FRENCH PUT CONTACT GROUP ON INDEFINITE HOLD

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001242

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/28/2017
TAGS: FR GM IR IS IT LE PARM PGOV PREL SP SY UK
UNSC
SUBJECT: FRENCH PUT CONTACT GROUP ON INDEFINITE HOLD

REF: STATE 36202

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: On March 27, Herve Besancenot, MFA
DAS-equivalent for the Levant, gave an equivocal response to
reftel demarche, claiming that the Quai's position had
remained consistent: the French support the Contact Group in
theory, but the timing must be handled carefully because of
the extremely delicate political situation in Lebanon.
Besancenot then explained that the French were unpersuaded by
reports of Hizballah's rearmament, and therefore felt no
urgency about convening the Contact Group. "Taking into full
account the sensitivity of the situation . . . we want to see
how things evolve before being tied down to a date,"
Besancenot said, although the clear subtext was that no time
is a good time from the Quai's perspective.


2. (S) Summary, ct'd: Besancenot revealed that, after Post
delivered reftel demarche to the MFA on March 22, with a
clear explanation that, as a gesture of good faith to ensure
the invitation addressed France's concerns, the Department
would refrain from inviting others until hearing back from
the French, the Quai took advantage of an EU Quintet meeting
the following day to line up the other Quintet members
against the proposed Contact Group meeting. The MFA's
repeated attempts to thwart USG efforts to convene a Contact
Group may presage a change in France's Lebanon policy in the
post-Chirac era if the MFA's traditional Arabists succeed in
having their way with the new president; see comment paras
11-12 for analysis. End summary.

French Position "Has Not Changed"
--------------


3. (C) Poloff delivered reftel demarche to Remy Bouallegue,
MFA Desk Officer for Lebanon, and Jean-Christophe Auge, Desk
Officer for Syria, on March 22. In a follow-up meeting on
March 23, Auge asked that the USG hold off on sending out
further invitations to the Contact Group until Monday, March
26, while the MFA "ironed out some administrative questions."
After receiving no response on March 26, Poloff met with MFA
DAS-equivalent for the Levant Herve Besancenot on March 27,
at which point Besancenot shared the MFA's official response,
which he said had just been cabled to the French Embassy in
Paris.


4. (C) Besancenot conceded that he was aware of Washington's
"perception" that the French had repeatedly changed their
mind concerning the timing and venue of the first Contact
Group meeting. However, Besancenot continued, the French
position has remained constant: the French support the
Contact Group in principle, but the timing must be handled
carefully given the extremely delicate political situation in
Lebanon. Besancenot asserted this was still the MFA's
position, although his subsequent remarks made it clear that
the MFA was unlikely to agree to any meeting of the Contact
Group in the near future.

Key Questions
--------------


5. (S) Besancenot then shared several questions which he said
might be usefully discussed within the context of the Contact
Group. First, what is the real nature of Hizballah's
rearmament? He emphasized that the French are skeptical of
Israeli claims that Hizballah is rearming south of the Litani
(claims which he dismissed as "manipulative"),and added that
he found the intel shared per reftel "unpersuasive."


6. (C) Second, what can the UNSC contribute to reinforce the
arms embargo? Besancenot said tightening control of the
Lebanese-Syrian border would require both air and ground
units, but added that the French are convinced that the only
way to truly end Hizballah's rearmament is via a political
solution that addresses other issues ("including Sheba'a
Farms),not a security or military solution. He said we
should also exert pressure on Syria and Iran to comply with
the embargo, not just the GOL, which cannot control its own
borders.


7. (C) Third, how to limit Hizballah's rearmament without
weakening the GOL? Besancenot made the case that enforcing
the arms embargo is not worth risking the collapse of the
Siniora government.


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8. (C) "Taking into full account the sensitivity of the
situation . . . we want to see how things evolve before being
tied down to a date. We shouldn't create an artificial sense
of urgency. If the Contact Group were to meet, it would be
essential not to feed the opposition's claims that an
international cabal of Western states is determining
Lebanon's future, so the meeting would have to be very
discreet, with no public statement afterwards. Even if
Siniora were to agree to some sort of stronger border
controls, such as a monitoring mission, he would need
something to balance that, such as an Israeli withdrawal from
Sheba'a Farms. So the Contact Group should talk about
implementation of UNSCR 1701 in its entirety," added
Besancenot.

We Push Back
--------------


9. (C) Poloff registered strong disagreement with
Besancenot's arguments, noting that the French have
repeatedly reversed themselves and have never given us a
convincing and straightforward explanation of their
reluctance to convene the Contact Group. At the same time,
we have bent over backwards to accommodate their putative
concerns; this latest response only deepens our frustration.
In a follow-up conversation with Besancenot on March 28,
Poloff cautioned that the French Embassy in Washington
appeared to have given the Quai an overly rosy account of the
Department's reaction to the French response, and emphasized
our perception that the French dealt with us in bad faith by
using the March 23 EU Quintet meeting to rally opposition to
the Contact Group proposal.


10. (C) Based on discussions with EUR and NEA, Post
understands that efforts are underway to find an appropriate
opportunity to express to Ambassador Levitte our deep
unhappiness about how the French have handled the Contact
Group proposal. Post concurs with this approach. We assess
that further protest on our part would be futile at this
point and possibly counter-productive, as it would serve to
unravel the hitherto close cooperation between the USG and
France on Lebanon policy.

Comment: A French Policy Change Ahead?
--------------


11. (S) Comment: Despite Besancenot's protests, it is clear
that the French have repeatedly attempted to delay, and
ultimately thwart, our efforts to convene the Contact Group.
Neither Besancenot's arguments, nor France's ever-present
force protection concerns with respect to the French
peacekeepers in Lebanon, adequately explain the MFA's
reluctance to play ball. Based on the many discussions we
have had with the MFA over the past few months, Post suspects
that Jean Felix-Pagagnon, the MFA NEA A/S equivalent, has
been the driving force behind the Quai's unhelpful behavior.
This may presage an attempt to return France's Lebanon policy
to what some Quai officials see as its natural center of
gravity in the aftermath of the Chirac presidency.
Specifically, we suspect that the Quai may advise France's
president-elect to "de-personalize" France's Lebanon policy
by putting some daylight between Paris and the March 14
majority. In addition, we anticipate that the Quai will
advocate some sort of diplomatic opening to Hizballah as a
means of restoring France's "neutral" image. Moreover, we
suspect that the MFA will "reconcile" itself to a
watering-down of the statutes establishing the International
Tribunal; the MFA's Lebanon desk officer (who we suspect is
parroting a line he has heard from Besancenot and
Felix-Pagagnon) has rhetorically asked us several times in
recent weeks whether it is "worth sacrificing the state of
Lebanon on the altar of the international tribunal?"
Finally, even Chirac's personal Middle East advisor,
Dominique Boche, concedes that regardless of who wins the
presidential election, France's next president will
inevitably send some sort of envoy to Damascus in a bid to
change the tenor of Franco-Syrian relations.


12. (C) While this analysis is speculative (when asked, our
MFA contacts continue to insist that the broad contours of
France's Lebanon policy will not change after Chirac's
departure),our sense is that Chirac is already facing
considerable resistance at the Quai as he tries to ensure the
creation of the International Tribunal before his term
expires. We may need to engage quickly, and at the highest
level, with France's next President to ensure that the tight
cooperation between our two governments on Lebanon does not

PARIS 00001242 003 OF 003


fall victim to the preferences of the MFA's career Arabists
once Chirac is no longer on the scene.



Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

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