PARIS HOSTS INAUGURAL W. MED RSI CONFERENCE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 08 PARIS 000319 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR S/CT MARC NORMAN, TED ALLEGRA E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/26/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV ASEC OTRA PTER FR AG LY IT MT SP TS, MO, PO SIPDIS SUBJECT: PARIS HOSTS INAUGURAL W. MED RSI CONFERENCE PARIS 00000319 001.2 OF 008 Classified By: AMBASSADOR CRAIG STAPLETON FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S) Summary: Ambassador Stapleton hosted the inaugural Western Mediterranean Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI) Conference on December 5-6 in Paris. U.S. Chiefs of Mission and Embassy representatives from France, Italy, Spain, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Portugal and Malta gathered as a first step to develop a regional counterterrorism strategy. Ambassador for Counterterrorism Henry Crumpton and U.S. interagency representatives participated. Meeting participants sought to understand how the North African and European dimensions of the terrorist threat interact and to identify possible measures to enhance both inter-USG and regional cooperation to address the cross-Mediterranean nature of the problem. ¶2. (S) Summary continued: Chiefs of Mission made several recommendations on the way forward, including the need to a) increase MEPI funding to foster vital economic reforms in North Africa and boost European assistance to North African countries in order to improve economic and social conditions that stimulate illegal (and legal) migration to Europe, b) develop a core short- and long-term message to the EU on counterterrorism issues c) develop a better understanding of the radicalization process, d) put in place a long-term strategy for an effective assimilation/integration policy out to 2050, e) get a better understanding of the attitudes of North African and immigrant populations with respect to the U.S., f) improve information-sharing among the countries of the region, g) produce/codify a list of counterterrorism and RSI best practices and disseminate these to posts, and h) continue to meet regularly to coordinate an integrated regional CT approach. End summary. The Regional Picture -------------- ¶3. (S) Attendees began the session by briefing on the distinctive aspects of threats posed by specific groups or to specific countries. ¶4. (S) Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC): With 500-800 operatives, the GSPC is a growing regional threat, in part as a result of the success of the Algerian government in combating the group in country. Faced with unrelenting pressure from the GoA, the GSPC has made a strategic shift from a focus on jihad in Algeria to a more international approach that emphasizes outreach to other organizations (including al Qaida),providing training to members of other groups, and launching attacks outside Algeria. For now, the GSPC uses Europe mostly for fund-raising and facilitation, but its September 2006 announcement of an open alliance with AQ may presage an increased threat there. ¶5. (S) Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG): Ultimate networkers, the LIFG serves as connective tissue for other groups and enjoys growing influence within AQ. It benefits PARIS 00000319 002.2 OF 008 from dynamic leadership with strong religious credentials. ¶6. (S) MSJ: The least known of the North African extremist groups, it appears to be more a movement than an organization. Following the Casablanca bombings, a strong Moroccan government crackdown dismantled more than a dozen cells and has led the group to operate increasingly out of Spain and to engage in close cooperation with the GSPC. ¶7. (S) Algeria: The 150,000 dead in the Algerian conflict has lead to increasing war-weariness on the part of the population and made GSPC recruitment more difficult. The GoA,s amnesty process has been successful in bringing many fighters out the maquis and the government,s closer monitoring of mosques has also limited extremists, influence. Countering these positive trends are the continuing difficult economic and social conditions, which the government has so far failed to address. Relations between U.S. and Algerian services are good, especially on the military side, but poor Algerian absorption capacity and bureaucratic inertia have complicated our ability to provide training and other forms of CT assistance. ¶8. (S) Morocco: Since the Casablanca bombings, some 23 cells have been disrupted, but concern is growing over the potential threat of jihadists returning from Iraq, especially as the GoM does not appear to have a plan to deal with such a threat. The GoM,s greatest asset is, in many ways, the king,s position as Commander of the Faithful. The GoM recognizes the need to address social and economic conditions and the king is pressing for reforms, particularly with respect to women,s and children,s rights. The GoM is also moving to control religious institutions and preaching with a view to ensuring that a tolerant form of Islam is practiced in Morocco. Relations with the U.S. are good. The 2004 Free Trade Agreement has increased investment and noticeably improved the image of the United States. There are estimates of up to 3 million Moroccans living outside the country; many Moroccans can move easily around Europe. ¶9. (S) Italy: A likely target for AQ because of its role in Iraq, Afghanistan and (now) Lebanon, Italy may have some 2-3% of its Muslim population radicalized. Small extremist communities, mostly in the north, are active, but the GoI devotes considerable resources to CT and is aggressive about using new powers to arrest and expel troublemakers. With North African, Bosnian, Somali, and increasingly Pakistani communities to contend with, the GoI has done a poor job of recruiting minorities or developing language capabilities in its security services. More broadly, the GoI has yet to meet the challenge posed by the need to integrate people of different ethnic origins. Cooperation with the USG, extraordinary under the previous government, remains good, but the Milan rendition case of abu Omar poses a challenge and the highly independent and left-leaning judiciary has shown a tendency to vitiate some CT efforts. PARIS 00000319 003.2 OF 008 ¶10. (S) Portugal: Portugal,s small Muslim population has seen minimal radicalization; the country,s CT challenge is mostly one of disrupting logistical support networks. Portugal has cooperated closely with the USG, even on detainee transfers through the country, although, as is the case in many countries, negative publicity about "rendition flights" poses a problem. ¶11. (S) Tunisia: The country appears on the surface to be stable and safe, but faces a growing threat. G8 ambassadors in country have expressed concern that the domestic environment may be fostering extremism. The GoT has repressed the terrorist threat within the country itself (terrorism suspects are closely monitored),but inadequate border security has meant Tunisian radicals can easily travel. Some have turned up in Iraq and there is Tunisian involvement in cells in Europe. Cooperation with the U.S. is good, but the GoT is more inclined to share with us information about external threats than it is about internal developments. Cooperation with its neighbors is adequate with respect to repatriation, but less than warm. ¶12. (S) Malta: While there appear to be no terrorist cells in the country, because of its location, Malta serves as a transfer point and, in effect as the Southern border of Europe. The GoM does a good job of monitoring its Freeport, but has responsibility for air and sea space some 800 times the size of the country itself, posing an obvious challenge to its limited resources. Illegal immigration is an enormous and growing problem equal to some 50% of the country,s birthrate in 2005. Despite increasing awareness of the potential for future problems, the Maltese are having trouble handling the influx. ¶13. (S) Spain: Some 1,000 Islamist extremists operate out of Spain, but the country,s long history of confronting terrorism has meant the GoS is very focused on the threat. Terrorist activity in Spain appears to be linked with criminal activity (especially with respect to credit card fraud, passport theft, and, to some degree, drug trafficking). Illegal immigration is a worsening problem. Recruitment (of foreign fighters for Iraq and Afghanistan) appears to be ongoing. USG/Embassy Madrid has excellent cooperation with the GOS on a range of CT issues, including an agreement to share terrorist watch list information (HSPD-6),which A/S Harty signed during her recent trip to Madrid and which now serves as a model for other such agreements. Embassy Madrid often serves as the "interagency" for the GOS, given poor Spanish internal coordination on CT, which the GoS is trying to address. Because of the close ties the Embassy maintains with all of the CT actors in the GOS, our counterterrorism efforts remain effective. ¶14. (S) France: The GoF, well aware that France is a target, does an effective job of monitoring and controlling the problem. French CT structures are robust and effective and the operational relationship with the USG is excellent. PARIS 00000319 004.2 OF 008 Nonetheless, France is confronted with a burgeoning immigrant population and is doing a poor job of assimilating it, despite recent GoF efforts to reach out to communities in which immigrants predominate. Terrorist recruitment in prisons and the possible threat of Iraq returnees is a concern, as is, increasingly, the Pakistan terrorism nexus. Specific Concerns and ideas to address them -------------- ¶15. (S) Chiefs of Mission engaged in a wide-ranging discussion, concluding that the regional challenge we face in addressing the terrorist threat manifests itself in several broad categories: Immigration: -------------- ¶16. (S) Underlying and contributing to the terrorist problem is the reality of a massive, often uncontrolled, and growing immigration flow across the Mediterranean: in Algeria alone, there were some 150,000 requests for French visas in 2006. Moreover, there is a growing number of young North Africans trying to enter Europe clandestinely or by seeking refugee status. This huge migration poses a major and multi-faceted challenge. Chiefs of Mission noted that the ongoing migration is driven by deep-seated economic and social conditions and is therefore likely to continue for the foreseeable future absent concerted efforts to address the conditions in North Africa (and points south) that feed a desire to relocate. While steps must be taken to enhance maritime security, we must also devise ways to provide economic opportunity in host countries that can create disincentive for relocation. Such an effort must be done in conjunction with European countries. We must seek European participation in and contributions to, the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA) and encourage them to press North African countries on the need for economic and social reform. We need more MEPI resources to augment our own efforts to promote vital economic and education reforms in North Africa. ¶17. (S) At the same time, we must find ways of assisting partner nations on both sides of the Mediterranean to manage population movements of the size currently underway. Specifically, we must help them ensure that terrorists do not take advantage of this movement to travel or to exploit discontent associated with such dislocation. Unfortunately, we and the governments in the region appear to have at best only a limited grasp of the nature of the migration: for example, camps for immigrants, which are presumably targets for terrorist subversion, as well as for terrorist transit, are essentially closed off as neither we nor governments have established effective monitoring or investigative capabilities. While some countries (Spain, for example) capture biometric data on immigrants, most do not and some lack the capacity to do so or to absorb the technology. We PARIS 00000319 005.2 OF 008 need to find ways to address this information gap. ¶18. (S) Libya in particular appears to be indifferent to the immigration problem. There may be more non-Libyans than Libyans living in the country, which serves as a launching pad for population movement from countries to its south. Chiefs of Mission noted that we must address Libyan inability (or unwillingness) to deal with the issue and agreed that Embassy Tripoli participation in the next RSI would be useful. Integration/Assimilation -------------- ¶19. (S) Chiefs of Mission noted that European partners will be faced with a growing need to develop effective programs to assimilate and/or integrate new residents of their countries. This will require a shift in mindset, as many receiving countries have yet to deal with (or in some cases even acknowledge) the scope of the problem. It has proven difficult to integrate even legal migrants; terrorist plots in recent years have involved wealthy students and spouses of airplane pilots, for example. The Internet and continuing links with migrants, "home countries" pose additional and poorly understood challenges for governments seeking to grapple with the imperative of integrating new populations. Chiefs of Mission concluded that we need to raise the profile of radicalization/immigration issue in the ongoing U.S.-EU dialogue on terrorism and explore the possibility of involving the North African leadership in European efforts at integration. Radicalization -------------- ¶20. (S) The phenomenon of radicalization appears to affect 1-3 percent of Muslim populations across the board, with violent extremists seeking to exploit the discontent of underprivileged, disadvantaged communities. Chiefs of Mission determined that we need to develop a better understanding of the nature of the threat terrain, especially with regard to radicalization. To this end, we should commission additional studies on how radicalization takes place, look closely at de-radicalization efforts around the world (e.g., in Morocco); and encourage countries to share successes in countering radicalization. Of particular concern is prison radicalization, about which little is yet known; this issue should be made a priority. Information and Outreach -------------- ¶21. (S) Chiefs of Mission noted that we often lack a clear picture of many aspects of the challenges we face in the region. Over the long term to address this shortfall, we need to make a serious investment in counterterrorism expertise, train a cadre of CT experts, and ensure that PARIS 00000319 006.2 OF 008 information regarding challenges and best practices is widely disseminated. ¶22. (S) More specifically, we need to get a handle on the nature of the immigration wave. For example, the practice engaged in by some migrants of destroying identity papers before arrival at their destination countries not only assures that they cannot be returned to their countries of origin but also makes it close to impossible to identify new arrivals. We need to help partner countries find ways to monitor migrants and to discern terrorists and criminals that may be in their midst. ¶23. (S) We lack as well a good sense of the nature and thinking of existing Muslim communities in Europe. To address this shortfall, Chiefs of Mission concluded that we need to devote additional resources to polling immigrant communities, as well as local populations in North Africa, with a view to determining their concerns and attitudes towards the U.S. and its policies. ¶24. (S) Chiefs of Mission noted that efforts to engage with Muslim populations and share information about USG assistance programs have a significantly positive impact on those communities, perceptions of the United States. We must do a better job of getting out such information. Chiefs of Mission therefore strongly urged additional resources be devoted to outreach and information efforts. Programs connecting such communities with U.S. Muslims and other moderates are vital and need to be better funded. Non-government organizations are also active on this front and we need to have to a better understanding of their activities and how we can leverage them. ¶25. (S) The recent Algerian amnesty for "repentant" terrorists provides yet another illustration of the need for better sharing of information. The lengthy delay (some 10 months) between the actual amnesty and GoA,s provision of the names of those pardoned is unacceptable; we need to ensure such lists are quickly provided and disseminated. Conclusions -------------- ¶26. (S) Chiefs of Mission propose a strategy that simultaneously examines and addresses the various stages of the interrelated immigration, integration, and radicalization challenges: mass movement, lack of connection to new homes, efforts by terrorists and radicals to exploit discontent and dislocation. By viewing the challenge holistically, and concurrently, we can begin to grapple with what will clearly be a long-term effort that will require a highly coordinated and flexible response across the government. Thus, CoMs propose a continuing series of discussions as part of an effort to bring to bear all instruments of national power. In light of these considerations, Chiefs of Mission made the following specific proposals: PARIS 00000319 007.2 OF 008 ¶A. Boost MEPI funding for programs to improve economic and social conditions in North Africa that stimulate illegal (and legal) immigration. Encourage European participation in BMENA and in efforts to enhance economic and social reforms in North Africa. Focus additional attention on the role of Libya with respect to immigration and population movement. ¶B. Develop a core message for our engagement with the EU on counterterrorism issues, including specific actions we want host governments to take, and areas where the U.S. is willing to provide assistance. We should focus on short-term specific goals, as well as longer term policy objectives. ¶C. Better map the environment and develop a greater understanding of the radicalization process through increased study of the phenomenon, and better sharing of successes in countering it. Increase the focus on the threat of prison radicalization. Raise the profile of integration and radicalization issues in discussions with the EU. Also, increase polling to better understand local views and how people acquire information, particularly in North Africa. ¶D. Put in place a long-term strategy to develop the necessary groundwork for an effective assimilation/integration policy out to 2050. Explore the utility and feasibility of encouraging North African governments to engage with the Europeans with a view to fostering integration of immigrant communities. Seek to leverage NGO activities. ¶E. Develop a better understanding of the attitudes of North African and immigrant populations with respect to the U.S. and key terrorism-related issues through more accurate and detailed polling. The USG needs to exponentially and rapidly expand successful people-to-people programs that create lasting favorable impressions of the U.S. and undermine the attractiveness of extremist ideologies as a key long-term instrument to counter extremism. One focus of these programs should be expanding local contacts with U.S. Muslims. ¶F. Improve information-sharing among the countries of the region, specifically with regard to lists of persons freed in amnesties. ¶G. To devise a more effective strategy to address the threat, we should produce/codify a list of counterterrorism and RSI best practices and disseminate these to posts, with a view to having them updated periodically. Make a long-term investment in developing CT expertise and a cadre of experts. ¶H. To maintain the momentum generated by this meeting, embassies intend to meet regularly to coordinate an integrated regional CT approach, based on a network of country teams and developed through face-to-face contact and video and telephone conferences. Chiefs of Mission agreed to continue the RSI process in the future and request assistance from Washington in obtaining and obligating significant PARIS 00000319 008.2 OF 008 additional funding necessary to undertake this regional CT strategy and increase understanding among decision-makers and budget analysts of the CT challenges in our region. Meeting Participants -------------- ¶27. (S) The meeting consisted of USG Ambassadors (and political and intel staffs) in the field as well as several Washington agencies. Principals from the field were: Craig Stapleton, Ambassador to France; Ronald Spogli, Ambassador to Italy; Eduardo Aguirre, Jr, Ambassador to Spain; Al Hoffman, Ambassador to Portugal; Robert Ford, Ambassador to Algeria; Bob Godec, Ambassador to Tunisia; Molly Bordonaro, Ambassador to Malta; Wayne Bush, DCM to Morocco. ¶28. (S) Principals from Washington included: Hank Crumpton, Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism; EUR A/S Dan Fried; NEA DAS Gordon Gray; Ambassador Brian Carlson, R; Nerissa Cook, Office Director EUR/PGI; Rollie Burans, NCTC; Bruce Swartz, U.S. DOJ Assistant Attorney General; GEN Mark Schissler, Joint Staff, Deputy Director for the War on Terror, MG Robertus C.N. Remkes, US EUCOM Director for Strategy, Policy, and Assessments; MG David Scott, US SOCOM, Deputy Director SCO. ¶29. (U) This cable was drafted by S/CT and cleared by all participating Chiefs of Mission and Ambassador-at-Large, Hank Crumpton. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON