PANAMA: THE WAY AHEAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 001737 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON SNAR MARR MOPS KCRM PM SUBJECT: PANAMA: THE WAY AHEAD Classified By: Ambassador William A. Eaton. Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d). -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) The election of Pedro Miguel Gonzalez (PMG),who is under federal indictment on five counts related to the 1992 murder of U.S. serviceman Zak Hernandez, as president of Panama's National Assembly marks a watershed for the U.S.-Panama bilateral relationship and Panamanian domestic politics. Only two months earlier, on June 28, U.S.-Panamanian relations reached a new high water mark with the signing in Washington of the Trade Promotion Agreement (TPA). Panama quickly ratified this agreement, and both nations pinned their hopes on quick ratification in Washington. PMG's September 1 election as National Assembly President abruptly placed the TPA in limbo. Over the course of eight short weeks, the tenor of U.S.-Panamanian relations shifted from one punctuated with euphoria to one characterized by questions. Embassy Panama has assessed the current status of our relations and programs and offers its insights into the way ahead to accentuate existing positive elements of the bilateral relation while pre-positioning ourselves for the upcoming electoral period. Politically, the U.S. should seek to promote a robust political season that results in a competitive presidential campaign that leads to free, fair and transparent elections. Economically, the U.S. should continue to promote our bilateral trade and commercial ties and crease pressure on the GOP for judicial reform and anti-corruption efforts. On the law enforcement/security front, the U.S. relationship with Panama will be largely unaffected and could even improve particularly in the areas of institution building and international cooperation. End Summary. -------------- PMG to Stay; TPA Frozen -------------- ¶2. (C) President Torrijos seems unlikely to do the political heavy lifting necessary to clear the way for U.S. congressional action on the TPA (i.e., compel PMG to step down),despite his recent commitments to Principals in Washington. The GOP has already shifted its posture with respect to U.S. ratification of the TPA: Panama has done its duty by ratifying, the matter now rests with the U.S. Congress, and, if not ratified this year, the TPA will be ratified soon thereafter. Most of the Embassy's interlocutors fail to understand the amount of enthusiasm, forward momentum, and vigor that have been squandered by PMG's election. As the TPA gets put on hold, lest it be rejected by the U.S. Congress, a significant chapter in our bilateral agenda closes on an inconclusive note. -------------- Entering a Politically Dynamic Period -------------- ¶3. (C) Panama is now entering a more dynamic political period as political leaders turn to the May 2009 elections. The PMG affair revealed more profound divisions and troubles within the governing Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD), highlighted Torrijos' and First VP and FM Samuel Lewis' weak political management skills, and opened the door to a more fluid PRD internal election process that will unfold from January to March 2008. The opposition is beginning to feel its way toward the formation of a coalition to challenge the PRD. Panama's left wing is in disarray, but the PMG phenomenon merits observation. ¶4. (C) While the PRD remains Panama's most powerful political force, the race for the PRD's presidential race is less clear today. Lewis has been wounded by the Torrijos Administration's failure to secure implementation of the TPA, and he continues to poll in the low single digits. Panama City Mayor Juan Carlos Navarro told Ambassador on October 10 that his campaign for the PRD's presidential nomination was gaining steam, particularly in the wake of his cousin Lewis' TPA challenges. Minister of Housing Balbina Herrera's star, however, is rising the fastest reaching ever higher levels of popularity each time she asserts that she does not wish to run for president. ¶5. (C) Opposition leaders are paying lip service to unity, but real progress toward this goal is fleeting. In the meantime, there will be much jockeying for position among opposition presidential contenders, including: Ricardo Martinelli (Democratic Change - CD); Alberto Vallarino, Juan Carlos Varela and Marco Ameglio (Panamenista Party); Guillermo Endara (Moral Vanguard of the Nation - VMP); and Guillermo "Billy" Ford (Patriotic Union - UP). Though more opposition contenders are not likely to enter the contest at this stage, significant thinning of the opposition's candidates will not happen until the PRD decides what team it will field in March 2008. The fear of being left out of power for five more years, something that could be the death knell for smaller opposition parties, is the most significant factor for opposition unification. ¶6. (C) Finally, the PMG phenomenon merits close observation. PMG's fiery, populist, nationalist inaugural address to the National Assembly on September 1 may point to a more serious populist threat rising from within the PRD, not from the ranks of Panama's poorly organized and led leftist activists. To a large extent, PMG's election had more to do with PRD deputies' desire to rebel against their president whom they believed had been disrespectful and dismissive of legislators' prerogatives than with true support for PMG's populist, anti-American, and nationalist rhetoric. In fact, PMG has been silent and almost invisible. Since September 1 though, PMG has consolidated his base among the one-third of the PRD that indulges in nostalgia for the populist/nationalist political direction of the Omar Torrijos and Noriega dictatorships and that never fully accepted Martin Torrijos' more progressive, modernist direction. -------------- -------------- PMG's Rise and the TPA's Fall: Economic Fall-out -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Regardless of the fate of the TPA, Panama's economy is widely expected to continue growing at a rapid clip (currently outpacing the rest of Latin America at 9.6 percent annual growth) over the next several years. This continued growth will be driven by strong growth in construction, trade, tourism, Colon Free Zone (CFZ) activities, port/logistics operations, and financial services offered by Panama's international banking center. The seven-year, USD 5.25 billion Panama Canal expansion project is now underway. The GOP is ramping up its investment in other infrastructure projects to about USD 3 billion over the next five years, twice the amount invested over the past five years. Foreign investment continues to pour in at record levels, with U.S. firms such as Caterpillar, Hewlett Packard, and Procter and Gamble announcing plans to establish major regional operations in Panama. Occidental Petroleum and Qatar Petroleum are partnering on an effort to build a USD 7-8 billion regional refinery in Panama, and other firms are looking to build much needed hydro and thermal power generating plants and other energy projects. The GOP has also earned high marks for making it much easier for entrepreneurs to launch new businesses and for putting the government's fiscal house in order (i.e., posting a huge budget surplus for the first time in ten years and putting the social security system on a more solid footing). Unemployment has been cut nearly in half, down from about 14 percent in 2003 to 7.3 percent today. However, nearly forty percent of Panamanians remain mired in poverty, Panama continues to have vast income disparities between rich and poor, and unchecked corruption could undermine the government's ability to meet social demands for education, health and other services. ¶8. (SBU) Since 96 percent of Panama's exports to the U.S. already enter duty-free either unconditionally or under the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) and the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP),the U.S. should not expect Panamanian exports to feel any significant pain resulting from the TPA's delay or demise. The TPA's main impact on Panama would be to prod the GOP into further -- and much needed -- institutional reforms that would benefit U.S. investors. ¶9. (C) PMG's rise and the lack of a TPA with Panama's primary trading partner may tarnish Panama's "brand identity." In particular, it would bring into bold relief Panama's shortcomings in the rule of law. Momentum toward necessary institutional reforms would slow, thereby discouraging those foreign investors that are most sensitive to rule of law issues, such as real estate developers and small- and medium-sized enterprises. Nonetheless, the U.S. should expect continued growth in foreign direct investment (FDI) over the near- to mid-term driven by major infrastructure projects, increased demand for canal and logistics services, growth in the CFZ, and further consolidation of the banking sector. However, the U.S. should be vigilant should PMG and/or other retrograde PRD elements pursue policies that seek to reverse the GOP's economic reforms or to embark on populist, anti-market pursuits. Such a prospect -- which the Embassy does not see as imminent -- would tarnish Panama's "brand identity" as a business-friendly location and could bring a quick chill to investor enthusiasm and ultimately cool Panama's hot economic expansion. ¶10. (C) Panama's business community is resigned to losing their long sought after TPA and are unwilling or unable to voice more than a whimper of a complaint or concern for fear of antagonizing a National Assembly President who could exact revenge with anti-business legislation or at least with legislation that would have a negative impact on one's particular interests. -------------- -- Law Enforcement/Security Cooperation Unaffected -------------- -- ¶11. (C) PMG's election and the upcoming electoral season will have little impact on our on-going law enforcement and security cooperation, including U.S. top priority activities such as: interdicting illegal narcotics; prosecuting major narcotics traffickers; securing the Panama Canal; securing Panama's land and sea borders (especially with Colombia); and stopping the illegal flow of persons and contraband goods. One area, drug seizures, particularly highlights the excellent state of our cooperation. Thus far in 2007, Panama's drug seizures -- driven by close U.S.-Panamanian law enforcement cooperation -- has reached 53 metric tons, handily exceeding the 40 metric tons seized in 2006, which was itself a record year. The U.S. continues extensive training and equipment programs with the Panamanian National Police (PNP),the National Maritime Service (SMN),and the National Air Service (SAN). ¶12. (C) The new Minister of Government and Justice, Daniel Delgado, provides reason to believe that our law enforcement and security cooperation will remain unaffected and could indeed be improved. A competent and proven manager, Delgado also understands the challenges facing Panama in this area. Delgado also gets the political imperative to address crime, an issue that is routinely cited as one of the top two issues of concern to Panamanian voters. -------------- -------------- The Political Way Ahead: Promoting Competitive Politics -------------- -------------- ¶13. (C) The U.S. should seek to promote a robust political season that results in a competitive presidential campaign and leads to free, fair and transparent elections. The U.S. does not need to nor should pick winners, but rather should promote the democratic process. The PRD should be encouraged to continue its process of internal democratic reforms; item number one on its to-do list should be coming to terms with the election of PMG as National Assembly President. Finally, the U.S. should encourage consolidation in the opposition. A consolidated opposition is essentially to ensuring the kind of competitive political season that will strengthen Panama's democracy, keep the PRD honest and on its reform path, and provide an adequate counterbalance should the opposition lose the May 2009 presidential election. -------------- The Economic Way Ahead: -------------- ¶14. (C) Regardless of the TPA's fate, the Embassy will continue to encourage the continued expansion of our bilateral trade and commercial ties. To protect and advance U.S. investor interests, the Embassy will increase pressure on the GOP to reform its judiciary and to make good on its commitments to combat corruption. Toward that end, the Embassy will: -- press for stronger measures demonstrating the GOP's genuine commitment to the rule of law, particularly within the Executive's prerogatives (e.g., the nomination of Supreme Court magistrates); -- boost the focus of USG assistance and public diplomacy on civil society groups and others engage on transparency and anti-corruption good governance and grassroots democracy (e.g., make our "bully pulpit" available to experts to expound on the costs of corruption on business and the body politic); -- expand our existing efforts with other diplomatic missions to present a unified front to defend foreign investors against corrupt and capricious GOP entities; -- enhance collaboration with the private sector to advocate pro-market, pro-investor politics and resist any efforts to reverse positive GOP reforms; and -- encourage reform-minded private sector leaders to create a "scholarship fund for democracy" to support emerging young leaders committed to public careers to advance good governance. -------------- -------------- The Law Enforcement/Security Cooperation Way Ahead -------------- -------------- ¶15. (C) There remains much work to be done on our law enforcement and security cooperation particularly in the areas of institution building and international cooperation. The U.S. should: -- support GOP efforts to launch a new coast guard modeled on the USCG, an area where there has been much discussion but little action over the past year; -- engage the GOP to ensure that any effort to incorporate the Technical Judicial Police (PTJ) into the PNP preserves our fruitful law enforcement cooperation and ensures an aggressive, independent and professional support to prosecution of major narcotics and other criminals and in particular ensures that the direction of investigations remains in the hands of prosecutors operating under the semi-autonomous Attorney General; -- support the establishment and institutionalization of a stand-alone border security entity, a proposal that has been languishing in its implementation; -- build upon U.S. cooperation with the Attorney General in carrying out major investigations and extraditions of particular interest to the U.S. urging further improvements in Panama's own prosecutions and strengthening in particular the drug prosecutor's ranks; -- foster greater engagement, particularly at the senior-most levels, between Panamanian officials and their Mexican and Colombian counterparts and encourage greater engagement with the U.S. dialogue with the Central American Integration System (SICA). EATON