DOD USDP EDELMAN AND FRENCH POLITICAL DIRECTOR

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 PARIS 001063 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2016 TAGS: PREL FR NATO PARM AF IZ IR MOPS MNUC KCFE MARR SUBJECT: DOD USDP EDELMAN AND FRENCH POLITICAL DIRECTOR ARAUD DISCUSS MISSILE DEFENSE, AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ, IRAN Classified By: AMB Craig Stapleton for reasons 1.4 (B & D). ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: During a March 15 meeting with USDP Edelman, MFA Political Director Araud accepted fully the U.S. right to deploy MD in the Czech Republic and Poland while noting the need for careful Russia management. Agreeing with Edelman that this was more a problem of politics than physics, Araud expressed concern that the U.S. might be considering deployment of an MD element to Georgia and asked whether the U.S. also had plans to push for Georgian participation in NATO's MAP process in connection with the 2008 summit. Araud responded to Edelman's description of PRT successes in Afghanistan with a request for documentation and analysis of PRTs that might serve to produce a more favorable GOF attitude following the upcoming presidential elections, reiterated familiar concerns about the need to keep France and other NATO governments informed in advance of ISAF operations, and said France would raise as a matter of Alliance principle Turkey's denial of blanket authorization for ISAF-related overflights at NATO if France and Turkey did not reach an understanding soon. In response to Edelman's briefing on the surge in Iraq, Araud agreed that Iran was reassessing its operations in Iraq in response to the recent operations against the IRGC(QF) in Iraq and the dispatch of a second carrier battle group to the Gulf. However, he saw no moderating of Iran's "obsession" with enrichment and said the Iranian's were using Russia's current refusal to deliver fuel as another argument for an indigenous capability. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) DOD Under Secretary for Policy Eric Edelman and Ambassador Stapleton met March 15 with MFA Political Director Gerard Araud to discuss missile defense, Afghanistan, and the situation in Iraq. Araud was joined by Policy Planning A/S-equivalent Pierre Levy, IO PDAS-equivalent Marc Giacomini, Strategic Affairs A/S-equivalent Philippe Carre, Advisor to FM Douste-Blazy for Strategic Affairs and North America Francois-Xavier Carrel-Billard, Nonproliferation Affairs DAS-equivalent Philippe Errera, Strategic Affairs office desk officer for missile defense issues Arnaud Mentre, NATO desk officer for Afghanistan Xavier Chatel, and Special Assistant to the Political Director Gael Veyssiere. POL/MC, LtGen John Sattler of J-5, Military Assistant COL Tracy Warren, LTC Nate Lucas of OSD, LTC Chad Lemond of DATT, and POL Deputy (notetaker) accompanied Edelman. MISSILE DEFENSE -------------- ¶3. (S) Ambassador Edelman briefed on U.S. deployment plans, explaining U.S. sites were optimal to intercept missiles from North Korea but that the Czech and Polish sites were needed to defend fielded forces and European allies against an eventual Iranian threat. He reviewed U.S. efforts at transparency within NATO and with Russia, including in the NATO-Russia Council, and pointed out the contradiction between Russian opposition to a U.S. site defending against Iran and Russia's own claims that it needed to abrogate the INF Treaty for the same reason, among others. Finally, noting Russian statements that they would prefer a U.S. site in the UK even if technically such a site would theoretically enable interception of a Russian missile, he concluded that the Russian problem appeared to be one of politics, not physics. ¶4. (C) Araud responded that the U.S. had a right to defend itself, that Poland and the Czech Republic were friends and allies who had the right to agree to missile sites, and that the Russian complaints and implicit threats were unacceptable. He agreed that the Russian reaction was political in essence, and, recounting Putin's ravings during the most recent meeting of Foreign and Defense ministers in Moscow, cited traditional Russian fears of encirclement close to their "geopolitical borders" and their rekindled imperial ambitions. The Poles and Russians attached a similar importance to a U.S. presence -- if for opposite reasons. But Russian reactions still needed to be taken into account, since they had consequences for Europe. He said France's position of calling for more dialogue reflected its status as a concerned observer; while the Germans had perhaps overreacted to the U.S. announcement, the situation created was also uncomfortable for France. Edelman acknowledged the concern and stressed the continuing importance the U.S. PARIS 00001063 002 OF 003 attached to cooperation with Russia on Iran, Kosovo, and other issues. ¶5. (C) Carre asked whether Russia had accused the U.S. of violating NATO commitments on stationing and infrastructure on the territories of new members. Edelman responded that the Russians had not yet raised the issue in any of his conversations, adding that any deployment would involve neither substantial forces nor bases. ¶6. (S) Edelman pointed out that the likelihood that any potential Iranian missile would invariably cross Russian territory, with the possibility of significant debris, might yet persuade Russia to take a more cooperative approach. Araud responded that concerns about debris, and the possibility that a missile might be intercepted over German territory, might help explain the stronger German reaction. BUT WHAT ABOUT GEORGIA? -------------- ¶7. (S) Araud asked if, as has been reported, the U.S. was thinking of basing a radar site in Georgia, commenting that while the U.S. had the right to do so, this would be viewed by Russia as a red flag. Edelman acknowledged that, to be fully effective, the system would eventually need a forward radar site, but this could be in Turkey, Georgia, or even Azerbaijan. Noting that the Russians themselves had a radar site in Azerbaijan, he explained to Araud that the U.S. at one point had proposed a cooperative arrangement at the same site with the Russians (the Russians had yet to respond). Araud asked whether the U.S. would be pushing to admit Georgia into the NATO MAP process in 2008, which he said would pose new difficulties for Russia. Carre added that eventual NATO membership for Ukraine was also a consideration. Edelman registered the French concerns, noting that Russia had not raised concerns about Georgia and Ukraine in its discussions with the U.S. of MD. AFGHANISTAN -------------- ¶8. (C) Edelman described the improving economic situation in Afghanistan; noted his just-held talks with the Afghans on security, economic development, counter-narcotics, and governance; and noted the Administration's USDOL 11.8 billion assistance request for Afghanistan. Afghan military capabilities were improving, with police capabilities still lagging. President Karzai was feeling encouraged by U.S. and NATO support. Additional UK and Polish battalions would be arriving soon in advance of any potential Taliban "spring offensive." Edelman explained that this was not a "military" campaign at all, but more a terrorist one directed against schools, health clinics, police stations, and economic development -- in short, the fundamentals of civilization. ¶9. (C) Edelman recounted his visit to a U.S.-led PRT in Jalalabad, an operation which he described as proving effective. In response to a number of Araud's questions, Edelman explained how PRT activities were nested in brigades in order to serve as an enabler for reconstructive activity. Araud noted that the current French Administration "did not believe in PRTs," but indicated that this might change after the elections. He asked if the U.S. had documentation on and analyses of the PRTs that it would be prepared to share (with the eventual aim of changing minds). Edelman undertook to provide him materials as quickly as possible. (NOTE: As a first step, Post provided Araud's office March 16 with USIP reports and USAID's June 2006 interagency study on PRTs in Afghanistan.) ¶10. (S) Araud asked if the Achilles operation was a response to current Taliban activity or was designed to preempt it. Edelman and Gen Sattler explained that it was essentially intelligence driven and designed to block Taliban infiltration routes and protect infrastructure. Carrel-Billard asked whether Afghan troops had a significant role in the operations and were gradually taking over. Edelman and Gen Sattler responded that Afghan troops fought well, but that they lacked enablers and mobility; it was for this reason that U.S. trainers were embedded in them. ¶11. (C) In a brief exchange, Araud reiterated familiar PARIS 00001063 003 OF 003 French concerns that French political authorities be informed in advance of major ISAF operations. U.S. participants noted that the issue had been raised and appeared to have been satisfactorily addressed at the March 14 NAC. ¶12. (C) Edelman and Sattler noted that there would be a rotary wing shortfall in the south with the rotation out of U.S. equipment and hoped France might be able to think about helping there or in other areas. Araud expressed the hope that the U.S. properly recognized the contributions France was already making, including the recent decision to move an aircraft carrier into the Arabian Sea. Edelman assured him that this was the case. ¶13. (C) Araud raised Turkey's decision to cease providing blanket overflight authorization for ISAF missions, saying that this affected Alliance operations and was therefore a matter of principle. Edelman agreed with the French position that Allies should adhere to their NATO responsibilities. Araud expressed the hope that France and Turkey would resolve their differences at a meeting scheduled for March 20. If not, he said, France would take the issue to the NATO Council (NAC). IRAQ -------------- ¶14. (C) Edelman noted that while it was still early to draw definitive conclusions about current operations in Baghdad, the initial phases were proceeding well. Operations had proceeded effectively, and there had been no political interference by the PM with operations. Sectarian killings had declined somewhat. Economic activity appeared to be on the increase. On the political side, the hydrocarbon law had passed the Council of Ministers, an important step forward. The key to future success hinged on being able to build in the areas cleared and held, but the U.S. had plans to deploy ten additional PRTs in the near future. ¶15. (S) Araud asked about the Iranian role. Edelman noted that, while an Iranian hand was still visible in IED attacks, the U.S. decision to pursue Iranian agents more actively and to deploy an aircraft carrier to the region appeared to be have catalyzed a process of reassessment. Araud agreed, affirming that Iran was worried about a possible military operation. Edelman agreed this was probably the case, while reiterating that the U.S. had no current plans for attacking Iran. Araud discerned signs of Iranian willingness to negotiate, although they continued to refuse suspension of their nuclear activities. They were obsessed by enrichment, he said, and were now citing the Russian refusal to deliver fuel to Bushehr as a justification for an indigenous capability. ¶16. (U) This message was cleared by USDP Edelman. Please visit Paris' Classified Website at: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/paris/index.c fm STAPLETON