A/S FRIED'S JUNE 24 MEETING WITH FRENCH SPECIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 002723 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2017 TAGS: PREL LE FR SY SUBJECT: A/S FRIED'S JUNE 24 MEETING WITH FRENCH SPECIAL ENVOY COUSSERAN Classified By: Classified by PolMinCouns Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) Summary: A/S Fried and Department Counselor Cohen met June 24 with French Special Envoy Cousseran, FM Kouchner's point man for the Lebanese dialogue meeting to be held in Paris in mid-July. Cousseran had just concluded a visit to Tehran, meeting there with national security chief Larijani, Foreign Minister Mottaki, and Diplomatic Advisor to the Supreme Guide Velayati. Cousseran reported he had rejected Iranian arguments for a Lebanese national unity government. In the end, the Iranians accepted the French proposal for an informal Paris meeting of Lebanese government and opposition representatives. Cousseran said the failure on Friday of the Arab League's national dialogue effort, which he blamed on Syria, gave reason for pause, but it would not likely derail the French initiative. Cousseran (who had canceled an earlier visit to Damascus, following the Eido assassination) stated he would not travel to Syria. Citing Nahr al-Barid as only the latest evidence of Syria's determination to destabilize Lebanon, Cousseran said he did not see how speaking to the Syrians could be useful to Lebanon. Reporting on his meetings in Tehran, Cousseran described a leadership fixated by the country's rise to power while still fearful, particularly of U.S. and Israeli "sabotage." His said his Iranian interlocutors had never once defended Syria's Lebanon policy. Larijani had affirmed that Iran and Syria had different approaches to Lebanon, but had resisted further elaboration. Cousseran offered his own analysis: Syria has no future vision for Lebanon, which it views as a French invention; its intention is to "destroy the Lebanese framework," meaning Lebanese sovereignty. Iran, on the other hand, says it wants an independent Lebanon -- though what kind of Lebanon is not clear. Cousseran, Fried and Cohen agreed that France and the U.S. must continue to work closely together on Lebanon. End Summary. ¶2. (C) French Special Envoy on Lebanon Jean-Claude Cousseran met with A/S Fried and Counselor Cohen in the context of the Secretary's June 24-26 visit to Paris. (Cousseran had met SIPDIS with U/S Burns and A/S Fried in Washington on June 18, and had promised a read-out of his intervening visit to Tehran.) Ambassador Stapleton and DCM Pekala also attended. Cousseran described his just-concluded visit to Tehran, where he had met with Larijani, Mottaki, and Velayati -- two former foreign ministers and the current one. According to Cousseran, Larijani's responsibilities clearly extend to Lebanon, while Mottaki seemed to play less of a role. The fact that Velayati met with him was significant, said Cousseran, given his close ties to Khamenei. His involvement means that Lebanon is seen not only as an MFA issue of interest, but rises to the level of "Muslim matters" under the Supreme Guide's responsibility. ¶3. (C) Cousseran reported he had presented Kouchner's proposal of an informal Paris meeting of Lebanese government and opposition representatives, with the modest objective of dialogue. Larijani, who Cousseran described as the most at ease with the French, pushed for a more ambitious objective -- the negotiation and establishment of a national unity government. Cousseran rejected the Iranian proposal, insisting that Kouchner's intention was simply to meet with the Lebanese parties; there was to be no negotiation. He said he had reminded Larijani and Mottaki that France is not neutral on Lebanon. For thirty years it has sought to uphold Lebanese independence in the face of outside interference. France supports the Lebanese Government, the Seven-Point Plan, the Tribunal, and the various UNSCRs. (Cousseran said he had refused to discuss Iranian objections to the latter.) Failing to bring Cousseran around, all three Iranians in the end stated their acceptance of the French approach to the Paris meeting. Cousseran said that toward the tail-end of his talks, the Iranians introduced Hizballah representatives. ¶4. (C) Commenting on Iranian-Syrian dynamics, Cousseran noted the Iranian observation that Iran and Syria are "two countries with two approaches" ("deux regards"); pressed for further detail by A/S Fried, Cousseran said the Iranians had refused to elaborate. Interestingly they never once defended Syria's Lebanon policy, contenting themselves with the observation that France has no evidence for its accusations against Damascus. Cousseran judged that the secular Baath regime and the Islamic Republic had common interests but little mutual sympathy. While Syria has no future vision for Lebanon, which it views as a "French invention," Larijani stated that Iran wants one government in Lebanon, not two, and that Tehran is attached to the Lebanese national framework. Cousseran said he found it interesting that PARIS 00002723 002 OF 002 Larijani had taken this approach, given his deep familiarity with the French. How sincere he was is anyone's guess, and there are reasons to be skeptical. Commenting further on the Iranian world view, Cousseran said Tehran sees the U.S. and Israel as a "major problem"; they had used the word "sabotage" to describe the pressure Iran expected from the U.S and Israel, and this was not simply rhetorical, he added. Cousseran said there was no mention of UNIFIL, nor of Nahr al-Barid in the Tehran talks. Responding to A/S Fried's question, Cousseran stated there were currently no plans for another meeting with the Iranians. Follow-up phone calls are certainly possible; FM Kouchner would have to decide about further contact, but personally, said Cousseran, he wouldn't rule it out. ¶5. (C) Looking ahead, Cousseran noted that PM Siniora would be meeting Sarkozy on June 26. "After that we will see" where to go on the French proposal for a Paris meeting of Lebanese government and opposition representatives. Referring to the failed Arab League attempt over the weekend to bring the parties together in Beirut -- a failure which Cousseran laid at the door of Syria -- France would perhaps have to look again at its proposal. (Perhaps not, commented Cousseran later on his way out: perhaps the Arab League failure made the French meeting all that more necessary.) In any case, the meeting date will slip slightly, from late June to mid-July -- on or about July 15. Responding to Counselor Cohen's query about Syrian policy, Cousseran cited Nahr al-Barid as evidence of Syria's determination to destabilize Lebanon, attacking it where it is weakest -- the LAF. Yet the LAF had resisted: U.S. assistance had been crucial. That said, the LAF is still poorly equipped, and its ability to withstand continuing pressure cannot be assured. Cousseran commented that the Iranians had said nothing positive about Nahr al-Barid; he got the feeling they do not support Syria on it. He noted that it was significant that this operation was happening in the one part of Lebanon with no Hizballah presence: "Syria, not Hizballah or Iran, chose this." Responding to A/S Fried, Cousseran stated he is not planning a mission to Damascus: "I see no reason why speaking to the Syrians would be useful to Lebanon, considering things as they are." ¶6. (C) Counselor Cohen asked Cousseran if he saw signs, as the U.S. does, of a significant effort to rearm Hizballah through Syria. Cousseran responded in the affirmative, adding that France's approach is identical to that of the U.S.: Hizballah cannot remain a military force if it wants to participate in a democracy. Returning to the theme of differing Syrian and Iranian visions, Cousseran contrasted Syria's desire to destroy the Lebanese framework to Iranian views, which range from the minimal objective of protecting the Shi'a to a maximalist vision of an independent Lebanon dominated by the Shi'a through an armed Hizballah ¶7. (C) Responding to Counselor Cohen's question about the mood of Iran's senior leadership, Cousseran described a worldview deeply affected by a self-image of victimhood -- "a party of victims, of losers for twelve centuries" -- but which is fascinated by the country's current ascent to a position of regional power. By contrast, Syria is buying time; its currency is its capacity to do harm. Damascus, he stressed, is doing whatever it can do to destabilize Lebanon. It has a high tolerance for isolation, to which it has grown accustomed. The regime is confident that the West, in the end, prefers that Bashar remain in power, considering the alternatives. ¶8. (C) Fried and Cohen stressed the importance of France and the U.S. continuing to work closely together. Cousseran agreed, noting that we, the U.S. and France, share the same vision for Lebanon -- and that when we work together we succeed. ¶9. (C) A/S Fried has cleared this message. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON