed in March. The MFA was brainstorming on the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) and considering what might be done in the face of a continuing lack of cooperation on ICTY. He said there was a clean division within the EU between the UK and the Netherlands on one hand, and Hungary and unspecified other member states on the other. Fried responded that the U.S. supported EU outreach to Serbia so that Serbia should think about a future in the EU rather than the past as represented by Kosovo. CONTACT GROUP AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL? -------------- ¶14. (C) Araud said it would be important to maintain the Contact Group as a way of demonstrating that close coordination with Russia was continuing. He proposed, at the end of February, a possible Contact Group meeting at political director or even ministerial level, noting that it might appear to some as "paradoxical" that "dramatic" decisions would be taken at any other level. Fried responded that the Secretary would be raising Kosovo soon with FM Lavrov and that he would keep this proposal in mind. He said it would be necessary to find the right combination of pushing and embracing Russia for them to justify an abstention, and then to act quickly thereafter. U.S.-EU ESDP MiSSION? -------------- ¶15. (C) Returning to a possible ESDP mission to Kosovo, Araud expressed the hope the U.S. would consider participating, saying that this would be the first time the U.S. and EU cooperated in an operation. Fried did not rule out the possibility, noting that the U.S. would have something to contribute and that this would demonstrate U.S.-European unity. But issues of NATO equities would have to be considered carefully. Carre said that France would await an indication of USG interest before pursuing the idea any further, at which time further bilateral exchanges would no doubt prove necessary in order to get the details right. GEORGIA -------------- ¶16. (C) Bujon-Barre asked for Fried's assessment as to whether Kosovo would impinge negatively on the April renewal of the UNOMIG mandate for Georgia. Fried responded that he would have responded in the affirmative a week earlier, but that the Russians had shown a more cooperative side during a recent meeting of the Friends Group in Berlin, by showing PARIS 00000363 004 OF 005 interest in CBMs for Abkhazia. This trend was further reinforced during recent U.S.-Russian discussions in Moscow on Nagorno-Karabakh. That said, it was essential to be firm with Russia against Kosovo trade-offs; the Secretary, he said, had made clear to the Russians that unilateral Russian recognition of Abkhazia would constitute a major problem, including in U.S.-Russian relations. Fried said he felt somewhat encouraged by a recent article in the Russian newspaper Kommersant which judged that Russian pressure tactics on Georgia had failed, which suggested that the Russians were perhaps preparing to reconsider some aspects of their policies. He hoped this was the case, and that they would be less tempted now to try to hold Georgia hostage. CFE AND MOLDOVA/TRANSNISTRIA -------------- ¶17. (C) Carre worried that the Allied position on the link between Russian fulfillment of its Istanbul commitments and ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty was reaching its limits and was not sustainable over the longer term. Now that the Russians and Georgians had reached an agreement on basing, it was hard to justify the Allied position on the basis of a few stockpiles of munitions in Transnistria. There was a risk of killing the adapted Treaty, which argued for seeking a way to decouple the Istanbul commitments from CFE. It was now time for creative thinking; mentioning the issue once a year at the OSCE ministerial was insufficient. ¶18. (C) Fried asked rhetorically why Allies felt a need to respond to Russian refusal to fulfill its commitments. What was wrong with asking Russia to do what it had committed to do? Fried cited the recent U.S. suggestion that the EU consider a multilateral mission to Transnistria (that would include Russians) as a more appropriate example of creative thinking, adding that it could be tailored in such a way as to proceed in parallel with further steps toward a political settlement. This, he suggested, made more sense than backing away from existing commitments. ¶19. (C) Carre agreed that the Russian position on stockpiles was ridiculous, but continued to argue that the basing agreement with Georgia should make it possible to solve other issues in a reasonable way. He did not wish to give credence to the view that Allies were prepared to abandon the adapted CFE treaty or were linking it to a complete solution of Russia's "post-colonial" baggage. Carre also worried that an EU mission to Transnistria could put the EU "between" Russia and the Moldovans and create problems. Fried responded that any solution would no doubt involve a package arrangement, but should not be one of surrender. NATO INFORMAL MINISTERIAL ON AFGHANISTAN/KOSOVO -------------- -- ¶20. (C) Carre recalled French satisfaction with the Riga summit and reminded Fried that France had done what it could. He asked Fried for confirmation that the January 26 ministerial was aimed at renewing NATO's purpose and general commitment and was not intended to provoke dramatic new commitments. Fried assured him that this was the case, adding that it should be seen in the context of a series of meetings on Afghanistan aimed at demonstrating the need for a comprehensive approach to Afghanistan that included civilian as well as military elements and for bolstering Afghanistan in anticipation of a spring Taliban offensive. That said, we sought and needed required forces, more resources, and an end to caveats on this issue. Fried asked if it was correct that France might be prepared to provide significant additional military resources to Afghanistan. Araud responded that such a decision would probably have to be taken by the next president. ¶21. (C) Carre assured Fried that the French proposal for a contact group on Afghanistan was aimed at enhancing political coordination and guidance rather than creating a new institution, with Araud adding that the French saw a need for more political/strategic dialogue among key players. Fried assured them that the U.S. had considered the French proposal in that same spirit in looking at ways to broaden cooperation beyond the purely military aspect. ¶22. (C) Carre announced that, contrary to indications earlier in the week, FM Douste-Blazy would now participate in the morning session of the Ministerial; he would depart before lunch in order to return to Paris for Abbe Pierre's funeral. (Note: Douste-Blazy originally indicated that he PARIS 00000363 005 OF 005 would attend the entire ministerial. Subsequently, Embassy was told January 23 that, for domestic political reasons related to the ongoing presidential campaigns and prior to Abbe Pierre's passing, Douste-Blazy would not be able to attend the Ministerial.) SUDAN -------------- ¶23. (C) Araud, noting ongoing debate in the U.S. Congress on Sudan, asked to be informed in advance of any evolution in U.S. policy, given the repercussions this could have for French interests in Chad and the C.A.R. ¶24. (U) A/S Fried cleared this message. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON