Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07PARIS3080
2007-07-17 16:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Paris
Cable title:
TURKISH AMBASSADOR ON STATE OF PLAY IN
how-toVZCZCXRO5013 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHFR #3080/01 1981628 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 171628Z JUL 07 FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9011 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 0483 RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN PRIORITY 0216
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 003080
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2017
TAGS: PREL EUN TU CY AR FR
SUBJECT: TURKISH AMBASSADOR ON STATE OF PLAY IN
FRANCE-TURKEY RELATIONSHIP
REF: STATE 94204
Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 b and d.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 003080
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2017
TAGS: PREL EUN TU CY AR FR
SUBJECT: TURKISH AMBASSADOR ON STATE OF PLAY IN
FRANCE-TURKEY RELATIONSHIP
REF: STATE 94204
Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 b and d.
1. (C) SUMMARY. On July 11, Turkish Ambassador Koroturk
told the Ambassador that Sarkozy's declared opposition to
Turkish EU membership is presenting challenges for
French-Turkish relations on a practical level as the French
bureaucracy rushes to implement what it interprets as
Sarkozy's will, despite Sarkozy's expressed desire to
maintain good bilateral relations and not close the door
completely on Turkey's accession negotiations. One positive
development on the bilateral front is the lack of activity in
the French Senate regarding legislation criminalizing denial
of the Armenian "genocide." But France's closer ties with
Cyprus and decision to allow Cypriot troops to participate in
the July 14 Bastille Day celebrations were sources of
concern. Koroturk was noncommittal on Sarkozy's proposed
Mediterranean Union, citing the lack of detail in the
proposal, although he said Turkey would be willing to
participate in principle since the Med Union was still
compatible with Turkey's EU aspirations. END SUMMARY.
--------------
TURKEY-EU RELATIONS
--------------
2. (C) Koroturk recounted that Sarkozy had made clear to
Erdogan following his election that he did not wish his
position of opposing Turkish EU membership to interfere with
bilateral relations, and that the two leaders had agreed
their differences should be kept private. It was during this
call that Sarkozy offered to send Jean-David Levitte to
Turkey for private consultations, with Levitte arriving in
Ankara only two days later. Levitte had assured the Turks
that, notwithstanding Sarkozy's opposition to Turkish
membership, France would not attempt to put an end to
Turkey's accession negotiations. Koruturk said the
distinction France was now making between those chapters
viewed as implying full membership, and those that could
apply to membership or a privileged partnership, was thus all
the more disturbing. And this was not an isolated example.
He noted that some meetings among EU member country
Ambassadors in France and Brussels that had been open in the
past to "negotiating countries" (Turkey and Croatia) were now
restricted to EU member countries only.
3. (C) Elaborating further, Koruturk stated that he was
worried about the French bureaucracy's tendency to be more
Catholic than the Pope in implementing what it understood to
be the day-to-day operational implications of Sarkozy's
opposition to Turkish EU membership. The key for the Turks
was to buy time to implement the reforms that would
eventually bring them up to the same standards as EU member
countries. Then, and only then, would it be appropriate for
each side -- not only the EU, but also the Turks -- to take a
decision as to whether Turkish EU membership was in its
interest. Koruturk unequivocally affirmed that there should
be no doubts about Turkey's pro-Western orientation; playing
the Iranian or the Syrian card was not an option.
--------------
TURKEY-FRANCE RELATIONS
--------------
4. (C) Koruturk noted the damage to the bilateral
relationship that had been caused by National Assembly
legislation that would criminalize denial of the Armenian
"genocide." Saying that he was speaking for U.S. ears only,
he indicated that Sarkozy had promised, and the President of
the Senate had assured him in confidence, that the
legislation would never be taken up by the Senate. In
response to a question, Koruturk confirmed that the mil-mil
relationship was not yet back to normal, but he attributed
that to ongoing wrangling over a Turkish role in EU
decision-making rather than differences over the Armenian
"genocide" legislation, saying that it was important to find
the right balance between NATO country participation in EU
decision-making and vice versa. When Levitte had traveled to
Turkey, the Turks had compared the French-Turkish
relationship to "a three-legged" stool consisting of
bilateral, regional, and EU vectors; it was important that
all three remain strong.
--------------
MEDITERRANEAN UNION
--------------
5. (C) Koruturk said he had been told by Levitte
specifically that the Mediterranean Union was not conceived
PARIS 00003080 002 OF 002
as a means of dealing with the Turkish EU question. He
affirmed that Turkey was prepared in principle to participate
in the initiative, although a decision would be based on how
the initiative was fleshed out. He seemed to think that
Philippe Seguin, Sarkozy's advisor on economic growth, and
Claude Gueant, Secretary General of the Presidency, would be
responsible for elaborating the idea.
--------------
CYPRUS
--------------
6. (C) Koruturk noted that Turkey had formally protested
France's decision to allow (Greek-)Cypriot troops to
participate in its July 14 Bastille Day celebrations on the
same footing as other EU member states. Citing the Cypriot
constitution's mandate for a mixed north-south composition,
he complained that there was no such thing as a Cypriot army
and that their participation was illegitimate. In response
to a question about the status of French-Cypriot relations,
Koruturk noted that while France had accepted the Turkish
offer of using Turkish ports to stage the evacuation of
French citizens from Lebanon, it had shown a preference for
using Cyprus and had subsequently signed a military agreement
with Cyprus. Although he speculated that the French may have
been motivated in part by their rivalry with the British, he
was clearly disappointed.
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
7. (C) Koroturk was clearly worried that Sarkozy's
opposition in principle to Turkish EU membership, while
manageable, will encourage a diligent bureaucracy to set up
roadblocks in practice that have the potential to do more
substantial damage to the bilateral relationship. Koroturk
was pragmatic nonetheless about the opportunities for Turkey
to continue to reform and harmonize its standards with the
EU.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2017
TAGS: PREL EUN TU CY AR FR
SUBJECT: TURKISH AMBASSADOR ON STATE OF PLAY IN
FRANCE-TURKEY RELATIONSHIP
REF: STATE 94204
Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 b and d.
1. (C) SUMMARY. On July 11, Turkish Ambassador Koroturk
told the Ambassador that Sarkozy's declared opposition to
Turkish EU membership is presenting challenges for
French-Turkish relations on a practical level as the French
bureaucracy rushes to implement what it interprets as
Sarkozy's will, despite Sarkozy's expressed desire to
maintain good bilateral relations and not close the door
completely on Turkey's accession negotiations. One positive
development on the bilateral front is the lack of activity in
the French Senate regarding legislation criminalizing denial
of the Armenian "genocide." But France's closer ties with
Cyprus and decision to allow Cypriot troops to participate in
the July 14 Bastille Day celebrations were sources of
concern. Koroturk was noncommittal on Sarkozy's proposed
Mediterranean Union, citing the lack of detail in the
proposal, although he said Turkey would be willing to
participate in principle since the Med Union was still
compatible with Turkey's EU aspirations. END SUMMARY.
--------------
TURKEY-EU RELATIONS
--------------
2. (C) Koroturk recounted that Sarkozy had made clear to
Erdogan following his election that he did not wish his
position of opposing Turkish EU membership to interfere with
bilateral relations, and that the two leaders had agreed
their differences should be kept private. It was during this
call that Sarkozy offered to send Jean-David Levitte to
Turkey for private consultations, with Levitte arriving in
Ankara only two days later. Levitte had assured the Turks
that, notwithstanding Sarkozy's opposition to Turkish
membership, France would not attempt to put an end to
Turkey's accession negotiations. Koruturk said the
distinction France was now making between those chapters
viewed as implying full membership, and those that could
apply to membership or a privileged partnership, was thus all
the more disturbing. And this was not an isolated example.
He noted that some meetings among EU member country
Ambassadors in France and Brussels that had been open in the
past to "negotiating countries" (Turkey and Croatia) were now
restricted to EU member countries only.
3. (C) Elaborating further, Koruturk stated that he was
worried about the French bureaucracy's tendency to be more
Catholic than the Pope in implementing what it understood to
be the day-to-day operational implications of Sarkozy's
opposition to Turkish EU membership. The key for the Turks
was to buy time to implement the reforms that would
eventually bring them up to the same standards as EU member
countries. Then, and only then, would it be appropriate for
each side -- not only the EU, but also the Turks -- to take a
decision as to whether Turkish EU membership was in its
interest. Koruturk unequivocally affirmed that there should
be no doubts about Turkey's pro-Western orientation; playing
the Iranian or the Syrian card was not an option.
--------------
TURKEY-FRANCE RELATIONS
--------------
4. (C) Koruturk noted the damage to the bilateral
relationship that had been caused by National Assembly
legislation that would criminalize denial of the Armenian
"genocide." Saying that he was speaking for U.S. ears only,
he indicated that Sarkozy had promised, and the President of
the Senate had assured him in confidence, that the
legislation would never be taken up by the Senate. In
response to a question, Koruturk confirmed that the mil-mil
relationship was not yet back to normal, but he attributed
that to ongoing wrangling over a Turkish role in EU
decision-making rather than differences over the Armenian
"genocide" legislation, saying that it was important to find
the right balance between NATO country participation in EU
decision-making and vice versa. When Levitte had traveled to
Turkey, the Turks had compared the French-Turkish
relationship to "a three-legged" stool consisting of
bilateral, regional, and EU vectors; it was important that
all three remain strong.
--------------
MEDITERRANEAN UNION
--------------
5. (C) Koruturk said he had been told by Levitte
specifically that the Mediterranean Union was not conceived
PARIS 00003080 002 OF 002
as a means of dealing with the Turkish EU question. He
affirmed that Turkey was prepared in principle to participate
in the initiative, although a decision would be based on how
the initiative was fleshed out. He seemed to think that
Philippe Seguin, Sarkozy's advisor on economic growth, and
Claude Gueant, Secretary General of the Presidency, would be
responsible for elaborating the idea.
--------------
CYPRUS
--------------
6. (C) Koruturk noted that Turkey had formally protested
France's decision to allow (Greek-)Cypriot troops to
participate in its July 14 Bastille Day celebrations on the
same footing as other EU member states. Citing the Cypriot
constitution's mandate for a mixed north-south composition,
he complained that there was no such thing as a Cypriot army
and that their participation was illegitimate. In response
to a question about the status of French-Cypriot relations,
Koruturk noted that while France had accepted the Turkish
offer of using Turkish ports to stage the evacuation of
French citizens from Lebanon, it had shown a preference for
using Cyprus and had subsequently signed a military agreement
with Cyprus. Although he speculated that the French may have
been motivated in part by their rivalry with the British, he
was clearly disappointed.
--------------
COMMENT
--------------
7. (C) Koroturk was clearly worried that Sarkozy's
opposition in principle to Turkish EU membership, while
manageable, will encourage a diligent bureaucracy to set up
roadblocks in practice that have the potential to do more
substantial damage to the bilateral relationship. Koroturk
was pragmatic nonetheless about the opportunities for Turkey
to continue to reform and harmonize its standards with the
EU.
Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm
STAPLETON