COMOROS: FRENCH MFA SEES NO EASY SOLUTION TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 003363 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/10/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM MOPS EAID PHUM PINR ASEC CN FR SUBJECT: COMOROS: FRENCH MFA SEES NO EASY SOLUTION TO IMPASSE REF: ANTANANARIVO 779 Classified By: Political-Minister Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, 1.4 (b/d ). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: MFA Comoros Desk Officer Stephane Le Brech said on August 7 that there appeared to be no ready solution to the current crisis in the Comoros, because of Anjouan "President" Bacar's intransigence and the improbability of any military solution to the impasse. Le Brech said that the GOF had no clear notion of what Bacar wanted, other than to maintain such power as he had seized. AU and South African diplomacy had come to naught, and both might soon reduce their diplomatic efforts. Bacar remained key to any solution but there were few apparent means to move him in the right direction. Separately, a member of the Comoran community in France urged the U.S., France, and others to encourage a "Western" orientation in the Comoros, to counter what he perceived as the risk of Arab/Islamic encroachment. END SUMMARY. MFA VIEW -------------- ¶2. (C) Stephane Le Brech, outgoing MFA Comoros Desk Officer, met with us on August 7. His assessment tracked with that of Embassy Antananarivo (reftel). There appeared to be no easy solution to the current impasse, with Anjouan "President" Bacar refusing to accommodate or work with other Comoran leaders or interested parties such as the AU and South Africa. Le Brech said that Bacar was the key to any solution but his ultimate goals remained obscure, and he continued to assert that any overtures for political dialogue as a way to a solution were evidence of conspiracies intended to undermine his "valid" electoral "victory." In Le Brech's view, Bacar had no discernible ideology but rather a tendency to say "no" in response to any proposition that might require compromise on his part, leaving one to conclude that he was simply interested in preserving such power as he had seized through his bogus "election." ¶3. (C) Le Brech said that France lauded efforts by the AU and South Africa to bring Bacar to his senses. However, in Le Brech's view, both the AU and South Africa, now realizing Bacar's intractable nature, were on the verge of slowing down their diplomatic efforts out of frustration and a loss of patience with what was becoming a more and more futile exercise. Le Brech said that France had done what it could quietly to promote dialogue between Bacar and the rest of the Comoran leadership but had met with similar results. No one, he said, knew what Bacar really wanted and it was therefore difficult to find a way to move him. ¶4. (C) Le Brech said that Union President Sambi's call for a military solution to the problem was completely unrealistic. No outside parties would want to intervene in an essentially internal political dispute, particularly absent large-scale conflict, humanitarian concerns, genocide, famine, ethnic cleansing, or a clear-and-present emergency situation that might spur international intervention. "If California decided to change its status vis-a-vis Washington, you could hardly expect the EU to help invade California militarily at Washington's behest," he observed dryly. Sambi's request for military support and outside intervention evidenced either a total lack of ideas or monumental naivete (or both),in Le Brech's view. ¶5. (C) As to next steps, Le Brech said that much depended on when and if Bacar showed his real hand. Nothing much would change, Le Brech said, so long as Bacar kept saying "no" to everything. There might be hope for progress if he started to say "yes" once in a while but so far, nothing had prompted a positive response. "We will just have to wait and see," Le Brech said, with regret. ¶6. (C) Asked whether the GOF was concerned about the possibility that extremist Islamic factions might try to profit from the situation (see below),Le Brech said that that did not seem very likely. He said that the problems of the Comoros were entirely internal and he did not see evidence that malevolent outside forces were at work there. He also said that the crisis was not having much effect on Mayotte, and he noted the resumption of commercial and personal traffic between Mayotte and the other islands, suggesting that the islands were in many ways functioning "normally," despite the political divide between Anjouan and PARIS 00003363 002 OF 002 the others. ¶7. (U) NOTE: Le Brech's last day as Comoros Desk Officer was August 8; he will soon transfer to France's Embassy in Cotonou. END NOTE. MEETING WITH COMORAN EXPATRIATE ¶8. (C) At the request of Comoran expatriate Abdou Saadi, we met on August 1 to discuss the situation in the Comoros. Saadi is a long-time resident of France of Comoran origin who said that he had a civil service job with the Ile-de-France Regional Council (which includes Paris). Saadi said that he was deeply troubled by the crisis in the Comoros. He immediately labeled Bacar as an opportunist without any goals other than to make Anjouan his personal fiefdom. Saadi said that the U.S., France, and others had to "keep the pressure on Bacar," although he agreed that there did not appear much in the way of effective leverage. ¶9. (C) Saadi's larger concern involved what he characterized as the growing influence of the "arabo-islamic" world in the Comoros. He suggested that the U.S., along with other Western countries, increase its presence in the Comoros and maintain a higher public profile, in order to keep Comorans, especially young ones, "oriented to the West." Saadi thought that the relative absence of Western influences and the lack of visible opportunities offered by Westerners (scholarships to study abroad, educational programs, media presence, etc.) were allowing Comorans to gravitate toward the "arabo-islamic" countries. Saadi believed that these countries would see the Comoros as an opportunity for expansion and would fill the void that he believed the West was allowing to develop. ¶10. (C) As to a longer term political solution, Saadi said that something had to be done to make simpler and more rational the system of governance. He provided a coherent printed document outlining what he saw as a possible solution -- a system whereby the national parliament would elect a national president, to replace the cumbersome rotational system now in place, although each island would still have its own elected president. ¶11. (C) Saadi said that he was trying to develop a plan to increase medical and health care coverage in the Comoros. He noted the presence of about 250,000 Comorans in France, most of whom maintained close ties to their families and friends in the islands. Saadi wanted to develop a system whereby Comorans in France could make regular financial contributions to a fund in France. The fund would then operate a private health care system in the islands, based on the investments made by Comorans in France, to be available to beneficiaries designated by those contributing to the fund in France. He said that his organization ("Caisse d'Assurance Maladie de l'Union des Comores" or CAMUC) would be interested in working with French or American companies that might want to help manage the system. (NOTE: He did not directly solicit USG involvement but made clear that USG interest in his health care project, or in his proposed governmental restructuring, would be most welcome. END NOTE.) ¶12. (C) COMMENT: Unlike many of our unsolicited visitors with interests in Africa, Saadi was calm, did not engage in polemics, displayed a minimum of self-interest, and seemed sincerely interested in trying to find ways to help the Comoros. END NOTE). Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm PEKALA