HEAD-TO-HEAD WITH AOUN'S HENCHMAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001883

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR MARCHESE/DORAN/ABRAMS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/11/2017
TAGS: FR PGOV PREL LE SY
SUBJECT: HEAD-TO-HEAD WITH AOUN'S HENCHMAN


CLASSIFIED BY: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT,
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: WE MET MAY 10 WITH MICHEL AOUN'S
REPRESENTATIVE IN PARIS, SIMON ABI RAMIA, AND CHALLENGED HIS
TEDIOUS ASSERTION THAT THE U.S. SHOULD REGARD AOUN AS AN
ALLY. WE ARGUED, INTER ALIA, THAT AOUN IS BEING USED BY
HIZBALLAH, THAT ABI RAMIA'S "AOUN IS YOUR ALLY" MESSAGE HAS
LOST ALL CREDIBILITY, AND STRESSED THAT SO LONG AS AOUN
CONTINUES ON HIS CURRENT PATH HE WILL HAVE TROUBLE WITH THE
USG. ABI RAMIA RESPONDED WITH HIS TIRED, SET-PIECE
ARGUMENTS, AND FLOATED THE IDEA OF ARRANGING A MEETING
BETWEEN AOUN AND AMBASSADOR STAPLETON -- AN IDEA WE
IMMEDIATELY SHOT DOWN. END SUMMARY.

DEBUNKING ABI RAMIA'S MESSAGE
--------------


2. (C) EMBASSY NEA WATCHER MET MAY 10 WITH MICHEL AOUN'S
REPRESENTATIVE IN PARIS, SIMON ABI RAMIA, AT THE LATTER'S
REQUEST. AFTER SOME CURSORY DISCUSSION OF AOUN'S TRAVEL
PLANS (THE FORMER LEBANESE ARMED FORCES GENERAL WILL VISIT
PARIS THE WEEK OF JUNE 2 FOR THE LAUNCH OF HIS BIOGRAPHY,
"GENERAL AOUN: UNE CERTAINE VISION DU LIBAN," AND WILL SEEK A
MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SARKOZY, ALTHOUGH HE HAS NOT YET
FORMALLY REQUESTED AN APPOINTMENT),WE LAUNCHED A PRE-EMPTIVE
ATTACK ON ABI RAMIA'S TIRED ASSERTION THAT THE U.S. SHOULD
REGARD AOUN AS AN ALLY IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST HIZBALLAH.
NOTING THAT AOUN HAS DEMONSTRATED NO ABILITY TO MODERATE
HIZBALLAH'S BEHAVIOR OR RHETORIC, AND STRESSING THAT NEITHER
HIZBALLAH NOR SYRIA WOULD EVER ACCEPT THE MERCURIAL AOUN AS
PRESIDENT OF LEBANON, WE ASKED WHEN WOULD AOUN WAKE UP TO THE
FACT THAT HE WAS BEING USED BY HASSAN NASRALLAH?


3. (C) ADDING THAT AOUN'S ACTIONS (INCLUDING HIS OPPOSITION
TO A CHAPTER VII UNSCR) ARE NOT THOSE OF A FRIEND AND ALLY,
WE STRESSED THAT ABI RAMIA'S MESSAGE WAS QUICKLY LOSING
CREDIBILITY. THE SAME HELD TRUE FOR HIS MESSENGERS, WHO
WOULD LIKELY FIND THEIR ACCESS TO U.S. POLICYMAKERS REDUCED
UNLESS THEY COULD DEMONSTRATE AN ABILITY TO STEER AOUN IN A
MORE POSITIVE DIRECTION. WE WARNED THAT, SO LONG AS AOUN
CONTINUED HIS PRESENT COURSE OF APPEASING SYRIA AND HIZBALLAH
WHILE CONFRONTING THE MARCH 14 MAJORITY, HIS RELATIONS WITH
THE USG WOULD BE TROUBLED. (FOR GOOD MEASURE, WE OBSERVED
THAT ARAFAT HAD EXPERIENCED A SIMILAR CREDIBILITY GAP IN THE
MONTHS BEFORE WASHINGTON WROTE HIM OFF, AND THAT IT WAS A
SHAME THAT ARAFAT PROVED TOO SELF-CONFIDENT, AND
SELF-DELUDED, TO TAKE OUR WARNINGS SERIOUSLY.)


4. (C) ABI RAMIA TOOK CAREFUL NOTES, AND THEN REVIEWED HIS
FAMILIAR, SET-PIECE ARGUMENTS: THAT ONE MUST DISARM
HIZBALLAHS IDEOLOGY, NOT JUST ITS WEAPONS; THAT THE KEY IS
TO DELIVER THE SHEBA FARMS, WHICH WILL STRIP HIZBALLAH OF ITS
PRETEXT FOR KEEPING ITS ARMS; THAT IF HIZBALLAH THEN REFUSES
TO DISARM, THE AOUNISTS (AND MANY SHIITES) WILL TURN AGAINST
IT; THAT LEBANON'S PALESTIQAN REFUGEES MUST RETURN TO
PALESTINE AS NEITHER LEBANON'S CHRISTIANS NOR ITS SHIITES
COULD EVER ACCEPT THEIR PERMANENT RESETTLEMENT IN LEBANON,
AND THAT HIZBALLAH WOULD NEVER DISARM SO LONG AS ARMED
PALESTINIANS REMAINED IN LEBANON; THAT HIZBALALH CANNOT BE
DEFEATED MILITARILY BY ANY COMBINATION OF INTERNAL/EXTERNAL
FORCES ("HIZBALLAH ISN'T JUST A THOUSAND FIGHTERS -- IT HAS
THE SUPPORT OF 90% OF LEBANON'S SHIITES. NASRALLAH CAN FIELD
100,000 FIGHTERS IN A WEEK, WITH EVEN MORE PEOPLE BEHIND
THEM"); THAT AOUN IS INTENT ON BUILDING AN ATMOSPHERE OF
TRUST WITH HIZBALLAH THAT WILL FACILITATE ITS EVENTUAL
DISARMAMENT; THAT IT'S TRUE THAT DAMASCUS, AND PERHAPS
HIZBALLAH, DOES NOT WANT AOUN TO BECOME PRESIDENT BECAUSE HE
IS TOO INDEPENDENT -- WHICH IS EXACTLY WHY THE U.S. SHOULD
SUPPORT HIM; THAT THE MARCH 14 LEADERSHIP, ESPECIALLY WALID
JUMBLATT AND SAMIR GEAGEA, HAVE NOTQEEN ABLE TO DELIVER
ANYTHING ON HIZBALLAH'S DISARMAMENT EITHER, AND NEVER WILL BE
ABLE TO; AND THAT AOUN IS NOT IN IT FOR THE PERSONAL GLORY OF
BEING PRESIDENT, HE'S IN IT BECAUSE HIS SUPPORTERS KNOW THAT
ONLY HE CAN DELIVER HIZBALLAH. FINALLY, ABI RAMIA SAID THAT
IF THE U.S. HAD A BETTER PLAN FOR DISARMING HIZBALLAH THEN HE
WANTED TO HEAR IT. "WHAT'S YOUR PLAN?" HE ASKED.


5. (C) WE RESPONDED THAT THE FOUNDATIONS OF OUR PLAN ARE
CLEAR: CREATION OF THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL, WHICH WILL VASTLY
INCREASE OUR LEVERAGE OVER SYRIA; REPLACEMENT OF LAHOUD WITH
A PRESIDENT WHO WILL NOT BE A SYRIAN PUPPET; AND TIGHTER
ENFORCEMENT OF THE ARMS EMBARGO TO PREVENT ADDITIONAL HEAVY
WEAPONS FROM REACHING HIZBALLAH. THESE WERE THE
PREREQUISITES FOR ANY SERIOUS PLAN ON DISARMAMENT. AS FOR
THE SHEBA FARMS, HIZBALLLAH HAS ALREADY INDICATED THAT IT
WILL SIMPLY INVENT ANOTHER PRETEXT FOR ATTACKING ISRAEL, AND
NONE OF THE LEBANESE ADVOCATES OF AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM

THE SHEBA FARMS SEEMS TO HAVE GIVEN MUCH THOUGHT TO WHAT'S IN
IT FOR ISRAEL.


6. (C) ABI RAMIA ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR AOUN
TO MEET WITH AMBASSADOR STAPLETON OR OTHER EMBASSY PARIS
PERSONNEL DURING AOUN'S UPCOMING VISIT TO PARIS. WE STRESSED
THAT THAT AMBASSADOR FELTMAN IS AOUN'S INTERLOCUTOR AND THAT
THE U.S. IS NOT LOOKING TO MUDDY THE WATERS BY OPENING ANY
OTHER CHANNELS. ABI RAMIA TOOK THE POINT.


7. (C) COMMENT: WE THINK IT WAS HEALTHY TO HAVE A FRANK
EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH ABI RAMIA, NOT LEAST SO AS TO DISABUSE
HIM OF THE NOTION THAT EMBASSY PARIS MIGHT SERVE AS A
"BACKCHANNEL" FOR AOUN TO TRANSMIT HIS VIEWS TO WASHINGTON.
ABI RAMIA PROMISED TO SHARE WITH AOUN OUR OBSERVATION THAT IF
THE FORMER GENERAL WANTS US TO BELIEVE THAT HE'S OUR FRIEND,
THEN WE NEED TO SEE HIM ACTING LIKE A FRIEND.


PLEASE VISIT PARIS' CLASSIFIED WEBSITE AT:
HTTP://WWW.STATE.SGOV.GOV/P/EUR/PARIS/INDEX.C FM




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