A/S FRIED'S JUNE 24 MEETING WITH FRENCH SPECIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 002723

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2017
TAGS: PREL LE FR SY
SUBJECT: A/S FRIED'S JUNE 24 MEETING WITH FRENCH SPECIAL
ENVOY COUSSERAN


Classified By: Classified by PolMinCouns Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4
(B) and (D)


1. (C) Summary: A/S Fried and Department Counselor Cohen
met June 24 with French Special Envoy Cousseran, FM
Kouchner's point man for the Lebanese dialogue meeting to be
held in Paris in mid-July. Cousseran had just concluded a
visit to Tehran, meeting there with national security chief
Larijani, Foreign Minister Mottaki, and Diplomatic Advisor to
the Supreme Guide Velayati. Cousseran reported he had
rejected Iranian arguments for a Lebanese national unity
government. In the end, the Iranians accepted the French
proposal for an informal Paris meeting of Lebanese government
and opposition representatives. Cousseran said the failure
on Friday of the Arab League's national dialogue effort,
which he blamed on Syria, gave reason for pause, but it would
not likely derail the French initiative. Cousseran (who had
canceled an earlier visit to Damascus, following the Eido
assassination) stated he would not travel to Syria. Citing
Nahr al-Barid as only the latest evidence of Syria's
determination to destabilize Lebanon, Cousseran said he did
not see how speaking to the Syrians could be useful to
Lebanon. Reporting on his meetings in Tehran, Cousseran
described a leadership fixated by the country's rise to power
while still fearful, particularly of U.S. and Israeli
"sabotage." His said his Iranian interlocutors had never
once defended Syria's Lebanon policy. Larijani had affirmed
that Iran and Syria had different approaches to Lebanon, but
had resisted further elaboration. Cousseran offered his own
analysis: Syria has no future vision for Lebanon, which it
views as a French invention; its intention is to "destroy the
Lebanese framework," meaning Lebanese sovereignty. Iran, on
the other hand, says it wants an independent Lebanon --
though what kind of Lebanon is not clear. Cousseran, Fried
and Cohen agreed that France and the U.S. must continue to
work closely together on Lebanon. End Summary.



2. (C) French Special Envoy on Lebanon Jean-Claude Cousseran
met with A/S Fried and Counselor Cohen in the context of the
Secretary's June 24-26 visit to Paris. (Cousseran had met

SIPDIS
with U/S Burns and A/S Fried in Washington on June 18, and
had promised a read-out of his intervening visit to Tehran.)
Ambassador Stapleton and DCM Pekala also attended. Cousseran
described his just-concluded visit to Tehran, where he had
met with Larijani, Mottaki, and Velayati -- two former
foreign ministers and the current one. According to
Cousseran, Larijani's responsibilities clearly extend to
Lebanon, while Mottaki seemed to play less of a role. The
fact that Velayati met with him was significant, said
Cousseran, given his close ties to Khamenei. His involvement
means that Lebanon is seen not only as an MFA issue of
interest, but rises to the level of "Muslim matters" under
the Supreme Guide's responsibility.


3. (C) Cousseran reported he had presented Kouchner's
proposal of an informal Paris meeting of Lebanese government
and opposition representatives, with the modest objective of
dialogue. Larijani, who Cousseran described as the most at
ease with the French, pushed for a more ambitious objective
-- the negotiation and establishment of a national unity
government. Cousseran rejected the Iranian proposal,
insisting that Kouchner's intention was simply to meet with
the Lebanese parties; there was to be no negotiation. He
said he had reminded Larijani and Mottaki that France is not
neutral on Lebanon. For thirty years it has sought to uphold
Lebanese independence in the face of outside interference.
France supports the Lebanese Government, the Seven-Point
Plan, the Tribunal, and the various UNSCRs. (Cousseran said
he had refused to discuss Iranian objections to the latter.)
Failing to bring Cousseran around, all three Iranians in the
end stated their acceptance of the French approach to the
Paris meeting. Cousseran said that toward the tail-end of
his talks, the Iranians introduced Hizballah representatives.


4. (C) Commenting on Iranian-Syrian dynamics, Cousseran
noted the Iranian observation that Iran and Syria are "two
countries with two approaches" ("deux regards"); pressed for
further detail by A/S Fried, Cousseran said the Iranians had
refused to elaborate. Interestingly they never once defended
Syria's Lebanon policy, contenting themselves with the
observation that France has no evidence for its accusations
against Damascus. Cousseran judged that the secular Baath
regime and the Islamic Republic had common interests but
little mutual sympathy. While Syria has no future vision for
Lebanon, which it views as a "French invention," Larijani
stated that Iran wants one government in Lebanon, not two,
and that Tehran is attached to the Lebanese national
framework. Cousseran said he found it interesting that

PARIS 00002723 002 OF 002


Larijani had taken this approach, given his deep familiarity
with the French. How sincere he was is anyone's guess, and
there are reasons to be skeptical. Commenting further on the
Iranian world view, Cousseran said Tehran sees the U.S. and
Israel as a "major problem"; they had used the word
"sabotage" to describe the pressure Iran expected from the
U.S and Israel, and this was not simply rhetorical, he added.
Cousseran said there was no mention of UNIFIL, nor of Nahr
al-Barid in the Tehran talks. Responding to A/S Fried's
question, Cousseran stated there were currently no plans for
another meeting with the Iranians. Follow-up phone calls are
certainly possible; FM Kouchner would have to decide about
further contact, but personally, said Cousseran, he wouldn't
rule it out.


5. (C) Looking ahead, Cousseran noted that PM Siniora would
be meeting Sarkozy on June 26. "After that we will see"
where to go on the French proposal for a Paris meeting of
Lebanese government and opposition representatives.
Referring to the failed Arab League attempt over the weekend
to bring the parties together in Beirut -- a failure which
Cousseran laid at the door of Syria -- France would perhaps
have to look again at its proposal. (Perhaps not, commented
Cousseran later on his way out: perhaps the Arab League
failure made the French meeting all that more necessary.) In
any case, the meeting date will slip slightly, from late June
to mid-July -- on or about July 15. Responding to Counselor
Cohen's query about Syrian policy, Cousseran cited Nahr
al-Barid as evidence of Syria's determination to destabilize
Lebanon, attacking it where it is weakest -- the LAF. Yet
the LAF had resisted: U.S. assistance had been crucial.
That said, the LAF is still poorly equipped, and its ability
to withstand continuing pressure cannot be assured.
Cousseran commented that the Iranians had said nothing
positive about Nahr al-Barid; he got the feeling they do not
support Syria on it. He noted that it was significant that
this operation was happening in the one part of Lebanon with
no Hizballah presence: "Syria, not Hizballah or Iran, chose
this." Responding to A/S Fried, Cousseran stated he is not
planning a mission to Damascus: "I see no reason why
speaking to the Syrians would be useful to Lebanon,
considering things as they are."


6. (C) Counselor Cohen asked Cousseran if he saw signs, as
the U.S. does, of a significant effort to rearm Hizballah
through Syria. Cousseran responded in the affirmative,
adding that France's approach is identical to that of the
U.S.: Hizballah cannot remain a military force if it wants
to participate in a democracy. Returning to the theme of
differing Syrian and Iranian visions, Cousseran contrasted
Syria's desire to destroy the Lebanese framework to Iranian
views, which range from the minimal objective of protecting
the Shi'a to a maximalist vision of an independent Lebanon
dominated by the Shi'a through an armed Hizballah


7. (C) Responding to Counselor Cohen's question about the
mood of Iran's senior leadership, Cousseran described a
worldview deeply affected by a self-image of victimhood -- "a
party of victims, of losers for twelve centuries" -- but
which is fascinated by the country's current ascent to a
position of regional power. By contrast, Syria is buying
time; its currency is its capacity to do harm. Damascus, he
stressed, is doing whatever it can do to destabilize Lebanon.
It has a high tolerance for isolation, to which it has grown
accustomed. The regime is confident that the West, in the
end, prefers that Bashar remain in power, considering the
alternatives.


8. (C) Fried and Cohen stressed the importance of France and
the U.S. continuing to work closely together. Cousseran
agreed, noting that we, the U.S. and France, share the same
vision for Lebanon -- and that when we work together we
succeed.


9. (C) A/S Fried has cleared this message.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


STAPLETON