MAY 2 BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001947 SIPDIS SIPDIS THE HAGUE FOR CWC DELAGATION; GENEVA FOR BWC DELATION. E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2017 TAGS: PARM PREL GM UK FR SUBJECT: MAY 2 BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION CONSULTATIONS WITH THE UK, FRANCE, AND GERMANY IN PARIS. REF: PARIS 1870 Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, Reason 1 .4 B/D -------------- Overview -------------- ¶1. (C) The French hosted consultations on biological weapons (BW) nonproliferation with the U.S., UK, and Germany in Paris, May 2, 2007. (May 3 chemical weapons discussions are reported reftel). New French and UK Heads of Delegation for this round of "Close Allies" reinvigorated discussions, facilitating a much-needed exchange on BW issues across the board. The positive climate created by the December Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) Review Conference should be capitalized on as planning proceeds for the August BWC Experts Meeting, which will emphasize enforcement of national implementation and regional cooperation on BWC implementation. All agreed that during the 2007-2010 Work Program the focus should be on - and come from - regional actors promoting their national and sub-regional progress on implementation, unlike during the initial 2003 session on this topic, where Western countries dominated with presentations and discussion. Unlike previously, the French included G-8 Global Partnership and bioterrorism, as well as the Australia Group, on the agenda, allowing a more thorough review of cross-cutting issues that should become a regular emphasis for coordination between the most active and influential countries in the area of biological weapons nonproliferation. ¶2. (C) The U.S. delegation was headed by ISN Bureau Deputy Assistant Secretary Donald Mahley, accompanied by an interagency team. Newly-arrived Deputy Head of the FCO,s Counter-proliferation Department, Chris Rampling, made a solid introduction with assistance from the departing head of the CBW section, Sarah Broughton. The Germans were represented by Peter Beerwerth of the MFA,s CW Section. The six-person French delegation was headed by the DAS-equivalent Head of the MFA,s BW/CW/Conventional Weapons Division, Camille Grand. -------------- Assessment of Sixth Review Conference -------------- ¶3. (C) French host Grand commented that with agreement on the Implementation Support Unit (ISU),a strong focus on CBMs and universality, an agreed 2007-2010 Work Program, and a comprehensive Final Document, the 2006 BWC Review Conferences was successful and had reinforced the importance of the Convention. U.S. Rep Mahley pointed out that a key underlying success, which should be exploited over the next five years, was that the non-aligned movement (NAM) countries were noticeably less aggressive and unified. The positive outcome from such an approach ought to lead to more engagement with moderate NAM countries to keep them from reverting to more radical positions that could adversely impact on willingness of States to provide assistance to their national efforts to counter BW. UK and German rep agreed. -------------- -------------- Universality and National Implementation Measures -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) National Implementation Measures. German expert Beck gave an overview of the "EU Joint Action" consisting primarily of awareness-raising seminars and bilaterals to persuade countries to join the BWC. Workshops in Nairobi, Bangkok, Costa Rica and Senegal have been carefully structured for the region; although unlike bilateral visits, few direct requests for assistance have arisen from the seminars, with the exception of Peru and Burundi. Jordan will host a seminar with the EU in June that will combine a push for key Middle Eastern countries to accede to the BWC with the offer of closer work on diagnostics and disease surveillance. Beck reminded that the ISU mandate allows for compiling information on national implementation, without giving them room to help States Parties directly. He also indicated that the WHO, OIE and EU WMD Coordinator Gianella were working together in support of the Joint Action. ¶5. (C) Dels agreed on the value of coordinating efforts to increase BWC membership. The U.S. will establish a "virtual working group" in which the Close Allies and others, on a selective basis, can communicate electronically on what each government, the ISU, RevCon Chairman Khan, etc., may be undertaking to bring non-States Parties on board. It was noted that this may also be useful as we push to get national implementation measures in place and through Parliaments. -------------- Iranian Amendment Proposal -------------- ¶6. (C) Grand thanked the UK/U.S. (as BWC Depositaries along with Russia) for its draft Note for use as a template in responding to the Russians with a negative "vote" against the proposed Iranian amendment to include "use" in the Preamble and Article I of the BWC. He said that a change to the BWC would not affect customary law as set out by the Geneva Protocol (France is Depositary),which bans use. The French have notified the Russians they oppose the BWC amendment. Only a half dozen EU members have sent such Notes, despite an internal EU push. It was not clear if the WEOG Coordinator has circulated the template to the larger Western Group. The Russians are keen to respond to the Iranians at some juncture. The U.S. and UK are determining if our national/Depositary responses later in the process will include a declaratory statement on the amendment request having failed. -------------- 2007 Meeting of Experts -------------- ¶7. (C) Potential Presentations. Delegations offered thinking on the August 20-24 Experts Meeting on national implementation and regional coordination. Beck outlined an EU plan, with support from an EU task force, to establish a matrix/database to allow "stock-taking" of the 27 EU members, progress on national implementation, along the lines of that used by the UNSYG,s 1540 Committee which has categories for prohibitions and export controls. The EU Joint Action, noted above, supports a website containing modules with information on how to complete national implementation actions. Rampling interjected that, while this work would be good to showcase, the objective for the August meeting was to get others to make presentations; he mentioned Serbia, Libya and Malaysia as promising candidates. U.S. rep agreed with Rampling,s assessment and noted ISU staff interest in Malaysia, Nigeria and South Africa as key regional players that may be willing to talk about the benefits of international/regional cooperation in supporting national implementation. ¶8. (C) Structure. U.S. rep said that the Chairman of the 2007 meetings (Pakistani Geneva PermRep Khan, President of the 2006 RevCon) needs this meeting to be a success, and should put as much energy into lining up NAM presentations as anyone. He agreed to contact Khan to determine his thinking on the meeting and report back to the three. Dels agreed that the structure of the meeting should allow for opening day briefings by Interpol and Vertic, who are leading IGO and NGO efforts to track national efforts towards BWC implementation, to set the tone for presentations to follow from States Parties. The next day and a half should focus on national implementation directly, while the latter day and a half focuses on regional cooperation/assistance on implementation. ¶9. (C) Implementation Support Unit. Beck indicated that the ISU may not be up and functioning to the degree expected due to delays at UN Headquarters over filling the P-5 and P-4 positions, despite tacit acceptance by RevCon participants on keeping the current "permanent" staff, Lennane and Millet. All agreed to supplement the ISU functions by making demarches to capitals on attendance, participation and national follow-through. -------------- -------------- UN SYG Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of BW (or CW) -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Quite unexpectedly, the French raised the issue of preserving the expertise of UNMOVIC in New York - which no longer has a WMD investigative role in Iraq. (France has supported the idea of retaining UNMOVIC and its personnel as an investigative body should there be a need to investigate alleged use of WMD.) Other delegations understood this issue as already resolved, with the imminent dissolution of UNMOVIC. Mahley reiterated the strongly-held U.S. view that UNMOVIC staff will return to their countries and serve as national experts in BW and other WMD/Missile fields. He also said that their "expertise" in investigating weapons production might well be relevant for investigating BW use, as the technical knowledge required for various investigations might not be different for different scenarios. Having such a body exist indefinitely would render experts obsolete and smack of an Organization for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons, which is a known non-starter for the U.S. ¶11. (C) Each del then outlined its approach to supporting the agreed goal of having a current set of experts available should the UNSYG mechanism be called upon. Mahley reiterated the U.S. commitment to make available experts and laboratories should a specific need arise. He said it would be useful to establish ) through outreach and training ) greater expertise in other regions, particularly NAM countries, which would provide benefits nationally, but also could be called upon, for example, in the case of natural disease outbreaks or a terrorist incident. UK Del Rep supported dissolution of UNMOVIC and indicated that the FCO maintained a current list of experts and facilities to be utilized by the UN around the clock. Beck indicated that Germany has provided lists of experts directly to the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs (UNDDA) to aid in the quick constitution of a team should an incident occur. He, personally, had hoped for a greater review of the UNSYG mechanism at the RevCon; it makes sense to review related technologies (e.g., diagnostics have changed since the 1980s with advances in PCR technologies, etc.). Beck also clarified that there is an internal UN review by "consultants" (as called for the 1989 report calling for the mechanism) of any request for an investigation and only after this review does the UNSYG determine whether to launch an investigation. U.S. Del rep reminded that UNSCOM, not UNMOVIC, did the majority of investigation related to BW in Iraq and that this community stays in close touch ) the UNDDA person holding the lists of experts is a key personality in this group of experts. ¶12. (C) CBMs. German expert Beck raised the topic of CBMs in an effort to seek agreement on "improving" the CBM process prior to the Seventh RevCon in 2011. Grand said France sees room for improvement in the basic questionnaire. Although a new version would have to be agreed by the Seventh RevCon, work should start early on developing a document which would increase the numbers of submissions and cut down on inaccuracies. UK del rep relayed that the Swiss plan to submit CBMs in both the agreed format and in the "new format" they had been working hard on prior to the Sixth RevCon. Mahley stressed that the USG believes more regular and accurate CBM submissions should be made before additional CBMs are considered. Beck responded that having CBM submissions publicly available would help build up pressure over inaccurate submissions. He also signaled that Germany would likely make Germany,s CBM submission publicly available beginning in 2007; the UK also intends to do so. France agrees with the U.S. position that, although the information used in the CBM submissions is unclassified, compiling it and then making it available publicly could create opportunities for terrorists and others intent on using the information for nefarious purposes. Biological Issues in the G-8 Framework -------------- Bioterrorism -------------- ¶13. (C) General Discussion. Grand explained that France sought greater clarity on the organization of G-8 work since the Bioterrorism Experts Group (BTEX),Global Health Security Action Group (GHSAG) and the Lyon-Roma counterterrorism group have some overlapping issues and government participation. All agreed that the GSHAG discussions among Health Ministers were working well and should not be tampered with or become part of the discussion over BTEX placement. The focus of the G-8,s Lyon-Roma process is on law enforcement and not WMD terrorism per se. Which subgroup would bioterrorism come under and, if expanding its mandate, shouldn't CW, nuclear and radiological terrorism also be addressed? In each government, the people handling law enforcement are not the same ones as those covering nonproliferation. There was a brief discussion of the evolution of the Russian bureaucracy, where bioterrorism work has shifted to the "New Threats and Challenges" section of the MFA from the Arms Control Directorate. Thus, different sections are dealing with nonproliferation and bioterrorism and senior arms control officials refuse to discuss bioterrorism issues in the nonproliferation context. ¶14. (C) National perspectives. Mahley indicated that discussions in Washington are ongoing about whether or not BTEX work should be moved from the G-8,s Nonproliferation Director's Group to the Lyon-Roma group that focuses on terrorism. Agreeing that BW issues across the board be discussed within the Close Allies, Rampling suggested that more be done in the G-8 on CBRN terrorism. The biological work was still in the "early days and may not yet have found the right home." The UK is open to suggestions about where the consequence management work should reside; health issues do not fit directly under either the nonproliferation or terrorism group. Beck said that the real "experts" on a given subject could attend meetings under any group of the G-8, however, there needs to be better coordination between the nonproliferation and law enforcement/terrorism groups. That said, Germany was flexible on where BTEX work should reside. The French wrap-up noted that French counterterrorism experts opposed adding BTEX to the Lyon-Roma group and highlighted the need for the Close Allies to pay better attention to the Health Minister meetings and attempt to raise their nonproliferation awareness. All agreed there is a lot of work to be done and better cross pollination will be increasingly important between the health, law enforcement/terrorism and nonproliferation communities. -------------- Global Partnership -------------- ¶15. (C) After delegations discussed with amusement Russia's continued declarations that there is no problem with biological weapons in the Russian Federation, Mahley mentioned that donors do not see a further need to focus on the long-stated Russian priority of nuclear submarine dismantlement and CW destruction. Consideration should be given to funding biological projects outside the Russian Federation. ¶16. (C) UK MOD rep gave an overview of BW work under the Global Partnership. While the U.S. and Canada have provided nearly all of the funding/work on-site in Russia, the UK and French are now committed to providing assistance for BW efforts. (French rep added a complaint about serious difficulties in working with the Russians in this field.) The four have been coordinating informally; perhaps it is time to have more organized discussions on the broader health security issues emerging in Russia, especially on emerging diseases. In addition, a "stability fund" has been established under EU auspices that will support increased biological projects in the FSU. German rep indicated that once the current funding cycle covering their assistance on chemical and nuclear weapons had ended in 2010-2011, funding could be considered for BW projects. -------------- Other Business -------------- ¶17. (C) Australia Group (AG). There was a brief, but inconclusive, discussion about some special outreach effort to China and Russia rather than full membership. Dels agreed with U.S. comment that intelligence-sharing component amongst all 27 AG members is critical and that Russian or Chinese membership would seriously inhibit this exchange. France expressed a cautious openness to the Russian candidacy and wondered whether Russia should be invited to a special session with the entire Australia Group to discuss this issue. Dels also agreed that the newest Canadian proposal on licensing export of certain classes of oligonucleotides raised an important issue but is not acceptable in its current form. ¶18. (C) Delegations briefly discussed the next two meetings ) September/October in Berlin and Washington in March/April of 2008. Delegations were asked to provide possible dates for the Berlin meeting as soon as possible. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON