JOHNNY ABDO TELLS THE LAF NOT TO PLAY INTO SYRIA'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 002286

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SIPDIS

NSC FOR MARCHESE/SINGH/ABRAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/30/2017
TAGS: PREL FR LE PGOV
SUBJECT: JOHNNY ABDO TELLS THE LAF NOT TO PLAY INTO SYRIA'S
HANDS

REF: PARIS 1307

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: On May 29, former Lebanese Military
Intelligence Chief Johnny Abdo said he recently advised LAF
Commander Michel Suleiman not to play into Syria's hands in
resolving the crisis in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp. Abdo
said Syria's strategy was to goad the LAF into a pitched
battle with the Palestinians. Consequently, he advised
Suleiman instead to limit the LAF to a supporting role while
letting friendly Palestinian forces take down Fatah
al-Islam's militants. Abdo despaired of the Christian
community's ability to rally behind a presidential candidate
other than Michel Aoun, said he was advising Saad Hariri not
to become Prime Minister, and indicated he would not be
surprised if the Sarkozy government were to intensify its
contacts with Syria. End summary.

Beating Syria at its Own Game
--------------


2. (C) Johnny Abdo, who served as Lebanon's Chief of Military
Intelligence during the Lebanese civil war, told us May 29
that he called LAF Commander Michel Suleiman (with whom he
rarely speaks) on or about May 25 to offer advice on handling
the crisis in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp. Abdo said he
was fully convinced that Fatah al-Islam was a Syrian
surrogate, and that Syria's aim in nurturing Palestinian
extremist groups was to goad the LAF into a pitched battle.
Such a battle would demonstrate that the Palestinians (not
Hizballah) were the source of Lebanon's instability, and
would likely spill over into the other refugee camps and
quickly overwhelm the LAF's military capabilities and
political cohesion -- thus setting the stage for a return of
Syrian control.


3. (C) Abdo told Suleiman that he must not fall into the trap
Damascus had set for the LAF. Rather than committing the
army to a frontal assault on Nahr al-Bared, Suleiman should
resolve the stand-off through an "intelligence operation" in
which 300 or so friendly Palestinian fighters would slip into
the camp and neutralize the Fatah al-Islam militants. The
LAF would play a supporting role as needed.


4. (C) Abdo said he subsequently spoke to Druze leader Walid
Jumblatt, who told him that Suleiman had greatly appreciated
Abdo's advice. Nevertheless, Abdo told us he remained
worried about the potential for disaster, not least if the
GOL becomes paralyzed by indecision. He criticized the GOL
for saying that it would take a cabinet decision to authorize
the LAF to enter the camp. "They should have declared it a
military zone and authorized the army to take all necessary
action," said Abdo, adding that time is not on the army's
side. "The army is less confessional than other institutions
in Lebanon, but it is still confessional. Any military
operation that lasts longer than three days will start to rip
the army apart (along confessional lines)," Abdo observed
darkly. Abdo singled out current military intelligence chief
George Khoury as an impediment to a successful resolution of
the crisis, saying that Khoury remained loyal to Damascus.
Finally, Abdo noted wryly that Michel Suleiman was not
entirely pleased that the U.S. had been so forthcoming in
meeting the LAF's ammunition needs (including those of
Lebanon's Gazelle helicopters),inasmuch as the rapid
resupply effort had deprived Suleiman of an excuse for
inactivity.

March 14's Image Problem
--------------


5. (C) Turning to the political fortunes of the March 14
majority (which he supports),Abdo said he remained convinced
(reftel) that March 14 is slowly surrendering to the
Syrian-backed opposition. "If anything, it has gotten worse"
said Abdo, who decried the Christian community's inability to
produce, and rally behind, an alternative to Michel Aoun in
the upcoming presidential election. Abdo skewered several
potential contenders, saying Samir Geagea failed to convince
anyone that he had turned over a new leaf, whereas Central
Bank Governor Riad Salameh probably could not be elected
without a constitutional amendment (for which there was no
political appetite, given the unfortunate precedent with
Lahoud).


6. (C) The underlying problem, according to Abdo, is that

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most Lebanese equate March 14 with Saad Hariri and the Sunni
community. Consequently, any candidate backed by March 14
will be seen as a Sunni stooge. In an effort to give March
14 a face-lift, Abdo said he had repeatedly urged Saad to
name a Christian as the movement's secretary-general, but to
no avail. Admitting that his influence on Saad was limited
(Saad similarly brushed off Abdo's advice that he not try to
become prime minister, and may have been annoyed when Abdo
advised him not to launch a Sunni political party),Abdo
contrasted the young Hariri to his late father: "Rafik had a
gift -- when he spoke to you, he always made you feel needed.
With Saad, when you look him in the eyes you get the feeling
that he's thinking to himself: 'I talk to Chirac, Putin,
etc., so why do I need you?'"

French-Syrian Relations
--------------


7. (C) With regard to the future of French-Syrian relations
under President Sarkozy's new government, Abdo said he would
not be surprised to see stronger ties between Paris and
Damascus. He noted that during the final months of the
Chirac presidency, Syrian military intelligence chief Assef
Shawqat made multiple trips to Paris. When Abdo tipped off
Nazek Hariri to one of Shawqat's visits, Nazek raised it with
Chirac, who was "stunned and furious" to discover that
Shawqat was in Paris at the invitation of French
intelligence. "Chirac had no idea what they (his
intelligence services) were doing . . . one of my contacts in
French intelligence told me that France had interests that
were more important than Chirac's friendship with the
Hariris. But I think Sarkozy, who was Minister of the
Interior at the time, knew exactly what was going on," said
Abdo. In addition, Abdo claimed that French intelligence
passed a message in 2006 to Lebanese President Emile Lahoud
telling him that it was ok to criticize Chirac, but not
France; Lahoud's assumption, Abdo added, was that the message
originated with Sarkozy.


8. (C) Comment: Abdo's web of contacts and his close
connection to Nazek Hariri provides him with an intriguing,
if necessarily remote, perspective on Lebanese events. As
always, we defer to Embassy Beirut as to the accuracy of his
analysis.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


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