CANADA: MAKING THE CASE FOR THE AFGHAN MISSION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OTTAWA 001922

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NOFORN
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2017
TAGS: PREL MOPS PGOV CA AF PK
SUBJECT: CANADA: MAKING THE CASE FOR THE AFGHAN MISSION

REF: A. OTTAWA 1903

B. OTTAWA 1769

Classified By: DCM Terry Breese, reasons 1.4 (b) (d)


1. (C/NF) Summary. The Canadian body politic is highly
conflicted over the Afghan mission, with one poll in
September indicating that 68 pct of Canadians want a complete
pullout in February 2009 and 56 pct want the troops out even
earlier, while an October poll shows that 54 pct want
Canadian troops in Afghanistan beyond 2009. The Harper
government upped the political ante in the October 16 Throne
Speech (septel) by positing 2011 rather than 2009 as a likely
end to a Canadian military role in Afghanistan, so debate
over the Afghan mission will continue to be lively. Public
volatility over Afghanistan stems from the barrage of images
that hit Canadians daily from the field, some positive and
some negative. Prime Minister Harper, Defense Minister
MacKay, and Foreign Minister Bernier are all speaking out
more vigorously about the importance of Canada's role in
Afghanistan and the need to ensure security in order to
promote human rights, democracy, health, education, and
development. The October 12 appointment of a new
non-partisan panel of "wise men" to review and recommend
policy options on the future of Canada's role in Afghanistan
(ref a) should also help to provide better political coverage
and possibly to come up with more popularly acceptable policy
choices. End Summary.

VOLATILE PUBLIC SUPPORT
--------------


2. (SBU) The Harper government is facing a general drop in
public support for a military mission in Afghanistan,
although the numbers fluctuate dramatically based on the
wording of the questions. When Canada first entered
Afghanistan in January 2002, 66 pct of the public supported
the mission. This approval had declined to 54 pct in March
2006 and by July 2007 hit only 43 pct. In a September
Ipsos-Reid poll, 68 pct of Canadians wanted Canada to pull
out altogether when the mission ends in February 2009, while
56 pct wanted a pullout even earlier. A recent self-selected
Globe and Mail internet survey put the figure even higher,
with 85 pct saying Canada should not extend the mission.
However, an October Ipsos-Reid poll indicated that 54 pct of
Canadians want their troops to continue in Afghanistan beyond
February 2009, although most (four in ten) want the
government to change the mission from combat to something
else.


3. (SBU) On the political front, the government's "Speech
from the Throne" at the October 16 opening of the new session
of Parliament specified that 2011 rather than 2009 was now
the government's target to end the Canadian military mission
in Afghanistan and turn over security to the Afghan army and
police, while promising another Parliamentary vote on the
issue. Prime Minister Harper had already made clear that the
nature of that mission may change based on recommendations by
the new non-partisan panel of "wise men" headed by former
Liberal Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister John
Manley, which will make its report in January 2008. The
QLiberal reaction to the 2011 date is not yet clear, but one
senior party leader has suggested publicly that the Party was
not opposed to a continuing role for the Canadian military
after February 2009 so much as it opposed a combat role in
Kandahar after that date. The Liberals are also divided
among themselves, with some recognizing that the original
decision to go into Afghanistan came from the then-Liberal
government, while others have claimed that the Canadian
military "duped" the political leadership into this choice.
The separatist Bloc Quebecois definitely intend to make the
Parliamentary decision on a February 2009 pull-out a vote of
confidence (and to vote against the government on it),while
the leftist New Democratic Party (NDP) wants the troops out
now (suggesting that they should be sent to the more
"Canada-appropriate" mission in Darfur instead).


4. (U) The government's determination to stay on is a
significant turnaround from where Canada appeared to be

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headed over the summer. In July, La Presse columnist Andre
Pratte, a supporter of the mission, wrote in an op-ed
entitled "Mission Finished" that "the Harper government has
abandoned any idea of extending beyond February
2009." He lamented that this would relegate Canada to a "new
international role: back seat driver." Columnist Don Martin
in September 2007 similarly wrote of Harper "seeking a
retreat with honour from the Kandahar battlefield." Even
supporters of the mission such as retired Chief of the
Defense Staff General Paul Manson have written of seeking
ways to contribute to the Afghan mission that did not include
a combat force in Kandahar.

MEASURING THE PROS AND CONS
--------------


5. (SBU) The volatility in public opinion appears to stem
from the positive and negative images that emerge from
Afghanistan daily. Many Canadians are aware of some of the
good news stories coming out of Afghanistan these days:
school attendance (especially for girls) is up, refugees have
returned in the millions, medical care is better and more
available, GDP has doubled, and infant mortality has dropped
by a quarter, all against the haunting specter of a
strengthening Taliban. They are proud that Canada is a part
of these successes. There also appears to be a growing
understanding in many circles that these types of missions
are messy by nature and require patience, and an acceptance
among many Canadians that robust security is necessary to
implement the humanitarian and development assistance that
Afghanistan so desperately needs. There is also a pride
about Canada taking on a robust role in Afghanistan,
consistent with the theme that "Canada is back" on the world
stage.


6. (SBU) But the negatives are hitting hard. The biggest and
most persistent negatives are recurrent casualties (71
military and one diplomat to date),each of which hits
Canadians three times - when the death occurs, when the body
returns, and when the funeral takes place. Some commentators
have claimed that at one point it was statistically more
dangerous to be a Canadian soldier in Kandahar than an
American soldier in Iraq. Many Canadians, wedded to popular
mythology, have expressed the notion that the current Afghan
mission is simply "un-Canadian" and gets away from the
classic Canadian mission of post-conflict peacekeeping.
However, some writers such as Esprit de Corps editor Scott
Taylor are doing their part to remind Canadians that the myth
of the friendly Canadian peacekeeper is just that -- a myth
-- and have pointed to the fierce combat of the Medak Pocket
in the Balkans: Afghanistan is not the first time Canadians
have engaged in combat in the interest of peace.


7. (SBU) There is also a sense among many that Canada's share
of the burden is too high, and that there would be nothing
dishonorable about pressing other NATO allies to step up to
the plate, with the contrary fear that if the Canadians
appeared too willing to stay on, the NATO "slackers" would
happily allow them to do so. Images of corruption and
Qhappily allow them to do so. Images of corruption and
disorganization in the warlord-heavy Karzai government, with
parallel increasing poppy production, are also leading many
Canadians to question both the long-term viability of the
project and whether it is possible to mark progress. There
is skepticism about eventual "success," whether by 2009,
2011, or any foreseeable date.


8. (C/NF) According to one of PM Harper's key advisors on
Afghanistan, Keith Fountain (protect),the mission likely has
been too focused all along on combat operations over
development assistance; this will need to shift as Afghan's
weariness with the presence of foreign military forces
increases. Fountain has advocated internally more urgent
delivery of humanitarian and development assistance, which
would build good will and squeeze the Taliban's popular
support and in the process bolster security. He nonetheless
emphasized that such a shift is not the same as a withdrawal;
he -- and his Prime Minister -- want to ensure that the
option of a robust combat presence in support of development
is on the table post-February 2009.

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MAKING THE CASE
--------------


9. (C/NF) PM Harper is actively fighting to make a case for
continued Canadian involvement in Afghanistan. As noted
military historian J.L. Granatstein had commented earlier,
Harper "needs to mount a major political and media campaign
on the reasons for Canada's presence and role in Afghanistan
... now" in order to keep the mission alive. In addition to
the Throne Speech delineation of the importance of the Afghan
mission -- both in humanitarian and security terms -- until
2011, PM Harper used a recent press conference to explain the
need for a combat role for Canadian soldiers in Kandahar in
support of humanitarian assistance, development, and security
force training. Positioning the government better to explain
the Afghan mission was apparently the main rationale for the
August cabinet shuffle that replaced the inarticulate and
"take it or leave it" Defense Minister O'Connor with the
softer touch of then-Foreign Minister Peter MacKay, while
moving francophone Maxime Bernier to Foreign Affairs, in part
to better sell the mission in Quebec.


10. (SBU) Early in his tenure at DFAIT, Bernier represented
the government at a prominent Montreal conference on "Canada
Faces the Challenge of Afghanistan." As he had foretold to
Ambassador on September 19 (ref b),he publicly reiterated
Canada's desire to play a constructive role in Afghanistan
even after February 2009, and made a strong case that
Canada's mission there was important in the overall context
of promoting human rights and democracy. To do so, however,
Canada had to help create conditions of better security.
Despite constant and well-planned heckling, Bernier made his
points articulately and sometimes with passion. In response
to a question from the Bloc Quebecois foreign affairs critic
on whether Canada will be militarily in Kandahar, Bernier
commented "we will adapt and we will decide." Other speakers
-- including the UN Deputy Special Representative of the
Secretary General in Kabul, Canadian diplomat Chris

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Alexander, the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team leader
Michael de Salaberry, Afghan Ambassador to Canada Omar Samad,
and analyst Barnett Rubin -- underscored that the situation
is improving and agreed that security was a necessary
precondition to reconstruction and development.


11. (C) Comment: What the Canadian contribution in
Afghanistan will look like after February 2009 will depend on
a number of factors -- whether/when there is an election in
Canada and who wins, progress on the ground, recommendations
of the "wise men" panel, and whether casualties stay at an
"acceptable" level. What is clear, however, is that the
current government sees this mission as the right thing for
Canada and would like to continue beyond the planned
end-date. PM Harper appears ready to take a considerable
political risk to do so, and the Manley Commission should
help buy him some political space as he maneuvers through the
minefields ahead.

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