NORWAY'S VIEWS ON SRI LANKA PEACE PROCESS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 OSLO 000195 SIPDIS SIPDIS MOLLY GOWER, SCA/INS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2017 TAGS: PHUM PREL PTER CE NO SUBJECT: NORWAY'S VIEWS ON SRI LANKA PEACE PROCESS REF: CONFIDENTIAL 2/27/07 EMAIL FROM M.GOWER TO E.CANUEL Classified By: DCM Kevin M. Johnson, Reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. On February 28, DCM and Pol Officer met with Norwegian Special Envoy to Sri Lanka Jon Hanssen-Bauer and Sri Lanka Adviser Tomas Stangeland at the MFA. The Norwegians stressed the importance of USG involvement in the peace process, outlined views on the Indian and the U.K. perspectives, and discussed future political and military scenarios. Hanssen-Bauer had been in contact with Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) representatives following the attack injuring Ambassador Blake, and believes the mortar barrage followed the Government of Sri Lanka (GSL)'s failure to properly report the Eastern province visit. The Special Envoy asked for USG analysis of potential Chinese or Pakistani involvement in the Sri Lankan peace process. Valuing the February 21 Co-Chairs conference call, Hanssen-Bauer seeks clarification as to when the USG would favor the next call. End Summary. Reporting Lapse Blamed for Attack -------------- ¶2. (C) After expressing clear concern and relief for Ambassador Blake's condition, the Special Envoy stressed that Ambassador Brattskar immediately contacted the LTTE upon hearing of the attack, seeking to halt the shelling and guarantee the safe transport of the helicopter's passengers. After speaking with LTTE contacts, Hanssen-Bauer believes their claim that the Tigers were unaware of the passengers' identities, as the GSL did not apparently follow an established, normal reporting procedure. Specifically, the LTTE claims that the GSL did not inform the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) of the flight which, in turn, would have contacted the Peace Secretariat. The Secretariat would guarantee that the LTTE recognize the visitors' safe passage. ¶3. (C) When DCM questioned why the normal reporting procedures were not followed, Hanssen-Bauer interprets the failure to notify as a result of the GSL's confidence that its military forces had "absolute control" in the East. The Norwegians confirmed with the SLMM that no message was transmitted to the LTTE. The local LTTE commander called off the attacks following Ambassador Brattskar's call, and claimed that the airport struck by mortar fire was located in an area where recent fighting occurred. Emphasizing that the Norwegians were not defending the LTTE's actions, Hanssen-Bauer stressed that the incident would at least provide a better understanding of the reporting procedures, to avoid future incidents. The Special Envoy's India Meetings -------------- ¶4. (C) Hanssen-Bauer outlined his recent travels to India, in advance of Norwegian Development Minister Eric Solheim's March 8 New Delhi visit. He found his Foreign Office meetings concerning Sri Lanka direct, with his Indian colleagues "outspoken." The Indians singled out the importance of the U.S. and Norway among the Co-Chairs, and did not find advantageous the involvement of other countries in the peace process. From India's perspective, the EU is losing influence and leverage with the GSL, given that the EU's LTTE terrorist ban did not result in the GSL feeling any pressure to more closely cooperate with the EU. Seeking US. Perspectives on Chinese, Pakistani Involvement -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) In Hanssen-Bauer's view, GSL President Rajapaksa is looking beyond the EU, and considering countries such as China, Pakistan and perhaps South Korea for roles in the peace process. Hanssen-Bauer perceives that the U.S. has better relations and influence with Pakistan and China, and seeks USG support in ascertaining the intentions and plans of both countries with respect to the Sri Lankan conflict. Using attendance at an international Peace and Reconciliation meeting in Beijing this month as a pretext, Hanssen-Bauer OSLO 00000195 002 OF 003 will seek bilateral discussions with the Chinese concerning the Sri Lanka conflict. Although not hiding this meeting from the GSL and LTTE, he will not "announce" trip details and specifics to the conflict parties. UK Involvement? -------------- ¶6. (C) Hanssen-Bauer spoke of his London trip, and possible UK "back-channel" involvement. He recently met with John Dennis, Additional Director for Asia in the UK Foreign Office and Jonathan Powell, the Prime Minister's Chief of Staff. The Special Envoy notes a revival of interest from the UK side. A possible UK role could include serving as a back-channel messenger to the GSL. Given the EU's LTTE ban, Hanssen-Bauer reiterated that the UK could not act as an LTTE mediator. He emphasized to the British that the lack of back channels is not hindering talks; rather, the increasing violence is. Reviewing Political Options, Assessing Military Situation -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) The Special Envoy believes a political opening for talks is unlikely to occur unless the military situation changes. He had high praise for Ambassador Blake's recent speech which emphasized no military solution to the conflict, and that the GSL must present a clear, credible political platform as a starting point for talks. Moreover, he fully backed the Ambassador's statement that the U.S. would not support an independent LTTE state. Rather, a federal solution must be found. Norway still advocates political solutions with the LTTE even if, given recent GSL military successes, the LTTE is perceived as militarily weak. Following any more LTTE defeats, its leader Prabhakaran would have difficulty within the LTTE to pursue non-military solutions. Hanssen-Bauer emphasized that the LTTE is unwilling to come talks in the middle of military actions, viewing cessation of fire as a prerequisite. On March 5 and 6, Ambassador Brattskar will visit Kilinochchi, which is viewed by Hanssen-Bauer as a positive step, indicating that the LTTE seeks to continue talking. The Special Envoy also agrees with India's opinion that a devolution of power should occur, similar to what the Tamils had in 2000, with the North and East still merged. ¶8. (C) The Special Envoy doesn't see any clear military solution down the road. Despite its losses, the LTTE military strength cannot be underestimated. For example, GSL forces in the East are not fully in control, and the LTTE can still employ guerrilla tactics in that region. In addition, the LTTE cannot be ruled out from undertaking an offensive, as Vakarai and the East are still under an LTTE declaration of war. ¶9. (C) Following military setbacks, the LTTE may view the international community as responsible for the Cease Fire Agreement crumbling, further destabilizing chances of a political solution. If a suitable pretext for the LTTE to launch an offensive is found, Hanssen-Bauer postulated on potential LTTE military strategies. Namely, the Tigers could launch direct military assaults in the North and undertake guerrilla warfare in the South. Alternatively, the LTTE could conduct military guerrilla strategies in the East, and then advance in the North. ¶10. (C) Hanssen-Bauer warns that the GSL, ripe with recent military successes, may overly value its position. Political problems could erupt should the violence continue. He reasons that if the LTTE is perceived as militarily weak, and the GSL forces advance into the North (as it has with the East),the situation will deteriorate. LTTE insurgents will have no home base, and spread out, resulting in fractured guerrilla groups which will be difficult to deal with. Clarifying Co-Chair Telephone Conferences -------------- ¶11. (C) The DCM asked the Special Envoy's impressions of the February 21 Co-Chairs conference call. Finding the OSLO 00000195 003 OF 003 conference very positive and a forum for frank assessments, Hanssen-Bauer also noted Japan's decision to pursue its continued line of diplomacy. Specifically, he viewed Japan as maintaining its bilateral aid and assistance to the GSL, while not changing its established views of either the GSL or the LTTE. ¶12. (C) Per ref A, the DCM also questioned why the Norwegians have asked the USG to host the Co-Chairs telephone conferences. Political and technical reasons contributed to the requests. Stating that it is "very important that the U.S. takes the lead," Hanssen-Bauer reiterated the political importance of USG involvement through hosting meetings in Washington. The GSL also recognizes that a USG-hosted call sends a "strong message" to the conflict parties. He pointed out that the GSL views the EU, for example, as "not on the same level." However, Stangeland noted the Norwegians attempted to host the recent conference call, but technical difficulties and scheduling issues prompted the Norwegian request for the USG to instead act as host. ¶13. (C) Hanssen-Bauer seeks USG clarification regarding the frequency of future Co-Chair telephone conferences. Emphasizing the value of the conferences, Hanssen-Bauer requests that they be held regularly. He understands that another telephone conference would occur after the forthcoming All Party Conference, but sensed USG ambivalence as to regular conference calls. He wants to know whether the USG prefers to have such calls on a regular basis, or only when/if progress is made through the All Party Conference. He recognizes the technical difficulties and scheduling hurdles involved. ¶14. (C) Comments: Hanssen-Bauer continues to seek political solutions for the Sri Lankan crises. He clearly values USG support, and seeks USG input on potential roles for China and Pakistan in the process, while hoping the USG agrees to regular Co-Chair telephone conferences. Seeking UK involvement as a back-channel messenger is not surprising. As with the 2006 Geneva conference, we suspect that the Norwegians are overwhelmed with minor requests from both the LTTE and GSL, which tie them up from focusing on more substantive issues. In addition, following the 2006 exclusion of EU powers from the SLMM, the Norwegians previously voiced concerns that the thinly-staffed force could not effectively handle many challenges. Hanssen-Bauer stated that no SLMM forces were in the East during the attack involving Ambassador Blake, which leads us to question whether the Norwegians will soon raise SLMM staffing level concerns. WHITNEY