C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 000557

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR IO AND WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2017
TAGS: PREL UN UNMIC PGOV YL PM
SUBJECT: PANAMA SUPPORTIVE BUT WARY ON KOSOVO

REF: STATE 47794

Classified By: AMBASSADOR WILLIAM EATON FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D


1. (C) "Rest assured, we're on the same page" on Kosovo
future status, First VP and FM Samuel Lewis told Ambassador
Eaton and POLOFF when he delivered reftel demarche on April

12. Lewis expressed Panamanian support of the UNMIK
Administrator's recommendations -- including independence --
but acknowledged Panama was waiting to see the text of the
proposal before pledging full public support. Panamanian
Senior Advisors for UNSC Affairs Nils Castro and Adolfo
Ahumada accompanied Lewis.


2. (C) Lewis said that based on his conversations with
Ambassador Ricardo Arias in New York, Panama's primary
concern revolves around the threat of Russia exercising its
veto power. Lewis opined that if the Russians perceive they
have been given adequate opportunity to express their
concerns on Kosovo, they will abstain from voting on the
UNSCR, telling the Serbs they have "exhausted all other
possible alternatives on Kosovo." He added that Russia was
pushing for a fact-finding mission to the region, but
Ambassador countered that after Ahtisaari's 20 rounds of
talks in 16 months with the Belgrade-Pristina governments,
even Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon does not endorse further
rounds of negotiations and discussion.


3. (C) Ambassador also noted that Panama's public silence
could be misinterpreted and only embolden the Russians to dig
in their heels. Lewis agreed there is "no way back" to
reunifying Kosovo and Serbia, calling Kosovo independence a
"reality," stating he would send a message to Arias in New
York to deliver an explicit (but private) message of Panama's
support for internationally-supervised Kosovo independence to
remove any possible misconceptions of Panama's position.
Lewis added that Panama would not undermine the ability to
work behind the scenes with Russia, but wanted to see the
text before publicly endorsing any resolution.


4. (C) When asked if Panama had any specific issues,
concerns, or text they would like to see addressed in the
resolution, Castro replied that Panama wanted to avoid
another outcome similar to Burma by spending the sufficient
amount of time to build consensus around the resolution,
noting that "Panama is not concerned about the concept, but
the speed at which a resolution is drafted." Castro also
noted that Panama wished to see a "discrete transition to
independence" in which the "symbols of independence" were
introduced delicately and sensitively to avoid antagonizing
the various ethnic groups within Kosovo. Castro opined this
process could take months, but Ambassador again countered
that while the USG also supports the gradual transition to an
internationally-supervised independent Kosovo, the status quo
cannot be perpetuated indefinitely without spawning unrest
that could destabilize the Balkans once again.


5. (C) On 11 April, POLOFF delivered similar reftel talking
points to MFA working level official Ernesto Cerrud, who
paralleled the response that Panama does not wish to "force
the issue" on Kosovo independence, and would prefer to await
the results of the Russian-led fact-finding mission to the
region before deciding to vote on a resolution. Cerrud's
comments mirrored those of Lewis, underscoring the Panamanian
paranoia that Russia will veto any resolution that is not
supported by Belgrade.


6. (C) Comment: Lewis and his advisors commented several
times they didn't want a repeat of the Burma resolution
vetoed by China. Local press painted this veto as a personal
embarrassment and setback for Lewis. As a Presidential
hopeful to succeed Martin Torrijos, Lewis is even more
cautious now than usual about press and public perceptions of
him. Lewis may also be concerned that creating a rift
between Panama and Russia vis a vis a vetoed Kosovo
resolution could damage the effectiveness of his planned tour
of Europe in May which includes a stop in Moscow.
Nevertheless, Lewis received our message clearly, and knows
he cannot hide in the shadows or the sideline on this issue.
However, the local Panamanian UNSC team may be willing to
stall the resolution signing process as long as possible. We
will continue to pressure Panama to take a stand. Continued
pressure on Ambassador Arias will also underscore the
seriousness of our resolve on this issue.

EATON