CWC CONSULTATIONS WITH FRANCE, UK AND GERMANY IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001870

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2017
TAGS: PARM PREL FR GM UK
SUBJECT: CWC CONSULTATIONS WITH FRANCE, UK AND GERMANY IN
PARIS MAY 3


Classified By: Donald A. Mahley, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
International Security and Nonproliferation, Reason 1.5(b)&(d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The French hosted consultations on the
Chemical Weapons Convention with the U.S., UK, and Germany in
Paris, May 3, 2007 preceded on May 2 by biological weapons
discussions (reported Septel). Due to new French and UK
Heads of Delegation, this round of Close Allies discussions
brought the return of a useful and candid discussion amongst
the four countries who are among the most active and
influential at the OPCW. The group discussed such pressing
issues as CW destruction deadlines in Albania, Libya, Russia
and the U.S.; use of challenge and OCPF inspections; end
point of destruction; continued pressure on non-States
Parties to join the CWC and on Parties that have yet to fully
implement their CWC obligations; the zero growth OPCW budget,
and Second Review Conference. This interaction allowed for
closer coordination between capitals and Hague delegates in
advance of the late June Executive Council Meeting. The
Germans will host the next meeting in September/October with
particular attention on preparations for the April 2008
Second Review Conference. End Summary.


2. (SBU) The U.S. delegation was headed by ISN Bureau Deputy
Assistant Secretary Donald Mahley, accompanied by U.S.
Representative to the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW),Amb. Eric Javits, and an interagency
team. Newly-arrived Deputy Head of the FCO,s
Counter-proliferation Department, Chris Rampling, made a
solid introduction with assistance from the departing head of
the CBW section, Sarah Broughton. The Germans were
represented by Peter Beerwerth of the MFA,s CW Section and
their OPCW Representative, Amb. Alexander Petri. The
ten-person French delegation was headed by the Head of the
MFA,s BW/CW/Conventional Weapons Division, Camille Grand.


--------------
Universality
--------------


3. (SBU) France opened the discussion, commenting that the
core problem is the Middle East, and, in particular,
wondering how best to make a push on universality in the
run-up to the Review Conference. Germany recommended that
the Allies focus on those states with administrative problems
as opposed to the difficult cases. The UK noted that it had
talked recently with the Bahamas and the Dominican Republic,
and wondered whether gentle nudges might speed the accession
process for Iraq and Lebanon. The U.S. said that it will
focus on the Bahamas, Haiti and the Dominican Republic over
the coming months. Germany plans to work with Angola.


4. (C) Regarding the Middle East, the Allies noted Egypt,s
rebuff of the Director General. The U.S. summarized its
exchange with Israel, reporting Israel,s assessment that the
security situation has worsened since it signed the CWC, and
that it did not see any possibility of acceding any time
soon. Germany noted that the Mideast states, arguments are
irrational; rational counter-arguments fall on deaf ears.
France believes that Egypt would only consider adhering to
the Convention AFTER Israel ratified. The UK argued that
because Israel doubts Iran,s compliance, it is even less
likely than before to consider ratification. The U.S. noted
some modest positive developments: visits by senior Israeli
officials to the OPCW and the DG,s meetings in Cairo with
Egyptians officials. France summarized the discussion,

noting little chance of success from P-5, EU, or Allies,
joint approaches to Middle East capitals. For now it is
preferable to continue bilateral approaches.


5. (C) The Allies briefly discussed the Secretariat,s
universality workshops. All agreed that the standard
presentation-based approach used by the Technical Secretariat
for the last three workshops is not effective. In fact,
Germany noted that this approach created a somewhat hostile
approach in Rome. Rather, the Allies need to encourage the
Secretariat to allow more time for open discussions and not

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push the attending non-States parties to reiterate their
positions. The U.S. questioned the value of continuing these
meetings. While agreeing in principle, France and the UK
thought it would not be a good signal to cancel them; rather
it would be preferable to keep the communications channel
open. France suggested that use of Chatham House rules in an
open venue might be an option. Delegations agreed that it
might be most effective to hold the next seminar only after
Iraq and/or Lebanon acceded.


6. (SBU) ISN/CB will establish the basis for a &virtual
working group8 in which the Close Allies and others, on a
selective basis, can communicate in real-time on what each

government, the TS, the G-8, etc., may be undertaking to
bring non-States Parties on board. It was noted that this
may also be useful in the context of Article VII, especially
as we push to get national implementation measures in place
and through Parliaments.

--------------
Destruction
--------------


7. (C) Discussion centered on renewed interest in defining
the end point of destruction, particularly in light of the
recent distribution of the facility agreement and
verification plan for Russia,s Maradykovsky facility. The
U.S., Germany, and France advocated adhering to the
definition of end point occurring only after second stage
destruction has been completed. The UK alone expressed
support for the Secretariat/Russian approach at Maradykovsky,
since their primary concern of demanding verification of both
stages was addressed. UK MOD rep also extolled the
significant progress made by Russia in the past eight months.
(Note: The U.S. pointed out that much of the "Russian"
progress was due to foreign assistance. End Note.) Germany
expressed surprise that the Director General had stated
unequivocally that Russia had met its 20% deadline, and
pointed out that it would prefer to see current
operations/accounting at the U.S.,s Newport facility (as
opposed to past practice at Aberdeen) used as the comparative
model.


8. (C) U.S. Rep. Mahley noted the difficulty we could
encounter in the future if we indicated some flexibility in
the treaty requirements for second stage destruction. The UK
pointed out that the Secretariat is not equating the
"counting point" and "end point," a concept that met with no
support from the other delegations who agreed with Mahley,s
point that the Maradykovsky approach effectively moves the
political end point to the end of the first stage. Mahley
also noted the potential, if second stage verification became
more of a confidence building measure than a legal
requirement, for questions of financial responsibility for
such verification (Article VI versus Article IV) in future
years. All delegations agreed that, particularly with recent
Russian/Secretariat assertions that Russia has met its 20%
deadline, the matter of end point of destruction will have to
be handled carefully to avoid political damage. Delegations
also agreed that while incineration of the second stage at
Maradykovsky could eventually bring all States Parties into
agreement on Russian CW destruction progress, it would
not/not obviate the need for changes in the Maradykovsky
facility agreement and verification plan language. France
noted the value of a common Allied position in advance of
EC-49.


9. (SBU) On U.S. destruction, Mahley reported the complete
destruction of former production capacity, and continued
progress toward the 45% intermediate deadline in December

2007. In response to questions about planned destruction
facilities at Pueblo and Blue Grass, Mahley reassured
delegations that while there are a number of special interest
groups that make construction and destruction more
complicated, the Congress is providing all the funds
requested for these two sites. Allies welcomed the news that
the U.S. is considering offering an EC visit to a U.S.
destruction site before the end of the year. Commentary on
significant delays in the U.S. program was minimal.


10. (SBU) Mahley updated delegations on the current situation
in Albania. Discussion on possible action at EC-49 led to
general agreement that an approach similar to the last EC
(drawing on Article VIII and capturing concern in report
language) would be the most logical and appropriate. France
mentioned that Article XII, and even a reference to the UN
Security Council, would not have to be a "crisis," but this
idea was not supported by others.


11. (C) On the topic of Libyan CW destruction, France stated
frankly that there is a French company seeking a piece of the
destruction process, and the French perception is that Libya
may be playing the U.S. and France against each other.
Mahley explained the status of the USG/GOL and GOL/U.S.
contractor contracts, and noted that the U.S. has elected to
bear the burden of much of the destruction (allowing Libya to
pick up infrastructure and more general support) primarily to
avoid a safety risk. U.S. also noted that the destruction
equipment has been funded, and fabrication has begun.

-------------- --------------
Preparations for the Second Review Conference (RevCon)
-------------- --------------


12. (SBU) The UK said that progress to date was fine,
especially given the more substantive involvement of
delegations recently. The Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG)
will continue to work through the list of issues from the
First RevCon. The chair (Amb. Parker, UK) expects to receive
a report from the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) in the
summer. He is cautious about getting into the textual
drafting too early, as this increases the risk of the text
being watered-down. They also stressed the value of the
Close Allies having a common set of objectives, referring to
a non-paper the UK distributed earlier this year and
encouraged additional comments.


13. (SBU) Germany reported that preparation has begun within
the European Union (EU). The recent symposium in Berlin
served as a good start toward a joint position, which they
hope to complete during the German Presidency. They do not
anticipate any surprises.


14. (SBU) Amb. Mahley reported that one of our objectives is
to ensure that the Australia Group (AG) remains unweakened by
the CWC, and reminded Allies of U.S. Congressional
requirements for certifying the continued strength of the AG.
Another objective is to ensure the CWC remains strong )
reaffirming its value, and keeping it adaptable to deal with
future issues, including terrorism. He promised that the
U.S. would have non-papers on most issues.


15. (SBU) France stated that, given this would be the last
RevCon before the 2012 destruction deadline, we needed to
ensure focus on destruction. At the same time, they said
they were not interested in raising controversial issues.


16. (C) Delegations also discussed who would chair the
RevCon. Given the rotation for CSP chair and among the five
regional groups and the five-year pattern for RevCon, the
practice from the First RevCon of having the CSP Chair also
chair the RevCon would always ensure an African Group chair
of the RevCon. (The First RevCon was chaired by Algeria.)
However, since there are no standing rules of procedure for
selection of the RevCon Chair, the issue is open. Discussion
about a rotation approach, with Asia next in line, quickly
led to concerns about a run-in with the Iranians. France
expressed concern that stopping an Iranian Chairmanship again
would give the Iranians even more reason to sabotage the
RevCon. Amb. Javits reminded the group that the Asian Group
was successful within itself in preventing an Iranian EC
Chair, and they were capable of doing that again. Before
considering an independent alphabetical rotation, Germany
insisted that we be sure that the Asian Group would prevent
an Iranian chair.


17. (C) Mahley emphasized that an early start in a search
for a Chair would allow those States Parties who may not
currently have strong presences in The Hague to be considered
and prepare for the role. In response to an inquiry, the UK
made it clear that Amb. Parker would not be a candidate and
that the UK would not seek the Chair. They pointed to the
risks of designating a Chair too early. The UK also stated
that the selection of the Chair was not within Amb. Parker,s
mandate, but expressed concern with leaving this to the
Bureau, as Iran represents the Asian Group there. The UK
suggested continuing these discussions in The Hague with Amb.
Parker.


18. (SBU) On the topic of NGOs and the industry forum, it was
stated that the format for these has been decided within the
OEWG. The UK announced that CEFIC (the European chemical
association) would be attending and that one U.S. association
has also confirmed. The list of NGOs will be discussed at
the next meeting of the OEWG. Given the typical visibility
of Iranian NGOs (groups of CW victims, etc.),France asked
how we would control participants and how the Secretariat
would control display space, etc. The UK pointed out that
the list would need to be approved, as is done with meetings
of the CSP, but that they are encouraging the widest
participation possible by NGOs.

--------------
Article VII
--------------


19. (SBU) France welcomed the establishment of National
Authorities since the last Review Conference and the
acceptance of the Action Plan. However, the legislative
piece remains a problem, with only three states finalizing
comprehensive legislation this year. Furthermore, the issue
of export controls needs much attention, and the TS,
assistance program must continue. The U.S. agreed, noting
its 25 Technical Assistance Visits (TAVs) generated
enthusiasm and commitments, but less progress than hoped.

The U.S. now intends to focus on implementation in its own
region. The U.S. also asked France, Germany and the UK to
encourage European states Belgium, Iceland, and Portugal to
complete their implementation. In its role as EU president,
Germany touted the latest EU Joint Action, but noted that
some states preferred to deal with the Secretariat and were
not always willing to include EU participants on TAVs.


20. (SBU) The UK and France presented information on their
training courses; noting that the TS had selected the
participants. France has given five basic courses for
National Authorities which presented a comprehensive overview
of all implementation aspects. The Secretariat has requested
France to prepare courses on new topics, such as inspections
and legislative requirements. France recommended that
student lists be shared, to minimize the potential for "CW
tourism."

--------------
Budget
--------------


21. (SBU) Discussion focused on support for the Director
General,s goal for 2008 of another zero nominal growth
budget. There was consensus on the need for a continued
focus on verification, including an increase in OCPF
inspections and that ongoing discussions on inspection
frequency and on budget numbers need to be kept separate.


22. (C) Reaching some sort of satisfactory conclusion to
discussions on OCPF site selection methodology was seen as
key, and all delegations were anxious to see what the
Director General would propose (as promised at EC-48) about
revising those areas under his mandate (equitable
geographical distribution of inspections and information on
the plant sites available to the TS). Germany felt from the
budget discussions last fall that the NAM believed that the
reasons for requesting more OCPF inspections in the 2007
budget was to shift the inspection burden from the West to
the NAM, and there was general agreement that work was needed
to correct this misunderstanding. Germany also felt that,
politically, inspections of Schedules 1, 2, and 3 would need
to be kept static (not lowered) to lessen concern over
increased OCPF inspections.


23. (SBU) Germany announced that they would chair the June
ABAF meeting because the Iranian chair has resigned. They
encouraged more expert attendance during the meetings, and
commended the U.S. on the return of John Fox, and expressed
the need for a UK representative, with French participation
welcome as well.

--------------
Industry Issues
--------------


24. (SBU) France stressed that OCPF site selection
methodology is a critical issue because of the desire to
focus more inspections on OCPFs. Javits gave a brief summary
of what the U.S. envisioned might happen when the
facilitation ends after the June EC. Although the UK is
still hopeful that the current facilitation will be
successful, they agreed that the current Secretariat efforts
may be the best hope. France agreed.


25. (SBU) Germany expressed the desire to better focus OCPF
inspections on "relevant" sites, although they conceded that
the selection criteria within the CWC made this difficult.
They referenced the comment by Jonathan Tucker at the recent
Berlin symposium that more site-specific information is
needed, but noted that the CWC does not allow the data
requirements to be increased. The U.S. noted that the Tucker
idea, as well as an earlier Canadian proposal, was helpful
and that perhaps additional data could be provided
voluntarily. The U.S. also noted that increases in OCPF
inspection numbers will increase inspections in
industrialized countries, most of which will not be in
countries of concern.

--------------
Sampling and Analysis (S&A)
--------------


26. (SBU) The UK reported that their recent Schedule 2
inspection that involved S&A went well ) the equipment
worked fine, the site had no concerns, no serious technical
issues arose. The analyses were run in "open mode." The
site found the results of the analyses valuable in better
understanding their process, etc. France stated the TS
should prepare a "lessons learned" document about its
experiences during the "trial period."


--------------
Challenge Inspections
--------------


27. (C) Delegations agreed that the lack of use of a
challenge inspection tends to increase the political cost of
using this particular facet of the CWC verification regime.
Amb. Mahley also noted with concern the efforts of some
States Parties to severely restrict the circumstances under
which a challenge inspection could be called. Delegations
discussed the concept raised by Mahley of targeting an
activity (e.g., materials in transit or a non-state actor) as
opposed to the State Party itself, in which case the
mechanism might be viewed as more constructive. Delegations
welcomed the upcoming Dutch-hosted challenge inspection
exercise, with the U.S. and France expressing support for EC
involvement in the exercise. Germany expressed some
reservations, and the UK noted that the DG had recently
advised against EC participation in the exercise. There was
general agreement that the primary aim should be to maintain
the relevance of the challenge inspection as an important and
valid verification measure.

--------------
Article XI
--------------


28. (C) France noted the Iranian attack on the Australia
Group (AG) and stressed that the Allies must stand ready to
fight back. The AG is legal and useful and must continue.
Germany chimed in that the aims of the AG and CWC are the
same. As long as there are states that have not adhered or
have not fully implemented, the AG will remain necessary.
The U.S. pointed out that UNSC Resolution 1540 also has the
same goals for all states, whether Party to the CWC or not.
The UK noted that the issue is becoming one where Iran stands
in opposition to everyone else. There is no need to
apologize. France said that if a state had a good record,
there would be no denials under the AG. Presently, Iran
accounts for at least 75 percent of the denials.

--------------
Terrorism
--------------


29. (SBU) Amb. Mahley expressed support for the DG,s public
statement condemning the recent chlorine gas attacks in Iraq.
The UK noted its position that there is a role for the OPCW
to play beyond simply speaking out against such attacks, and
outlined a four-point approach it hoped this group would
endorse:
a. Press States Parties to improve and strengthen national
implementation.
b. Promote awareness of CWC prohibitions in industry and
academia.
c. Request the Technical Secretariat to constructively steer
States Parties and highlight the synergies between Article X
and countering chemical terrorism.
d. Encourage States Parties who can do so to increase their
own offers of assistance.


30. (SBU) French facilitator Annie-Claire Mari noted that the
mandate of the Open Ended Working Group on Terrorism contains
many of these elements. She updated delegations on her
recent contact with interested States Parties and the
upcoming consultation on May 24 when there will be a
presentation by the Chairman of the UNSCR 1540 Committee,
Amb. Peter Burian. She outlined her general approach of
continued cultivation of synergies with international
organizations (e.g., the UN and EU),and highlighting the
assistance and protection aspects of Article X to raise
non-aligned support. The U.S. also noted the relevance of
toxic industrial chemicals as weapons, and recommended
inviting chemical industry reps to discuss concerns and best
practices. French rep Grand noted that France may issue a
"white paper" on terrorism.

--------------
Tenth Anniversary
--------------


31. (SBU) Dels felt that the recent events in Berlin and
London were useful in bringing up new ideas and focusing on
universality. Germany also felt that having many different
smaller events was better than one big event.


32. (SBU) Amb. Mahley spoke of the participation by Assistant
Secretary DeSutter in the May 9 events and the plans for an

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event at Columbia University on October 8. (Note: A message
of commendation from The Secretary has been sent to DG

Pfirter on the occasion of the tenth Anniversary. End Note.)
France stated that they hoped to host an event later in

2007.

--------------
Other Business
--------------


33. (SBU) Delegations briefly discussed the next two meetings
) September/October in Berlin and Washington in March/April
of 2008. Delegations were asked to provide possible dates
for the Berlin meeting as soon as possible.










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