PANAMA CANAL AUTHORITY SEEKS TO KEEP COAST GUARD

O N F I D E N T I A L PANAMA 001305 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR STATE WHA/CEN - FEELEY FOR STATE WHA/CEN - TELLO FOR COAST GUARD RDML SALERNO E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/01/2015 TAGS: ECON ETRD PM SUBJECT: PANAMA CANAL AUTHORITY SEEKS TO KEEP COAST GUARD BILLET Classified By: Charge Luis Arreaga for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. On July 26, 2007, Panama Canal Authority (ACP) Administrator Alberto Aleman Zubieta told the Ambassador that he would like to keep the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) billet (CGB) embedded with the Panama Canal Authority (ACP). He added that the ACP would continue to benefit from the continuing relationship, especially in light of the canal expnsion challenges ahead. However, he explained that he could not renew the contract because the USCG increased the FY08 cost by $63,000, which exceeds the amount approved by the ACP Board of Directors when the contract was originally executed. Aleman noted that continuing the billet at a higher price would require a renegotiation of the terms of the contract, a process that would involve the Board and the Foreign Ministry. This could open the issue to a new dynamic and possible opposition from those who question the wisdom of having a U.S. armed forces official embedded in the ACP. END SUMMARY. -------------- USCG billet a remnant from the canal handover -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The USCG has maintained a billet with the ACP since the USG handover of the Panama Canal on December 31, 1999. The billet was established partly to reassure the maritime community that a trusted U.S. institution would be involved in the maritime security of the canal. The ACP agreed to cover the costs a USCG Captain stationed in Panama and working at the ACP on safety and security matters. The CGB operates pursuant to a multiyear contract with annual renewals by the ACP. The next scheduled renewal is September 30, 2007. The incumbent s currently assigned to the CGB until summer, 2008. ¶3. (SBU) During FY 2007, the costs were approximately $180,000. For FY 2008, the costs increased by approximately $63,000 to $243,000. We understand that the increase was principally owed to the front loading of certain retirement benefits, plus a small inflation adjustment. -------------- ACP Administrator wants to keep the billet -------------- ¶4. (SBU) On July 26, 2007, Aleman told the Ambassador that he does not have the authority to renew the contract for the CGB for FY 2008 at the new price. Under ACP rules, he would have to submit for approval a newly negotiated contract to the ACP Board of Directors and eventually to the Foreign Ministry. If on the other hand, the price remained unchanged, he would have the authority to extend it another year, as he has been doing for the last few years. ¶5. (SBU) Aleman said he would like to keep the billet at the ACP because it has been beneficial to the canal. He acknowledged that in recent months the billet had been in a state of "limbo" owing to the ACP's reorganization undertaken to meet the challenges of the upcoming canal expansion. He now believes the CGB is correctly placed within the ACP Operations Division (the largest and arguably most important) and they are now willing to give the incumbent a far more substantive role than in recent months. ¶6. (SBU) Aleman noted that the ACP had considered several mechanisms for getting USCG expertise such as contracting USCG on an as needed consulting basis from staff based at the Embassy or USCG facilities in Miami or Puerto Rico. However, they had reached the conclusion that it would be best for a billet to be embedded in the ACP to get the most out of it. Aleman acknowledged that the USG may have other ideas about the ACP/USCG relationship and that he is willing to consider them. -------------- USCG billet serving U.S.interest -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Post defers to Washington agencies the discussion on the technical and budgetary merits of continuing the ACP-funded billet. Nonetheless, Post would like to offer a perspective on the broader context surrounding the issue. -------------- -------------- Canal expansion offers opportunities for deeper cooperation -------------- -------------- ¶8. (SBU) The $5.25 billion canal expansion project will require 7,000 to 9,000 additional workers and tax the ACP's management. Given the ACP,s willingness to keep the billet and to give it a substantive role, there may be opportunities to for the incumbent to provide valuable safety and security advise during the expansion project. The CGB would provide an additional layer of review to ensure the ACP, along with the private sector contractors (who may or may be fully versed in the unique safety and security issues related to the canal),safety and security issues are properly addressed. If such issues are not properly addressed during the construction phase, remediation may be extremely difficult or impossible. -------------- -------------- More traffic will bring greater risks to U.S. interests -------------- -------------- ¶9. (SBU) With the ever increasing amount of traffic transiting the canal (over 14,000 transits in 2006 and a 4% increase in transit through the second quarter of 2007),the safety and security of the canal is more important than ever. With approximately two-thirds of the cargo transiting the canal arriving at or departing from a U.S. port, the importance of the canal's safety and security to the U.S. economy is greater than ever. The CGB serves a strategic purpose in providing continuous ACP and USG coordination on safety and security matters. The CGB provides an immediate and direct point of contact, particularly crucial in the event of any natural or man-made disasters striking the canal. -------------- -------------- Billet serves as the USG,s eyes and ears in the canal -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) The CGB serves as the eyes and ears of the USG within the ACP. The CGB would allow the USG to have real time assessment not only of the safety and security matters affecting the canal, but the progress of the expansion project, the influence of other governments on the ACP, and the operational and management challenges faced by the ACP. The value of this arrangement has been recognized by other governments. We heard from ACP sources that the French had protested about the presence of USCG officer in the bowels of the ACP. ¶10. (SBU) The completion of the ACP organizational restructuring has resulted in placing the CGB within the ACP operational structure. The assignment of the CGB to the Operations Division eliminates some of the ambiguity of the CGB function and would allow for a more efficient use of its expertise. The current assignment ends a long period of when the CGB was, in Aleman's words, in "limbo". -------------- Other arrangements seem less efficient -------------- ¶11. (SBU) It is not clear whether a Coast Guard consulting arrangement with the ACP would be inadequate to serve U.S. and ACP needs. By definition a consulting arrangement would be a project specific, time specific assignment. A consulting arrangement would eliminate the daily contact with the ACP and endangers the institutional memory between the USG and ACP. Additionally, a consulting arrangement risks having the Coast Guard relationship with the ACP being usurped by other national maritime agencies or various private consulting firms. ¶12. (SBU) Transferring the functions of the CGB to Post is not feasible because Post does not have the expertise to assess or respond to ACP safety and security issues. Also, the current Coast Guard Attache at Post devotes a significant time to drug enforcement matters. Such individual would not have the time or resources to address the ACP matters. ¶13. (SBU) Between the time the current CGB contract possibly is terminated and the time a new consulting arrangement could be negotiated and approved by the ACP Board, a significant time gap could occur. The longer this time gap persist, the less likely an arrangement between the Coast Guard and the ACP would be concluded. There is a risk that inertia will allow the process to stall. Arreaga