FRENCH SHARE VIEWS ON LEBANON CONFERENCE, UNSCR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 000112

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR ABRAMS/DORAN/MARCHESE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2017
TAGS: FR KDEM LE PGOV PREL SY
SUBJECT: FRENCH SHARE VIEWS ON LEBANON CONFERENCE, UNSCR
1701 IMPLEMENTATION


Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Josiah Rosenblatt, reasons
1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary: EB PDAS Liz Dibble and NEA DAS Robert Danin
met with the MFA's Herve Besancenot (DAS-equivalent for the
Levant) and the Elysee's Dominique Boche (Chirac's Middle
East advisor) on January 9 to discuss preparations for the
January 25 Lebanon conference (septel to follow) and options
for tightening implementation of UNSCR 1701. The French
claimed to be confident that Hizballah had not succeeded in
rearming south of the Litani, but were cautious about the
prospect of UNIFIL launching UAV operations in light of
Hizballah's declaration that such operations would cross a
red line. Besancenot indicated that France was inclined to
accept a delay in establishing the international tribunal
until such time as Brammertz was prepared to name names.
Both men suggested it might be useful to "call Syria's bluff"
by allowing the Italians to run with their ideas on providing
technical assistance on border monitoring to the SARG.
Likewise, they both displayed interest in the possibility of
establishing a UNSCR 1701 Embargo Committee in New York.
Boche argued that Sheba Farms remained "the best political
trap" for Hizballah. End summary.

Moving Forward on UNSCR 1701
--------------


2. (S) EB PDAS Liz Dibble and NEA DAS Robert Danin met with
Herve Besancenot, MFA DAS-equivalent for the Levant, on
January 9, to discuss preparations for the January 25 Lebanon
conference (septel to follow) and options for tightening
implementation of UNSCR 1701. They raised the same topics in
a separate meeting later that day with Dominique Boche,
President Chirac's Middle East advisor.


3. (S) Danin, citing Washington's concern that Hizballah is
rearming, stressed the need to strengthen implementation of
UNSCR 1701. He said that PM Siniora, though receptive in
theory to enhancing the arms embargo regime, was not
proactive and seemed reluctant to accept that changes (i.e.,
rearmament) were taking place on the ground. He noted that
Israel shared the U.S. assessment, which was discussed during
the recent visit to Washington by Major General Amos Yadlin,
the head of IDF Military Intelligence.

French See Hizballah Checked South of Litani
--------------


4. (S) Besancenot agreed that there had been a slowdown in
the implementation of UNSCR 1701, but said he had seen no
proof of Hizballah's rearming, despite Israel's claims.
While he conceded that some significant rearmament may have
taken place north of the Litani river (including the
possibility that missile parts may have been smuggled over
the Syrian-Lebanese border),he said no significant
rearmament had taken place south of the Litani due to the
LAF/UNIFIL presence. For his part, Boche said the French
were aware of the risk of Hizballah rearming, but balanced
that against the fact that Hizballah fighters had effectively
been pushed out of the area south of the Litani, which meant
that cross-border raids of the type that triggered last
summer's conflict were no longer possible. (Later, on the
margins of the Paris III prep meeting (septel) Siniora
advisor Mohammed Chatah said that the PM believed Hizballah
was shipping arms from south Lebanon to north of the Litani.)


Drones: French Spooked by Hizballah Threat
--------------


5. (S) Danin asked for current French views on adding an
aerial dimension to UNIFIL's mandate (i.e., "AirUNIFIL"),
saying he understood that French UAVs in Lebanon remained in
their crates because PM Siniora was not prepared to ask for
their deployment. He noted the need to encourage Siniora to
do so, adding that the Secretary was personally concerned
about the reports of Hizballah's rearmament.


6. (S) Besancenot confirmed that the French UAVs had not been
unpacked due to the "sensitivity" of their deployment. He
indicated that if a decision were made to move forward, the
GoF would agree with UNIFIL to only operate the drones in
certain areas (presumably, not beyond UNIFIL's AOR).
However, he observed that: "Drones are useful, but we have to
consider the security consequences for our troops." Lebanon
desk officer Remy Bouallegue chimed in: "Given the negative
reaction from Hizballah, we're being very cautious . . . we

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think now may not be the best time" (to begin UAV flights).


7. (S) Boche agreed that France was prepared to make drones
available to UNIFIL, but was clearly spooked by reports that
Hizballah's D/SYG had recently announced that any drone
flights would cross a "red line." "This is difficult for us
because we have troops on the ground," Boche said
apologetically. Danin acknowledged that the vulnerability of
French peacekeepers was a legitimate concern, but pressed
Boche not to let Hizballah exercise a veto over UNIFIL
operations. He pointed out that UNIFIL had already expanded
its UNSCR 1701 mandate by adding a naval dimension to the
arms embargo; an aerial expansion could be justified by the
same logic. Boche remained unconvinced, saying that
Hizballah's warning had been very specific. "We must
consider it," he said.


8. (S) Both Boche and Besancenot made it clear that, in the
event UNIFIL did begin operating UAVs, they were under no
illusion that Israel would suspend its overflights of
Lebanese territory. However, they noted appreciatively that
Israel had made some progress in curbing the most irksome
(and to Siniora, politically damaging) overflights, and hoped
that Israel might be able to further limit its overflight
activities as its confidence in UNIFIL's performance grew.
Boche made it clear, however, that the French did not
envision a tit-for-tat trade of UAV-generated intel in
exchange for fewer overflights. "Our purpose is to beef up
UNIFIL's intelligence capabilities, not necessarily to
provide intelligence to Israel," he said.

"Taking a Pause" on International Tribunal
--------------


9. (S) Turning to options for establishing the International
Tribunal for Lebanon, Besancenot said that France was
inclined to "take a pause" in pressing for the tribunal's
establishment. Noting that the last Brammertz report was
rather anodyne, he questioned whether it made sense for
Siniora's government to "got to war" with the opposition
until such time that Brammertz was prepared to name names.
Danin suggested that France join the U.S. in pushing for
Brammertz's extension, and said that Arab League SYG Amr
Moussa's proposal for a six-person committee to review
tribunal documents that had already been approved by the
Siniora Cabinet was a step in the wrong direction. "It
depends on the purpose of the committee," said Besancenot,
who agreed that any major changes to the tribunal documents
would be unacceptable, while indicating that France would not
object to minor fiddles that might help the March 8
opposition to save face. Besancenot said he did not know
when Amr Moussa planned to return to Beirut, but said France
continued to act as if the Amr Moussa plan were still on the
table.

Border Monitors: Paris Willing to Call Syria's Bluff
-------------- --------------


10. (S) Asked about possibilities for monitoring the
Lebanese-Syrian border, Besancenot saw little scope for
beefing up monitoring on the Lebanese side of the border in
light of Syrian threats. "Siniora is against it because
Syria won't accept it," he summarized.
Besancenot seemed surprised when Danin suggested that Siniora
might reconsider were there to be monitors on both sides of
the border. "If Siniora has changed his mind, we'll try to
help," he said.


11. (S) Boche and Besancenot each stressed their continuing
conviction that there is nothing to be gained at present by
talking to the Syrian regime, which "pockets" any
international engagement it can get without changing its own
behavior. However, both suggested that France might be
prepared to "call Syria's bluff" by encouraging the Italians
to move forward with their offer to provide border-monitoring
assistance to the SARG. If the Syrians refused to seriously
engage with the Italians, then perhaps other EU states would
finally realize the futility of extending carrots to the Asad
regime. (Boche predicted that the Syrians would likely
accept whatever hi-tech border monitoring gear the Italians
offered to provide, but would send the Italian experts
packing as soon as Syrian forces had learned to use the new
equipment.) On the other hand, if the Syrians accepted
Italian cooperation, it would undermine the regime's argument
that the GOL is not entitled to international assistance for
the same purpose. Both Besancenot and Boche emphasized that,
whatever the Italians or other EU states might do, France

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would not enter into negotiations with the Syrian regime.


12. (S) Neither Boche nor Besancenot warmed to Danin's
suggestion of an EU announcement that Syria's EU association
agreement was on hold. "Very difficult -- we're a bit
isolated on this question," Besancenot said dryly. Boche
suggested it was immaterial, since the association agreement
could only move forward on the basis of unanimity and France
would continue to quietly block any progress. Dibble pressed
Boche, suggesting that a more high-profile declaratory policy
on this point might help the Syrian public to recognize that
it was missing out on tangible benefits due to the Asad
regime's behavior. Boche dodged the point. As for
discouraging Gulf States from investing in Syria
(particularly in Syria's heated real estate sector)
Besancenot said the idea was interesting, but would bump up
against the fact that most Gulf States -- including, in his
view, even Saudi Arabia -- did not want to see the Syrian
regime toppled.

French Open to Embargo Committee Idea
--------------


13. (S) Both French officials were somewhat more open to the
idea of establishing an Embargo Committee to oversee
implementation of UNSCR 1701, as well as to the prospect of
calling upon UN member states to report on their efforts to
enforce the embargo.

Sheba Farms the "Best Trap" for Hizballah
--------------


14. (S) Boche expressed hope that UN SYG Ban Ki-moon would
quickly restore momentum to the UN's engagement on 1701
implementation, especially on the question of delineating the
Syrian-Lebanese border in order to lay the groundwork for a
resolution of the Sheba Farms question. Boche acknowledged
that the Israeli government was in no position at present to
seriously consider an initiative on the Sheba Farms (which
might be seen as rewarding Hizballah for its aggression),but
insisted that at some point Hizballah had to be deprived of
the Sheba Farms pretext for attacking Israel. "Sheba is
still the best political trap for Hizballah," said Boche.

Israel-Syria
--------------


15. (S) Boche observed that the task of isolating Syria has
not been made easier by voices in both the United States and
Israel which are calling for engagement with Damascus. He
said he understood how difficult it was for an Israeli
politician to appear unwilling to explore the possibility of
an opening with Damascus, but noted approvingly that Israeli
PM Olmert, at least, seemed unmoved by Syria's gamesmanship.

Israel-Palestine
--------------


16. (S) Boche ended by asking Danin for his analysis of PM
Mahmoud Abbas' call for early parliamentary elections. Boche
said Abbas was making a "very risky wager" because if Hamas
won the election, Abbas would be finished politically. "Our
fear," Boche confessed, "is that he'll lose control of Gaza,
and instead of one (de facto) Palestinian state, there will
be two." He said the French continue to hope that Abbas will
reach an understanding with Hamas and thus avoid further
confrontation.

Comment
--------------


17. (S) We were struck by the extent to which the French
seemed paralyzed by Hizballah's latest implied threat. While
the French may not have had time to completely digest this
latest development, the implication -- that Hizballah can
exercise veto power over UNIFIL by declaring the existence of
red lines -- is deeply worrisome. No less troublesome is the
notion of "taking a pause" with respect to establishing the
international tribunal, which would seem to play into the
Syrian/opposition strategy of running down the clock until
President Chirac leaves office. In short, while the French
remain indispensable allies on questions involving Lebanon
and Syria, their thinking reflects the unresolved tension
between their aspiration to maximize support to PM Siniora
and his allies on the one hand, and their determination to
minimize risks to their peacekeepers on the other.


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18. (U) EB PDAS Liz Dibble and NEA DAS Robert Danin cleared
this cable.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

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