FRANCE/COTE D'IVOIRE: LINKING THE OUAGA ACCORD TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 001067 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2017 TAGS: PREL PHUM PINR IV FR SUBJECT: FRANCE/COTE D'IVOIRE: LINKING THE OUAGA ACCORD TO UNSC ROADMAP REF: 3/7 D'ELIA - AMB. JACKSON EMAIL Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Josiah B. Rosenblatt. Reas ons 1.4b,d ¶1. (C) Summary: French MFA AF DAS-Equivalent for West Africa Francis Blondet reviewed developments in Cote d'Ivoire during a March 14 meeting with AF/W Deputy Donald L. Heflin. Blondet did not deviate from the supportive French stance toward the Ouagadougou Accord; however, he reiterated French concerns that Ivoirian President Gbagbo might move precipitously to dismiss PM Konan Banny without consulting the UN Security Council. He emphasized the need to reinforce linkages between the Ouagagdougou Accord and the international roadmap, namely SCR 1721. Blondet said that the French military presence in Licorne was diminishing, but would likely stop short of a complete withdrawal. End Summary. ¶2. (C) In a March 14 meeting with visiting Af/W Deputy Director Donald L. Heflin and Africa Watcher, MFA AF DAS-Equivalent for West and Central Africa Francis Blondet outlined continuing GoF anxieties that Ivoirian President Gbagbo would invoke the Ouagadougou Accords to dismiss PM Konan Banny and form a new government. Consistent with his March 7 remarks (Ref),Blondet underscored the need to reinforce linkages between the Ouagadougou Accord and SCR 1721 (2006). Blondet held that since the UNSC had in effect appointed PM Konan Banny, the UNSC should also have a say in the appointment of his successor. Blondet demurred when cautioned against the UNSC treating Cote d'Ivoire as a trusteeship. ¶3. (C) In a telling departure from his March 7 remarks, Blondet did not dismiss the prospect of Soro becoming prime minister. Agreeing with Deputy Director Heflin, Blondet thought Konan Banny might be looking for the right moment to step down as prime minister, cloak himself in the mantle of peacemaker, and position himself for an eventual presidential run. Blondet disclosed that he had just concluded a meeting with Konan Banny adviser, Leon Koffi, who had flown from Abidjan to discuss terms for a possible handover of authority to Forces Nationales leader Guillaume Soro. Konan Banny was clearly assessing whether he could capitalize on the moment; still, he was not quite ready to go, Blondet judged, and sought to prolong his term by a few weeks or months, with Blondet even citing the figure of three months. The notion had come up, he said, for Konan Banny to serve somehow to implement the Ouagadougou Accords. Blondet added that Koffi was open to consultations in Washington and at UNHQ in New York. ¶4. (C) The French military presence in Cote d'Ivoire was diminishing, Blondet asserted. "Every month we reduce a little bit," Blondet said. He related that the Licorne commander had claimed he could meet mandated responsibilities with only 500 or fewer personnel. Licorne's mission was essentially to provide "quick air transport" for UNOCI; three to four airplanes and three to four helicopters were sufficient. Blondet confirmed that PM Villepin would put Licorne's future on the table during his New York visit with SYG Ban Ki-Moon. (Note: Villepin recently indicated he wanted to set out a timetable for Licorne withdrawal before the end of his term as Prime Minister in May.) Blondet noted there was interest in the French MoD in possibly transferring substantial Licorne forces to reinforce the French operation in Chad. ¶5. (C) A transition to a mini-Licorne was more likely than a complete shutdown of French military operations in Cote d'Ivoire, Blondet volunteered. France would reconfigure and reduce Licorne forces following the elimination of the Zone of Confidence, but the specter of Rwanda would slow the rush to withdrawal, he predicted; the risk of complicity in another African bloodbath would lead France to keep some boots on the ground. That said, French equities were nearly nil, Blondet stated. French citizen presence was down from a peak of between 40,000-60,000 to about 4,000, a figure which included many Lebanese or African dual nationals. Cocoa, coffee and cotton were no longer vital staples for French commerce. Harbor and water management remained commercial interests, he admitted, yet French engineering firm Bouygues was ready to disengage. ¶6. (C) Speculating on Compaore's motivation in brokering a peace deal for Cote d'Ivoire, Blondet, who was French PARIS 00001067 002 OF 002 ambassador in Ouagadougou from 2003 to 2006, described the Burkinabe President as secretive by nature. Blondet guessed that Compaore had come to the conclusion that Gbagbo was too powerful, that he would not vanish from the landscape, and that the time had come to cut a deal. In late 2003, by contrast, Compaore had excoriated Gbagbo and conveyed a wish to see the Ivoirian President dead, "with a bullet in his head," Blondet commented. Now Compaore was committed to coping with the immutable reality of Gbagbo's presence, assuming Compaore could obtain guarantees on behalf of the three million Burkinabe living and working in Cote d'ivoire and that Ouagadougou would also gain access to Ivoirian ports and thus to broader markets. ¶7. (C) Post Comment: The GoF is straining to harmonize its goals for Cote d'Ivoire with the Ouagadougou Accord. The GoF had no real hand in the deal, yet it does want the Accord to work, despite reflexive skepticism, if only in the hopes of a chance to downsize Licorne rapidly. The GoF has invested both national and UNSC prestige and resources in devising the rather bumpy international roadmap for peaceful elections that culminated in SCR 1721 and the monthly exercise of the International Working Group. Konan Banny, for Paris, represented "the man of the international community," even if the MFA has often conceded offline that Konan Banny had failed to live up to his billing. An abrupt and undignified departure for Konan Banny would be difficult for Paris to stomach. It could drive a wedge between the Ouagadougou Accords and the UNSC, and complicate efforts by the outoing French government to devise a calendar for the extraction of French troops from the Ivoirian theater. ¶8. (C) Comment cont'd: Girardin, Minister-Delegate for Cooperation, Development and Francophony, insisted in a March 11 interview with Jeune Afrique that there was no dissonance between Ouagadougou and SCR 1721, arguing that the genius of the Ouagadougou Accord lay in its "appropriation by the Ivoirians themselves of the roadmap defined by the international community." Blondet, who returned this summer from his posting in Burkina Faso, is less sanguine. In official meetings he will recite the party line, arguing for the almost forced harmonization between SCR 1721 and the Ouagadougou Accord. But in private, Blondet disassociates himself from that resolution, stressing that he was not yet in his present MFA position during the negotiations, and that he wasn't "shedding any tears" over its declining relevance. ¶9. (U) AF/W Deputy Donald L. Heflin cleared this cable. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON