Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07PANAMA1838
2007-12-06 21:09:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Panama
Cable title:  

PANAMA: IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM BRIEFING HAS MAJOR IMPACT ON MFA THINKING

Tags:  IR KNNP MNUC PM PREL UNSC 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHZP #1838/01 3402109
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 062109Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1512
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0300
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1513
C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 001838 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2017
TAGS: KNNP, MNUC, PREL, UNSC, IR, PM
SUBJECT: PANAMA: IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM BRIEFING HAS MAJOR
IMPACT ON MFA THINKING

REF: PANAMA 1829

Classified By: POLCOUNS Brian R. Naranjo. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 001838



SIPDIS



SIPDIS



E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2017

TAGS: KNNP, MNUC, PREL, UNSC, IR, PM

SUBJECT: PANAMA: IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM BRIEFING HAS MAJOR

IMPACT ON MFA THINKING



REF: PANAMA 1829



Classified By: POLCOUNS Brian R. Naranjo. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)



--------------

Summary

--------------



1. (C) "I fail to understand what legitimate civilian

purpose Iran's nuclear fuel cycle activities could possibly

have," Panamanian MFA Senior Advisor for UN Security Council

(UNSC) matters Nils Castro said at the conclusion of a

December 5 briefing by State Bureau of International Security

and Nonproliferation (ISN) expert Richard Nephew. "It's in

comprehensible how Iran could spend so much money and effort

on these concealed nuclear programs, resources that could be

better spent addressing Iran's pressing social and economic

needs." Mr. Nephew's briefing educated Panama's UNSC policy

makers on the technical aspects of Iran's nuclear program and

underscored the reasons for continued concern about the

threat Iran's nuclear programs. MFA interlocutors -- who

included DG for International Policy Javier Bonagas, DG for

International Organizations and Conferences Delia Villamonte,

and subject matter experts from across the MFA -- all

expressed their profound appreciation for the education on

the technical issues involved in nuclear weapons development

in general and aspects of Iran's program in particular. This

briefing had a major positive impact in winning over key

Panamanian policy makers and will hopefully yield positive

results in support of USG views if and when this matter

returns to the UNSC. In the discussion that followed the

briefing, Castro noted that while additional sanctions would

likely be necessary to sustain pressure on Iran, positive

inducements to change their behavior should also be provided.

End summary.



-------------- --------------

UNSC Policy makers Get Arms Around Technical Issues

-------------- --------------



2. (C) Castro prefaced several questions with "this may by a

naive question, but . . . ." Basic questions by Castro and

his colleagues included: "What is a centrifuge?;" "How does

it work?;" "How much fissile material can one centr
ifuge

produce?;" What is a centrifuge cascade system?;" "What is

'heavy water?';" "What is yellow cake "What is an isotope?;"

and "What is a fuel cycle?" Mr. Nephew's explanations in

clear, layman's terms brought a great deal of relief to

Panama's UNSC team (and to Embassy Panama's POL team.)



--------------

What Struck the Panamanians the Most

--------------



3. (C) Having grasped some of the basic concepts regarding

the ways to develop the materials necessary, Panama's UNSC

team was most struck by the following elements of Mr.

Nephew's briefing:



a) Iran cannot develop a "self-sufficient" in uranium fuel

cycle to supply its civilian nuclear power industry.

Geologically poor in natural uranium, even given the most

optimistic estimates of uranium deposits that Iran might

have, Mr. Nephew explained that Iran did not have the ability

to supply enough raw uranium to sustain even half of Iran's

existing civilian nuclear power industry. Though not

sufficient to supply a civilian nuclear power industry, Iran

has enough raw uranium to build seven to eight nuclear

weapons.



b) Iran could more cheaply acquire nuclear fuel for its

civilian nuclear power industry on the open market than

develop its own fuel cycle. Castro immediately jumped in to

note that Iran could have put the USD 1 billion invested in

fuel cycle development to address Iran's social and economic

challenges.



c) By already successfully developing lowly enriched uranium

(LEU),as confirmed by the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA),Iran had completed the hardest part of the enrichment

process essentially going 70-75 percent of the way to

achieving the highly enriched uranium (HEU) necessary for

weaponization. International Policy Advisor Ernesto Cerrud

quickly summarized that Iran could then move quickly from



holding a stockpile of LEU to developing HEU.



d) Iran's heavy water plutonium development plant had no

rational peaceful use, including for medical or agricultural

purposes as asserted by Iran.



e) Though Iran, as noted in the NIE, had ceased its nuclear

weaponization activities, its efforts to enrich uranium and

develop plutonium continued in violate of IAEA commitments

and UNSC obligations.



f) Iran has gone to enormous lengths to conceal its nuclear

activities for years.



g) Iran has a way to come clean with the international

community as laid out in the Work Plan with the IAEA. Iran

has violated the NPT, IAEA commitments and failed to comply

with UNSC obligations. The P5 1 stand ready to provide Iran

access to advance civilian nuclear reactors, nuclear fuel

guarantees, better access to the international economy and

energy, telecommunications, and agricultural assistance. The

U.S. would enter into direction talks "anywhere, any time" if

Iran suspended its activities. UNSC sanctions could be

lifted.



--------------

Comment

--------------



4. (C) ISN's briefing on Iran's nuclear weapons program was

greatly appreciated and appears to have won additional

support for U.S. views and position on this matter. Several

"Eureka!" and "Aha!" moments were witnessed around the table

as members of Panama's UNSC team grasped technical details

and internalized an understanding of the threat posed by

Iran's nuclear arms activities. Panama's desire to grapple

with this tough political issue in the Council is promising

given that Panama's default setting is normally to run for

the center of whatever emerging consensus there might be and

avoid any controversy. Nurtured properly, in post's

estimation, Panama's support for the U.S. position can be

sustained and strengthened to the point where Panama may have

the confidence to take a stand on this matter that very well

may split the Council. Finally, post is extremely grateful

to Mr. Nephew and ISN for their support and assistance in

educating not only our Panamanian counterparts but this

Embassy's POLOFFs as well.

ARREAGA

Share this cable

 facebook -  bluesky -