NORWAY AND CUBA

C O N F I D E N T I A L OSLO 000505 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR WHA/CCA (MARCHULETA),EUR/NB (VMIDDLETON, RDALLAND) E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2017 TAGS: PHUM PREL CU NO SUBJECT: NORWAY AND CUBA REF: A. 5/8/2007 EMAILS FROM MARCHELETA TO ECANUEL ¶B. HAVANA 398 ¶C. OSLO 397 Classified By: DCM Kevin M. Johnson, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. In a recent meeting, GON MFA State Secretary Raymond Johansen said Norway agreed with Spain's desire to increase european engagement with Cuba. He also claimed that the Norwegian approach to Cuba is supported by Cuban dissidents. Specifically, he claimed deeper engagement with the Cuban government and the GON's failure to meet with dissidents on the political level is accepted. Follow-up conversations indicate that the GON is in contact with some of the same dissidents the US engages. Post requests guidance for responding to Norwegian claims. End Summary. Dealing with Dissidents -------------- ¶2. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador on April 25, State Secretary Raymond Johansen reviewed his April 9-11 trip to SIPDIS Cuba (ref C). He claimed that the post-Castro period has begun and that Raul is a different leader. For example, he suggested that Raul's reliance on the communist party (as opposed to a clique around Fidel) is expanding the number of people involved in running the government. Raul also is more welcoming of private investment and has more contacts with the Cuban diaspora and is more open with the Catholic Church. In response, the Ambassador outlined the US approach to Cuba and explained that we are looking for a transition to democracy, not to a slightly expanded dictatorship. ¶3. (C) When questioned about Johansen's decision to meet with Cuban officials but not with dissidents, Johansen said that both the dissidents and the Cuban government welcome the GON approach. "Real" dissident groups, he claimed, are pleased to receive financial support, even though at the cost of not attending national day events or meeting with Norwegian political leaders. The Ambassador questioned whether this was true and suggested comparing notes on dissidents which Norway and the U.S. speak with. Which Dissidents? -------------- ¶4. (C) On May 10 we met with Herberth Linder, the MFA's Latin Affairs Section Director General, to continue the discussion. We debriefed Linder on Cuban matters raised in reftel B, and discussed the identity of Cuban dissidents with whom the Norwegian government maintains relations. Linder provided the following names which overlapped the identities of Cuban dissidents known by the Department's Office of Cuban Affairs (ref A): --Oswaldo Paya, Movimiento Cristiano Liberacion; --Martha Beatriz Roque and Rene Gomez Manzano, Asambla Para Promover la Sociedad Civil; --Elizardo Sanchez, La Cmuision Cubana de Derechos Humanos and Reconiliacion Nacional; --Luara Pollan, Berta Soler and Miriam Leiva, of the grupo dos 75; --Hector Palacios Ruiz, Center for Social Studies; --Vladimiro Roca, All United Coalition; and --Nestor Rodriguez Lobaina ¶5. (C) Linder emphasized that this was not an exclusive list, and will confer with MFA colleagues further as to the identity of other dissidents the MFA deals with. He noted that a real challenge exists as to whether Cuban dissident groups have been infiltrated by the Cuban state security services. He recalled that Cuban security forces often try to discredit dissidents, discussing how Oswaldo Paya was the victim of a government orchestrated smear campaign that falsely accused him of being a Cuban government agent. ¶6. (C) Linder broadly described his frequent Madrid meetings with Spanish MFA colleagues. The meetings, the most recent of which was May 1, often involve a general discussion of Latin American matters. As noted in reftel C, there is no coordinated Spanish-Norwegian Cuba policy, although Johansen confirmed to us that Norway agrees with Spain's approach. Request for Guidance -------------- ¶7. (C) Post requests Department's guidance and reaction to the GON claims. It seems unlikely to us that the Norwegian engagement of the current Cuban government is as welcome to dissidents as they claim, since this would put the dissidents and Cuba's government in agreement. We question if the dissidents Norway is engaging with are representative of the opposition spectrum and, in the case of dissidents known both to the U.S. and Norway, whether they are they telling the USG something different. Specific information along these lines would be very helpful in encouraging the GON to take a fresh look at their Cuba policy. WHITNEY