MAY 2 BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001947

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

THE HAGUE FOR CWC DELAGATION; GENEVA FOR BWC DELATION.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2017
TAGS: PARM PREL GM UK FR
SUBJECT: MAY 2 BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION
CONSULTATIONS WITH THE UK, FRANCE, AND GERMANY IN PARIS.

REF: PARIS 1870

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, Reason 1
.4 B/D

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Overview
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1. (C) The French hosted consultations on biological weapons
(BW) nonproliferation with the U.S., UK, and Germany in
Paris, May 2, 2007. (May 3 chemical weapons discussions are
reported reftel). New French and UK Heads of Delegation for
this round of "Close Allies" reinvigorated discussions,
facilitating a much-needed exchange on BW issues across the
board. The positive climate created by the December
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Review Conference should
be capitalized on as planning proceeds for the August BWC
Experts Meeting, which will emphasize enforcement of national
implementation and regional cooperation on BWC
implementation. All agreed that during the 2007-2010 Work
Program the focus should be on - and come from - regional
actors promoting their national and sub-regional progress on
implementation, unlike during the initial 2003 session on
this topic, where Western countries dominated with
presentations and discussion. Unlike previously, the French
included G-8 Global Partnership and bioterrorism, as well as
the Australia Group, on the agenda, allowing a more thorough
review of cross-cutting issues that should become a regular
emphasis for coordination between the most active and
influential countries in the area of biological weapons
nonproliferation.


2. (C) The U.S. delegation was headed by ISN Bureau Deputy
Assistant Secretary Donald Mahley, accompanied by an
interagency team. Newly-arrived Deputy Head of the FCO,s
Counter-proliferation Department, Chris Rampling, made a
solid introduction with assistance from the departing head of
the CBW section, Sarah Broughton. The Germans were
represented by Peter Beerwerth of the MFA,s CW Section. The
six-person French delegation was headed by the DAS-equivalent
Head of the MFA,s BW/CW/Conventional Weapons Division,
Camille Grand.

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Assessment of Sixth Review Conference
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3. (C) French host Grand commented that with agreement on the
Implementation Support Unit (ISU),a strong focus on CBMs and
universality, an agreed 2007-2010 Work Program, and a
comprehensive Final Document, the 2006 BWC Review Conferences
was successful and had reinforced the importance of the
Convention. U.S. Rep Mahley pointed out that a key
underlying success, which should be exploited over the next
five years, was that the non-aligned movement (NAM) countries
were noticeably less aggressive and unified. The positive
outcome from such an approach ought to lead to more
engagement with moderate NAM countries to keep them from
reverting to more radical positions that could adversely
impact on willingness of States to provide assistance to
their national efforts to counter BW. UK and German rep
agreed.

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Universality and National Implementation Measures
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4. (C) National Implementation Measures. German expert Beck
gave an overview of the "EU Joint Action" consisting
primarily of awareness-raising seminars and bilaterals to
persuade countries to join the BWC. Workshops in Nairobi,
Bangkok, Costa Rica and Senegal have been carefully
structured for the region; although unlike bilateral visits,
few direct requests for assistance have arisen from the
seminars, with the exception of Peru and Burundi. Jordan
will host a seminar with the EU in June that will combine a
push for key Middle Eastern countries to accede to the BWC
with the offer of closer work on diagnostics and disease
surveillance. Beck reminded that the ISU mandate allows for
compiling information on national implementation, without
giving them room to help States Parties directly. He also
indicated that the WHO, OIE and EU WMD Coordinator Gianella
were working together in support of the Joint Action.


5. (C) Dels agreed on the value of coordinating efforts to
increase BWC membership. The U.S. will establish a "virtual

working group" in which the Close Allies and others, on a
selective basis, can communicate electronically on what each
government, the ISU, RevCon Chairman Khan, etc., may be
undertaking to bring non-States Parties on board. It was
noted that this may also be useful as we push to get national
implementation measures in place and through Parliaments.

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Iranian Amendment Proposal
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6. (C) Grand thanked the UK/U.S. (as BWC Depositaries along
with Russia) for its draft Note for use as a template in
responding to the Russians with a negative "vote" against the
proposed Iranian amendment to include "use" in the Preamble
and Article I of the BWC. He said that a change to the BWC
would not affect customary law as set out by the Geneva
Protocol (France is Depositary),which bans use. The French
have notified the Russians they oppose the BWC amendment.
Only a half dozen EU members have sent such Notes, despite an
internal EU push. It was not clear if the WEOG Coordinator
has circulated the template to the larger Western Group. The
Russians are keen to respond to the Iranians at some
juncture. The U.S. and UK are determining if our
national/Depositary responses later in the process will
include a declaratory statement on the amendment request
having failed.

--------------
2007 Meeting of Experts
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7. (C) Potential Presentations. Delegations offered thinking
on the August 20-24 Experts Meeting on national
implementation and regional coordination. Beck outlined an
EU plan, with support from an EU task force, to establish a
matrix/database to allow "stock-taking" of the 27 EU
members, progress on national implementation, along the
lines of that used by the UNSYG,s 1540 Committee which has
categories for prohibitions and export controls. The EU
Joint Action, noted above, supports a website containing
modules with information on how to complete national
implementation actions. Rampling interjected that, while
this work would be good to showcase, the objective for the
August meeting was to get others to make presentations; he
mentioned Serbia, Libya and Malaysia as promising candidates.
U.S. rep agreed with Rampling,s assessment and noted ISU
staff interest in Malaysia, Nigeria and South Africa as key
regional players that may be willing to talk about the
benefits of international/regional cooperation in supporting
national implementation.


8. (C) Structure. U.S. rep said that the Chairman of the
2007 meetings (Pakistani Geneva PermRep Khan, President of
the 2006 RevCon) needs this meeting to be a success, and
should put as much energy into lining up NAM presentations as
anyone. He agreed to contact Khan to determine his thinking
on the meeting and report back to the three. Dels agreed
that the structure of the meeting should allow for opening
day briefings by Interpol and Vertic, who are leading IGO and
NGO efforts to track national efforts towards BWC
implementation, to set the tone for presentations to follow
from States Parties. The next day and a half should focus on
national implementation directly, while the latter day and a
half focuses on regional cooperation/assistance on
implementation.


9. (C) Implementation Support Unit. Beck indicated that the
ISU may not be up and functioning to the degree expected due
to delays at UN Headquarters over filling the P-5 and P-4
positions, despite tacit acceptance by RevCon participants on
keeping the current "permanent" staff, Lennane and Millet.
All agreed to supplement the ISU functions by making
demarches to capitals on attendance, participation and
national follow-through.

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UN SYG Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use
of BW (or CW)
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10. (C) Quite unexpectedly, the French raised the issue of
preserving the expertise of UNMOVIC in New York - which no
longer has a WMD investigative role in Iraq. (France has
supported the idea of retaining UNMOVIC and its personnel as
an investigative body should there be a need to investigate
alleged use of WMD.) Other delegations understood this issue

as already resolved, with the imminent dissolution of
UNMOVIC. Mahley reiterated the strongly-held U.S. view that
UNMOVIC staff will return to their countries and serve as
national experts in BW and other WMD/Missile fields. He also
said that their "expertise" in investigating weapons
production might well be relevant for investigating BW use,
as the technical knowledge required for various
investigations might not be different for different
scenarios. Having such a body exist indefinitely would
render experts obsolete and smack of an Organization for the
Prohibition of Biological Weapons, which is a known
non-starter for the U.S.


11. (C) Each del then outlined its approach to supporting the
agreed goal of having a current set of experts available
should the UNSYG mechanism be called upon. Mahley reiterated
the U.S. commitment to make available experts and
laboratories should a specific need arise. He said it would
be useful to establish ) through outreach and training )
greater expertise in other regions, particularly NAM
countries, which would provide benefits nationally, but also
could be called upon, for example, in the case of natural
disease outbreaks or a terrorist incident. UK Del Rep
supported dissolution of UNMOVIC and indicated that the FCO
maintained a current list of experts and facilities to be
utilized by the UN around the clock. Beck indicated that
Germany has provided lists of experts directly to the UN
Department of Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA) to aid in the quick
constitution of a team should an incident occur. He,
personally, had hoped for a greater review of the UNSYG
mechanism at the RevCon; it makes sense to review related
technologies (e.g., diagnostics have changed since the 1980s
with advances in PCR technologies, etc.). Beck also
clarified that there is an internal UN review by
"consultants" (as called for the 1989 report calling for the
mechanism) of any request for an investigation and only after
this review does the UNSYG determine whether to launch an
investigation. U.S. Del rep reminded that UNSCOM, not
UNMOVIC, did the majority of investigation related to BW in
Iraq and that this community stays in close touch ) the
UNDDA person holding the lists of experts is a key
personality in this group of experts.


12. (C) CBMs. German expert Beck raised the topic of CBMs
in an effort to seek agreement on "improving" the CBM process
prior to the Seventh RevCon in 2011. Grand said France sees
room for improvement in the basic questionnaire. Although a
new version would have to be agreed by the Seventh RevCon,
work should start early on developing a document which would
increase the numbers of submissions and cut down on
inaccuracies. UK del rep relayed that the Swiss plan to
submit CBMs in both the agreed format and in the "new format"
they had been working hard on prior to the Sixth RevCon.
Mahley stressed that the USG believes more regular and
accurate CBM submissions should be made before additional
CBMs are considered. Beck responded that having CBM
submissions publicly available would help build up pressure
over inaccurate submissions. He also signaled that Germany
would likely make Germany,s CBM submission publicly
available beginning in 2007; the UK also intends to do so.
France agrees with the U.S. position that, although the
information used in the CBM submissions is unclassified,
compiling it and then making it available publicly could
create opportunities for terrorists and others intent on
using the information for nefarious purposes.

Biological Issues in the G-8 Framework

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Bioterrorism
--------------


13. (C) General Discussion. Grand explained that France
sought greater clarity on the organization of G-8 work since
the Bioterrorism Experts Group (BTEX),Global Health Security
Action Group (GHSAG) and the Lyon-Roma counterterrorism group
have some overlapping issues and government participation.
All agreed that the GSHAG discussions among Health Ministers
were working well and should not be tampered with or become
part of the discussion over BTEX placement. The focus of the
G-8,s Lyon-Roma process is on law enforcement and not WMD
terrorism per se. Which subgroup would bioterrorism come
under and, if expanding its mandate, shouldn't CW, nuclear
and radiological terrorism also be addressed? In each
government, the people handling law enforcement are not the
same ones as those covering nonproliferation. There was a
brief discussion of the evolution of the Russian bureaucracy,

where bioterrorism work has shifted to the "New Threats and
Challenges" section of the MFA from the Arms Control
Directorate. Thus, different sections are dealing with
nonproliferation and bioterrorism and senior arms control
officials refuse to discuss bioterrorism issues in the
nonproliferation context.


14. (C) National perspectives. Mahley indicated that
discussions in Washington are ongoing about whether or not
BTEX work should be moved from the G-8,s Nonproliferation
Director's Group to the Lyon-Roma group that focuses on
terrorism. Agreeing that BW issues across the board be
discussed within the Close Allies, Rampling suggested that
more be done in the G-8 on CBRN terrorism. The biological
work was still in the "early days and may not yet have found
the right home." The UK is open to suggestions about where
the consequence management work should reside; health issues
do not fit directly under either the nonproliferation or
terrorism group. Beck said that the real "experts" on a
given subject could attend meetings under any group of the
G-8, however, there needs to be better coordination between
the nonproliferation and law enforcement/terrorism groups.
That said, Germany was flexible on where BTEX work should
reside. The French wrap-up noted that French
counterterrorism experts opposed adding BTEX to the Lyon-Roma
group and highlighted the need for the Close Allies to pay
better attention to the Health Minister meetings and attempt
to raise their nonproliferation awareness. All agreed there
is a lot of work to be done and better cross pollination will
be increasingly important between the health, law
enforcement/terrorism and nonproliferation communities.

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Global Partnership
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15. (C) After delegations discussed with amusement Russia's
continued declarations that there is no problem with
biological weapons in the Russian Federation, Mahley
mentioned that donors do not see a further need to focus on
the long-stated Russian priority of nuclear submarine
dismantlement and CW destruction. Consideration should be
given to funding biological projects outside the Russian
Federation.


16. (C) UK MOD rep gave an overview of BW work under the
Global Partnership. While the U.S. and Canada have provided
nearly all of the funding/work on-site in Russia, the UK and
French are now committed to providing assistance for BW
efforts. (French rep added a complaint about serious
difficulties in working with the Russians in this field.)
The four have been coordinating informally; perhaps it is
time to have more organized discussions on the broader health
security issues emerging in Russia, especially on emerging
diseases. In addition, a "stability fund" has been
established under EU auspices that will support increased
biological projects in the FSU. German rep indicated that
once the current funding cycle covering their assistance on
chemical and nuclear weapons had ended in 2010-2011, funding
could be considered for BW projects.

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Other Business
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17. (C) Australia Group (AG). There was a brief, but
inconclusive, discussion about some special outreach effort
to China and Russia rather than full membership. Dels agreed
with U.S. comment that intelligence-sharing component amongst
all 27 AG members is critical and that Russian or Chinese
membership would seriously inhibit this exchange. France
expressed a cautious openness to the Russian candidacy and
wondered whether Russia should be invited to a special
session with the entire Australia Group to discuss this
issue. Dels also agreed that the newest Canadian proposal on
licensing export of certain classes of oligonucleotides
raised an important issue but is not acceptable in its
current form.


18. (C) Delegations briefly discussed the next two meetings
) September/October in Berlin and Washington in March/April
of 2008. Delegations were asked to provide possible dates
for the Berlin meeting as soon as possible.


Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm


STAPLETON