JOHNNY ABDO: DISTRUSTFUL OF SAUDI DIPLOMATIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001307 SIPDIS SIPDIS NSC FOR MARCHESE/DORAN/ABRAMS E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/022017 TAGS: FR LE PGOV PREL SY SUBJECT: JOHNNY ABDO: DISTRUSTFUL OF SAUDI DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a March 30 meeting, Former Lebanese Intelligence Chief Johnny Abdo said he distrusts the recent flurry of Saudi diplomatic activity on Lebanon, and faulted the Saudis for not taking Saad Hariri seriously. A March 14 supporter, Abdo nevertheless criticized the March 14 leadership for "lacking a strategic vision" and said the majority was "gradually surrendering" to the March 8 opposition. Abdo said Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh was best suited for the job of becoming Lebanon's next president, and that if elected he should seek to escape from the current political stalemate by focusing the country on economic rather than political questions. He also shared his views on Lebanese-Syrian relations (more assassinations are likely if Syria feels threatened by the International Tribunal/presidential election),Hizballah (Nasrallah's endgame has never been anything other than replicating the Iranian revolution in Lebanon),and Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri (Hizballah is keeping Berri on a short leash, believing that he would not hesitate to undermine Hizballah's interests if given the chance). End summary. Riyadh Summit: Form Over Substance -------------- ¶2. (C) Former Lebanese Intelligence Chief Johnny Abdo shared his insights into Lebanon's political crisis during a meeting at his Parisian home on March 30 with Poloff. Abdo began by dismissing the recent Arab League summit in Riyadh for having produced "nothing of note." "The Saudis are more interested in form than in substance," Abdo said disdainfully, adding that the Summit's communique had merely papered over the deep cleavages between AL members, including on the subject of Lebanon. He noted (with mild annoyance) that while he knew that Saudi King Abdallah met twice at the summit with Syrian President Bashar al-Asad, he (Abdo) had been unable to learn what transpired in those meetings. He was unimpressed that King Abdallah refused to grant an audience to Lebanese President Lahoud. "Lahoud is nothing. Why should the King bother to see him, when he has already met his master (Bashar)?" Abdo asked rhetorically. Saudi-Lebanese Relations -------------- ¶3. (C) Turning to the recent spate of Saudi diplomatic activity on Lebanon, Abdo (a self-proclaimed supporter of the March 14 Coalition) expressed general distrust of the Saudis. He assessed that Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan and Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal are at odds over Lebanon/Syria policy, with Bandar urging support for March 14 and the Siniora government, Saud al-Faisal urging reconciliation with Syria, and King Adballah somewhere in between but readily influenced by whomever managed to grab his ear last. "Whether the Saudis decide they hate Bashar one hundred percent, or love him one hundred percent, it's still bad for Lebanon," he said. ¶4. (C) The biggest problem with the Saudis, he continued, is that they don't take Saad Hariri seriously. Whereas the late Rafik Hariri was an active participant in Saudi decision-making, advising the Saudi leadership on how to promote Lebanon's interests as well as on how best to pursue the Kingdom's interests in Lebanon, the Saudis treat Saad "like a child." Developing this theme, Abdo declared that Saad was a young but wise leader who had matured significantly over the past couple of years -- "but the Saudis don't see it." The resultant imbalance in the relationship has made it difficult for Saad to shake the perception that he is a Saudi puppet who will do whatever Riyadh tells him to do, a perception that, in turn, undermines his ability to attack Hassan Nasrallah and others for being foreign agents. The Woes of March 14 -------------- ¶5. (C) Abdo assessed that March 14 was in a weaker position today than twelve months ago, and was getting weaker all the time. This, he said, was due to a lack of strategic vision on the part of March 14's leadership, as well as to the sundry personal liabilities of Saad Hariri, Samir Geagea, and Walid Jumblatt. Hariri, he reiterated, is seen as too beholden to the Saudis; Geagea says the right things and probably believes them, but needs to improve his public image PARIS 00001307 002 OF 003 (Abdo cited Geagea's inability to pull in the Christian voters who have deserted Michel Aoun, and predicted that if Aoun runs for president, most of his former supporters will return to his fold); and Jumblatt is seen by many as untrustworthy (even though Abdo is convinced that Jumblatt has "passed the point of no return" and there is no danger of his defecting to the opposition). Expounding on Geagea's problems, Abdo said that Lebanon's Christian community did not want to face the fact that, after 25 years, it hasn't managed to move beyond Michel Aoun, Samir Geagea, and Amin Gemayel. ¶6. (C) Abdo said March 14 is underestimating the challenges posed by the end of President Chirac's term, which he predicted would lead to revisions in French policy toward Lebanon. He hoped, however, that an electoral victory by Nicolas Sarkozy would mitigate any fallout for March 14's interests (predicting that the putatively pro-American Sarkozy would be more inclined remain in synch with the U.S. on Lebanon policy than would his opponents). Compounding March 14's troubles is Maronite Patriarch Sfeir, whom Abdo accused of "not doing his job" for failing to shape the outcome of the presidential election. "Sfeir has no knees," Abdo said sadly, adding that he expresses his frustration by boycotting the Patriarch during Sfeir's visits to Paris. Riad Salameh for President -------------- ¶7. (C) In light of March 14's difficulties, Abdo said it was incumbent upon Lebanon's next president to lead the country out of its current political stalemate by re-focusing it on economics. "He needs to convince the public that the country's biggest problem is economic rather than political, and then focus on economic reform so as to reduce political tensions. I can think of no one better positioned to do that than the Governor of the Central Bank, Riad Salameh," he continued. Lebanese-Syrian Relations -------------- ¶8. (C) Turning to Lebanon's turbulent relations with Syria, Abdo said he saw only three ways out of the current crisis: First, topple the Syrian regime ("not an option for us," Abdo said ruefully); second, reach a compromise ("unfortunately, the Syrians are not interested in compromise right now because they have the upper hand"); third, surrender (which is what he believes March 14 is gradually doing). ¶9. (C) Pausing to extol at some length the wily mind of the late Hafez al-Asad, Abdo said that al-Asad's genius lay in never conclusively answering the question of whether, from an American point of view, Syria was "retrievable" or "beyond rehabilitation." Abdo argued that Bashar has attempted, albeit clumsily, to follow the same line. Nonetheless, Abdo predicted that, if there appears to be movement on establishing the International Tribunal or if the November 2007 presidential election appears likely to go against the opposition, the Syrians would not hesitate to order the assassination of March 14 ministers or parliamentarians. "If the Syrians really want to create chaos, they will target Geagea, Jumblatt, Hariri or Nasrallah," said Abdo, adding that killing one or more of the four might be enough to tip Lebanon back into civil war. ¶10. (C) Pressed on why the Syrian regime might wish to eliminate Nasrallah (who, "like it or not, is the only charismatic leader in Lebanon today"),Abdo said that Nasrallah himself believes -- and has told members of his entourage -- that elements in the Syrian regime tried to kill him with a car bomb some years ago as Nasrallah was returning from a visit to Damascus. "The Syrians don't care about Nasrallah personally; if he dies, they know someone else will take his place," said Abdo. The key to ending Syrian support for Hizballah, is, in Abdo's mind, for Israel to make peace with Syria by giving back the Golan Heights. "Peace with Israel would be a trap for Syria that would not only sever the Iranian landbridge to Hizballah, but would also undermine the Syrian regime on numerous levels," said Abdo. Returning to Nasrallah, Abdo said the Hizballah leader was "a total liar" whose endgame has never been anything other than the spread of the Islamic Revolution to Lebanon. "He has no loyalty" to the Taif Agreement, Abdo declared. Nabih Berri -------------- PARIS 00001307 003 OF 003 ¶11. (C) As for Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, Abdo said Berri "owed" Hizballah after having backed UNSCR 1701 (and having urged Nasrallah to accept it); having said that Siniora's government (not Hizballah) was "the resistance government"; and after advising PM Siniora to agree to a maritime dimension to UNIFIL. As a result of these moves, Nasrallah became "furious" with Berri and put him "on a short leash." "Hizballah's leadership believes that Berri would not hesitate to do them further damage if he had the chance," said Abdo. ¶12. (C) Comment: Abdo, notwithstanding the many years he has spent in Paris, remains an intense observer of the Lebanese scene, and a gregarious if somewhat disconcerting interlocutor. (At one point in the conversation, Abdo evoked -- with candid admiration -- Yasser Arafat's skill at dissembling, calling the late Palestinian leader the "greatest liar I ever met.") Although we have attempted to accurately convey his views, we naturally defer to our colleagues at Embassies Beirut and Damascus as to the value of his analysis. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON