FRANCE/COTE D'IVOIRE: LINKING THE OUAGA ACCORD TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001067

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2017
TAGS: PREL PHUM PINR IV FR
SUBJECT: FRANCE/COTE D'IVOIRE: LINKING THE OUAGA ACCORD TO
UNSC ROADMAP

REF: 3/7 D'ELIA - AMB. JACKSON EMAIL

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah B. Rosenblatt. Reas
ons 1.4b,d


1. (C) Summary: French MFA AF DAS-Equivalent for West Africa
Francis Blondet reviewed developments in Cote d'Ivoire during
a March 14 meeting with AF/W Deputy Donald L. Heflin.
Blondet did not deviate from the supportive French stance
toward the Ouagadougou Accord; however, he reiterated French
concerns that Ivoirian President Gbagbo might move
precipitously to dismiss PM Konan Banny without consulting
the UN Security Council. He emphasized the need to reinforce
linkages between the Ouagagdougou Accord and the
international roadmap, namely SCR 1721. Blondet said that
the French military presence in Licorne was diminishing, but
would likely stop short of a complete withdrawal. End
Summary.


2. (C) In a March 14 meeting with visiting Af/W Deputy
Director Donald L. Heflin and Africa Watcher, MFA AF
DAS-Equivalent for West and Central Africa Francis Blondet
outlined continuing GoF anxieties that Ivoirian President
Gbagbo would invoke the Ouagadougou Accords to dismiss PM
Konan Banny and form a new government. Consistent with his
March 7 remarks (Ref),Blondet underscored the need to
reinforce linkages between the Ouagadougou Accord and SCR
1721 (2006). Blondet held that since the UNSC had in effect
appointed PM Konan Banny, the UNSC should also have a say in
the appointment of his successor. Blondet demurred when
cautioned against the UNSC treating Cote d'Ivoire as a
trusteeship.


3. (C) In a telling departure from his March 7 remarks,
Blondet did not dismiss the prospect of Soro becoming prime
minister. Agreeing with Deputy Director Heflin, Blondet
thought Konan Banny might be looking for the right moment to
step down as prime minister, cloak himself in the mantle of
peacemaker, and position himself for an eventual presidential
run. Blondet disclosed that he had just concluded a meeting
with Konan Banny adviser, Leon Koffi, who had flown from
Abidjan to discuss terms for a possible handover of authority
to Forces Nationales leader Guillaume Soro. Konan Banny was
clearly assessing whether he could capitalize on the moment;
still, he was not quite ready to go, Blondet judged, and
sought to prolong his term by a few weeks or months, with
Blondet even citing the figure of three months. The notion
had come up, he said, for Konan Banny to serve somehow to
implement the Ouagadougou Accords. Blondet added that Koffi
was open to consultations in Washington and at UNHQ in New
York.


4. (C) The French military presence in Cote d'Ivoire was
diminishing, Blondet asserted. "Every month we reduce a
little bit," Blondet said. He related that the Licorne
commander had claimed he could meet mandated responsibilities
with only 500 or fewer personnel. Licorne's mission was
essentially to provide "quick air transport" for UNOCI; three
to four airplanes and three to four helicopters were
sufficient. Blondet confirmed that PM Villepin would put
Licorne's future on the table during his New York visit with
SYG Ban Ki-Moon. (Note: Villepin recently indicated he
wanted to set out a timetable for Licorne withdrawal before
the end of his term as Prime Minister in May.) Blondet noted
there was interest in the French MoD in possibly transferring
substantial Licorne forces to reinforce the French operation
in Chad.


5. (C) A transition to a mini-Licorne was more likely than a
complete shutdown of French military operations in Cote
d'Ivoire, Blondet volunteered. France would reconfigure and
reduce Licorne forces following the elimination of the Zone
of Confidence, but the specter of Rwanda would slow the rush
to withdrawal, he predicted; the risk of complicity in
another African bloodbath would lead France to keep some
boots on the ground. That said, French equities were nearly
nil, Blondet stated. French citizen presence was down from a
peak of between 40,000-60,000 to about 4,000, a figure which
included many Lebanese or African dual nationals. Cocoa,
coffee and cotton were no longer vital staples for French
commerce. Harbor and water management remained commercial
interests, he admitted, yet French engineering firm Bouygues
was ready to disengage.


6. (C) Speculating on Compaore's motivation in brokering a
peace deal for Cote d'Ivoire, Blondet, who was French

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ambassador in Ouagadougou from 2003 to 2006, described the
Burkinabe President as secretive by nature. Blondet guessed
that Compaore had come to the conclusion that Gbagbo was too
powerful, that he would not vanish from the landscape, and
that the time had come to cut a deal. In late 2003, by
contrast, Compaore had excoriated Gbagbo and conveyed a wish
to see the Ivoirian President dead, "with a bullet in his
head," Blondet commented. Now Compaore was committed to
coping with the immutable reality of Gbagbo's presence,
assuming Compaore could obtain guarantees on behalf of the
three million Burkinabe living and working in Cote d'ivoire
and that Ouagadougou would also gain access to Ivoirian ports
and thus to broader markets.


7. (C) Post Comment: The GoF is straining to harmonize its
goals for Cote d'Ivoire with the Ouagadougou Accord. The GoF
had no real hand in the deal, yet it does want the Accord to
work, despite reflexive skepticism, if only in the hopes of a
chance to downsize Licorne rapidly. The GoF has invested
both national and UNSC prestige and resources in devising the
rather bumpy international roadmap for peaceful elections
that culminated in SCR 1721 and the monthly exercise of the
International Working Group. Konan Banny, for Paris,
represented "the man of the international community," even if
the MFA has often conceded offline that Konan Banny had
failed to live up to his billing. An abrupt and undignified
departure for Konan Banny would be difficult for Paris to
stomach. It could drive a wedge between the Ouagadougou
Accords and the UNSC, and complicate efforts by the outoing
French government to devise a calendar for the extraction of
French troops from the Ivoirian theater.


8. (C) Comment cont'd: Girardin, Minister-Delegate for
Cooperation, Development and Francophony, insisted in a March
11 interview with Jeune Afrique that there was no dissonance
between Ouagadougou and SCR 1721, arguing that the genius of
the Ouagadougou Accord lay in its "appropriation by the
Ivoirians themselves of the roadmap defined by the
international community." Blondet, who returned this summer
from his posting in Burkina Faso, is less sanguine. In
official meetings he will recite the party line, arguing for
the almost forced harmonization between SCR 1721 and the
Ouagadougou Accord. But in private, Blondet disassociates
himself from that resolution, stressing that he was not yet
in his present MFA position during the negotiations, and that
he wasn't "shedding any tears" over its declining relevance.


9. (U) AF/W Deputy Donald L. Heflin cleared this cable.

Please visit Paris' Classified Website at:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm

STAPLETON