MFA REMAINS LEERY OF CHAPTER VII OPTION FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 000032 SIPDIS SIPDIS NEA/FO FOR DANIN; NSC FOR DORAN/MARCHESE E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/05/2017 TAGS: FR LE PGOV PREL SY SUBJECT: MFA REMAINS LEERY OF CHAPTER VII OPTION FOR LEBANON TRIBUNAL REF: A. BEIRUT 2 ¶B. 06 PARIS 7787 Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) On January 4, Poloff reviewed legal options for establishing the Special Tribunal for Lebanon with Salina Grenet, MFA Action Officer for Middle East issues at the UN. Grenet said the Quai is still taking a "wait and see" approach to the tribunal in hopes that the March 14 coalition will yet manage to strike a deal with the opposition that would allow the tribunal to move forward. Significantly, she said the MFA decided just before Christmas "not to push" for rapid establishment of the tribunal for fear of creating a backlash that would topple the Siniora government. (When Poloff noted that the Siniora government might collapse notwithstanding France's "restraint" on the tribunal, Grenet said she hoped that the current tension in Beirut might ease slightly over the next few weeks as attention shifts to the International Conference for Lebanon on January 25.) However, Grenet added that France's patience was not inexhaustible. "If there's no progress on the tribunal within the next month or so, then we would have to reconsider our options. And if the Siniora government falls, we will have no choice but to use Chapter VII," she said. ¶2. (C) Grenet then stressed that, for the time being, invoking Chapter VII was the "worst possible option." On the one hand, she said, the MFA's lawyers have "strong reservations" about the legality of a UNSC-imposed tribunal, and on the other hand the French Mission to the UN assesses that Russia and China "will never go along" with such an approach. Moreover, even if that assessment proved incorrect, she questioned whether other states would cooperate with a tribunal that was established over the objections of the Lebanese opposition and which would be branded as an affront to Lebanese sovereignty. Consequently, she summarized, the French consider the Chapter VII option "neither desirable nor feasible." ¶3. (C) Turning to the possibility of a deal between the March 14 majority and the Lebanese opposition, Grenet indicated that France could accept minor fiddling with the text of the tribunal documents if such small changes would be a face-saving measure for the minority. However, the changes currently proposed by the opposition -- restricting the competency of the tribunal to just the Hariri assassination, and preventing those tried from inculpating their superiors -- would require further consideration by the UNSC. Surprisingly, Grenet said her personal view was that France would be more likely to demonstrate flexibility on the latter point (even if it meant not directly implicating Syrian President Bashar al-Asad in Hariri's killing) than on the former (due to French conviction that the multiple assassinations since Hariri's killing are linked). ¶4. (C) Comment: Grenet's comments track with the signs we had previously detected (Ref B) of a softening in France's position on establishing the international tribunal in order to avoid a conflagration in Beirut (and, by extension, to minimize the danger to French peacekeepers). One possible side-effect of that softening will be increased French anxiety in the weeks ahead that the U.S. is pursuing an overly aggressive approach to tribunal formation/UNSCR 1701 implementation. While stressing that our preference is also to see the tribunal ratified by the Lebanese Parliament, Poloff pointed out to Grenet two risks with the Quai's "wait and see" approach: the passage of time will not necessarily put the Siniora government/March 14 majority in a stronger position, but it will play into the opposition strategy of running down the clock until President Chirac leaves office. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm HOFMANN