SCENESETTER FOR CANADA POLICY PLANNING TALKS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 OTTAWA 002125

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/P AMBASSADOR GORDON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV CA
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CANADA POLICY PLANNING TALKS,
NOVEMBER 29-30

REF: A. OTTAWA 1924

B. OTTAWA 1903

Classified By: DCM Terry Breese, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Stephen Harper leads one of the most stable
minority governments in Canadian history. He is a Western
conservative who came to power on a domestic agenda but has
been surprisingly focused on foreign affairs. Harper's
foreign policy style includes a halting transition from
"peacekeeping only" to conventional military operations, a
shift in foreign assistance from Africa to Latin America, a
focus on doing a few things where Canada can make a
difference rather than dabbling in everything, a
"principle-based" approach to human rights, a willingness to
partner with the United States, and a diminution of Canada's
traditional obsession with multilateralism. Harper is
struggling to shape a policy that will allow Canadian troops
to stay in Afghanistan beyond the current end-date of
February 2009 but faces opposition on many domestic fronts
and is increasingly nervous about how the situation in
Pakistan will affect his options. Canada could have a minor
supporting role in a Middle East peace process, is with us on
Iran but has limited tools to influence the mullahs, and
would like be more helpful on Iraq without being too visible.
The Harper government continues to focus conceptually on the
rise of Asia but has not developed a coherent and
comprehensive policy for dealing with the shift in power
there and is interested in coordinating closely with us on
security and commercial architecture. Ottawa is actively
trying to reform its toolbox for foreign policy by shifting
more Foreign Services officers overseas and changing the way
foreign assistance is allocated. End Summary

A MINORITY GOVERNMENT THAT GOVERNS LIKE A MAJORITY
-------------- --------------


2. (C) The average duration of a Canadian minority government
is one year and three months. Stephen Harper's conservatives
have now exceeded this average by eight months and appear set
to continue on at least until next year -- and not impossibly
until the required elections in fall 2009. The most likely
scenario for the Harper government's demise at this point
would be for it to engineer its own defeat to seek a new
mandate at the polls that could lead to an actual majority.
But while comfortable with Harper governing in a minority,
the Canadian people do not yet appear willing to trust the
Conservatives with a majority. Given the weakness of the
Liberal opposition, however, the Conservatives are
increasingly seeking to use their minority to move forward on
their ambitious agenda at home and abroad.


3. (U) In the recent Throne Speech laying out his
parliamentary agenda (ref a),the government outlined five
areas on which the Tories would focus: strengthening Canada's
sovereignty and security by projecting a presence into the
Arctic and rebuilding the armed forces; building the economy;
modernizing the federation; protecting the environment and
improving healthcare; and, tackling crime. While foreign
policy did not play heavily in the speech, there was a
controversial statement about remaining committed to
Afghanistan until at least 2011, a commitment to greater
engagement in the Americas, and a reference to support for
democratization.

HARPER'S FOREIGN POLICY STYLE
--------------


4. (C) Harper came to office from a Western Canadian
Q4. (C) Harper came to office from a Western Canadian
background that never brought him into much contact with
foreign policy. But the pressure of the Afghan mission has
forced him to devote an inordinate amount of time to foreign
issues, and he has not shied away from other challenges in
the world along the way. Over the past 21 months, Harper has
developed a certain style in foreign affairs.

-- A willingness to conduct conventional military operations:
Harper has actively challenged the decades-old consensus
here that the Canadian armed forces should only be engaged in
traditional "blue hat" peacekeeping, arguing that some hard
fighting is sometimes necessary to gain the security
necessary to make progress on development, democracy, and
peace. Harper wants armed forces that have the equipment and
training to do that fighting and is willing to deploy them
judiciously for such missions.


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-- A shift from Africa to Latin America: Harper believes
that Canada should focus more on its own neighborhood in the
Americas, leaving Europe to focus on Africa. He is shifting
aid dollars from Africa and Asia while adding more in order
to develop a policy in the Americas that allows Canada to
play a more active role there.

-- Greater focus: Unlike his Liberal predecessors -- who
never met a program or process that they didn't want to be a
part of, or a country or cause that they didn't want to
support -- Harper prefers to focus on a relatively few causes
where Canada can make a difference. His government
constantly takes inventory of where Canadian engagement will
matter, and is willing to be absent from certain areas in
order to be effective.

-- A "principle-based" approach to human rights and
democratization: Harper has challenged Canada's traditional
policy of going along with the multilateral consensus on
human rights and democracy issues and not upsetting relations
with key trading partners. He has challenged Belarus on its
flawed elections, refused to recognize the Hamas government,
officially received the Dalai Lama, and shifted Canada's
voting record at the UN to clarify its position on
non-democratic regimes. But he has also failed to embrace
the opportunity offered recently by a Parliamentary committee
to develop an NED-style organization to promote democracy in
the world, to date going along with DFAIT's recommendation
that Canada continue to promote democracy on the margins of
other programs.

-- A willingness to partner with the United States: Harper
must keep his distance from the U.S. on the hard edge of the
war on terror and must proactively exert Canada's
sovereignty, which he does safely in the Arctic. But unlike
his predecessor, Harper has actively sought areas where we
can collaborate more effectively and never takes cheap shots
at the U.S. for political gain. Harper has taken the
traditional affinity for good relations and expanded it to
include cooperation on a number of areas around the world,
starting with enhanced coordination and burdensharing in the
hemisphere, notably in Haiti.

-- A propensity to act unilaterally: Somewhat to the chagrin
of the traditionalists at DFAIT, Harper has actively
challenged Canada's long-established policy of doing as much
as possible through multilateral organizations. Harper does
not have much patience for multilateral diplomacy and resists
diluting Canada's values or influence in a process whose
outcome is uncertain. He would rather get together with
like-minded countries and simply get things done, as in the
PSI.

POLICY PLANNING IN THE CANADIAN CONTEXT
--------------


5. (C) Policy Planning in DFAIT falls under the Assistant
Deputy Minister for Strategic Policy and Planning, whose
bureau also includes public diplomacy, strategic planning,
and intergovernmental relations. Policy planners are
involved in most bilateral talks we hold with regional
bureaus and are prominent on the democratization issue --
they have the lead on Canada's involvement in the PDG, and
were active in recent talks with Assistant Secretary Boucher
on South Asia. Where Policy Planning appears to add value is
in drawing attention to areas that have cross-regional or
inter-functional convergence, and in identifying trends five
Qinter-functional convergence, and in identifying trends five
to ten years in the future.


6. (C) But while the expertise and views of policy planners
appear sought after and respected within the bureaucracy,
their influence on higher level decision-makers even in
Foreign Minister Bernier's office is likely limited, and
probably virtually nil in the PMO and PCO. The current ADM
for Strategic Policy is a remnant of the Martin government
rather than a confidant of the still-new Foreign Minister.
One example: PCO is moving forward on the development of a
new national security policy, without the apparent
involvement of the professional policy planners at DFAIT or
Department of National Defence.

STAYING THE COURSE IN AFGHANISTAN
--------------


7. (C) The Harper government inherited the Afghan mission
from the previous government, but has taken on the task of

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stabilizing Kandahar province with the firm conviction that
the mission is essential to international peace and stability
in the post-9/11 era, and also offers a way for Canada to
restore its own credibility after what the Conservatives see
as a twenty year near-absence from the world stage: "Canada
is back" is their slogan. Harper would like for Canadian
troops to stay engaged in Afghanistan and even in Kandahar
beyond the current commitment that ends in February 2009,
while acknowledging that Parliament would have to have the
final say on this decision. He nonetheless faces an
increasingly skeptical public uneasy about the mission on
several levels -- its combat vs. peacekeeping focus, accounts
of corruption in the Karzai government, the simple drum-beat
of casualties (73 killed, including the latest two over the
weekend),and the seemingly growing unlikelihood of eventual
"success." Public opinion in Canada on Afghanistan is very
mixed, with enough support to carry the mission through as
long as there is visible progress, but with even those who
support the mission increasingly convinced Canada is carrying
a disproportionate share of the NATO load.


8. (C) Harper has bought some time with the appointment of
the Manley Panel of experts to explore options for a
post-2009 Canadian presence in Afghanistan. Given the terms
of reference for the panel (ref b),members likely will end
up with recommendations aimed at keeping Canadian troops on
the ground in some form, probably including more mentoring
and training of Afghan forces, a more robust assistance
mission, and enough combat forces to protect the trainers and
developers. To maintain public support, Canada still seeks
more burden-sharing by NATO allies, some visible success in
increasing the capacity of the Karzai government, less
visibility for ex-warlords and narco-traffickers in the
government, a clear path to handing over security to Afghan
forces, and as few casualties as possible. In the short
term, Canada also needs medium-lift helicopters and predators
to continue with its current mission, and has asked for U.S.
help with this (septel). Harper is increasingly concerned
with events in Pakistan and their impact on the security of
Canadians in Afghanistan.

FINDING A COURSE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
--------------


9. (C) Canada has never had many policy tools in the Middle
East, and Harper has been busy enough with Afghanistan that
the rest of the region has not really consumed his attention.
But, given the prominence of Middle East issues, Harper
would like Canada to be engaged and believes that Canada's
studied neutrality and capabilities in certain areas could
help it to play a role on the margins. Even with the more
pro-U.S. shift under Harper, Ottawa has steered clear of too
direct involvement in Iraq, while dedicating C$300 million
for Iraqi reconstruction through 2010. Canada has also
conducted training programs for Iraqi diplomats and
government executives and has spent C$210 million in aid for
Iraqi humanitarian relief, most of it through multilateral
agencies. The Canadian Forum of Federations was also
involved in writing the Iraqi constitution; its wide
experience with comparative federal models could be helpful
in guiding Iraq toward a stable future. DFAIT also notably
put together a forum on Iraq in 2006 that produced solid
Qput together a forum on Iraq in 2006 that produced solid
analysis on the way forward for Iraq.


10. (C) On the Middle East more broadly, Harper directed his
bureaucracy to be more balanced in its approach, which some
have interpreted as a closer alignment with Israel. Canada
has shifted away from the anti-Israel votes in the UN, cut
ties early on with the Hamas government, and offered support
to Israel in its incursions into Lebanon. On Iran, Canada
has had extremely limited policy tools since it tightened its
long-standing policy of controlled engagement in 2005 over
the human rights situation (in particular the killing of
Canadian-Iranian journalist Zahra Kazemi in an Iranian prison
in 2003) and Iran's nuclear program. It tightened its
regulations again in February in response to the UN
resolution on Iran's enrichment program. In 2006, Harper
appointed prominent Pakistani-Canadian MP, Wajid Khan, to
help shape Middle East policy, but he was unable to find any
real traction and has not been active recently.

SHIFTING THE COURSE TO LATIN AMERICA
--------------


11. (C) After Afghanistan, PM Harper has made the Western
Hemisphere his top foreign policy priority. Canada provides

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over C$100 million per year in assistance to Haiti, and has
pledged to continue this level of funding at least through

2011. In July, Harper visited Colombia, Chile, Barbados, and
Haiti to highlight his hemispheric strategy. In Colombia, he
showcased Canada's resolve to work with struggling
democracies in the face of transnational challenges; in
Chile, he highlighted the importance of free trade and good
governance; in Barbados, he reiterated Canada's commitment to
helping the countries of the Caribbean manage security and
pandemic health challenges; and in Haiti, he renewed Canada's
extensive commitment to mend the most broken country in the
hemisphere. The Harper government has followed up the trip
with several other ministerial meetings and visits, and over
the summer launched free trade negotiations with Peru,
Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and CARICOM. Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs and International Trade Helena
Guergis most recently visited Costa Rica and Nicaragua and
promised that Canada would also complete ongoing free trade
negotiations with El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and
Nicaragua.


12. (C) Skeptics have pointed out that there is no written
strategy, although according to one Central American
ambassador here DFAIT plans to issue a Latin American policy
document in mid-December or early January. John Graham, the
Chair of the Foundation for the Americas, has commented that
this would be the third time in less than 20 years that
Canada has launched a major initiative to engage in the
Americas, after joining the OAS in 1989 and the Quebec City
Summit of the Americas in 2001. He noted that in both cases
"the government was distracted by other priorities and the
momentum fizzled."

DEVELOPING THE RIGHT ARCHITECTURE FOR ASIA
--------------


13. (C) There was an obsession in the last government with
the rise of China and an almost pandering policy toward the
PRC centered on economic and business interests. The Tories
have changed course by laying down markers with the PRC over
the importance of human rights to good relations, and Harper
officially received the Dalai Lama to make the point. Harper
wants to exercise a "principle-based foreign policy" with
China, but also sees India, as a large growing Commonwealth
democracy (as well as the origin of many Canadian citizens
and residents),as a country that equally deserves Canada's
attention. While generally supportive of Taiwan, Canada has
not been outspoken on cross-strait relations and sees little
value in engagement on the issue. Trade with China continues
to boom, growing by 43% in the first seven months of the year
alone. Still, Canada has not been afraid to pressure China
for greater exchange rate flexibility and increasing domestic
demand to prevent a global economic slowdown. Canadian
analysts recently completed a study of the growing role of
China in Africa based on input from Canadian missions there.



14. (C) Strategically, Canada has been searching for the
right approach to Asian architecture. While broadly sharing
our support for the primacy of APEC and the ASEAN Regional
Forum, it is inching toward participation in the East Asia
Summit due to its concerns about Chinese inroads into ASEAN.
It is finalizing details about a formal role in the
International Monitoring Team in the southern Philippines,
QInternational Monitoring Team in the southern Philippines,
with its team members probably focused on governance issues
rather than military monitoring, however. Canada likely will
welcome proposals for additional free trade areas in the
Pacific Rim as well as individual and regional FTAs. It
recently concluded "open skies" agreements with New Zealand
and Singapore to strengthen its position as a "Pacific
Gateway" into the North American market. Canada has been
fully supportive of the six-party talks and efforts to
denuclearize North Asia.

REORGANIZING TO ACHIEVE THE NEW AGENDA
--------------


15. (C) To achieve his agenda, Harper has been trying to move
the bureaucracy, both ideologically away from its traditional
reliance on multilateral mechanisms and aversion to conflict,
and geographically away from its heavy headquarters focus.
There were rumblings earlier this year when the PMO chastised
Canadian diplomats in Beijing for not attending the trial of
a Canadian citizen accused of terrorism, and then issued an
internal statement ordering its diplomats to "align"
themselves with the Harper government's priorities. Canada

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will go through its own global repositioning exercise over
the next few years, pushing larger numbers of diplomats out
to missions abroad. Harper would also like for Canadian
foreign assistance to be more closely tied to policy
objectives. This is evident superficially in the quantity of
foreign aid that has been shifted to Afghanistan, but PMO
staffers have claimed that money is still tied up in old
spending mechanisms and is not available on the ground with
the flexibility of U.S. CERP monies. DFAIT does have at its
disposal a C$100 million replenishable peace and security
fund, which its Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force
manages independently. Additional coordination by the Task
Force with S/CRS might be beneficial on both sides.

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WILKINS