FRENCH INITIATIVES ON DARFUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 002263 SIPDIS SIPDIS PASS TO D, AF/SE, AF/SPG, AND EUR/WE E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2016 TAGS: PREL PHUM PINR CD SU FR SUBJECT: FRENCH INITIATIVES ON DARFUR REF: A. PARIS 2198 B. STATE 73693 C. LARREA-D'ELIA 5/30 E-MAIL Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah B. Rosenblatt. Reas ons 1.4b,d ¶1. (C) Summary: The French Government is finalizing an accelerated policy review of options on Darfur that promises a substantial uptick in diplomatic and other engagement, including a proposed ministerial-level Contact Group meeting in Paris on June 25 (Ref A). President Sarkozy will receive FM Kouchner on June 5 to review and decide on a set of recommendations, according to separate remarks on May 30 by a Presidency African Affairs Adviser and the MFA Sudan Desk Officer. The accelerated policy review would enable France to demonstrate leadership on Darfur during the June 6-8 G-8 Summit, at the June 18 EU GAERC, and the June 21-22 EU Council. End Summary. ¶2. (C) In follow-up conversations to Ref A, Remi Marechaux (Adviser for African Affairs at the French Presidency) and MFA Sudan Desk Officer Frederic Bouvier clarified the status of an ongoing French policy review on Darfur. Both stated that President Sarkozy would receive FM Kouchner on June 5 to review and decide on a set of recommendations. The accelerated policy review would enable President Sarkozy to demonstrate leadership on Darfur during the June 6-8 G-8 Summit and the June 21-22 EU Council. As reported Ref A, Foreign Minister Kouchner wants to host an expanded meeting of the Sudan Contact Group at Ministerial level. The target date is June 25, which would permit Germany to participate as EU Presidency. The expanded meeting would be exceptional in that it would include China, Russia, Egypt, and South Africa in addition to the standard Contact Group, comprising the P-3, major donors Norway, Netherlands, and Canada, as well as the EU, AU and UN. Bouvier, speaking in advance of the 30 May G-8 meeting of Foreign Ministers in Potsdam, believed Kouchner might propose the Ministerial during conversations with counterparts and possibly extend an invitation on the spot to all G-8 members, expanding Ministerial attendance still further. Asked if FM Kouchner might also invite Libya and Eritrea, Bouvier insisted their attendance was not foreseen. ¶3. (C) Bouvier said the MFA, MoD, and Elysee had already met on May 23 to review an initial package of proposals for French engagement on Darfur. There had been some MoD pushback on a potential increase in responsibilities for French military forces in Chad, requiring adjustments to the package, primarily a menu of alternatives for a presidential decision. Bouvier said the policy review tackled three principal issues: 1) Humanitarian needs and refugee security in eastern Chad; 2) How to boost humanitarian operations in Darfur; 3) Bilateral support for AMIS. The overall package would recommend increased French engagement but also heightened European involvement, including in Eastern Chad, where Bouvier suggested that Operation Epervier ("Sparrowhawk"),the ongoing French military operation, could begin to incorporate EU partners. ¶4. (C) FM Kouchner was examining how French and European military forces could reinforce security and humanitarian assistance for encamped Darfur refugees, ideally under an EU and UN mandate. (Note: This would entail a change in the current mandate for Operation Epervier.) Another target was the establishment of a humanitarian corridor through which aid could reach Darfur, on the condition that the WFP backed the proposal. Bouvier said this would, in effect, constitute a third humanitarian corridor, since some aid already reached Darfur via Port Sudan and from Libya. Bouvier discounted the notion, related in the major French dailies Le Monde and Le Figaro, that French or European forces would extend the humanitarian corridor onto Sudanese territory. FM Kouchner could however call for French forces to safeguard select border crossings in order to facilitate passage for humanitarian assistance. FM Kouchner also had floated the idea of aerial delivery of assistance to those areas of Darfur that remained inaccessible. The WFP, in a preliminary reaction, had expressed enthusiasm for opening border crossings. (Note: Bouvier found it ironic that WFP might prefer to use the humanitarian corridor and the border crossings to transport materials in the opposite direction PARIS 00002263 002 OF 002 than originally conceived -- namely, supplying Chad from Darfur with assistance transported overland from Port Sudan, rather than supplying Darfur from Chad.) France also would inject immediate bilateral aid to AMIS, Bouvier commented. Bouvier noted that France already provides substantial aid via EU channels, namely the European Development Fund (EDF), and that France would maintain this support. ¶5. (C) Regarding the U.S. sanctions initiative, Bouvier commented that the Ministry had "taken note" (Ref B). The GoF disagreed fundamentally with the decision to designate JEM Khalil Ibrahim and Sudan State Minister Harun. With Ibrahim, the priority should instead be to coax his return to negotiations. In fact, the MFA was now prepared to permit Ibrahim's return to France, where he legally has refugee status, provided Ibrahim first makes a concrete commitment to dialogue. As to Harun, the MFA would continue to respect the explicit request by the ICC that the UNSC not sanction individuals under investigation on the argument that the UNSC would otherwise compromise ICC autonomy. Both Bouvier and MFA Action Officer for UN Peacekeeping and Sanctions Franck Paris commented on May 31 that the GoF found the unilateral U.S. initiative understandable, given the U.S. domestic focus on Darfur. That said, the GoF was waiting to see how it would translate into action at the Security Council. ¶6. (C) Africa Watcher imparted to both Bouvier and Paris the USG position that UNSCR 1706 was sufficient to authorize a hybrid AU-UN deployment in Darfur (Ref C). He also shared USG concerns that at the unfortunate precedent should the UNSC dilute UNSCR 1706 or renege on its application. Bouvier, for his part, commented that UNSCR 1706 was insufficient for the hybrid AU-UN deployment. Paris highlighted the juridical problem that the agreed UN-AU mandate for the hybrid force did not correspond to UNSCR ¶1706. He agreed nonetheless that there might be procedural or tactical means by which to maintain the centrality of UNSCR 1706, perhaps by appending the UN-AU accord as an annex or by adopting a Presidential Statement to complement UNSCR ¶1706. Paris said the GoF had similar concerns about the precedent of unimplemented UNSC resolutions with regard to Cote d'Ivoire. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON