FRENCH MFA: GIVE US TIME ON KOSOVO; VETO IS THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 002485

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2017
TAGS: PREL UNSC PHUM PBTS KPAO YI FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA: GIVE US TIME ON KOSOVO; VETO IS THE
WORST CASE SCENARIO

REF: JUNE 8 PARIS POINTS

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT FOR REASONS 1.4 (B
) AND (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Hours before President Sarkozy announced his
proposal at the G-8 to delay a Kosovo final status UNSCR for
six months while the parties could continue discussions
(reftel),MFA Cabinet Advisor for the Balkans and Russia,
Isabelle Dumont, told us on June 7 that FM Kouchner wanted
more time to personally engage on the Kosovo final status
issue. Kouchner intends to visit Belgrade and Pristina and
wanted the opportunity to discuss options with the parties,
particularly the Serbs, lest there be a Russian veto in the
UN Security Council. Dumont stressed that France would find
it extremely difficult to consider the recognition of an
independent Kosovo without a UNSCR for legal cover; it would
split the quint and the EU. (NOTE: Sarkozy's G8 proposal
included the condition that absent an accord by the parties,
Ahtisaari's plan go into effect after the six month delay and
called on President Putin to recognize the inevitable
independence of Kosovo-- language used for the first time by
a high ranking French official. END NOTE) END SUMMARY

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MORE TIME, PLEASE
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2. (C) Isabelle Dumont, MFA Cabinet Advisor for the Balkans,
Russia, the Caucasus, OSCE, Central Asia, and the FSU
countries, told poloff on June 7 -- only hours before
President Sarkozy's G8 proposal for a six month delay on
Kosovo final status discussions -- that FM Kouchner wanted
more time to engage with the Serbs and Kosovars in the hope
of finding some common ground on a Kosovo final status
agreement. Dumont acknowledged that a settlement did not
appear likely and noted that Kouchner was not naive about the
possibilities, but did want time to at least "try." She
agreed with poloff's assertion that the parties had clearly
and consistently demonstrated that there was no agreement to
be found, but was less willing to admit that a delay might
serve to exacerbate tensions both between the parties, as
well as inside their respective territories.


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VETO IS THE WORST CASE SCENARIO
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3. (C) A Russian veto, Dumont said, would divide the quint
and the EU, immediately. Without what the GOF considers a
legal basis (i.e. a UNSCR),France would find it extremely
difficult to recognize an independent Kosovo. Even if French
authorities thought recognition was the most viable option,
she said, the GOF would not likely recognize Kosovo if some
EU members objected. Those objections, Dumont added, were a
near certainty at this point. Kouchner, she said, thought
this was clearly the worst case scenario, leaving France with
a legally impossible situation.

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PLANS B AND C ?
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4. (C) Dumont said she was spending most of her time working
on plans B and C. Plan B-- the optimistic alternative-- was
a face-saving proposal for Russia that would allow the
parties to return to a dialogue for a year or less. The
idea, she said, would have to include a guarantee that, at
the end of said time period, and absent an agreed settlement
between the parties, the UN Ahtisaari plan would
automatically take effect. Dumont hoped that Russia could
see this as a political win. Plan C, Dumont explained, would
be the adoption of a technical UNSCR that would mention
neither independence and the Ahtisaari plan nor UNSCR 1244.
(Legal experts at the MFA were still discussing implications
for 1244.) The idea would be to authorize and provide a legal
framework for the proposed ESDP and ICO missions, as well as
for KFOR. Plan C avoided a veto and assumed that Putin
continued his intransigence in which case the international
community needed to provide some legal framework for its
continued presence in Kosovo.

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COMMENT
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5. (C) Sarkozy's proposal for a six month delay of a UNSCR on

PARIS 00002485 002 OF 002


Kosovo final status (see reftel) appears to be in line with
Dumont's "optimistic" plan B. It was unclear, however, from
Sarkozy's public announcement of the proposal, whether his
plan foresaw specific guarantees from the Russians about the
status of Kosovo after the six month delay (i.e. the
automatic activation of the Ahtisaari plan). Sarkozy does
not appear to have strayed from the quint's conviction that
independence is the only possible outcome. His statement
calling on Putin to recognize the inevitable independence of
Kosovo was a first for a high level French official. We
should encourage the French to continue to use similar
language as we move forward.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


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