SPECIAL ENVOY FOR SUDAN ANDREW NATSIOS' JUNE 25, 2007

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 002820 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/26/2017 TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV PREF PINS FR SU SUBJECT: SPECIAL ENVOY FOR SUDAN ANDREW NATSIOS' JUNE 25, 2007 MEETING WITH FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR ON AFRICA BRUNO JOUBERT Classified by: POL M/C Josiah Rosenblatt for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. French Presidential Advisor on Africa Bruno Joubert said on June 25 that Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner would hold a meeting with President Sarkozy within a week to gain his support to station French troops (along with local gendarmes and an international police force) in Eastern Chad to protect refugee camps from incursions and to decide overall French policy on other matters related to the Darfur crisis. Ideally, EU troops would replace French troops quickly, but several EU countries, particularly Germany, might resist. If France fails to obtain EU consensus, it hopes that several "like-minded" EU countries will provide troops. France supports a new UN Security Council resolution on Sudan, but believes that careful phrasing would be important in gaining the support of China and certain other Security Council members. Unanimous support would better influence the Government of Sudan (GOS). Joubert believed that international aid would be crucial to stabilizing Darfur prior to the July 2009 elections. He agreed to try to find ways to influence Sudan Liberation Movement leader Abdul Wahid to play a more constructive role in the international process to bring peace to Sudan. He also agreed that the number of fora dealing with Sudan needed rationalization and better coordination. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) On June 25, Special Envoy for Sudan Andrew Natsios discussed next steps in the Sudan peace process with French Presidential Advisor on Africa Bruno Joubert. French Presidency Technical Advisor Romain Serman, Natsios Chief of Staff Andrew Steinfeld, and econoff also attended. -------------- U.S. Support for Military Protection of Chad-based Refugee Camps -------------- ¶3. (C) Special Envoy (SE) Natsios expressed support for the French initiative to station troops, along with local gendarmes and an international police force, in Eastern Chad to ensure security inside the Chad-based camps for refugees from Darfur and at sites for displaced persons. This action, in addition to protecting civilians in Chad, would serve to send a message to both the GOS and the Janjaweed that they cannot attack Darfur civilians with impunity. Natsios said the USG could work with other Europeans to encourage support for the French initiative. Joubert said that he would hold a meeting with President Sarkozy within a week to convince him to support an enhanced French military presence, along with local gendarmes and an international police force, in Eastern Chad to protect the camps. (NOTE: Sarkozy is also planning to make key decisions on other Darfur-related matters. END NOTE.) Ideally, the military force would combine French with European troops, especially since Chad's President Deby would not support a larger UN force in Chad. The main problem with the French initiative, however, was support in other European countries, some of which wanted a clear exit strategy before supporting the initiative. Germany was especially problematic because the Bundestag was not generally supportive of sending German peace-keeping troops overseas. If the GOF could not obtain a European consensus on supporting this mission, France's hope would be to have several other European countries, such as Sweden or the Netherlands, commit troops. The UK might not participate because HMG's military is stretched thin in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the new UK Prime Minister likely would not want to commit to a new military engagement abroad. -------------- Paris Conference on Darfur to Pressure GOS -------------- ¶4. (C) The Paris June 25 Conference on Darfur (which took place shortly after the meeting with Joubert) would focus on how to deploy a hybrid UN-African Union (AU) force as soon as possible to keep pressure on the GOS, Joubert said. SE Natsios praised the GOF for placing the political process high on the agenda for the conference. Finding a political solution to the problems in Darfur was essential to solving the Darfur crisis, yet international meetings too often overlooked this dimension. Joubert favored Egypt's offer to provide 2,000 soldiers and vehicles as the basis for a UN Peacekeeping mission. SE Natsios noted the controversial nature of sending Egyptians into Darfur. Reports are that, when the GOS did not trust its own pilots to conduct aerial bombings of Darfur, it had used Egyptians. This had sewn distrust of Egyptians among IDPs in the Darfur-based camps. SE Natsios said that we all needed to work to help mobilize TCC?s for both the hybrid and the heavy support package. . PARIS 00002820 002 OF 003 -------------- New UNSC Resolution Necessary -------------- ¶5. (C) A new UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution on the hybrid force looked now to be necessary, but the U.S. did not want the new resolution to water down UNSCR 1706. Important elements should include clear UN command and control of the hybrid force, which could include non-Africans. The force should have a clear mandate under Chapter VII to protect civilians and aid workers. A sanctions resolution at the UNSC should remain an option should Sudan impede the hybrid force, or take other actions inimitable to peace. The international community can continue to develop the technical provisions of the sanctions in parallel to enable rapid implementation, if necessary. He noted that existing U.S. bilateral sanctions were hurting the GOS, and explained that we would like other like-minded Europeans to join sanctions on companies and individuals. Joubert did not commit, but asked for more information on precisely how US sanctions work. ¶6. (C) Joubert agreed and said that there were ways of writing the resolution to gain Chinese support. The drafters should focus on substance, not symbols. For instance, the resolution does not have to contain an explicit statement that the UN will lead the hybrid force, while, in fact, it would. He agreed that protection of civilians under imminent threat of violence was key. He indicated that the inclusion of non-Africans in the UN force was fine, but that the resolution would have to include language indicating that, to the extent possible, Africans should make up the hybrid force. Joubert noted repeatedly the sensitivities of the AU, and particularly the difficulty of working with Konare. -------------- Stabilize Darfur by July 2009 Elections -------------- ¶7. (C) According to SE Natsios, the goal should be to stabilize Darfur by the July 2009 elections. He has heard rumors in the refugee camps that the GOS would not allow those in the camps to vote. Additionally, the GOS is giving landless Arabs from Chad, Niger, and Mauritania tribal land associated with the Fur ethnic group as well as Sudanese nationality so that they will support the present regime in the election. This not only plays into the worst fears of the refugees, it also sews the seeds for further conflict as the refugees return home and find their traditional lands occupied by outsiders. The GOS is also gerrymandering districts to dilute the African vote. ¶8. (C) Joubert noted that unless the international community came up with USD 5-6 million for Darfur reconstruction, the area would not become peaceful. SE Natsios replied that GOS reconstruction money would be equally essential, as well as the decentralization of power. The GOS already committed to USD 30 million in compensation, but one official indicated that this sum could rise to USD 200 million. -------------- Abdul Wahid Needs to Be More Constructive -------------- ¶9. (C) SE Natsios said that he had met with Sudan Liberation Movement leader Abdul Wahid Mohamed Nour on June 24 (septel), who indicated that he would not attend the Kenya Conference organized by the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue (CHD). Joubert indicated that after the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials met with Abdul Wahid, they had the impression that he had much less leverage over rebel fighters than in the past. Abdul Wahid enjoys refugee status in France, which he would lose if he went back to Sudan. Since Abdul Wahid knows this and does not want to lose his status, he spends all of his time out of Sudan. His control over events in Sudan is naturally weakening. This shortcoming could be exposed at the Kenya Conference, which was likely the reason that he would not attend. SE Natsios noted that Abdul Wahid's desire to remain in France provided the GOF with some leverage over him. (Note: Abdul Wajid has a one-year carte de sejour or residence permit in France. End note.) The head of CHD planned to meet with Abdul Wahid the following week, and SE Natsios encouraged the GOF to use this leverage to encourage Abdul Wahid to be constructive. ¶10. (C) Rather than have several mediators in Sudan, Natsios believed the CHD should play this role. The CHD had some notable assets. As a Geneva-based organization, it was viewed as being neutral. CHD did not publicize its activities, encouraging frankness. It had neither a geopolitical agenda nor PARIS 00002820 003.2 OF 003 any American staff. Representatives of the Save Darfur organization openly supported Abdul Wahid. Since Foreign Minister Kouchner knows members of that group, Natsios expressed hope that Kouchner would talk to them to persuade Abdul Wahid to be less obstructionist. Joubert said he would talk to Kouchner. -------------- Stop the Forum Shopping -------------- ¶11. (C) Forum shopping was an increasing problem in the Sudan process, SE Natsios continued. Rebel leaders were negotiating with the sponsors of various fora and only attending those that provided them with an increased number of seats, speaking time, and other advantages. The number of fora needed to decrease and sponsors needed to coordinate more closely. Moreover, direct talks with the GOS reps and rebel leaders at international conferences were not always constructive. At Abuja, for instance, rebel leaders were outbidding each other to make demands to the GOS. Shuttle diplomacy could be more effective. Joubert agreed. ¶12. (C) While Eritrea wanted to play a constructive role, SE Natsios said, it had several liabilities. First, many in Darfur believed that the GOS promised to provide Eritrea with subsidized oil if it was able to broker an agreement between the GOS and the rebels. Second, Eritrea had detained rebel leaders, and they did not want to travel there. However, after the July Tripoli meeting involving rebel leaders, the contact group might consider a September meeting in Asmara to continue the attempt to bring them on board. . ¶13. (U) Natsios Chief of Staff Steinfeld cleared this cable. Stapleton