FRENCH WILL NOT LEAVE AFGHANISTAN; LESS PRESSURE

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 002359

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2017
TAGS: PREL NATO MOPS MARR IR FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH WILL NOT LEAVE AFGHANISTAN; LESS PRESSURE
ON IRAQ; EU IS THE PRIORITY

REF: PARIS 2208

Classified By: AMBASSADOR CRAIG R. STAPLETON FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) and (d
)


1. (C) SUMMARY: MFA Political Director Gerard Araud told the
Ambassador on June 4 that President Sarkozy had made a
decision the previous day that France would not leave
Afghanistan, but did want to begin discussing an exit
strategy in a restricted format (Germany, the UK, the U.S.,
and France). Araud said that Sarkozy intended to increase
military training assistance by augmenting the number of
embedded teams from one to 14 (we presume he was referring to
NATO's Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams, or OMLTs).
On Iraq, Araud reiterated (ref) that the GOF would be backing
off from statements by the previous administration suggesting
the U.S. should have a time horizon for withdrawal. Araud
said Sarkozy was also heavily involved in working to obtain
support for an EU simplified treaty, if only to shift blame
for any future impasse to another country. Araud said that
Pierre Vimont remained the top candidate to become Ambassador
to the U.S., but that it was not yet a done deal. END SUMMARY

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AFGHANISTAN
--------------


2. (C) President Sarkozy decided during a restricted cabinet
meeting on June 3 that France would stay in Afghanistan and
augment military training assistance, Araud said. Araud
focused on Sarkozy's decision to increase military training
assistance (again we assume he was referring to the OMLTs)
and downplayed the request to discuss an exit strategy in a
restricted format by noting that the discussions did not
necessarily need to come to any conclusions for the time
being. He added that we should begin to prepare for the
unavoidable -- that some European governments would bow to
their public opinion and withdraw before the U.S. and NATO
were necessarily prepared to call the mission complete.
Reiterating his earlier comment (reftel),Araud laid out his
Qasoning very simply, saying, "the Taliban can't win, NATO
can't win, and we have years and years of fighting ahead of
us, while European public opinion is tiring quickly... the
only outcome is Afghanization... we need to begin discussing
at what point we will be ready to turn the responsibility
over to the Afghans." Araud insisted that the talks would be
aimed at discussing what the "end-game" should look like, but
would not be a premise for France's withdrawal. He did not
offer specific requests on format or timing, except to say,
"soon."

--------------
IRAQ
--------------


3. (C) Araud noted that the GOF would be backing off from
statements about Iraq and calls on the U.S. to provide a
horizon for an eventual withdrawal. The new administration,
he said, saw no utility in such rhetoric.

--------------
EU TREATY
--------------


4. (C) Araud expressed some optimism that Sarkozy was making
headway with other EU member states on his call for a
"simplified" treaty. Even if France did not succeed, at a
minimum its current activism would shift responsibility for
any potential impasse from France to another country. Araud
praised Presidential Diplomatic Advisor Jean-David Levitte
for the strategy, which he likened to a French children's
game similar to "Old Maid." For the moment, he said, it
appeared that either the British or the Polish would become
the key obstacle. While PM Tony Blair might agree to the
simplified treaty, signals from Gordon Brown were not
particularly positive though he remained somewhat of an
unknown quantity. Araud argued that the Poles were the wild
card because of their unpredictability. As it stood, the
current signals from Warsaw were rather negative. Sarkozy
remained engaged, he said, and the EU and domestic issues
would likely be taking up most of his summer straight through
the UNGA in September.

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FRENCH AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S.
--------------


5. (C) Araud said that Pierre Vimont was still the top choice
to be Ambassador to the U.S., but noted that the lack of an

active Mrs. Vimont was working against him. Because the
social duties of an Ambassador to the U.S. were rather
demanding, this was actually a fairly serious issue, he
added. Despite all that, Araud said he felt fairly
comfortable with whatever the final decision would be since
it now appeared that Sarkozy would choose someone from inside
the foreign affairs establishment.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


STAPLETON