MUSLIM OUTREACH -- SENIOR ADVISOR FARAH PANDITH'S

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 PARIS 003402 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/WE, DRL/IL, INR/EUC, EUR/ERA, EUR/PPD, EB DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR ITA DEPT OF LABOR FOR ILAB E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: SOCI PTER PGOV EUN FR PINR ECON SUBJECT: MUSLIM OUTREACH -- SENIOR ADVISOR FARAH PANDITH'S MEETINGS IN PARIS JULY 25 - 26 PARIS 00003402 001.2 OF 008 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. Please handle accordingly. ¶1. (SBU) In meetings in Paris July 25 - 26 with a wide range of figures from France's large and diverse Muslim community and France,s new government, EUR Senior Advisor Farah Pandith underlined U.S. interest in respectful dialogue and exchange of ideas with France's Muslim population, the largest in Europe. In their meetings with her, civil servants, elected officials, ordinary citizens, community activists, religious leaders and intellectuals focused on the French "Republican model" for immigrant minority integration, whether or not this model can work to solve the social problems of France's immigrant-origin (largely Muslim) underclass, and whether or not President Sarkozy's proposed reforms to state-religion relations in France are likely to make any difference in the economic prospects of the country's largely Arab and Black Muslim minority. Interlocutors all cited the potential for radicalization of a small, but potentially dangerous, fraction of Muslim youth. Some of S/A Pandith's civil society interlocutors were concerned about the lack of any authoritative "voice of moderation" able to counsel ordinary, middle-class Europeans (who happen to be Muslim) on matters of religious practice and cultural identity in their new social environment. Asked if they had considered the possibility of a "learning center" for reformed, European, contemporary Islam, most of S/A Pandith's civil society interlocutors responded enthusiastically, while others (and in particular some government officials) worried that it would soon fall prey to factionalism among "national communities" or infiltration by radicals. Nonetheless, as it has for many years, discussion of such a center continues, and post will continue to follow the issue. Muslim outreach is an MSP priority for post; S/A Pandith's round of meetings greatly advanced post's Muslim engagement efforts. Targeted program funding -- in the tradition of SEED programs -- for grants of various kinds would be a welcome addition to post's efforts to complement Washington-based outreach in this critical field of public opinion. END SUMMARY. FRANCE'S MUSLIM COMMUNITY -------------- ¶2. (SBU) There are about five million ethnically Muslim people in France (out of a total population of nearly 64 million.) Both in absolute size and in proportion to the total population (between 8 and 9 percent),France has the largest Muslim population of any country in Europe. Over 70 percent of the Muslims in France have their roots in the Maghreb, primarily Algeria, but also Morocco, reflecting the dominant pattern of migration to France in recent decades -- from colonies/former colonies to the mother country. More recently, a steady stream of immigrants, also Muslim, have come from the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, such as Senegal and Mali. France is also home to relatively small communities of Muslims from Turkey and Iran, and communities from countries in the sub-continent and the far east. Some of Paris' predominantly Muslim neighborhoods are microcosms of the Muslim world's diversity. ¶3. (U) Given that the French "Republican model," with its constitutional injunction against distinguishing among citizens on the basis of race or religion, precludes the state from collecting census data on religious affiliation, there are no truly accurate statistics on the size of France's Muslim population. Some estimates put France's Muslim population at 6 or 7 million, and beyond. Vast diversity prevails among France's Muslims with regard to inward religiosity, outward piety and the extent to which a social and cultural identity as "a Muslim" is central to their self-conception. "French first" is the general rule, and French Muslims often express frustration at the mainstream community's persistent identification of them as "immigrants," "foreigners," "Arabs," "Muslims," etc. About 3 million of France's Muslims are French citizens. Though two-thirds observe Ramadan, only about one fifth are considered continuously observant. GOALS AND PARTICIPANTS -------------- ¶4. (SBU) In her July 25 - 26 meetings with officials from PARIS 00003402 002.2 OF 008 the Prime Minister's office, Foreign Ministry, and Interior Ministry, and with politicians, religious leaders, academics, businessmen and community activists, S/A Pandith outlined the two overarching goals of U.S. engagement with Europe's Muslims: countering the widespread conviction that the U.S. is somehow "at war" with Islam, and initiating a constructive dialogue about Muslim integration in European societies aimed at sharing America's best practices with regard to providing equal opportunity to disadvantaged, racially distinct minorities. ¶5. (SBU) During her two days of meetings in Paris S/A Pandith met with: French government officials: -- Prime Minister's Office: Laurence Marion, Civil Rights and Public Liberties Advisor to the Prime Minister -- Foreign Ministry: Justin Vaisse, Special Advisor for Transatlantic Relations; Yves Oudin, Deputy Director for North America; Denis Fromaget, Special Assistant for Religious Affairs -- Interior Ministry: Christophe Chaboud, Director, Coordination Unit for the Fight Against Terrorism; Anthony Bernardi, Chief of the Foreigners and Minorities Section of France's Internal Intelligence Services (RG),Fabienne Duthe, Extremism and Counter-Terrorism specialist of France,s Intelligence Service (DST) Politicians: -- Najat Azmy, political activist and official of the National Agency for Social Cohesion and Equal Opportunity. (Azmy has led numerous campaigns against discrimination in her home area of Pas-de-Calais.) -- Chafia Mentalecheta, one of the EU delegates to the European Agency of Fundamental Rights in Vienna. (She aimed to run in the last legislative elections under the Socialist Party (PS) banner, but resigned from the Party in frustration at the short shrift given to minorities in the PS, and ran as an independent.) -- Faycal Douhane, former IV grantee, a PS spokesperson, and General Secretary of the Association of Mayors of the Paris Region. (In 1997 Douhane founded the Club Averroes, an association dedicated to promoting diversity in the French media and to fight discrimination.) -- Ali Zahi, City Councilman in Paris suburb of Bondy and the International Relations and Communications Director for the Mayor of nearby Clichy-sous-Bois. (Clichy-sous-Bois is the suburb where the urban unrest of November 2005 began.) Academics and Journalists: -- Said Branine, Chief Editor of France's leading, mainstream, Muslim website www.Oumma.com (http://oumma.com/) -- Omero Marongiu, sociologist, specialist on "Muslim Brotherhood" in France. (Marongiu, a convert to Islam, is employed by a number of mosques as their legal counselor; he is also a consultant for social projects for the city of Roubaix, where Muslims may soon be a majority of the population.) -- Moussa Khedimellah, sociologist, specialist on Tabligh and Salafism in France (Kedimellah, with Marongiu, worked for the Ministry of the Interior on sensitivity-building training modules for police and prison guards.) -- Nourdin Mabil, Antione Menuisier, and Chou Sin, all journalists and all leading lights of Bondyblog, a news and commentary website from the viewpoint of suburban youth. (Menuisier, who works for the Swiss news weekly L'Hebdo, during the unrest of November 2005, pioneered, through Bondyblog, coverage of the events through cell phone video clips and other reports "from the street," as opposed to PARIS 00003402 003.2 OF 008 "from the mainstream media behind the police.") -- Aziz Zemouri, journalist at Le Figaro. (Zemouri is the author of Marianne and Allah, a book that explores the birth of the French Council of Muslim Faith (CFCM),a government-sponsored representative committee of Muslim institutions in light of France's much vaunted separation of church and state and integration of Muslims into French society according to the "Republican model." -- Hassina Ambolet, Deputy Mayor, Bondy Community and Business Leaders: -- Adda Bekkouch, chairman of the Movement for Active Citizenship (MCA). (Bekkouch, known as a gadfly in his political opinions, regularly excoriates the left for failing to act on discrimination and minority issues. According to Bekkouch, though the left "initiates the debate," it has been the right that "takes the plunge," for example, giving the vote to women, independence to Algeria, and, now, greater minority representation in government.) --Eduardo Rihan Cypel, Chief of Staff to Mayor of Bondy -- Said Hammouche, CEO of APC recruitment, the first minority placement agency in France (Hammouche was born in Bondy, and created his agency, which is quite successful, to offer the French minorities an opportunity to hone job-landing skills and facilitate their recruitment by employers) Leaders of Religious and Representative Institutions: -- Abderahmane Kebir, Director for International Relations of the Great Mosque of Paris -- Mohamed Timol, chief administrator of the CFCM -- Haydar Demiryurek, Secretary General of the CFCM and President of the French-Turkish Community's Representative Committee (CCFTM) GOVERNMENT STANDS BY THE "REPUBLICAN MODEL" -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Hardly surprisingly, the government officials that met with S/A Pandith defended France's "Republican model" of minority integration. The "Republican model" of integration posits that equal opportunity and integration will ensue if the state remains assiduously blind to race, creed and national origin as it strives to secure individual rights. The "Republican model's" emphasis on individual citizens and their equality flies in the face of the social reality of group identities and the economic inequality of, for example, much higher school dropout and unemployment rates among immigrant, mostly Muslim, youth. Because the bulk of France's urban underclass poor are Muslims, discussion of the integration of this disadvantaged minority invariably brings up France's way of separating church and state. President Sarkozy has suggested modifying the relationship between state and religion to harness the community-building capacity of faith-based organizations, while also -- in connection with Islam -- reducing the potential spread of political fundamentalism. WHILE FLOATING REFORM PROPOSALS -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Laurence Marion of the Prime Minister's office focused on two key government initiatives: modifying the laws that define religious organizations so as to "expand their presence in the community" and provide for government-subsidized training of Imams. Both of these initiatives have been championed by President Sarkozy and are part of his effort to engender "debate without taboos" about the place of religion in a France that Sarkozy sees as leaving behind a long history of antagonism between the Republic and the Catholic church. Marion discussed, at length, the 1905 law that is the cornerstone of the legal status of religious organizations in France; she said that that law relegated religion to the personal, private sphere. Marion said the government was considering proposals to PARIS 00003402 004.2 OF 008 loosen the law's limitation of "religious associations" (associations cultuelles) to worship activities only. This would allow religious associations (such as mosques) to expand their social and charitable community-building activities. In addition, Marion said the government was considering modifications to the law that would allow local associations (as opposed to recognized, organized religions) to build places of worship. The runaway growth of unregulated prayer-rooms and "basement mosques" is part of what Sarkozy would like to see reined in by what he has called a "public" (that is, officially recognized and supported) French Islam. ¶8. (SBU) Marion went on to detail another key pillar of, possible, Sarkozy administration reform of France's current framework for state-religion relations: government-funded training of religious leaders, possibly even the establishment of a study center for that purpose. The first option would involve providing curriculum materials and subsidies to ensure that foreign-born Imams were familiar with "Republican values," French government institutions and the French language. This training would be mandatory. and there would be some sort of state-administered verification that Imams had assimilated the training to passing standards. A second, more ambitious -- though still highly notional -- option, according to Marion, would include facilitating the creation of a state-sponsored theological institute of sorts, that would be capable of offering courses on Muslim theology, non-fundamentalist in outlook, and compatible with "liberal," Western values, among them religious pluralism. ¶9. (SBU) Marion underlined that the Sarkozy administration was keen on finding ways "to support faith-based groups," while at the same time, "not radically departing from the tenets of the 1905 law." In connection with the problem of how to pay for the proposed Imam training and theological institute, Marion said that the government would need to "find creative solutions." As an example of a funding mechanism, Marion cited the Foundation for Muslim Works in France, created in 2005, as a possible means of channeling resources to Muslim projects in a way that could be considered analogous to how state funds are channeled into the historic preservation of Catholic churches. FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS EXPRESS UNDERSTANDING OF U.S. MUSLIM OUTREACH GOALS -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Foreign Ministry officials Justin Vaisse, Yves Oudin, and Denis Fromaget, in their defense of the "Republican model," stressed that the "problems faced by Arabs and Blacks" in France have much more to do with ethnicity and education than with religion. Vaisse said that the French "Republican model" did not recognize race as a proper "political distinction," and observed that France was more inclined to address the evident social realities of poverty and marginalization on a "geographical basis." He cited, as an example of that, the Priority Educational Zones (ZEPs),that benefit from considerable special funding and other programs, to the benefit of their predominantly immigrant populations. ¶11. (SBU) Vaisse, Oudin and Fromaget expressed understanding of U.S. Muslim outreach goals. Vaisse (who will be a fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington beginning in September) called the goal of refuting the notion that the U.S. is at war with Islam and of enhancing communication and cooperation with Europe on Muslim integration an "accurate approach." He added that outreach along those lines could be "enlarged to reflect the reality that it's not just the U.S., but the West in general, that is perceived by many to be at war with Islam." Vaisse however, then went on to emphasize the "cultural specificity" of Islam in Europe and cautioned against assuming that a standardized approach could be applied across European national borders. As an example of the cultural differences among Europe's Muslims, Vaisse recalled a conference he recently attended in Berlin at which French and German representatives had difficulty establishing common ground for a discussion of how to reconcile religious and political identity, because both are approached so differently by French and Germans. For example, citizenship PARIS 00003402 005.2 OF 008 and self-identification as French are, overall, much more easily accessible to foreigners than in Germany. ¶12. (SBU) In addition, Vaisse bemoaned what he called the "negative influence" of foreign, itinerant Imams. Alluding to the French government's bind between keeping itself sealed off from the religious activities of citizens and its responsibility to monitor potential radicalization that could lead to terrorists acts, Vaisse lamented the "negative" influence of itinerant Imams who, he said, frequently operate with foreign funding and tended to be fundamentalist, as opposed to moderate, in their doctrinal outlook. GOVERNMENT AND MUSLIM COMMUNITY WORRIED BY RADICALIZATION -------------- ¶13. (SBU) All interlocutors stressed that the potential radicals may be few in number, but that these few could still wreak havoc by mounting terrorist attacks or fomenting violent unrest. Violence would be bad for civil peace and for France in general, and it would aggravate religious prejudice against Muslims. The danger of angry, frustrated youths turning to religion, and becoming radicalized under the influence of fundamentalist Imams or other zealots, was evoked by Ministry of the Interior intelligence professionals and by sociologists and other representatives of civil society. The Interior Ministry's Chaboud and Bernardi stressed that fundamentalist extremism was a problem only in a tiny fraction of France,s roughly 1,800 mosques (fewer than 100 of which are linked to Salafist or radical Turkish influences). However, echoing the comments of their MFA colleagues, Interior's counter-terrorism experts also cited itinerant, charismatic preachers as the most serious "radicalization" threat because their constant movement makes it difficult to monitor the effect they may have on malleable followers. (Note: Since 2003, French security forces have expelled 21 radical imams for preaching jihad or expressing opinions that contravene France,s hate crime legislation. END NOTE.) Similarly, the worry that "desperate" suburban youth might fall prey to radicalization was specifically mentioned by Grand Mosque official Abderahmane Kebir, sociologist Moussa Khedimellah and web-based editorialist Said Branine. ¶14. (SBU) The government counter-terrorism professionals and the sociologists S/A Pandith met with both emphasized that the radicalization process has changed recently. Contrary to the usual pattern in the past -- radicalization beginning with religious "conversion" -- today many "radicalization cases" bypass religious extremism and move straight to political extremism, ever more frequently via "self-radicalization" through contacts made on the internet, via networks formed among childhood friends, prison inmates, or around charismatic, advocates of jihad who do not claim to be religious leaders. Khedimellah observed that the motors of radicalization among poor, suburban youths and better off, and more well-educated, "middle-class radicals" were quite different. "Escape to a different life" by volunteering to go off to "resistance fighter" training camps seems to often motivate the poor, whereas, according to Khedimellah, middle-class radicals are more "ideologically motivated" -- by identification with the Palestinians and by anti-Semitism, for example. Khedimellah said that, since the beginning of the U.S.-led intervention in Iraq, about 100 individuals per year have departed France as recruits to Jihadist ranks. MOST FRENCH MUSLIMS ALSO SUPPORT THE "REPUBLICAN MODEL" -------------- -------------- ¶15. (SBU) Throughout S/A Pandith's numerous exchanges with civil society representatives and political figures, the message came through loud and clear that French Muslims support France's "Republican model," earnestly wishing it would deliver on its promise of "liberty, equality and brotherhood" for all. Equally consistently, they warned that failure to diminish the prejudice experienced by suburban youths and improve job opportunities for them would lead to another round of the sort of urban unrest that shook France in the fall of 2005. Journalist Assiz Zemouri and politician Chafia Mentalecheta were among those who -- even as they excoriated France and French society for "marginalizing PARIS 00003402 006.2 OF 008 without a future" the suburban immigrant poor -- also made a point of underlining their pride in their own achievements and their gratitude to the "Republican model" for the educational and professional opportunities that had been extended to them. The power of the promise of equality under France's "Republican model" should not be underestimated. The controversy that continues to swirl around Sarkozy's proposals of affirmative action and official recognition of "communitarian" identities, among Muslims and others in France, is evidence of the "Republican model's" deep roots in the French character, a character aspired to and shared by most immigrants to France, including most Muslim immigrants. Again and again in S/A Pandith's conversations with French Muslims, the observation recurred about how travel "back" to Algeria, Morocco etc. made them intensely aware, in Mentalecheta's phrase, of how "French we are." ¶16. (SBU) One odd twist in the thread of discussion about the "Republican model" was provided by Mohamed Timol, an official of Paris' Grand Mosque, who is a leading member of the (tiny) Muslim community that traces its roots to 19th century immigrants from India to the French territory of Reunion Island in the Indian Ocean. Timol remarked that one effect of the "Republican model" and its "refusal" of communitarian identities was to protect communities like his own from dominance by the much larger "national" communities -- Algerian, Moroccan, etc. -- that are still the main building blocks of the larger, Muslim community. INTRIGUED BY THE IDEA OF IDENTITY AS EUROPEAN MUSLIMS... -------------- ¶17. (SBU) The primary focus of the range of interlocutors canvassed during the visit was the pros and cons of the "Republican model," whether or not the model is part of the solution for the social problems of France's immigrant (largely Muslim) underclass, and whether or not Sarkozy's proposed reforms to state-religion relations are likely to make any difference in the lives of those who, above all, need jobs. However, when the subject of Europe and a broader identity as European Muslims came up, S/A Pandith's civil society interlocutors found the idea intriguing, though somewhat novel to them. Europe's Muslims share a common experience, both as immigrants and as the first, large Muslim population to live in modern Europe. Awareness of that could be gathering currency among Europe's Muslims, possibly generating a broader identity as European Muslims. Civil society interlocutors greeted this as something that could be very positive, even though it was still quite an unfamiliar notion. Haydar Demiryurek, for example, an official of the CFCM and leading member of the France's Turkish Muslim community said that he hoped a European Muslim identity could overcome the country-of-origin national divisions that, he said, still deeply divide Europe's Muslims. ¶18. (SBU) Another approach to the question of a growing Muslim identity came up in the meeting with sociologists Marongiu and Khedimellah. They said they had observed a new "dynamic" in social identity -- growing self-identification as "Muslims" going hand-in-hand with growing use of the religious identifier, "the Muslims" by the mainstream majority (as opposed to the heretofore more common ethnic and racial terms of "the Arabs and the Blacks"). Marongiu and Khedimellah also remarked that there is a resurgence of interest in Muslim heritage and "cultural" Muslim identity among France's immigrants of Muslim extraction. The net result of this could be a growing self-awareness as members of a Muslim minority in France, and beyond France, in Europe. ...AND THE IDEA OF A "EUROPEAN MUSLIM LEARNING CENTER" -------------- -------------- ¶20. (SBU) Discussion of the possibility of an identity common to European Muslims led to inquiring if there was a need for a Europe-wide, authoritative "voice of moderation" able to provide information to ordinary, middle-class Europeans (who happen to be Muslim) on matters of religious practice and Muslim history, science, art, culture and identity. S/A Pandith's suggestion of a "learning center" in the heart of Europe for modern, European, contemporary Islam was enthusiastically greeted by many of her civil society PARIS 00003402 007.2 OF 008 interlocutors. The imperative to insure transparency within the organization to prevent its radicalization was discussed. Some stated their worry that it would soon fall prey to factionalism among "national communities" or infiltration by radicals. Additional concerns included potential dismissal of the center by Muslims as yet another state-sponsored attempt to guide their religion and criticism that such a center was superfluous because it would have no impact on the Muslim community's social ad economic problems. There was general agreement, however, that if the experience of immigration to Europe and the experience of being a minority religious community were to engender a version of Islam suited to contemporary, decidedly secular, Europe, then some sort of center for religious studies that could authoritatively propose interpretations of the Koran and modes of religious observance might find constructive, widespread use among moderate European Muslims. The need for instruction in local languages was also mentioned as a critical component. As Said Branine, who heads up the website Oumma.com, observed about the queries about religiously correct behavior and ritual practice that users post to the site, "a lot of these questions just don't come up" in traditional Muslim countries. Thus, there is a need to fill the vacuum so radical ideology does not. FRENCH-LANGUAGE WEBSITES REFLECT EVOLUTION OF FRENCH MUSLIM COMMUNITY -------------- ¶21. (SBU) "Muslim websites" -- ranging from the obscurantist and hate-mongering to the rational and conciliating -- abound in France. Websites are among the most influential resources used by French Muslims, especially youth, in search of guidance "balancing their identities" as Muslims (religious and/or cultural) and patriotic French citizens and contemporary kids shaped by popular mass culture, etc. Oumma.com (http://www.oumma.com) is probably the most widely used, and reform-oriented in its religious outlook. As Branine put it (quoting from his website's own homepage) "France's Muslims need a rational perspective -- that is both appreciative and critical -- of their religion and their culture." Oumma.com claims about six million hits per month, and a big spike in users during Ramadan, showing that its guidance with regard to religious practice is heeded as authoritative by many. Oumma.com reflects the outlook of the professional elite of immigrant Muslim background that was educated in France's public school system -- and speaks and thinks -- in French. Oumma.com's Francophone, indeed, Cartesian, outlook testifies to the truth of that commonplace about the immigrant experience everywhere that full assimilation of the new country's language is the most powerful engine of integration. ¶22. (SBU) A/S Pandith's visit to Bondyblog -- to which the site gave considerable coverage (http://yahoo.bondyblog.fr/news/ sommet-usa-bondy-blog-a-la-sabliere) -- provided insight into a more youth-oriented use of the internet. Bondyblog does provide news and commentary tuned to the sensibility of youthful members of France's immigrant community. The anti-American, chip-on-the-shoulder attitude so common among immigrant youth was very much in evidence in the -- otherwise fulsomely laudatory -- coverage of S/A Pandith's visit in its evocation of disagreement with key aspects of U.S. foreign policy. The Bondybloggers were clearly thrilled to receive a U.S. representative concerned about Muslim issues, and also conflicted by their reprobation of many U.S. policies. As one poignantly put it, "Look at us -- our dress our habits our music. We are American. If you put us in America no one would know we were French. But we have fallen out of love with America" -- over Iraq, Guantanamo/Abu Ghraib, and what is felt as different standards applied Israelis and Palestinians. In France, among young French Muslims in particular, the depth of the anti-Americanism generated by distorted perceptions about the U.S. and the U.S. role in the world should not be underestimated. These misperceptions are insistently fueled by widely-watched French-language, "Arab" television stations. SUPPORTING MUSLIM OUTREACH -------------- PARIS 00003402 008.2 OF 008 ¶23. (SBU) Anti-Americanism in France, particularly with regard to U.S. foreign policies, and especially among France's Muslims, persists. As came through loud and clear in S/A Pandith's exchanges in Paris, France abounds with thoughtful, articulate voices -- of individuals who happen to be Muslim -- willing to question distortions about America's role in the world. Particularly during the past two years, outreach to France's Muslims has been the unifying theme of post's minority/diversity/women's issues Public Diplomacy programming. The impact of France's predominantly Muslim underclass on social peace, and government efforts to better the situation of this population, have been a reporting priority of the Political Section, as has continuous advocacy of U.S. policies in the Middle East about which, French Muslims in particular, harbor such suspicions. Some SEED-style funding for post's outreach programs would allow for grants aimed at amplifying voices of moderation and for creating an action network of like-minded Europeans. Indeed, a relatively small investment in France of between $100,000 - $200,000 directed to minority youth NGOs could have a highly positive impact on youth opinion in the immigrant community. ¶24. (U) Senior Advisor Pandith cleared this message. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm PEKALA