INFORMATION ON HOST GOVERNMENT PRACTICES -

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 002029 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PTER PREL KVPR PGOV PINR CVIS ASEC KHLS CA SUBJECT: INFORMATION ON HOST GOVERNMENT PRACTICES - INFORMATION COLLECTION, SCREENING, AND SHARING; CANADA REF: STATE 133921 ¶1. (SBU) Officials of the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) declined to meet with Emboffs to discuss elements of their border practices in time to meet the deadline for responding to reftel. The entire issue of "Watch-listing" is extremely politically sensitive in Canada. Therefore, responses below are based on observation and interaction of various Embassy offices with their Canadian counterparts. ¶2. (SBU) Responses are linked to para six of reftel. ¶A. Watchlisting: -- the current Canadian Watchlist contains approximately 2000 records. We have no breakdown of the watchlist by content. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) maintains the watchlist. ¶B. Traveler Information Collection: -- What are the country's policies (legislation, mandates, etc.) on collecting information from travelers arriving in the country?: Essentially the same as the United States. -- Are there different policies for air, sea, and land entry and for domestic flights?: Policies are not officially different. But data collection is more thorough at the air and sea ports of entry than the land border. -- Who collects traveler information?: CBSA -- What are the policies of the collecting agency to share that information with foreign governments?: Canadian privacy laws severely limit information-sharing with regard to Canadian citizens or persons with a legal status in Canada. Information on others is more freely shared. -- Does the host government collect Passenger Name Record (PNR) data on incoming commercial flights or vessels? Is this data used for intelligence or law enforcement purposes to screen travelers? Does host government have any existing treaties to share PNR data?: Canada collects PNR data, but we have no information as to the extent this data is used for screening travelers. -- If applicable, have advance passenger information systems (APIS),interactive advanced passenger information systems (IAPIS),or electronic travel authority systems been effective at detecting other national security threats, such as wanted criminals?: Not available. ¶C. Border Control and Screening: -- Does the host government employ software to screen 
travelers of security interest?: Yes. National Record Assessment Center (NRAC) -- Are all travelers tracked electronically, or only non-host- country nationals? What is the frequency of travelers being "waived through" because they hold up what appears to be an appropriate document, but whose information is not actually recorded electronically? What is the estimated percentage of non-recorded crossings, entries and exits?: All travelers are tracked only at entry. All travelers are entering by land or sea are entered electronically. The majority of land entries are entered electronically. -- Do host government border control officials have the authority to use other criminal data when making decisions on who can enter the country? If so, please describe this authority (legislation, mandates, etc): Yes. CBSA has MOU's with responsible agencies to use their information in making entry decisions. -- What are the host government's policies on questioning, detaining and denying entry to individuals presenting themselves at a point of entry into the country? Which agency would question, detain, or deny entry?: CBSA has the authority and its practices are similar to those in the United States. -- How well does information-sharing function within the host government, e.g., if there is a determination that Qhost government, e.g., if there is a determination that someone with a valid host government visa is later identified with terrorism, how is this communicated and resolved internally?: Interagency cooperation is not particularly good within the Canadian bureaucracy. ¶D. Biometric Collection: OTTAWA 00002029 002 OF 003 -- Are biometric systems integrated for all active POEs? What are the systems and models used?: No, they are still being integrated. -- Are all passengers screened for the biometric or does the host government target a specific population for collection (i.e. host country nationals)? Do the biometric collection systems look for a one to one comparison (ensure the biometric presented matches the one stored on the e-Passport) or one to many comparison (checking the biometric presented against a database of known biometrics)?: No -- If biometric systems are in place, does the host government know of any countermeasures that have been used or attempted to defeat biometric checkpoints?: Not available. -- What are the host government's policies on collecting the fingerprints of travelers coming into the country?: Fingerprints may only be collected for specific reasons such as Refugee Applicant, Suspected Criminal. -- Which agency is responsible for the host government's fingerprint system?: Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) -- Are the fingerprint programs in place NIST, INT-I, EFTS, UK1 or RTID compliant?: Not available. -- Are the fingerprints collected as flats or rolled? Which agency collects the fingerprints?: Either process may be used depending on the circumstances. CBSA collects the prints at the Port of Entry. ¶E. Passports: -- If the host government issues a machine-readable passport containing biometric information, does the host government share the public key required to read the biometric information with any other governments? If so, which governments?: There is no sharing. -- Does the host government issue replacement passports for full or limited validity (e.g. the time remaining on the original passports, fixed validity for a replacement, etc.)?: Except for temporary, emergency passports, replacement passports are issued for a full validity. They are considered new passports. -- Does the host government have special regulations/procedures for dealing with "habitual" losers of passports or bearers who have reported their passports stolen multiple times?: There is no basis for denying issuance of a passport except for a violation of law. -- Are replacement passports of the same or different appearance and page length as regular passports (do they have something along the lines of our emergency partial duration passports)?: Replacement passports are considered fully valid new passports. There is a short validity emergency passport issued by overseas offices that has a different appearance. -- Do emergency replacement passports contain the same or fewer biometric fields as regular-issue passports?: Emergency passports have no biometric fields. -- Where applicable, has Post noticed any increase in the number of replacement or "clean" (i.e. no evidence of prior travel) passports used to apply for U.S. visas?: Canadian citizens do not need a visa to enter the United States. -- Are replacement passports assigned a characteristic number series or otherwise identified?: No ¶F. Fraud Detection -- How robust is fraud detection and how actively are instances of fraud involving documents followed up?: It is reasonably robust. On an individual basis, there is limited follow-up. Where a pattern is detected or where individual fraud appears as a component for a larger issue, there is significant investigation. -- How are potentially fraudulently issued documents taken out of circulation, or made harder to use?: The documents Qout of circulation, or made harder to use?: The documents are seized and entered into the CBSA Fraudulent Document System. ¶G. Privacy and Data Security -- What are the country's policies on records related to the OTTAWA 00002029 003 OF 003 questioning, detention, or removal of individuals encountered at points of entry into the country? How are those records stored, and for how long?: All records are covered by the Access To Information and Privacy Act. All records are stored in the Field Operation Support System (FOSS). We have no information on retention policies. -- What are the country's restrictions on the collection or use of sensitive data?: Restrictions are based on the Access To Information and Privacy Act, which severely restricts the use or sharing of any collected data. -- What are the requirements to provide notice to the public on the implementation of new databases of records?: Not available. -- Are there any laws relating to security features for government computer systems that hold personally identifying information?: Yes. Access To Information and Privacy Act. -- What are the rules on an individual's ability to access data that homeland security agencies hold about them?: A Canadian citizen can request copies of data that government agencies hold on him except in the case of security-related data. But the standards of withholding data are very high. -- Are there different rules for raw data (name, date of birth, etc.) versus case files (for example, records about enforcement actions)?: No -- Does a non-citizen/resident have the right to sue the government to obtain these types of data?: Yes Visit our shared North American Partnership blog (Canada & Mexico) at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap WILKINS