CANADA SEEKS DEDICATED HELICOPTER AND UAV SUPPORT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 002133

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS NATO AF CA
SUBJECT: CANADA SEEKS DEDICATED HELICOPTER AND UAV SUPPORT
IN RC-S

REF: OTTAWA 2069

Classified By: PolMinCouns Scott Bellard, reasons: 1.4 (d) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: The Canadian government is lobbying
European NATO partners to provide dedicated helicopter and
unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) support in the Kandahar region
of Regional Command - South (RC-S) in Afghanistan. Canada's
military has no organic capability of this type, despite an
ongoing program to equip the Canadian Forces (CF).
Meanwhile, combat deaths and injuries -- due in part to lack
of aviation assets -- erode public and political support for
the mission. With diminishing prospects for help from other
NATO partners, Canada would welcome U.S. helicopter support
for the CF operating in the RC-S, and, during the visit of
State Department Counselor and DASD Shivers (septel) also
sought U.S. assistance in expediting delivery of MQ-9
Predator B UAVs once the Canadian procurement bureaucracy
authorizes their purchase. Regardless of how well PM Harper
manages the Parliamentary vote -- likely by spring 2008 -- on
the CF future in Afghanistan, as well as scrutiny on
procurement practices, Canada would definitely welcome our
help in upgrading these capabilities. End summary.


2. (C/RelCan) Canada under Prime Minister Stephen Harper is
committed to transforming and re-equipping the CF and to
reforming defense procurements to ensure greater speed.
Despite recent improvements, it will be two to three years
before Canada is able to field its own helicopters in
Afghanistan, and a year or more before it is able to procure
and deploy high-end UAVs. Both systems are necessary to
reduce risk and enhance targeting in the restive Kandahar
region. As Canadian lobbying of European NATO partners for
combat helicopter support and interim UAV coverage has so far
failed to produce results, Canada now is looking to the U.S.
for help and also seeking assurances that, once its
bureaucracy authorizes helicopter and UAV procurements, the
U.S. will work with industry to expedite delivery.

War Politics
--------------


3. (SBU) The current six-month rotation of front-line combat
troops led to the deployment in August of the Quebec-based
Royal 22nd Regiment ("Vandoos") in Afghanistan. Six Vandoos
have been killed since July, bringing total Canadian deaths
in Afghanistan to 73 soldiers and one diplomat. The single
most important cause of Canadian casualties has been
road-side Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks on
convoys delivering supplies to forward operating bases. 24
of 26 deaths in the past 12 months were attributed to IEDs.


4. (S/NF) Troops involved in CF re-supply missions are
forced to use, and to re-use, similar tactics, techniques,
and procedures in Afghanistan due to their lack of organic
UAV and helicopter capability. This presents the insurgents
with relatively predictable targets. The government faces
heated political exposure to accusations that it does not
provide troops with adequate force protection. This argument
undermines popular and political support for the deployment.

Helicopters
--------------


5. (S/NF) Canada has developed a procurement case for 16
Chinooks, but it has been delayed because the Canada-specific
QChinooks, but it has been delayed because the Canada-specific
CH-47F "Plus" is not yet in production. If Canada and Boeing
sign a contract as expected in February 2008, aircraft
delivery will occur from 2011 through 2013.


6. (C) In the meantime, Canada is asking NATO partners to
deploy helicopters to support the CF in Kandahar. According
to Department of National Defence (DND) planners, Canadian
forces have significant, persistent airlift requirements:
-- personnel mobility: 265 passenger movements per week;
-- general cargo: delivery of up to 10,000 kgs per day;
-- M777 howitzer and ammunition, moved every 2-4 weeks;
-- MEDEVAC: 24/7 as required;
-- emergency re-supply and parts delivery: 24/7 as required;
-- reconnaissance for future operations: as required.
Any expeditious command arrangement would do, DND officials

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tell us, as long as there is dedicated 24/7 air support
available to meet the CF's urgent needs in RC-S.


7. (C) Canadian officials have already asked both Germany
and Poland to deploy combat-capable rotary-wing aircraft to
southern Afghanistan in support of Canadian NATO-ISAF
operations. Minister of Defence Peter MacKay told Counselor
of the Department Cohen and DASD Shivers on November 14 that
if they want the Canadian Parliament to concur in extending
the CF deployment in Kandahar after February 2009, NATO
partners should move quickly to find ways to deliver enablers
such as dedicated helicopters, UAVs, and other "tech support"
to RC-S. These deliverables would have a profound
psychological and practical effect on Canadians, he
underlined.


8. (C) MacKay explained that Canada had not given up on its
requests for helicopters in RC-S from Germany and Poland.
Poland had "said all the right things" but had not followed
through, he said, while Germany was still weighing options to
deploy without breaking its unhelpful caveats.


9. (S/NF) MacKay added that Canada and Germany had also been
discussing the possible deployment of German rotary wing
airlift to RC-S as soon as early 2008 (reftel). One scenario
would include temporary deployments of German-crewed CH-53
aircraft from northern Afghanistan to RC-S in a combat
support role. Another scenario would have Canadian or "NATO
multilateral" crews flying German CH-53 aircraft in RC-S. In
follow-up conversation on November 20 with poloff, however, a
senior Department of National Defence (DND) official admitted
that the initiative was now on "life support and would soon
die."

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
--------------


10. (S/NF) In a separate meeting with Dr. Cohen and DASD
Shivers, Chair of the Panel on the Future Role of Canada in
Afghanistan and former Liberal Deputy Prime Minister John
Manley asked if the U.S. government would be willing to help
Canada expedite the procurement of General Atomic MQ-9
Predator Bs. He predicted that his Panel's report (due in
January 2008) would likely suggest specific enhancements
before Canada commits to extending the CF's combat presence
in RC-S. Among them -- if General Atomic and the USG could
assure Canada of its early delivery -- would be the MQ-9
Predator B, due in part to its utility in detecting and
destroying teams planting IEDs. During a subsequent meeting,
Foreign and Security Adviser to the Prime Minister Keith
Fountain also raised the Predator, asking Dr. Cohen and DASD
Shivers if delivery to the CF would be "doable" before 2009.
(General Atomic officials recently told DATT that they could
deliver MQ-9 Predator Bs and ground stations before 2009 if
Canada moved swiftly to place orders and, critically, to
begin crew training.)


11. (S/NF) The CF currently operates French-made SPERWER
tactical UAVs, which are capable of only minimal coverage - 8
hours per day. Only two of the original 13 SPERWERs have
survived the Afghan mission. The CF launched procurement of
the MQ-9 Predator B in 2006 because it was the only aircraft
that met its requirement of 24/7 coverage. The Predator
Qthat met its requirement of 24/7 coverage. The Predator
procurement was stymied in February 2007 by complaints about
sole source acquisitions. (Comment: the government's direct
and FMS procurements of four C-17, 17 C-130Js, and 16 CH-47Fs
from the U.S. were as much as the political atmosphere could
tolerate at one time. End Comment.) Instead, DND put a less
capable interim intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance
(ISR) solution out for competitive bid. According to DND
sources, the government was under pressure from Canadian
business concerns to purchase an inferior Israeli product,
which was being "shoved down our throats."

Comment
--------------


12. (S/NF) PM Harper's appointment of the Manley Panel was a
shrewd political maneuver that at once delayed public
discussion of the Afghan Mission and provided an opportunity
for some creative thinking. Breaking the political and

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policy logjams in the way of the MQ-9 Predator B procurement
could be one of its most important contributions to the
future of the CF in Afghanistan, but Canada will need our
help on this. Over the next few months, Canada will use the
various pre-Bucharest venues to continue to press allies to
deploy helicopters and UAVs, as well as maneuver forces, to
the Kandahar region, but at this point Canadian officials
believe that the Europeans' likely reaction will be a
letdown. Regardless of how well Harper manages the
Parliamentary vote -- likely by spring 2008 -- on the CF
future in Afghanistan as well as scrutiny of procurement
practices, Canada could use our help in upgrading its
capabilities.

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