THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MAY 15 MEETING WITH FRENCH PRESIDENT SARKOZY'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR JEAN-DAVID LAVITTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 002095 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2017 TAGS: PREL FR EUN ECON SENV PGOV NATO IZ IR AF TU SUBJECT: THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S MAY 15 MEETING WITH FRENCH PRESIDENT SARKOZY'S DIPLOMATIC ADVISOR JEAN-DAVID LAVITTE Classified By: Ambassador Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (B & D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The Deputy Secretary met informally May 15 with President-elect Sarkozy's Diplomatic Advisor-designate, Jean-David Levitte, to explore the U.S.-French foreign policy agenda in advance of Sarkozy's assumption of office on May ¶16. Levitte cautioned against expecting dramatic changes in French foreign policy, although there would be a change in tone, while stressing that Sarkozy's top priorities would include climate change and Darfur and reiterating Sarkozy's opposition to Turkish EU membership. Levitte affirmed that Sarkozy would want to pursue a stronger U.S.-French relationship; that Sarkozy's comments on Afghanistan were made in the context of wanting to help free a French hostage, and did not represent a change in French policy toward its NATO/ISAF commitments; and, that he would keep an initial distance from Russia. Levitte confirmed his own expanded mandate (to include African Affairs) as the President's Diplomatic Advisor and Bernard Kouchner's selection as Foreign Minister. In a May 16 meeting, prominent French international affairs analysts did not believe Sarkozy's idea of a Mediterranean Union would become a reality anytime soon, especially if there is no progress on the Western Sahara, and they predicted Sarkozy would show less "Gallic embarrassment" on missile defense. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) The Deputy Secretary, accompanied by the Ambassador, held an initial meeting May 15 with President-elect Sarkozy's Diplomatic Advisor-designate (and National Security Advisor-equivalent) Jean-David Levitte to discuss France's probable foreign policy orientation under a Sarkozy presidency. The meeting took place at the Ambassador's residence, given that Levitte was meeting with the Deputy Secretary in an unofficial capacity (Sarkozy was officially installed as President on May 16). On May 16, the Deputy Secretary exchanged views over lunch with noted former Mitterrand advisor and Sarkozy friend Jacques Attali, strategic affairs specialist Francois Heisbourg, and Americanist Nicole Bacharan. EXPECT CONTINUITY IN FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY -------------- ¶3. (C) Levitte cautioned the Deputy Secretary at the outset of the meeting against expecting dramatic changes in French foreign policy under a Sarkozy presidency, although there would be a change in tone. He hastened to add that he had yet to hold extensive consultations with Sarkozy about his foreign policy views. Levitte said he had had two meetings with Sarkozy, but that they had focused primarily on organizational issues rather than policy questions. Levitte confirmed press reports that his mandate would be broader than that of his predecessor, to include supervision of the Presidency's Africa cell. Confirming that Bernard Kouchner would be named as Foreign Minister, Levitte said he would need to broaden his horizons beyond running an NGO (Medecins sans Frontieres); both he and the MFA bureaucracy would require a little time to adjust to one another. U.S.-FRENCH RELATIONS -------------- ¶4. (C) Indicating that his own pro-U.S. orientation was already well known, Levitte assured the Deputy Secretary that Sarkozy was eager to work with the United States. That said, France would insist on being treated as an equal partner, and should be consulted as such. CLIMATE CHANGE -------------- ¶5. (C) Levitte indicated that climate change would be a top domestic and international priority for Sarkozy, perhaps his top priority. The Deputy Secretary defended the U.S. record on climate change, with the Ambassador pointing out a number of technological advances the U.S. was making to reduce emissions, or at a minimum the rate of growth of emissions, despite our non-ratification of Kyoto. The Deputy Secretary and the Ambassador stressed USG willingness to work together with the Sarkozy government in a way that would further both our interests. AFGHANISTAN -------------- ¶6. (C) The Deputy Secretary requested a clarification of Sarkozy's views on continuing French engagement in Afghanistan, given the statements he had made to the effect that France would not remain in Afghanistan permanently. Levitte responded by acknowledging that France had interests in Afghanistan, including two French-language schools, and agreed with the U.S. on the continuing Taliban threat. He explained that Sarkozy's statement should be understood within the context of the government's then-ongoing efforts to secure the release of French hostages, and did not represent any change in French policy. PARIS 00002095 002 OF 002 IRAQ -------------- ¶7. (C) The Deputy Secretary stressed the important role the ongoing regional conferences on Iraq could play in building up international support for a sovereign Iraq. Levitte promised that France would continue to participate in such conferences at a suitably high level. He added that a precipitate U.S. withdrawal from Iraq also was not in France's interest. He did not offer any specifics as to how France might increase its support. DARFUR -------------- ¶8. (C) Levitte emphasized the importance of doing more on Darfur. He added that this was likely to be a very high priority for incoming Foreign Minister Kouchner, in part because it would give Kouchner, on an issue he personally cares about, an opening to make an immediate impact on the international stage. Levitte noted French deployments in Chad and the C.A.R. as evidence of France's engagement and stressed the potential for spillover. But it would be difficult to do more militarily, as French forces were stretched thin. For that reason, French efforts would focus primarily on diplomatic action. EU, TURKEY, RUSSIA -------------- ¶9. (C) In response to a question from the Deputy Secretary, Levitte reviewed briefly Sarkozy's strategy for working with the UK and Germany to push forward the idea of a simplified treaty that could be ratified by member states without recourse to a referendum. The Deputy Secretary asked about Sarkozy's opposition to Turkey, reviewing the strategic reasons behind U.S. support for eventual Turkish membership. Levitte indicated that it would be very difficult to change Sarkozy's views on Turkey. The Deputy Secretary urged the French to keep an open mind and refrain at least from closing the door completely. Levitte commented in passing that Sarkozy would also take a tougher line on Russia, adding that Sarkozy would not be in a hurry to visit Putin anytime soon. MEETING WITH INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ANALYSTS -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The Deputy Secretary's meeting covered the French political scene as well as foreign policy issues. The Deputy Secretary reviewed U.S. thinking on Iraq stabilization, the SIPDIS Middle East peace process, Iran, Syria, and Latin American free trade agreements. The international affairs analysts noted Sarkozy's decision to strengthen the mandate of his Diplomatic Advisor, subordinating not only the role of the Africa cell, but also that of the President's military advisor. This obviated the need to create a separate NSC structure, an idea which has been apparently discarded. Heisbourg described Kouchner and Sarkozy as "compatible" with respect to their "interventionist" approach to international humanitarian and human rights crises. Attali and Heisbourg were skeptical that Sarkozy would change his hard-line views on Turkish EU membership, and they predicted that Sarkozy's vision of a Mediterranean Union would not progress given political realities on the other side of the Mediterranean, noting specifically Moroccan-Algerian relations, which would not improve until a solution was found on the Western Sahara. Heisbourg recommended U.S. efforts with Algeria, given increasing American influence there. Heisbourg also suggested that Sarkozy would be less afflicted by "Gallic embarrassment" than his predecessors in dealing with issues such as missile defense. ¶11. (U) This message was cleared by the Deputy Secretary's party. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON