TURKISH CYPRIOT PARTIES HEAD FOR DECEMBER SHOWDOWN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000994 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL TR CY SUBJECT: TURKISH CYPRIOT PARTIES HEAD FOR DECEMBER SHOWDOWN REF: A. NICOSIA 836 ¶B. NICOSIA 971 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher for reasons 1.4(b) and 1. 4 (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: An October agreement between the "governing" Republican Turkish Party (CTP) and the opposition to amend the "TRNC constitution" and consider early elections may derail before January 1 given the wildly differing goals of the participants. CTP considers the ad hoc committee agreement useful in luring the opposition back to "parliament," creating the appearance of reconciliation with opposition parties, and democratizing an outdated "constitution." The opposition National Unity Party (UBP) and the Democrat Party (DP),boycotting the "parliament8 since October 2006, are not against amending the "constitution," but are demanding as quid pro quo early elections in 2008, a CTP non-starter. CTP appears unlikely to back down, given its strong majority in "parliament," meaning UBP and DP--unless saved by a deus ex machina of Ankara-imposed early elections--seem headed for another political defeat. End Summary. -------------- Background -------------- ¶2. (SBU) On October 9, the "governing" CTP and the two main opposition parties, the National Unity Party (UBP) and Democrat Party (DP),agreed to amend the "TRNC constitution" and a number of other "laws" (concerning political parties, elections and referendums, and "parliamentary" by-laws),as well as discuss transition to a &presidential8 system in the Turkish Cypriot-administered area. CTP also accepted DP and UBP's demands to consider early "parliamentary" elections (the next vote is scheduled for 2010). The parties agreed to work in ad hoc committees until December 20, then take stock and, if all concurred, set a date by January 1 for both early elections and a referendum on the changes (the "presidential" transition was outside of the equation, however). The opposition's agreement to work in ad hoc committees was its first foot back in "parliamentary" waters after it stormed out in October 2006 (Note: Both UBP and DP have accused CTP of violating political ethics when it dumped DP as its "junior partner" 15 months ago in favor of the newly-founded--some say with support from Ankara--"Freedom and Reform Party" (OP). OP ranks include defectors from both DP and UBP. End Note) -------------- What they agree on -------------- ¶3. (C) The parties concur that the "TRNC constitution," not amended since its adoption in 1985, is outdated and not in tune with twenty-first century demands. Most of the ad hoc committee work to date, in fact, has focused on amending it. Ahmet Kasif, a UBP "MP" and member of the "constitutional" ad hoc committee (CAHC),told Poloff on November 14 that the "constitution" is twenty-two years old and not reflective of the "TRNC's" desire to "open up to the world." CTP General Secretary Omer Kalyoncu, chair of the CAHC, joked with Poloff SIPDIS on November 22 that his party had even accepted UBP's proposal to amend "Article 12," which forbids changing "the rights and status of the 'TRNC'" Kalyoncu was optimistic, however, that the parties would eventually agree on all the "articles" but "Temporary Article 10" (army/police control) and "Article 156" (Military Judicial Power). Others we spoke with share this view as well. -------------- What they don,t agree on -------------- ¶4. (C) As noted above, the parties appear less willing to compromise on two key "articles" dealing with civilian-military relations: "Temporary Article 10," which gives Turkey control of the police and armed forces, and "Article 156," which, in certain circumstances, allows military courts to try civilians. "Temporary Article 10" appears the most difficult to change. CTP &Minister of the Interior8 Ozkan Murat told us December 5 that CTP favors putting the police under civilian control and leaving the armed forces, for the present, under Turkish command. In contrast, UBP Party President Tahsin Ertugruloglu told us on November 27 that UBP "never" would agree to changing NICOSIA 00000994 002 OF 003 "Temporary Article 10." DP "MP" Ertugrul Hasipoglu, a CAHC member, took a more nuanced if equally obstructionist path, telling us November 14 that amending the article must be discussed with Turkey first. CTP is unlikely to back down, however. Kutlay Erk, a CTP insider and former mayor of Nicosia, asserted November 19 that "democratizing" the "constitution" is "as important to us as early elections are to UBP and DP." (Note: UBP and DP also fear that CTP would pack the police with party faithful, should command be transferred to the "TRNC.") -------------- And what they really don,t agree on -------------- ¶5. (C) The real obstacle between the parties has nothing to do with the "constitution," and everything to do with their radically differing goals and expectations of the committee process. For the opposition, the ad hoc committee work has one aim: to force early elections in 2008. UBP General Secretary Nazim Cavusoglu, another CAHC member, told the SIPDIS Embassy December 4 that the "constitutional" work of the committee was necessary, but the real goal was early elections. For CTP, just the opposite is the case. Bayram Karaman, a CTP "MP" and also a committee member, told us on November 30 that CTP had "thrown the opposition a life preserver" by forming the ad hoc committees, and that there would be no early elections in 2008. DP's Hasipoglu, however, told us that he &would take his hat and leave8 if the committee's work did not lead to early elections in 2008. -------------- Hard fall for the Opposition? -------------- ¶6. (C) Kalyoncu of CTP told us the CAHC would not be able to finish its work by December 20 and would need to continue at least another three months. If pressed by the opposition for early elections as a price for continuation, he continued, CTP would name some date in 2009, and "parliament" subsequently would pass an early-election resolution. (Note: The CTP/OP "government" enjoys a strong majority, with 29 of 50 "seats.") Kalyoncu strongly hinted that CTP would use ongoing 2008 "parliamentary" budget debates to delay the work of the CAHC. Barely containing his anger, he added that the opposition "should have thought of this before starting its completely unfounded boycott." ¶7. (C) DP leader Serdar Denktash told us that, absent early elections in 2008, he and his five "MPs" would resign from "parliament" in January, after the party receives the first tranche of its "state" budgetary support. Kudret Akay, a former DP insider who recently broke from the party, said November 29 that he doubted all the DP deputies would resign, however. UBP boss Ertugruloglu, who personally is against the boycott, nevertheless revealed that early elections in 2008 are a must for the party. In contrast to Denktash, Ertugruloglu saw no logic in resigning from "parliament" even if the opposition did not obtain early elections in 2008. UBP General Secretary Cavusoglu, however, told us that their situation "would turn into a comedy" if they did not resign in such a case. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) The true reason behind the ad hoc committee / "constitutional" debate has always been about holding--or not holding--early elections. In that sense, CTP is holding all the cards. It enjoys a strong majority in "parliament," and the UBP/DP boycott of that institution has not found support among the general populace. Moreover, many in the opposition itself are unhappy with the boycott and think it is hurting them. To illustrate, one boycotting UBP "MP" told us that politics was not just "shouting in villages," but getting down to the business of "legislating." Thus, opposition threats to resign from "parliament" or continue to boycott it do not scare CTP. That said, it is unclear how long CTP, and, more importantly Turkey, will tolerate the near total absence of an opposition from "parliamentary" life here. In his September 19 speech before the "TRNC parliament," Turkish President Abdullah Gul pointedly noted that "political controversies" in northern Cyprus should not weaken the legitimacy of the "state." Gul's comments lend some credence to rumors we have heard recently (Ref B) that Turkey supports 2008 elections here (other rumors claim it prefers a a 2009 NICOSIA 00000994 003 OF 003 date, however, in order to favor newcomer and alleged AKP favorite OP.) We expect some type of behind-the-scenes intervention from Ankara to end the present political crisis, either by triggering early elections in 2008 or by strong-arming the opposition--or at least UBP--back into &parliament." Barring that, UBP and DP will continue their self-inflicted downward spiral. As we continue to monitor events, we need to make sure that T/C nationalists and Turkey do not use the issue of early elections as a means of delaying engagement in a renewed UN negotiating track in ¶2008. SCHLICHER