FRANCE AND LEBANON: UPDATE ON CHAPTER VII

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001888

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR MARCHESE/DORAN/ABRAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/11/2017
TAGS: FR PGOV PREL LE SY
SUBJECT: FRANCE AND LEBANON: UPDATE ON CHAPTER VII

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) NEA Watcher met May 11 with Damien Loras, FM
Douste-Blazy,s cabinet advisor for the Middle East, to
discuss French thinking on the content and timing of a
Chapter VII resolution to establish the Special Tribunal for
Lebanon. On content, Loras noted that the French disagreed
with essentially all of the changes Washington had proposed
to France,s draft UNSCR. He reiterated the by now familiar
argument that a minimalist resolution would garner general
support within the UNSC, whereas a more ambitious resolution
would likely fail. He conceded that the differing drafts
reflect a conceptual difference: the U.S., he said, is
approaching the resolution in terms of the Lebanese political
process having failed, so the international community must
now take the Tribunal out of Lebanon,s hands.


2. (C) In contrast, the French approach is to pass a
resolution that merely ratifies the tribunal statutes,
thereby substituting UNSC action for that of Lebanon,s
parliament. In the French approach, it would still be up to
the Lebanese to work out the modalities of funding, the venue
for the tribunal,s headquarters, the recruitment of judges,
etc., even though the French recognize that deferring such
issues may give the opposition an opportunity to create
further blockages down the road. The beauty of the French
plan, according to Loras, is that once the Tribunal statute
is ratified, Lebanon,s political factions can turn their
attention to working out an agreement on other issues (such
as the presidential election and cabinet restructuring)
which, if successfully resolved, might facilitate an eventual
deal on the Tribunal modalities. In a worst case scenario,
the UNSC could always intervene once again.


3. (C) Assuming that Paris and Washington agree on a text in
the next few days, Loras predicted that the French would seek
to introduce a resolution sometime between SYG Ban Ki-Moon,s
lunch with UNSC PermReps on Tuesday, May 15, and the end of
the month. However, he added that: "Now that we know that
Sarkozy is going to follow Chirac,s policy, there is no need
to hurry."


4. (C) In a follow-up conversation between PolM/C and IO
A/S-equivalent Sylvie Berman, Berman said that the French
will be ready to move in the Council once a) there is P-3
agreement on the resolution text; b) Siniora's second letter
is received; c) the SYG briefs PermReps (at the May 15
lunch). She explicitly confirmed that once past those three
steps, there would be no reason for further delay. Thus, if
everything fell into place, we could move next week following
the SYG's briefing.


5. (C) Interestingly, Berman initially insisted that
Siniora's second letter should not be sent until there was
P-3 agreement on the text, as his letter should reflect that
agreement. She called back five minutes later to say that
the Elysee had ruled otherwise: the letter from Siniora must
be sent this weekend (even without P-3 agreement) in order to
help the Secretary in her call to Russian FM Lavrov.
(Comment: We suspect that the Quai's initial insistence on
incorporating elements of an agreed text into Siniora's
letter was intended to ensure that Siniora did not ask for
more from the UNSC than was included in the French draft
resolution. End comment.)


6. (C) Berman stated that instructions are going out tonight
to New York (telling the French mission to work with us and
the UK to achieve agreement on the text) and to Beirut (to
facilitate the dispatch of Siniora's letter this weekend).

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

STAPLETON