HEAD-TO-HEAD WITH AOUN'S HENCHMAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001883 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR MARCHESE/DORAN/ABRAMS E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/11/2017 TAGS: FR PGOV PREL LE SY SUBJECT: HEAD-TO-HEAD WITH AOUN'S HENCHMAN CLASSIFIED BY: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JOSIAH ROSENBLATT, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: WE MET MAY 10 WITH MICHEL AOUN'S REPRESENTATIVE IN PARIS, SIMON ABI RAMIA, AND CHALLENGED HIS TEDIOUS ASSERTION THAT THE U.S. SHOULD REGARD AOUN AS AN ALLY. WE ARGUED, INTER ALIA, THAT AOUN IS BEING USED BY HIZBALLAH, THAT ABI RAMIA'S "AOUN IS YOUR ALLY" MESSAGE HAS LOST ALL CREDIBILITY, AND STRESSED THAT SO LONG AS AOUN CONTINUES ON HIS CURRENT PATH HE WILL HAVE TROUBLE WITH THE USG. ABI RAMIA RESPONDED WITH HIS TIRED, SET-PIECE ARGUMENTS, AND FLOATED THE IDEA OF ARRANGING A MEETING BETWEEN AOUN AND AMBASSADOR STAPLETON -- AN IDEA WE IMMEDIATELY SHOT DOWN. END SUMMARY. DEBUNKING ABI RAMIA'S MESSAGE -------------- ¶2. (C) EMBASSY NEA WATCHER MET MAY 10 WITH MICHEL AOUN'S REPRESENTATIVE IN PARIS, SIMON ABI RAMIA, AT THE LATTER'S REQUEST. AFTER SOME CURSORY DISCUSSION OF AOUN'S TRAVEL PLANS (THE FORMER LEBANESE ARMED FORCES GENERAL WILL VISIT PARIS THE WEEK OF JUNE 2 FOR THE LAUNCH OF HIS BIOGRAPHY, "GENERAL AOUN: UNE CERTAINE VISION DU LIBAN," AND WILL SEEK A MEETING WITH PRESIDENT SARKOZY, ALTHOUGH HE HAS NOT YET FORMALLY REQUESTED AN APPOINTMENT),WE LAUNCHED A PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACK ON ABI RAMIA'S TIRED ASSERTION THAT THE U.S. SHOULD REGARD AOUN AS AN ALLY IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST HIZBALLAH. NOTING THAT AOUN HAS DEMONSTRATED NO ABILITY TO MODERATE HIZBALLAH'S BEHAVIOR OR RHETORIC, AND STRESSING THAT NEITHER HIZBALLAH NOR SYRIA WOULD EVER ACCEPT THE MERCURIAL AOUN AS PRESIDENT OF LEBANON, WE ASKED WHEN WOULD AOUN WAKE UP TO THE FACT THAT HE WAS BEING USED BY HASSAN NASRALLAH? ¶3. (C) ADDING THAT AOUN'S ACTIONS (INCLUDING HIS OPPOSITION TO A CHAPTER VII UNSCR) ARE NOT THOSE OF A FRIEND AND ALLY, WE STRESSED THAT ABI RAMIA'S MESSAGE WAS QUICKLY LOSING CREDIBILITY. THE SAME HELD TRUE FOR HIS MESSENGERS, WHO WOULD LIKELY FIND THEIR ACCESS TO U.S. POLICYMAKERS REDUCED UNLESS THEY COULD DEMONSTRATE AN ABILITY TO STEER AOUN IN A MORE POSITIVE DIRECTION. WE WARNED THAT, SO LONG AS AOUN CONTINUED HIS PRESENT COURSE OF APPEASING SYRIA AND HIZBALLAH WHILE CONFRONTING THE MARCH 14 MAJORITY, HIS RELATIONS WITH THE USG WOULD BE TROUBLED. (FOR GOOD MEASURE, WE OBSERVED THAT ARAFAT HAD EXPERIENCED A SIMILAR CREDIBILITY GAP IN THE MONTHS BEFORE WASHINGTON WROTE HIM OFF, AND THAT IT WAS A SHAME THAT ARAFAT PROVED TOO SELF-CONFIDENT, AND SELF-DELUDED, TO TAKE OUR WARNINGS SERIOUSLY.) ¶4. (C) ABI RAMIA TOOK CAREFUL NOTES, AND THEN REVIEWED HIS FAMILIAR, SET-PIECE ARGUMENTS: THAT ONE MUST DISARM HIZBALLAHS IDEOLOGY, NOT JUST ITS WEAPONS; THAT THE KEY IS TO DELIVER THE SHEBA FARMS, WHICH WILL STRIP HIZBALLAH OF ITS PRETEXT FOR KEEPING ITS ARMS; THAT IF HIZBALLAH THEN REFUSES TO DISARM, THE AOUNISTS (AND MANY SHIITES) WILL TURN AGAINST IT; THAT LEBANON'S PALESTIQAN REFUGEES MUST RETURN TO PALESTINE AS NEITHER LEBANON'S CHRISTIANS NOR ITS SHIITES COULD EVER ACCEPT THEIR PERMANENT RESETTLEMENT IN LEBANON, AND THAT HIZBALLAH WOULD NEVER DISARM SO LONG AS ARMED PALESTINIANS REMAINED IN LEBANON; THAT HIZBALALH CANNOT BE DEFEATED MILITARILY BY ANY COMBINATION OF INTERNAL/EXTERNAL FORCES ("HIZBALLAH ISN'T JUST A THOUSAND FIGHTERS -- IT HAS THE SUPPORT OF 90% OF LEBANON'S SHIITES. NASRALLAH CAN FIELD 100,000 FIGHTERS IN A WEEK, WITH EVEN MORE PEOPLE BEHIND THEM"); THAT AOUN IS INTENT ON BUILDING AN ATMOSPHERE OF TRUST WITH HIZBALLAH THAT WILL FACILITATE ITS EVENTUAL DISARMAMENT; THAT IT'S TRUE THAT DAMASCUS, AND PERHAPS HIZBALLAH, DOES NOT WANT AOUN TO BECOME PRESIDENT BECAUSE HE IS TOO INDEPENDENT -- WHICH IS EXACTLY WHY THE U.S. SHOULD SUPPORT HIM; THAT THE MARCH 14 LEADERSHIP, ESPECIALLY WALID JUMBLATT AND SAMIR GEAGEA, HAVE NOTQEEN ABLE TO DELIVER ANYTHING ON HIZBALLAH'S DISARMAMENT EITHER, AND NEVER WILL BE ABLE TO; AND THAT AOUN IS NOT IN IT FOR THE PERSONAL GLORY OF BEING PRESIDENT, HE'S IN IT BECAUSE HIS SUPPORTERS KNOW THAT ONLY HE CAN DELIVER HIZBALLAH. FINALLY, ABI RAMIA SAID THAT IF THE U.S. HAD A BETTER PLAN FOR DISARMING HIZBALLAH THEN HE WANTED TO HEAR IT. "WHAT'S YOUR PLAN?" HE ASKED. ¶5. (C) WE RESPONDED THAT THE FOUNDATIONS OF OUR PLAN ARE CLEAR: CREATION OF THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL, WHICH WILL VASTLY INCREASE OUR LEVERAGE OVER SYRIA; REPLACEMENT OF LAHOUD WITH A PRESIDENT WHO WILL NOT BE A SYRIAN PUPPET; AND TIGHTER ENFORCEMENT OF THE ARMS EMBARGO TO PREVENT ADDITIONAL HEAVY WEAPONS FROM REACHING HIZBALLAH. THESE WERE THE PREREQUISITES FOR ANY SERIOUS PLAN ON DISARMAMENT. AS FOR THE SHEBA FARMS, HIZBALLLAH HAS ALREADY INDICATED THAT IT WILL SIMPLY INVENT ANOTHER PRETEXT FOR ATTACKING ISRAEL, AND NONE OF THE LEBANESE ADVOCATES OF AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SHEBA FARMS SEEMS TO HAVE GIVEN MUCH THOUGHT TO WHAT'S IN IT FOR ISRAEL. ¶6. (C) ABI RAMIA ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR AOUN TO MEET WITH AMBASSADOR STAPLETON OR OTHER EMBASSY PARIS PERSONNEL DURING AOUN'S UPCOMING VISIT TO PARIS. WE STRESSED THAT THAT AMBASSADOR FELTMAN IS AOUN'S INTERLOCUTOR AND THAT THE U.S. IS NOT LOOKING TO MUDDY THE WATERS BY OPENING ANY OTHER CHANNELS. ABI RAMIA TOOK THE POINT. ¶7. (C) COMMENT: WE THINK IT WAS HEALTHY TO HAVE A FRANK EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH ABI RAMIA, NOT LEAST SO AS TO DISABUSE HIM OF THE NOTION THAT EMBASSY PARIS MIGHT SERVE AS A "BACKCHANNEL" FOR AOUN TO TRANSMIT HIS VIEWS TO WASHINGTON. ABI RAMIA PROMISED TO SHARE WITH AOUN OUR OBSERVATION THAT IF THE FORMER GENERAL WANTS US TO BELIEVE THAT HE'S OUR FRIEND, THEN WE NEED TO SEE HIM ACTING LIKE A FRIEND. PLEASE VISIT PARIS' CLASSIFIED WEBSITE AT: HTTP://WWW.STATE.SGOV.GOV/P/EUR/PARIS/INDEX.C FM PAGE 03 RUEHFRA1883 C O N F I D E N T I A L STAPLETON