SUDAN - SPECIAL ENVOY FOR SUDAN ANDREW NATSIOS' JUNE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 002912 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2017 TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV PREF PINS FR SU SUBJECT: SUDAN - SPECIAL ENVOY FOR SUDAN ANDREW NATSIOS' JUNE 25, 2007 MEETING WITH CHINA SPECIAL ENVOY FOR SUDAN LIU GUIJIN Classified by: POL M/C Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. China Special Envoy for Sudan Liu Guijin told Special Envoy (SE) for Sudan Andrew Natsios on June 25 that a new Security Council resolution would bring official endorsement of the hybrid UN-African Union (AU) peacekeeping force. A new resolution need not refer to UNSCR 1706, but Liu understood that the repeal of UNSCR 1706 would not be possible, even if the GOS desires it. Sole UN command and control of the hybrid force was not desirable, given previous agreements and GOS objections -- AU should be in the lead. The GOS would also object to the resolution placing all of the operative paragraphs under Chapter VII. The international community needed the GOS on board for the peace-making process to come to a successful conclusion. Liu noted that the common objective of the U.S. and China as strategic partners on this issue should be to encourage the GOS, the rebel groups, and governments in the region to reach a regional peace agreement as soon as possible. End summary. ¶2. (U) On June 25, Special Envoy for Sudan Andrew Natsios discussed next steps in the Darfur peace process with China Special Envoy for Sudan Liu Guijin. China Foreign Affairs Africa Bureau Feng Biao, Chinese Embassy PolCouns, Natsios Chief of Staff Andrew Steinfeld, and econoff also attended. ¶3. (C) SE Natsios gave Sudan President Omar al-Bashir credit for having finally agreed to the hybrid UN-AU force, but the proof of Sudanese bona fides will be in its rapid implementation. Liu replied that implementation would inevitably encounter some difficulties. However, "the joint efforts of the international community" would be necessary to overcome these problems. Each player in the Sudan conflict had different priorities, which was "normal." Liu recently traveled to Egypt, Sudan, AU headquarters and South Africa. His interlocutors remained concerned that the situation in Darfur needs additional redress. The morale among existing AU peacekeepers was low. -------------- -------------- China Supports a New UN Security Council Resolution on Sudan -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Natsios engaged Liu on the various aspects of a new UNSC, indicating through his questions what U.S. redlines were. Liu said that the most important element of a new security resolution would be official endorsement of the hybrid UN-AU peacekeeping force. According to the three- party joint statement, the November 16 agreement, and the AU Abuja agreement, the hybrid force would have a joint UN-AU command but be African-led, which the new resolution should reflect. SE Natsios replied that he wrote the November 16 agreement, which indicated that the hybrid force should be under UN control. Liu insisted that earlier agreements specified join control and that other formulations would be complicated. ¶5. (C) Liu said that, if the GOS agrees, a new Security Council resolution should propose a joint UN-AU mandate over the hybrid force, protection of civilians whose lives are in imminent danger, and the smooth transportation of aid. He noted that any peacekeeping mission had to have GOS support to be successful. China did not agree with placing all of the operative paragraphs in the resolution under Chapter VII. The GOS would object, and the international community needed the GOS on board for the peace-making process to come to a successful conclusion. Liu admitted that he did not discuss this issue in detail with the GOS, and therefore did not know the official GOS position. However, a new resolution does not need to refer to UNSCR 1706. ¶6. (C) Liu admitted that, even if the GOS wanted to repeal UNSCR 1706, that would not be feasible. That said, the international community needs to take into account GOS President al-Bashir's concerns. New Security Council resolutions need to focus on the political process and need to send a message to the GOS, the rebels, and countries in the region. The international community needs to urge rebels to coordinate and begin negotiating with the GOS ASAP. ¶7. (C) SE Natsios agreed with an emphasis on the political process, which has not yet received enough prominence. He said that Secretary Rice also underscored this point publicly. He praised the GOF for making the political process the first agenda item on the June 25 Darfur Conference in Paris. However, the GOS had told him that it has tried to divide the rebel groups to weaken them militarily. This tactic is contrary to the stated GOS goal of encouraging the rebels to form a negotiating counterpart and reaching an agreement that all rebel groups would accept. The division of the rebel groups, which the GOS has been trying to achieve, has thus made a political solution more difficult. Likewise, the GOS has a long history of signing agreements and then violating them, and interested PARIS 00002912 002 OF 002 nations had to ensure implementation this time. ¶8. (C) The GOS is complicating a solution in Darfur by giving landless Arabs from Chad, Niger, and Mauritania tribal land associated with the Fur ethnic group as well as Sudanese nationality so that they will support the present regime in the 2009 elections, SE Natsios continued. This tactic not only plays into the worst fears of the refugees, it also sows the seeds for further conflict as the refugees return home and find their traditional lands occupied by outsiders. Liu asked for hard evidence. Natsios cited satellite imagery of the area around four abandoned Fur villages now supporting crops, the fact that 45,000 to 90,000 Chadians moved across the border in the past month, and Niger's likely expulsion of 200,000 members of Niger's Rizeigat Tribe, who might go to Darfur. The GOS is also gerrymandering districts to dilute the African vote. Given all these factors, the goal should be to stabilize Darfur by the 2009 elections. ¶9. (C) Liu said that the common objective of the U.S. and China as strategic partners on this issue is that the GOS, the rebel tribes, and governments in the region reach a regional peace agreement. He ended the meeting by complaining that the U.S. media's treatment of the situation in Darfur and China's role, noting that the U.S. media was complicating progress. He said he was frustrated by this; he suggested that the USG "try to do something about it." ¶10. (U) The Special Envoy's office cleared this message. STAPLETON