SCENESETTER FOR CANADA POLICY PLANNING TALKS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 OTTAWA 002125 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR S/P AMBASSADOR GORDON E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV CA SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CANADA POLICY PLANNING TALKS, NOVEMBER 29-30 REF: A. OTTAWA 1924 ¶B. OTTAWA 1903 Classified By: DCM Terry Breese, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Stephen Harper leads one of the most stable minority governments in Canadian history. He is a Western conservative who came to power on a domestic agenda but has been surprisingly focused on foreign affairs. Harper's foreign policy style includes a halting transition from "peacekeeping only" to conventional military operations, a shift in foreign assistance from Africa to Latin America, a focus on doing a few things where Canada can make a difference rather than dabbling in everything, a "principle-based" approach to human rights, a willingness to partner with the United States, and a diminution of Canada's traditional obsession with multilateralism. Harper is struggling to shape a policy that will allow Canadian troops to stay in Afghanistan beyond the current end-date of February 2009 but faces opposition on many domestic fronts and is increasingly nervous about how the situation in Pakistan will affect his options. Canada could have a minor supporting role in a Middle East peace process, is with us on Iran but has limited tools to influence the mullahs, and would like be more helpful on Iraq without being too visible. The Harper government continues to focus conceptually on the rise of Asia but has not developed a coherent and comprehensive policy for dealing with the shift in power there and is interested in coordinating closely with us on security and commercial architecture. Ottawa is actively trying to reform its toolbox for foreign policy by shifting more Foreign Services officers overseas and changing the way foreign assistance is allocated. End Summary A MINORITY GOVERNMENT THAT GOVERNS LIKE A MAJORITY -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) The average duration of a Canadian minority government is one year and three months. Stephen Harper's conservatives have now exceeded this average by eight months and appear set to continue on at least until next year -- and not impossibly until the required elections in fall 2009. The most likely scenario for the Harper government's demise at this point would be for it to engineer its own defeat to seek a new mandate at the polls that could lead to an actual majority. But while comfortable with Harper governing in a minority, the Canadian people do not yet appear willing to trust the Conservatives with a majority. Given the weakness of the Liberal opposition, however, the Conservatives are increasingly seeking to use their minority to move forward on their ambitious agenda at home and abroad. ¶3. (U) In the recent Throne Speech laying out his parliamentary agenda (ref a),the government outlined five areas on which the Tories would focus: strengthening Canada's sovereignty and security by projecting a presence into the Arctic and rebuilding the armed forces; building the economy; modernizing the federation; protecting the environment and improving healthcare; and, tackling crime. While foreign policy did not play heavily in the speech, there was a controversial statement about remaining committed to Afghanistan until at least 2011, a commitment to greater engagement in the Americas, and a reference to support for democratization. HARPER'S FOREIGN POLICY STYLE -------------- ¶4. (C) Harper came to office from a Western Canadian Q4. (C) Harper came to office from a Western Canadian background that never brought him into much contact with foreign policy. But the pressure of the Afghan mission has forced him to devote an inordinate amount of time to foreign issues, and he has not shied away from other challenges in the world along the way. Over the past 21 months, Harper has developed a certain style in foreign affairs. -- A willingness to conduct conventional military operations: Harper has actively challenged the decades-old consensus here that the Canadian armed forces should only be engaged in traditional "blue hat" peacekeeping, arguing that some hard fighting is sometimes necessary to gain the security necessary to make progress on development, democracy, and peace. Harper wants armed forces that have the equipment and training to do that fighting and is willing to deploy them judiciously for such missions. OTTAWA 00002125 002 OF 005 -- A shift from Africa to Latin America: Harper believes that Canada should focus more on its own neighborhood in the Americas, leaving Europe to focus on Africa. He is shifting aid dollars from Africa and Asia while adding more in order to develop a policy in the Americas that allows Canada to play a more active role there. -- Greater focus: Unlike his Liberal predecessors -- who never met a program or process that they didn't want to be a part of, or a country or cause that they didn't want to support -- Harper prefers to focus on a relatively few causes where Canada can make a difference. His government constantly takes inventory of where Canadian engagement will matter, and is willing to be absent from certain areas in order to be effective. -- A "principle-based" approach to human rights and democratization: Harper has challenged Canada's traditional policy of going along with the multilateral consensus on human rights and democracy issues and not upsetting relations with key trading partners. He has challenged Belarus on its flawed elections, refused to recognize the Hamas government, officially received the Dalai Lama, and shifted Canada's voting record at the UN to clarify its position on non-democratic regimes. But he has also failed to embrace the opportunity offered recently by a Parliamentary committee to develop an NED-style organization to promote democracy in the world, to date going along with DFAIT's recommendation that Canada continue to promote democracy on the margins of other programs. -- A willingness to partner with the United States: Harper must keep his distance from the U.S. on the hard edge of the war on terror and must proactively exert Canada's sovereignty, which he does safely in the Arctic. But unlike his predecessor, Harper has actively sought areas where we can collaborate more effectively and never takes cheap shots at the U.S. for political gain. Harper has taken the traditional affinity for good relations and expanded it to include cooperation on a number of areas around the world, starting with enhanced coordination and burdensharing in the hemisphere, notably in Haiti. -- A propensity to act unilaterally: Somewhat to the chagrin of the traditionalists at DFAIT, Harper has actively challenged Canada's long-established policy of doing as much as possible through multilateral organizations. Harper does not have much patience for multilateral diplomacy and resists diluting Canada's values or influence in a process whose outcome is uncertain. He would rather get together with like-minded countries and simply get things done, as in the PSI. POLICY PLANNING IN THE CANADIAN CONTEXT -------------- ¶5. (C) Policy Planning in DFAIT falls under the Assistant Deputy Minister for Strategic Policy and Planning, whose bureau also includes public diplomacy, strategic planning, and intergovernmental relations. Policy planners are involved in most bilateral talks we hold with regional bureaus and are prominent on the democratization issue -- they have the lead on Canada's involvement in the PDG, and were active in recent talks with Assistant Secretary Boucher on South Asia. Where Policy Planning appears to add value is in drawing attention to areas that have cross-regional or inter-functional convergence, and in identifying trends five Qinter-functional convergence, and in identifying trends five to ten years in the future. ¶6. (C) But while the expertise and views of policy planners appear sought after and respected within the bureaucracy, their influence on higher level decision-makers even in Foreign Minister Bernier's office is likely limited, and probably virtually nil in the PMO and PCO. The current ADM for Strategic Policy is a remnant of the Martin government rather than a confidant of the still-new Foreign Minister. One example: PCO is moving forward on the development of a new national security policy, without the apparent involvement of the professional policy planners at DFAIT or Department of National Defence. STAYING THE COURSE IN AFGHANISTAN -------------- ¶7. (C) The Harper government inherited the Afghan mission from the previous government, but has taken on the task of OTTAWA 00002125 003 OF 005 stabilizing Kandahar province with the firm conviction that the mission is essential to international peace and stability in the post-9/11 era, and also offers a way for Canada to restore its own credibility after what the Conservatives see as a twenty year near-absence from the world stage: "Canada is back" is their slogan. Harper would like for Canadian troops to stay engaged in Afghanistan and even in Kandahar beyond the current commitment that ends in February 2009, while acknowledging that Parliament would have to have the final say on this decision. He nonetheless faces an increasingly skeptical public uneasy about the mission on several levels -- its combat vs. peacekeeping focus, accounts of corruption in the Karzai government, the simple drum-beat of casualties (73 killed, including the latest two over the weekend),and the seemingly growing unlikelihood of eventual "success." Public opinion in Canada on Afghanistan is very mixed, with enough support to carry the mission through as long as there is visible progress, but with even those who support the mission increasingly convinced Canada is carrying a disproportionate share of the NATO load. ¶8. (C) Harper has bought some time with the appointment of the Manley Panel of experts to explore options for a post-2009 Canadian presence in Afghanistan. Given the terms of reference for the panel (ref b),members likely will end up with recommendations aimed at keeping Canadian troops on the ground in some form, probably including more mentoring and training of Afghan forces, a more robust assistance mission, and enough combat forces to protect the trainers and developers. To maintain public support, Canada still seeks more burden-sharing by NATO allies, some visible success in increasing the capacity of the Karzai government, less visibility for ex-warlords and narco-traffickers in the government, a clear path to handing over security to Afghan forces, and as few casualties as possible. In the short term, Canada also needs medium-lift helicopters and predators to continue with its current mission, and has asked for U.S. help with this (septel). Harper is increasingly concerned with events in Pakistan and their impact on the security of Canadians in Afghanistan. FINDING A COURSE IN THE MIDDLE EAST -------------- ¶9. (C) Canada has never had many policy tools in the Middle East, and Harper has been busy enough with Afghanistan that the rest of the region has not really consumed his attention. But, given the prominence of Middle East issues, Harper would like Canada to be engaged and believes that Canada's studied neutrality and capabilities in certain areas could help it to play a role on the margins. Even with the more pro-U.S. shift under Harper, Ottawa has steered clear of too direct involvement in Iraq, while dedicating C$300 million for Iraqi reconstruction through 2010. Canada has also conducted training programs for Iraqi diplomats and government executives and has spent C$210 million in aid for Iraqi humanitarian relief, most of it through multilateral agencies. The Canadian Forum of Federations was also involved in writing the Iraqi constitution; its wide experience with comparative federal models could be helpful in guiding Iraq toward a stable future. DFAIT also notably put together a forum on Iraq in 2006 that produced solid Qput together a forum on Iraq in 2006 that produced solid analysis on the way forward for Iraq. ¶10. (C) On the Middle East more broadly, Harper directed his bureaucracy to be more balanced in its approach, which some have interpreted as a closer alignment with Israel. Canada has shifted away from the anti-Israel votes in the UN, cut ties early on with the Hamas government, and offered support to Israel in its incursions into Lebanon. On Iran, Canada has had extremely limited policy tools since it tightened its long-standing policy of controlled engagement in 2005 over the human rights situation (in particular the killing of Canadian-Iranian journalist Zahra Kazemi in an Iranian prison in 2003) and Iran's nuclear program. It tightened its regulations again in February in response to the UN resolution on Iran's enrichment program. In 2006, Harper appointed prominent Pakistani-Canadian MP, Wajid Khan, to help shape Middle East policy, but he was unable to find any real traction and has not been active recently. SHIFTING THE COURSE TO LATIN AMERICA -------------- ¶11. (C) After Afghanistan, PM Harper has made the Western Hemisphere his top foreign policy priority. Canada provides OTTAWA 00002125 004 OF 005 over C$100 million per year in assistance to Haiti, and has pledged to continue this level of funding at least through ¶2011. In July, Harper visited Colombia, Chile, Barbados, and Haiti to highlight his hemispheric strategy. In Colombia, he showcased Canada's resolve to work with struggling democracies in the face of transnational challenges; in Chile, he highlighted the importance of free trade and good governance; in Barbados, he reiterated Canada's commitment to helping the countries of the Caribbean manage security and pandemic health challenges; and in Haiti, he renewed Canada's extensive commitment to mend the most broken country in the hemisphere. The Harper government has followed up the trip with several other ministerial meetings and visits, and over the summer launched free trade negotiations with Peru, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and CARICOM. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and International Trade Helena Guergis most recently visited Costa Rica and Nicaragua and promised that Canada would also complete ongoing free trade negotiations with El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua. ¶12. (C) Skeptics have pointed out that there is no written strategy, although according to one Central American ambassador here DFAIT plans to issue a Latin American policy document in mid-December or early January. John Graham, the Chair of the Foundation for the Americas, has commented that this would be the third time in less than 20 years that Canada has launched a major initiative to engage in the Americas, after joining the OAS in 1989 and the Quebec City Summit of the Americas in 2001. He noted that in both cases "the government was distracted by other priorities and the momentum fizzled." DEVELOPING THE RIGHT ARCHITECTURE FOR ASIA -------------- ¶13. (C) There was an obsession in the last government with the rise of China and an almost pandering policy toward the PRC centered on economic and business interests. The Tories have changed course by laying down markers with the PRC over the importance of human rights to good relations, and Harper officially received the Dalai Lama to make the point. Harper wants to exercise a "principle-based foreign policy" with China, but also sees India, as a large growing Commonwealth democracy (as well as the origin of many Canadian citizens and residents),as a country that equally deserves Canada's attention. While generally supportive of Taiwan, Canada has not been outspoken on cross-strait relations and sees little value in engagement on the issue. Trade with China continues to boom, growing by 43% in the first seven months of the year alone. Still, Canada has not been afraid to pressure China for greater exchange rate flexibility and increasing domestic demand to prevent a global economic slowdown. Canadian analysts recently completed a study of the growing role of China in Africa based on input from Canadian missions there. ¶14. (C) Strategically, Canada has been searching for the right approach to Asian architecture. While broadly sharing our support for the primacy of APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum, it is inching toward participation in the East Asia Summit due to its concerns about Chinese inroads into ASEAN. It is finalizing details about a formal role in the International Monitoring Team in the southern Philippines, QInternational Monitoring Team in the southern Philippines, with its team members probably focused on governance issues rather than military monitoring, however. Canada likely will welcome proposals for additional free trade areas in the Pacific Rim as well as individual and regional FTAs. It recently concluded "open skies" agreements with New Zealand and Singapore to strengthen its position as a "Pacific Gateway" into the North American market. Canada has been fully supportive of the six-party talks and efforts to denuclearize North Asia. REORGANIZING TO ACHIEVE THE NEW AGENDA -------------- ¶15. (C) To achieve his agenda, Harper has been trying to move the bureaucracy, both ideologically away from its traditional reliance on multilateral mechanisms and aversion to conflict, and geographically away from its heavy headquarters focus. There were rumblings earlier this year when the PMO chastised Canadian diplomats in Beijing for not attending the trial of a Canadian citizen accused of terrorism, and then issued an internal statement ordering its diplomats to "align" themselves with the Harper government's priorities. Canada OTTAWA 00002125 005 OF 005 will go through its own global repositioning exercise over the next few years, pushing larger numbers of diplomats out to missions abroad. Harper would also like for Canadian foreign assistance to be more closely tied to policy objectives. This is evident superficially in the quantity of foreign aid that has been shifted to Afghanistan, but PMO staffers have claimed that money is still tied up in old spending mechanisms and is not available on the ground with the flexibility of U.S. CERP monies. DFAIT does have at its disposal a C$100 million replenishable peace and security fund, which its Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force manages independently. Additional coordination by the Task Force with S/CRS might be beneficial on both sides. Visit our shared North American Partnership blog (Canada & Mexico) at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap WILKINS