PANAMA: IRAN AND SUDAN DEMARCHES DELIVERED

C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 000406 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR IO/PSC (GRACE KANG),IO/T (HEATHER VON BEHREN), IO/UNP, WHA/CEN (ELIA TELLO),AND WHA/PPC E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2017 TAGS: PREL UNSC KPKO IR CD CT SUBJECT: PANAMA: IRAN AND SUDAN DEMARCHES DELIVERED REF: (A) STATE 33349 (B) STATE 33367 Classified By: Counselor for Political Affairs Brian R. Naranjo. Reaso n: 1.4 (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) "We do not foresee a problem with the draft UN Security Council Resolution on Iran that was prepared by the P-5 1 and anticipate that it will be adopted early next week," Panamanian MFA Senior Advisor for UN Security Council Matters Nils Castro told POLCOUNS on March 16. Though he complained about the lack of early consultation with the E-10 regarding the resolution's text, Castro did not believe that any significant "observations" would be made on March 19 in New York and that the resolution would be passed quickly with Panama's support. Noting the very grave situation Sudan, Castro said that the GOS was "clearly aggravating the situation" and "using false pre-texts" to derail the peacekeeping effort. Panama would voice its concerns on March 19 when UN U/SYG Guehenno briefed the Council on Sudan. -------------- Unable to Reach FM or VFM -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Ambassador continues to try to reach First VP and FM Samuel Lewis and VFM Ricardo Duran to present reftel demarches. Lewis is traveling in the U.S., and Duran is traveling in Panama. Post will report septel the results of any further high-level conversations on these matters. Castro was the highest-ranking available MFA official to receive this demarche. -------------- -- Iran: Panama Supportive, but With Hurt Feelings -------------- -- ¶3. (C) Noting that he had reviewed the P-5 1 draft UNSCR, Castro said that Panama had "no major concerns" and believed that the text was good. Nonetheless, Castro said Panama shared South Africa's concerns that that E-10 were not being given sufficient time to consider the text and were not provided the opportunity to negotiate. Castro welcomed the text's "gradualist" approach and said its "flexibility" would help bring about a diplomatic solution. When the draft Iran UNSCR was discussed on the morning of March 19, Castro predicted that there would not be any serious observations and that the resolution would be quickly adopted next week with Panama's support. -------------- Sudan: Grave Situation, What to Do Next? -------------- ¶4. (C) Castro said that Sudan was "clearly aggravating" the situation in Sudan and using "pre-texts" to derail UN-AU cooperation. "This very grave situation is a clear threat to international peace and security," Castro added. "We are running out of Chapter VI options." Castro said Panama would voice its concerns on Sudan in New York. Frustrated, Castro said he did not know what else could be done to pressure Sudan to accept a peacekeeping mission. Though he winced at the prospect of "coercive measures," Castro acknowledge that the time for such measures may have arrived. Castro said that he had already spoken with PANUN PermRep Arias, and they agreed that Panama had to speak out on the "humanitarian tragedy" in Sudan. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶5. (C) Concerning Iran, Panama's concerns have been primarily about process and approach: maintain consensus (especially among the P-5) and gradually ratchet up pressure on Iran. While Panama's feelings are somewhat bruised for not having been brought into the negotiations on the P-5 1 text, Panama will support this resolution since its concerns were met. On Sudan, Panama will speak out against the continuing humanitarian crisis and may even directly criticize the Sudanese government, a government with which it has little at stake. Panama will need to be brought along to accept coercive measures, and it's acknowledgment that "Chapter VI" options are running out should help pave the way to accept tougher steps. EATON