NORWAY AND CUBA

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000505

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR WHA/CCA (MARCHULETA),EUR/NB (VMIDDLETON, RDALLAND)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2017
TAGS: PHUM PREL CU NO
SUBJECT: NORWAY AND CUBA

REF: A. 5/8/2007 EMAILS FROM MARCHELETA TO ECANUEL


B. HAVANA 398

C. OSLO 397

Classified By: DCM Kevin M. Johnson, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. In a recent meeting, GON MFA State Secretary
Raymond Johansen said Norway agreed with Spain's desire to
increase european engagement with Cuba. He also claimed that
the Norwegian approach to Cuba is supported by Cuban
dissidents. Specifically, he claimed deeper engagement with
the Cuban government and the GON's failure to meet with
dissidents on the political level is accepted. Follow-up
conversations indicate that the GON is in contact with some
of the same dissidents the US engages. Post requests
guidance for responding to Norwegian claims. End Summary.

Dealing with Dissidents
--------------

2. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador on April 25, State
Secretary Raymond Johansen reviewed his April 9-11 trip to

SIPDIS
Cuba (ref C). He claimed that the post-Castro period has
begun and that Raul is a different leader. For example, he
suggested that Raul's reliance on the communist party (as
opposed to a clique around Fidel) is expanding the number of
people involved in running the government. Raul also is more
welcoming of private investment and has more contacts with
the Cuban diaspora and is more open with the Catholic Church.
In response, the Ambassador outlined the US approach to
Cuba and explained that we are looking for a transition to
democracy, not to a slightly expanded dictatorship.


3. (C) When questioned about Johansen's decision to meet
with Cuban officials but not with dissidents, Johansen said
that both the dissidents and the Cuban government welcome the
GON approach. "Real" dissident groups, he claimed, are
pleased to receive financial support, even though at the cost
of not attending national day events or meeting with
Norwegian political leaders. The Ambassador questioned
whether this was true and suggested comparing notes on
dissidents which Norway and the U.S. speak with.

Which Dissidents?
--------------

4. (C) On May 10 we met with Herberth Linder, the MFA's
Latin Affairs Section Director General, to continue the
discussion. We debriefed Linder on Cuban matters raised in
reftel B, and discussed the identity of Cuban dissidents with
whom the Norwegian government maintains relations. Linder
provided the following names which overlapped the identities
of Cuban dissidents known by the Department's Office of Cuban
Affairs (ref A):

--Oswaldo Paya, Movimiento Cristiano Liberacion;
--Martha Beatriz Roque and Rene Gomez Manzano, Asambla Para
Promover la Sociedad Civil;
--Elizardo Sanchez, La Cmuision Cubana de Derechos Humanos
and Reconiliacion Nacional;
--Luara Pollan, Berta Soler and Miriam Leiva, of the grupo
dos 75;
--Hector Palacios Ruiz, Center for Social Studies;
--Vladimiro Roca, All United Coalition; and
--Nestor Rodriguez Lobaina


5. (C) Linder emphasized that this was not an exclusive list,
and will confer with MFA colleagues further as to the
identity of other dissidents the MFA deals with. He noted
that a real challenge exists as to whether Cuban dissident
groups have been infiltrated by the Cuban state security
services. He recalled that Cuban security forces often try
to discredit dissidents, discussing how Oswaldo Paya was the
victim of a government orchestrated smear campaign that
falsely accused him of being a Cuban government agent.


6. (C) Linder broadly described his frequent Madrid meetings
with Spanish MFA colleagues. The meetings, the most recent of
which was May 1, often involve a general discussion of Latin
American matters. As noted in reftel C, there is no
coordinated Spanish-Norwegian Cuba policy, although Johansen
confirmed to us that Norway agrees with Spain's approach.

Request for Guidance
--------------

7. (C) Post requests Department's guidance and reaction to
the GON claims. It seems unlikely to us that the Norwegian
engagement of the current Cuban government is as welcome to
dissidents as they claim, since this would put the dissidents
and Cuba's government in agreement. We question if the
dissidents Norway is engaging with are representative of the
opposition spectrum and, in the case of dissidents known both
to the U.S. and Norway, whether they are they telling the USG
something different. Specific information along these lines
would be very helpful in encouraging the GON to take a fresh
look at their Cuba policy.
WHITNEY