FM STOERE AND AMBASSADOR WHITNEY ON THE MIDDLE

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000667

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2017
TAGS: PGOV NO
SUBJECT: FM STOERE AND AMBASSADOR WHITNEY ON THE MIDDLE
EAST, RUSSIA AND WHITE HOUSE VISITS

Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Kristen Bauer
for reasons 1.4 b and d


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Ambassador Whitney met with Foreign
Minister Jonas Gahr Stoere on June 15 over lunch and
discussed a variety of issues including the Middle East,
Afghanistan, Russia and missile defense, a White House visit
for Prime Minister Stoltenberg and the New Embassy Compound.
END SUMMARY

MIDDLE EAST


2. (C) The situation in Gaza is a topic of high interest to
Stoere and he expressed agreement for U.S. support of Abbas.
Stoere felt that the GON's position on normalizing relations
with Hamas members of the government has been vindicated
because isolation weakened the moderate Hamas elements and
strengthened the extremists. He stated that he is not
surprised that Hamas would revert to the violence that it
knows best, given the failure of the diplomatic path of the
New Unity Government. Stoere was pessimistic of any plans
for a renewal of the unity government because while Abbas can
call for a new government, Hamas would still have to give its
approval for a new government to have any chance of
effectiveness. This is unlikely to occur. Stoere believes
that the international community has to show progress for the
new PM, Fayyad. He made no mention of making contacts with
Hamas. Interestingly, Stoere made a cryptic comment at the
end of this discussion that it is important for MFA to
recognize that ME is really a &sideshow8 for Norway. Norway
can be helpful given their contacts but their role should not
be overstated.

AFGHANISTAN AND THE TELEMARK BATTALION


3. (C) Stoere was more optimistic on Afghanistan and believes
progress has been made on both the military and the civilian
side. One area of concern was the lack of progress on some
of the GON priority projects, such as creating a civil
service academy to train Afghans. Ambassador Whitney
recommended further contact with Mark Ward, Senior Deputy
Assistant Administrator for Asia and the Near East in USAID,
who recently visited the MFA and who appreciated the need to
develop Afghan human capital. On the security side
Ambassador Whitney asked about future Norwegian contributions
to ISAF. Stoere clearly indicated not to expect extension of
the Norwegian Special Forces in Kabul beyond the current six
month commitment. (Note: This was repeated publicly by the
Defense Minister this week.) When Ambassador Whitney asked
about the possibility of sending the Telemark battalion to
Afghanistan Stoere did not immediately reject it but said
neutrally that it depended on the assignment, the parameters,
and so forth.

RUSSIA AND MISSILE DEFENSE


4. (C) Despite the reference to opposition to all missile
defense systems in the government's platform, Stoere does not
see NATO activity on missile defense (MD) as a real problem
for the government. He said that comments by the defense
spokesman for the Socialist Left party (member of the
coalition and fiercely anti-missile defense) that the GON
should be more aggressive in its opposition to MD should be
viewed as &isolated8 and not reflective of the coalition's
position. Stoere reacted somewhat defensively when
Ambassador Whitney suggested the PM Stoltenberg,s skeptical
comments on MD while during a visit to Russia were
unfortunate. Stoere claimed that the media distorted what
the PM said but did not disagree when the Ambassador pointed
to specific comments that were unhelpful.

VISIT TO THE WHITE HOUSE


5. (C) Stoere suggested a visit by the Prime Minister to the
US with a White House visit could come when Norway opens the
Snohvit LNG plant and the first delivery of Norwegian LNG to
the U.S. arrives.

THE NEC


6. (C) The Ambassador briefed Stoere on the progress with the
New Embassy Compound and encouraged him to see if there was a
mechanism to push the court decision to after the local
elections. Stoere agreed with the embassy,s decision to hold
the application for a building permit until after local
elections.

COMMENT


7. (C) It is not surprising the Stoere claimed some
vindication of his policy initiative on normalizing relations

with Hamas. There was no discussion of possible steps Norway
may consider to help the situation. In fact, Deputy FM
Raymond Johansen recently stated that Norway was powerless to
influence the situation at present. On sending new forces to
ISAF, Stoere was equivocal. He did not immediately rule out
sending the Telemark battalion, as he did on the question of
extending the Special Forces in Kabul, but he was not
supportive either. We speculate that the deal struck with
the Socialist Left party on the Special Forces was to do a
single deployment only. Since there was no deal on the
Telemark that leaves it at least theoretically open. END
COMMENT
Whitney