A/S WELCH PRESSES FRENCH TO CAPITALIZE ON LEBANON

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 000307 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR DORAN/ABRAMS E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/24/2016 TAGS: FR IR IS KDEM KPAL LE PGOV PREL SUBJECT: A/S WELCH PRESSES FRENCH TO CAPITALIZE ON LEBANON CONFERENCE Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: NEA A/S David Welch met separately January 24 with Dominique Boche, President Chirac's Middle East Advisor, and Jean Felix-Pagagnon, his French MFA counterpart. Welch strongly urged the French to take advantage of the political moment created by the Lebanon Conference, noting that tighter enforcement of the arms embargo could change the perception that Lebanon's opposition forces have put PM Siniora's government and its international supporters on the defensive. Boche responded with habitual caution (observing at one point that "the security of UNIFIL hinges to a large extent on good relations with Hizballah"),but agreed that a contact group to exchange intelligence and ideas on the arms embargo was "a good idea," and reaffirmed France's interest in establishing a UN embargo committee. Welch encouraged the French to think creatively, pointing out that Siniora's government would likely emerge from the current crisis in better shape than the opposition. "So why not be bold?" asked Welch, who took the opportunity also to encourage the French to stand firm in keeping pressure on Iran and Hamas. End summary. Capitalizing on Paris III -------------- ¶2. (S) NEA A/S David Welch met separately on January 24 with Dominique Boche, President Chirac's Middle East Advisor, and Jean Felix-Pagagnon, his French MFA counterpart. Welch strongly urged the French to take advantage of the political moment created by the Lebanon Conference. Saying that Hizballah's strength has been overestimated by many observers, he pointed to a number of ways (chief among them, stronger enforcement of the UNSCR 1701 arms embargo, including through creation of an obligatory reporting mechanism) by which France could change the perception that the Lebanese opposition has put PM Siniora's government, and its international supporters, on the defensive. He warned that Syria and Iran would take advantage of the porous Lebanese-Syrian border if not checked, and Israel would draw its own conclusions about the efficacy of UNIFIL and UNSCR 1701 if progress on the arms embargo was not forthcoming. He stressed the need for creative thinking, and underscored U.S. interest in creating a contact group to share intelligence (between UNIFIL partners and with the Governments of Lebanon and Israel) and ideas with respect to border monitoring and enforcing the arms embargo. "We have an opportunity to encourage the Siniora government to stretch a little," he observed. French Response Positive, but Cautious -------------- ¶3. (S) Boche responded positively to the contact group proposal, calling it "a good idea" and promising to give it serious consideration. He reaffirmed French interest in standing up an embargo committee under UNSC auspices. He also agreed that Hizballah's position was not as strong as generally believed, noting that Nasrallah -- who was lionized by many Arabs in the wake of last summer's fighting with Israel -- was now widely seen as an Iranian tool. Felix-Pagagnon was even more upbeat. "I'm ready to have a sanctions (sic) committee. We're all for it. We should have done it much earlier," he enthused. As for the contact group proposal, Felix-Pagagnon said the MFA supported it on an ad hoc basis outside the context of UNIFIL. ¶4. (S) Despite this positive response, and though he hailed the extraordinary cooperation between the U.S. and France in supporting Lebanon, Boche's habitual caution surfaced at several points during the conversation. He indicated that the Elysee remained leery of taking steps that might make Siniora's government even more fragile, suggesting this was a cardinal principle of the French approach to Lebanon. Moreover, in a clear reflection of concern about the vulnerability of French peacekeepers, Boche said at one point that "the security of UNIFIL hinges to a large extent on good relations with Hizballah." Boche also struck a somewhat timid note on the International Tribunal for Lebanon, predicting that any attempt to press forward on the tribunal would lead to a mass resignation of opposition MPs and thus the collapse of Lebanon's parliament and other political institutions. "I'm not announcing a new policy," said Boche, "but shouldn't we reconsider establishing the tribunal if it means risking the disappearance of Lebanon? We need to be firm, but we should not push Lebanon into a ratification PARIS 00000307 002 OF 003 procedure that would explode the parliament." ¶5. (S) Felix-Pagagnon's analysis was similarly worrisome. He agreed that border monitoring was the next logical step for the international community to focus on, but opined that the GOL's priority in the wake of the Paris III conference should be on implementing promised economic reforms. To do that, he continued, March 14 had no option other than to give the opposition an expanded role in the cabinet. "Our hope is that Siniora will be in a position to make a better deal after Paris III than he would have made otherwise," said Felix-Pagagnon. He continued: "It will probably be a package deal: expansion of the cabinet, a deal on the tribunal, an agreement on electing a new president . . . should we complicate matters by asking Siniora to reach an agreement with Hizballah on border monitoring?" (In Felix-Pagagnon's view, it was a given that Siniora could not make any significant decision with respect to the arms embargo or border enforcement without Hizballah's acquiescence.) Be Bold, Mes Amis -------------- ¶6. (S) Welch acknowledged that Lebanon's parliament was unlikely to deliver progress on the tribunal for the moment, but stressed that the GOL's search for a political compromise could not be allowed to compromise the tribunal itself. Moreover, he noted that the idea of establishing a tribunal still enjoyed widespread public support in Lebanon, support that could be capitalized on whatever the divisions among Lebanon's political elite. He once again encouraged the French to think creatively, pointing out that: firstly, the Lebanon Conference was sending a positive signal to the Lebanese public at a time when Hizballah and Aoun were sending only negative signals; secondly, the Siniora government was showing courage in the face of the opposition's assault; and thirdly, the March 14 camp was likely to emerge from the current crisis in better shape than the Lebanese opposition, so why not be bold? Iran: Envoy Option Still Under Consideration -------------- ¶7. (S) Turning to Iran and the question of UNSCR 1737 implementation, Boche said the French were increasingly convinced that Iranian President Ahmadinejad was seeking conflict with the international community over Iran's nuclear program. "Ahmadinejad is unprecedented in Iranian political history . . . he really believes in the return of the Mahdi, and he believes the Mahdi will return during his presidency," Boche said. Nonetheless, France was encouraged by the results of Iran's recent elections, and by the fact that Ahmadinejad's management of the nuclear file has come under serious criticism within Iran. "We think a combination of pressure and an openness to dialogue might work," said Boche, who confirmed that France was still considering sending a high-level envoy to Tehran but would not do so without first consulting its partners. However, if Iran remained intransigent, Boche said he foresaw difficulty in securing Russian support for further action within the UNSC. "We will need to bring the Russians in early; we think international unity -- including Russia -- is essential," Boche remarked. Welch pointed out that there was ample scope for increasing pressure on Iran outside the framework of the UNSC. "We need to keep up the pressure," he emphasized. In Defense of Quartet Principles -------------- ¶8. (S) Boche recited the standard litany of French talking points on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (reiterating, for example, reservations about PA President Abbas' call for early parliamentary elections),culminating with the argument that it was time to "move beyond preconditions" and to instead focus on questions of process. "That worries me," Welch said bluntly. Welch countered by arguing that now was not the time to relax the international pressure on Hamas, which like Hizballah, was not as strong as it looked. Emphasizing that the U.S. supported the formation of a Palestinian national unity government so long as that government was founded on the basis of the Quartet Principles, Welch said that any unity government's commitment to the Quartet Principles would have to stand up to public scrutiny -- especially that of the Israeli public. "People are going to ask whether Hamas joined Abu Mazen's government, or whether Abu Mazen joined Hamas' government. If it's the latter, that's going to make our jobs a lot harder," he said. PARIS 00000307 003 OF 003 Once again, he urged the French to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the Secretary's recent visit to the region. Explaining U.S. plans for moving beyond bilateral talks between the GOI and the PA to a trilateral format, Welch made clear that the U.S. was not abandoning the Roadmap nor its provisions on sequencing, but would also help the parties to discuss the creation of a political horizon. Comment -------------- ¶9. (S) Comment: The tenor of Welch's meetings was positive. Once again, the French made clear how much they appreciate U.S. support for the Lebanon Conference in particular, and our close cooperation on Lebanon in general. At the same time, we have much work to do. With respect to forming a contact group, the next step will be to translate their receptivity into active participation: re-engaging soon with a detailed proposal on the venue, participants and agenda for the first contact group meeting should help solidify their commitment. As for creating an embargo committee (which the French seemed particularly keen on),we agreed to consult with our respective missions in New York as to when and how this could be done (Felix-Pagagnon saw no way to do it without a new UNSCR). On Iran, we will need to continue to drive home the message that this is the wrong time for France to send an envoy to Tehran; engaging Iran, even if only on "regional affairs," is more likely to strengthen President Ahmadinejad's hand than to weaken it. Finally, the French are likely intrigued by U.S. efforts to revitalize implementation of the Roadmap in tandem with trilateral talks about core issues; our short-term challenge will be to leverage this interest into a commitment not to break ranks on the Quartet Principles. ¶10. (U) A/S Welch has cleared this cable. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON