CYPRIOTS OPPOSE KOSOVO UDI, TIGHT-LIPPED ON ESDP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000979 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SCE (JOSHUA BLACK),EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, EUR/RPM, IO/UNP E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV KO SE CY SUBJECT: CYPRIOTS OPPOSE KOSOVO UDI, TIGHT-LIPPED ON ESDP MISSION REF: A. SECSTATE 165486 ¶B. ANKARA 2949 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Cognizant that Kosovo final status represented the European Union's greatest foreign policy challenge -- "one we must confront successfully" -- Cyprus nonetheless could "never" support Pristina's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI),asserted Foreign Ministry Political Director Euripides Evriviades on December 12. "Sui generis" existed only in theory, he argued; a UDI with EU and/or wider international community blessing created negative precedent for countries, like Cyprus, fighting separatism. Rumors the RoC was isolated over Kosovo in Brussels were untrue, he added, as perhaps a half-dozen member-states harbored serious misgivings over Pristina's independence. Despite Cypriot heartburn over an "imposed" final status solution, Cyprus recognized the need to prevent inter-ethnic violence in Kosovo and its potential to spur broader Balkans instability; it therefore intended to take no steps to exacerbate an already-tenuous situation. Regarding one such safety valve, the EU's proposed ESDP Rule of Law mission in Kosovo, Evriviades claimed his government had yet to determine its final position. Contributing to the difficulty in casting a "yes" vote were Cypriot questions over the legal basis for deploying forces, and the RoC's determination not to allow Turkey veto power over Nicosia's possible participation in the mission. END SUMMARY. -------------- Like-Minded Nations Not in Short Supply -------------- ¶2. (C) In response to Ref A, the Ambassador December 12 called on PolDir (and former Ambassador to the United States) Euripides Evriviades. He first sought Evriviades's opinion on the current state of play in Brussels -- was Cyprus increasingly isolated, as media reports and other Embassy sources claimed? Evriviades disputed those accounts, noting that Slovakia, Romania, Greece, and Spain held similar views, all worried that a Kosovo UDI would destabilize the Balkans and embolden separatist groups in their countries. Even the Dutch had gotten cold feet, although their problems were more procedural than substantive. No issue in his memory had convulsed the EU more than Kosovo final status, Evriviades asserted. It represented Brussels's paramount foreign policy challenge, and member states unanimously believed that somehow, "Europe must get it right." ¶3. (C) The Ambassador expressed puzzlement why Cyprus would posit a comparison between its own situation and Kosovo when nobody else was doing so, and when the international community clearly was treating Kosovo as sui generis. Cyprus flatly could not recognize a Kosovo that had obtained independence without Serbia's blessing, Evriviades responded. Further, a huge, Kosovo-spawned neuralgia existed in Cyprus. Any settlement the international community "imposed" in the Balkans could create precedent for a similar procedure in the "breakaway Turkish Cypriot pseudostate," Cypriots reasoned. Personally, Evriviades acknowledged the difference between northern Cyprus and Kosovo, the latter essentially a UN protectorate since 1999. Nonetheless, the "sui generis" argument didn't fly in Nicosia. Why the need to rush in Kosovo? he wondered aloud. The Cypriot stalemate had lasted 33 years, proof that the Balkans status quo was not as untenable as many (implying the U.S. and larger EU states) argued. -------------- But First, Do No Harm -------------- ¶4. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's suggestion that Cyprus exercise great prudence and not endanger the EU's proposed ESDP Rule of Law mission to Kosovo, Evriviades claimed his government had yet to formulate its position. The RoC did not wish to see the situation on the ground worsen due to Europe's inattention on inactivity, especially since fellow member-states already had nationals deployed there. Nor did Cyprus wish to be isolated, one against 26, in Brussels -- "a political disaster," he and the Ambassador agreed. The decision on ESDP was legal as much as political, however, and Cyprus, joined by several other states, had doubts regarding the bases underpinning the deployment decision. NICOSIA 00000979 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) The MFA had "outsourced" analysis of the Kosovo situation to prominent international law attorneys, Evriviades noted. Their findings rang clear: on the broader issue of separating Kosovo from Serbia, the UN Charter did not allow the Security Council to "dismember" sovereign states without an opinion from the International Court of Justice, a process likely to take years. Regarding the ESDP deployment, the lawyers, in contrast to our Ref A points, deemed Paragraph 10 of UNSC Resolution 1244 unsuitable, since that section also declared the inviolability of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (and its successor state, Serbia.) A separate but related concern, Cyprus worried that, even if it green-lighted the EU mission, Turkey might seek to block it, absent clear indication from Brussels that Cypriot personnel would not take part (Ref B). The Foreign Ministry believed that Berlin-Plus arrangements did not apply to this civilian mission, Evriviades maintained, but he was certain that Ankara would protest regardless. -------------- No Entangling Alliance Here -------------- ¶6. (C) Evriviades dismissed the Ambassador's concerns over recent media accounts alleging some sort of Moscow-Nicosia "axis" on Kosovo, which were fueled in large part by the comments of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who visited Cyprus December 9-10 (Septel). On Kosovo, the two countries' interests for stability and a negotiated settlement simply matched, he stated. Replying to the Ambassador's statement that it would be profoundly to Cyprus's detriment to be perceived as carrying Moscow's water against the interests of its EU sister states, Evriviades declared that Cyprus was no Russian "satellite," as opposition daily "Politis" claimed, and would not do Moscow's bidding in Brussels. The GoR in fact favored the ESDP deployment, and had even signaled to the RoC its willingness to approve a technical amendment to UNSCR 1244 that could allow it. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) No amount of Washington or Brussels persuasion will budge the Cypriots from their "No Recognition of a Kosovo Unilateral Declaration of Independence" position (according to a Serbian Embassy contact, RoC President Tassos Papadopoulos recently told his Serbian counterpart that Cyprus would not recognize Pristina -- even if Belgrade did!) They're less dug in over the Rule of Law mission, however, and we expect that, in the end, they will not seek to block it; we will strongly push them in this direction. In hopes of reducing Cypriots' precedent neuralgia and getting Nicosia to "yes" on ESDP, the Embassy will emphasize Kosovo's potential to re-ignite Balkan strife and its sui generis nature in our public outreach and media strategy. In addition to our local efforts, the Ambassador recommends placement in local print media of a Kosovo-themed, Department principal-drafted op-ed. SCHLICHER