CWC CONSULTATIONS WITH FRANCE, UK AND GERMANY IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001870 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2017 TAGS: PARM PREL FR GM UK SUBJECT: CWC CONSULTATIONS WITH FRANCE, UK AND GERMANY IN PARIS MAY 3 Classified By: Donald A. Mahley, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, Reason 1.5(b)&(d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The French hosted consultations on the Chemical Weapons Convention with the U.S., UK, and Germany in Paris, May 3, 2007 preceded on May 2 by biological weapons discussions (reported Septel). Due to new French and UK Heads of Delegation, this round of Close Allies discussions brought the return of a useful and candid discussion amongst the four countries who are among the most active and influential at the OPCW. The group discussed such pressing issues as CW destruction deadlines in Albania, Libya, Russia and the U.S.; use of challenge and OCPF inspections; end point of destruction; continued pressure on non-States Parties to join the CWC and on Parties that have yet to fully implement their CWC obligations; the zero growth OPCW budget, and Second Review Conference. This interaction allowed for closer coordination between capitals and Hague delegates in advance of the late June Executive Council Meeting. The Germans will host the next meeting in September/October with particular attention on preparations for the April 2008 Second Review Conference. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) The U.S. delegation was headed by ISN Bureau Deputy Assistant Secretary Donald Mahley, accompanied by U.S. Representative to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW),Amb. Eric Javits, and an interagency team. Newly-arrived Deputy Head of the FCO,s Counter-proliferation Department, Chris Rampling, made a solid introduction with assistance from the departing head of the CBW section, Sarah Broughton. The Germans were represented by Peter Beerwerth of the MFA,s CW Section and their OPCW Representative, Amb. Alexander Petri. The ten-person French delegation was headed by the Head of the MFA,s BW/CW/Conventional Weapons Division, Camille Grand. -------------- Universality -------------- ¶3. (SBU) France opened the discussion, commenting that the core problem is the Middle East, and, in particular, wondering how best to make a push on universality in the run-up to the Review Conference. Germany recommended that the Allies focus on those states with administrative problems as opposed to the difficult cases. The UK noted that it had talked recently with the Bahamas and the Dominican Republic, and wondered whether gentle nudges might speed the accession process for Iraq and Lebanon. The U.S. said that it will focus on the Bahamas, Haiti and the Dominican Republic over the coming months. Germany plans to work with Angola. ¶4. (C) Regarding the Middle East, the Allies noted Egypt,s rebuff of the Director General. The U.S. summarized its exchange with Israel, reporting Israel,s assessment that the security situation has worsened since it signed the CWC, and that it did not see any possibility of acceding any time soon. Germany noted that the Mideast states, arguments are irrational; rational counter-arguments fall on deaf ears. France believes that Egypt would only consider adhering to the Convention AFTER Israel ratified. The UK argued that because Israel doubts Iran,s compliance, it is even less likely than before to consider ratification. The U.S. noted some modest positive developments: visits by senior Israeli officials to the OPCW and the DG,s meetings in Cairo with Egyptians officials. France summarized the discussion, noting little chance of success from P-5, EU, or Allies, joint approaches to Middle East capitals. For now it is preferable to continue bilateral approaches. ¶5. (C) The Allies briefly discussed the Secretariat,s universality workshops. All agreed that the standard presentation-based approach used by the Technical Secretariat for the last three workshops is not effective. In fact, Germany noted that this approach created a somewhat hostile approach in Rome. Rather, the Allies need to encourage the Secretariat to allow more time for open discussions and not SIPDIS push the attending non-States parties to reiterate their positions. The U.S. questioned the value of continuing these meetings. While agreeing in principle, France and the UK thought it would not be a good signal to cancel them; rather it would be preferable to keep the communications channel open. France suggested that use of Chatham House rules in an open venue might be an option. Delegations agreed that it might be most effective to hold the next seminar only after Iraq and/or Lebanon acceded. ¶6. (SBU) ISN/CB will establish the basis for a &virtual working group8 in which the Close Allies and others, on a selective basis, can communicate in real-time on what each government, the TS, the G-8, etc., may be undertaking to bring non-States Parties on board. It was noted that this may also be useful in the context of Article VII, especially as we push to get national implementation measures in place and through Parliaments. -------------- Destruction -------------- ¶7. (C) Discussion centered on renewed interest in defining the end point of destruction, particularly in light of the recent distribution of the facility agreement and verification plan for Russia,s Maradykovsky facility. The U.S., Germany, and France advocated adhering to the definition of end point occurring only after second stage destruction has been completed. The UK alone expressed support for the Secretariat/Russian approach at Maradykovsky, since their primary concern of demanding verification of both stages was addressed. UK MOD rep also extolled the significant progress made by Russia in the past eight months. (Note: The U.S. pointed out that much of the "Russian" progress was due to foreign assistance. End Note.) Germany expressed surprise that the Director General had stated unequivocally that Russia had met its 20% deadline, and pointed out that it would prefer to see current operations/accounting at the U.S.,s Newport facility (as opposed to past practice at Aberdeen) used as the comparative model. ¶8. (C) U.S. Rep. Mahley noted the difficulty we could encounter in the future if we indicated some flexibility in the treaty requirements for second stage destruction. The UK pointed out that the Secretariat is not equating the "counting point" and "end point," a concept that met with no support from the other delegations who agreed with Mahley,s point that the Maradykovsky approach effectively moves the political end point to the end of the first stage. Mahley also noted the potential, if second stage verification became more of a confidence building measure than a legal requirement, for questions of financial responsibility for such verification (Article VI versus Article IV) in future years. All delegations agreed that, particularly with recent Russian/Secretariat assertions that Russia has met its 20% deadline, the matter of end point of destruction will have to be handled carefully to avoid political damage. Delegations also agreed that while incineration of the second stage at Maradykovsky could eventually bring all States Parties into agreement on Russian CW destruction progress, it would not/not obviate the need for changes in the Maradykovsky facility agreement and verification plan language. France noted the value of a common Allied position in advance of EC-49. ¶9. (SBU) On U.S. destruction, Mahley reported the complete destruction of former production capacity, and continued progress toward the 45% intermediate deadline in December ¶2007. In response to questions about planned destruction facilities at Pueblo and Blue Grass, Mahley reassured delegations that while there are a number of special interest groups that make construction and destruction more complicated, the Congress is providing all the funds requested for these two sites. Allies welcomed the news that the U.S. is considering offering an EC visit to a U.S. destruction site before the end of the year. Commentary on significant delays in the U.S. program was minimal. ¶10. (SBU) Mahley updated delegations on the current situation in Albania. Discussion on possible action at EC-49 led to general agreement that an approach similar to the last EC (drawing on Article VIII and capturing concern in report language) would be the most logical and appropriate. France mentioned that Article XII, and even a reference to the UN Security Council, would not have to be a "crisis," but this idea was not supported by others. ¶11. (C) On the topic of Libyan CW destruction, France stated frankly that there is a French company seeking a piece of the destruction process, and the French perception is that Libya may be playing the U.S. and France against each other. Mahley explained the status of the USG/GOL and GOL/U.S. contractor contracts, and noted that the U.S. has elected to bear the burden of much of the destruction (allowing Libya to pick up infrastructure and more general support) primarily to avoid a safety risk. U.S. also noted that the destruction equipment has been funded, and fabrication has begun. -------------- -------------- Preparations for the Second Review Conference (RevCon) -------------- -------------- ¶12. (SBU) The UK said that progress to date was fine, especially given the more substantive involvement of delegations recently. The Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) will continue to work through the list of issues from the First RevCon. The chair (Amb. Parker, UK) expects to receive a report from the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) in the summer. He is cautious about getting into the textual drafting too early, as this increases the risk of the text being watered-down. They also stressed the value of the Close Allies having a common set of objectives, referring to a non-paper the UK distributed earlier this year and encouraged additional comments. ¶13. (SBU) Germany reported that preparation has begun within the European Union (EU). The recent symposium in Berlin served as a good start toward a joint position, which they hope to complete during the German Presidency. They do not anticipate any surprises. ¶14. (SBU) Amb. Mahley reported that one of our objectives is to ensure that the Australia Group (AG) remains unweakened by the CWC, and reminded Allies of U.S. Congressional requirements for certifying the continued strength of the AG. Another objective is to ensure the CWC remains strong ) reaffirming its value, and keeping it adaptable to deal with future issues, including terrorism. He promised that the U.S. would have non-papers on most issues. ¶15. (SBU) France stated that, given this would be the last RevCon before the 2012 destruction deadline, we needed to ensure focus on destruction. At the same time, they said they were not interested in raising controversial issues. ¶16. (C) Delegations also discussed who would chair the RevCon. Given the rotation for CSP chair and among the five regional groups and the five-year pattern for RevCon, the practice from the First RevCon of having the CSP Chair also chair the RevCon would always ensure an African Group chair of the RevCon. (The First RevCon was chaired by Algeria.) However, since there are no standing rules of procedure for selection of the RevCon Chair, the issue is open. Discussion about a rotation approach, with Asia next in line, quickly led to concerns about a run-in with the Iranians. France expressed concern that stopping an Iranian Chairmanship again would give the Iranians even more reason to sabotage the RevCon. Amb. Javits reminded the group that the Asian Group was successful within itself in preventing an Iranian EC Chair, and they were capable of doing that again. Before considering an independent alphabetical rotation, Germany insisted that we be sure that the Asian Group would prevent an Iranian chair. ¶17. (C) Mahley emphasized that an early start in a search for a Chair would allow those States Parties who may not currently have strong presences in The Hague to be considered and prepare for the role. In response to an inquiry, the UK made it clear that Amb. Parker would not be a candidate and that the UK would not seek the Chair. They pointed to the risks of designating a Chair too early. The UK also stated that the selection of the Chair was not within Amb. Parker,s mandate, but expressed concern with leaving this to the Bureau, as Iran represents the Asian Group there. The UK suggested continuing these discussions in The Hague with Amb. Parker. ¶18. (SBU) On the topic of NGOs and the industry forum, it was stated that the format for these has been decided within the OEWG. The UK announced that CEFIC (the European chemical association) would be attending and that one U.S. association has also confirmed. The list of NGOs will be discussed at the next meeting of the OEWG. Given the typical visibility of Iranian NGOs (groups of CW victims, etc.),France asked how we would control participants and how the Secretariat would control display space, etc. The UK pointed out that the list would need to be approved, as is done with meetings of the CSP, but that they are encouraging the widest participation possible by NGOs. -------------- Article VII -------------- ¶19. (SBU) France welcomed the establishment of National Authorities since the last Review Conference and the acceptance of the Action Plan. However, the legislative piece remains a problem, with only three states finalizing comprehensive legislation this year. Furthermore, the issue of export controls needs much attention, and the TS, assistance program must continue. The U.S. agreed, noting its 25 Technical Assistance Visits (TAVs) generated enthusiasm and commitments, but less progress than hoped. The U.S. now intends to focus on implementation in its own region. The U.S. also asked France, Germany and the UK to encourage European states Belgium, Iceland, and Portugal to complete their implementation. In its role as EU president, Germany touted the latest EU Joint Action, but noted that some states preferred to deal with the Secretariat and were not always willing to include EU participants on TAVs. ¶20. (SBU) The UK and France presented information on their training courses; noting that the TS had selected the participants. France has given five basic courses for National Authorities which presented a comprehensive overview of all implementation aspects. The Secretariat has requested France to prepare courses on new topics, such as inspections and legislative requirements. France recommended that student lists be shared, to minimize the potential for "CW tourism." -------------- Budget -------------- ¶21. (SBU) Discussion focused on support for the Director General,s goal for 2008 of another zero nominal growth budget. There was consensus on the need for a continued focus on verification, including an increase in OCPF inspections and that ongoing discussions on inspection frequency and on budget numbers need to be kept separate. ¶22. (C) Reaching some sort of satisfactory conclusion to discussions on OCPF site selection methodology was seen as key, and all delegations were anxious to see what the Director General would propose (as promised at EC-48) about revising those areas under his mandate (equitable geographical distribution of inspections and information on the plant sites available to the TS). Germany felt from the budget discussions last fall that the NAM believed that the reasons for requesting more OCPF inspections in the 2007 budget was to shift the inspection burden from the West to the NAM, and there was general agreement that work was needed to correct this misunderstanding. Germany also felt that, politically, inspections of Schedules 1, 2, and 3 would need to be kept static (not lowered) to lessen concern over increased OCPF inspections. ¶23. (SBU) Germany announced that they would chair the June ABAF meeting because the Iranian chair has resigned. They encouraged more expert attendance during the meetings, and commended the U.S. on the return of John Fox, and expressed the need for a UK representative, with French participation welcome as well. -------------- Industry Issues -------------- ¶24. (SBU) France stressed that OCPF site selection methodology is a critical issue because of the desire to focus more inspections on OCPFs. Javits gave a brief summary of what the U.S. envisioned might happen when the facilitation ends after the June EC. Although the UK is still hopeful that the current facilitation will be successful, they agreed that the current Secretariat efforts may be the best hope. France agreed. ¶25. (SBU) Germany expressed the desire to better focus OCPF inspections on "relevant" sites, although they conceded that the selection criteria within the CWC made this difficult. They referenced the comment by Jonathan Tucker at the recent Berlin symposium that more site-specific information is needed, but noted that the CWC does not allow the data requirements to be increased. The U.S. noted that the Tucker idea, as well as an earlier Canadian proposal, was helpful and that perhaps additional data could be provided voluntarily. The U.S. also noted that increases in OCPF inspection numbers will increase inspections in industrialized countries, most of which will not be in countries of concern. -------------- Sampling and Analysis (S&A) -------------- ¶26. (SBU) The UK reported that their recent Schedule 2 inspection that involved S&A went well ) the equipment worked fine, the site had no concerns, no serious technical issues arose. The analyses were run in "open mode." The site found the results of the analyses valuable in better understanding their process, etc. France stated the TS should prepare a "lessons learned" document about its experiences during the "trial period." -------------- Challenge Inspections -------------- ¶27. (C) Delegations agreed that the lack of use of a challenge inspection tends to increase the political cost of using this particular facet of the CWC verification regime. Amb. Mahley also noted with concern the efforts of some States Parties to severely restrict the circumstances under which a challenge inspection could be called. Delegations discussed the concept raised by Mahley of targeting an activity (e.g., materials in transit or a non-state actor) as opposed to the State Party itself, in which case the mechanism might be viewed as more constructive. Delegations welcomed the upcoming Dutch-hosted challenge inspection exercise, with the U.S. and France expressing support for EC involvement in the exercise. Germany expressed some reservations, and the UK noted that the DG had recently advised against EC participation in the exercise. There was general agreement that the primary aim should be to maintain the relevance of the challenge inspection as an important and valid verification measure. -------------- Article XI -------------- ¶28. (C) France noted the Iranian attack on the Australia Group (AG) and stressed that the Allies must stand ready to fight back. The AG is legal and useful and must continue. Germany chimed in that the aims of the AG and CWC are the same. As long as there are states that have not adhered or have not fully implemented, the AG will remain necessary. The U.S. pointed out that UNSC Resolution 1540 also has the same goals for all states, whether Party to the CWC or not. The UK noted that the issue is becoming one where Iran stands in opposition to everyone else. There is no need to apologize. France said that if a state had a good record, there would be no denials under the AG. Presently, Iran accounts for at least 75 percent of the denials. -------------- Terrorism -------------- ¶29. (SBU) Amb. Mahley expressed support for the DG,s public statement condemning the recent chlorine gas attacks in Iraq. The UK noted its position that there is a role for the OPCW to play beyond simply speaking out against such attacks, and outlined a four-point approach it hoped this group would endorse: a. Press States Parties to improve and strengthen national implementation. b. Promote awareness of CWC prohibitions in industry and academia. c. Request the Technical Secretariat to constructively steer States Parties and highlight the synergies between Article X and countering chemical terrorism. d. Encourage States Parties who can do so to increase their own offers of assistance. ¶30. (SBU) French facilitator Annie-Claire Mari noted that the mandate of the Open Ended Working Group on Terrorism contains many of these elements. She updated delegations on her recent contact with interested States Parties and the upcoming consultation on May 24 when there will be a presentation by the Chairman of the UNSCR 1540 Committee, Amb. Peter Burian. She outlined her general approach of continued cultivation of synergies with international organizations (e.g., the UN and EU),and highlighting the assistance and protection aspects of Article X to raise non-aligned support. The U.S. also noted the relevance of toxic industrial chemicals as weapons, and recommended inviting chemical industry reps to discuss concerns and best practices. French rep Grand noted that France may issue a "white paper" on terrorism. -------------- Tenth Anniversary -------------- ¶31. (SBU) Dels felt that the recent events in Berlin and London were useful in bringing up new ideas and focusing on universality. Germany also felt that having many different smaller events was better than one big event. ¶32. (SBU) Amb. Mahley spoke of the participation by Assistant Secretary DeSutter in the May 9 events and the plans for an SIPDIS event at Columbia University on October 8. (Note: A message of commendation from The Secretary has been sent to DG Pfirter on the occasion of the tenth Anniversary. End Note.) France stated that they hoped to host an event later in ¶2007. -------------- Other Business -------------- ¶33. (SBU) Delegations briefly discussed the next two meetings ) September/October in Berlin and Washington in March/April of 2008. Delegations were asked to provide possible dates for the Berlin meeting as soon as possible. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON