CYPRIOTS FREAK OVER UK-TURKEY AGREEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000863

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2017
TAGS: PREL PGOV CY UK TU
SUBJECT: CYPRIOTS FREAK OVER UK-TURKEY AGREEMENT

REF: SCHLICHER-BRYZA EMAIL 10/29/07

Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: "Relations with UK Hit New Low" screamed
Nicosia's English-language daily October 25. The cause?
Island-related elements of the recent "Strategic Partnership
Agreement" between the United Kingdom and Turkey that
codified the countries' desires to help end the isolation of
Turkish Cypriots (and thus enflamed the Greek Cypriot
majority). Official Nicosia and the political opposition
joined the fray, with all demanding that Cyprus respond
forcefully to the British affront. All options remain on the
table, Foreign Ministry contacts revealed, even those
regarding the British Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs). Further,
Foreign Minister Marcoullis has urged that no similar
declaration emerge from the November 5 Bush-Erdogan meeting
in Washington. British High Commission counterparts,
expecting the RoC to pick at least one fight in the run-up to
February's presidential elections, were not surprised by the
Cypriot saber-rattling, but hope to lower temperatures and
thus preserve the strategic benefits afforded Her Majesty's
Government (and USG) by the SBAs. END SUMMARY.

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Agreement Far-Reaching...But Only Cyprus Elements Matter
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2. (U) Prime Ministers Gordon Brown and Recep Tayyip Erdogan
met in London October 23. Agreeing that their countries
shared close ties and common perspectives and that the
relationship was "of growing and crucial importance," the
leaders' "Turkey / United Kingdom Strategic Partnership
2007/8" document committed them to regular consultations on
shared concerns. The list of priorities included
strengthening bilateral trade, defense, and cultural ties,
tackling climate change, improving counter-terrorism
cooperation, and fostering Ankara's bid for European Union
membership.


3. (SBU) Most Cypriots ignored those commitments to focus on
Bullet 2: "(The parties commit to) help end the isolation of
the Turkish Cypriots -- and encourage others in the
international community to join us in our efforts."
Expounding in subsequent pages, the agreement mandates the
following: a) Support for the UN Secretary General's Good
Offices mission and his efforts to achieve a Cyprus
settlement; b) Efforts within the EU and bilaterally to
promote direct contacts between Turkish Cypriots and the EU /
UK; c) High-level contacts with Turkish Cypriot authorities;
d) Assistance to "TRNC" authorities and universities in their
attempts to engage with the Bologna Process; e) A push for
Turkish Cypriot representation in the European Parliament;
and f) implementation of the UK's bilateral aid program for
Turkish Cypriots, and UK support for similar EU efforts for
the T/C community.

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Rivals Close Ranks Against Common Enemy
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4. (SBU) As expected on an island where words often count
more than actions, reactions to the accord proved harsh and
hyperbolic. Most claimed that London had "upgraded" the
"TRNC" by its mere mention in an official policy document.
"Partitionist logic" ran throughout the text, argued
Government Spokesman Vassilis Palmas October 24, "preserving
the effects of the Turkish invasion and occupation." In
response, Nicosia would act calmly but decisively to protect
its national interests. Mainstream media piled on with
accusations that Britain finally had put on paper what it had
been practicing for many years -- bias favoring Turkish
Cypriots and the Turkish "invaders." And the island's
resident conspiracy theorists concluded that Erdogan had won
Brown's concessions on northern Cyprus in exchange for Turkey
not invading northern Iraq.


5. (SBU) Opposition figures briefly ceased their
campaign-related attacks and formed a common front. Both
left-wing leader Dimitris Christofias and right-wing
counterpart Nikos Anastassiades condemned the British stance
as unacceptable. Both saw an opening to make political hay
shortly thereafter, however. Christofias asserted that the
government "no longer could preempt negative developments on
the Cyprus Problem," urging voters to give the island a fresh
start. Anastassiades lambasted the Papadopoulos
administration for mismanaging Cypriot foreign policy,
continuously fighting fires instead of preventing them.


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Foreign Ministry Employing Biggest Guns
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6. (C) Media reported that Foreign Minister Erato Marcoullis
administered a severe tongue-lashing on resident UK High
Commissioner Peter Millet October 24. She seemingly failed
to finish the task, since Embassy officials spotted her and
Millet locked in verbal fisticuffs at a UN Day celebration
the same evening. Maria Michael, a counselor in the MFA's
Cyprus Question division, subsequently provided us a readout
of her boss's discussions and Cyprus's position on the
UK-Turkey agreement. "Relations with Britain can never be
the same," asserted Michael. For the first time, Britain had
laid bare its pro-Turkey, pro-partition policies for all to
see.


7. (C) President Papadopoulos's calm visage belied a
seething interior, Michael revealed; he had ordered
Marcoullis to energize the Ministry in identifying a proper
response. It would not be knee-jerk, she promised -- Cyprus
would not oppose Britain in EU or international fora out of
spite, for example. But it would be harsh, commensurate with
the damage the Turkey accord had wrought. Up first for
inspection, if not eventual abrogation, was the Cyprus-UK
"Structured Dialogue" which called for the sides to cooperate
on matters ranging from immigration to publich health. And
the SBAs most certainly would figure high in the analysis.

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Much Ado About Nothing? Not Here
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8. (C) UNFICYP Political Officer Tim Alchin encapsulated the
views of the diplomatic community in claiming that, "in
calling for the lifting of the isolation, there is nothing
controversial here. Most EU member states think the same."
UK High Commission official David Reed echoed Alchin's points
October 25, while acknowledging the Foreign Office's
wordsmiths had not distinguished themselves in their sparing
use of quotes and liberal mention of "TRNC authorities."
That a major bilateral spat had occurred during election
season surprised no one at the UKHC, Reed noted -- in their
2007 "Risk Report," they assumed the President would pick a
fight for electoral reasons. The RoC had reacted predictably
to the Britain-Turkey accord by making unspecified threats to
the SBAs, he added. The bases' legal status was solid,
however, thus limiting the Cypriots to harassment actions.


9. (C) In an October 29 call on the Ambassador, High
Commissioner Millet admitted to a coordination breakdown
within Her Majesty's Government. He was as flabbergasted as
anyone upon seeing the text the first time -- on the Foreign
Office website, after the story had broken. Marcoullis's
words in private had rung even harsher than her public
remarks, he revealed, with the Foreign Minister insisting the
British policy portended partition. Millet was attempting to
buy time with his Cypriot interlocutors and avert a major
retaliatory initiative against the bases.

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Leaving No Diplomatic Stone Unturned
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10. (C) With little warning, Marcoullis summoned the
Ambassador early October 29 to discuss the UK-Turkish
arrangement (Ref). While the RoC had found most of the text
unexceptionable, she used "strategic betrayal" to describe
those parts referring to Cyprus and the Turkish and British
governments' intentions to ease Turkish Cypriot isolation and
encourage high-level international contacts for "TRNC"
authorities. The document contained ostensible proof that
HMG was actively supporting the partition of the country in
spite of its oft-stated policy encouraging reunification.
Marcoullis also claimed the British, by agreeing to a joint
declaration that did not mention or support the UN's July 8
process, were damaging prospects for progress on the UN
front, and encouraging Turkey's recent rhetorical shift away
from a federation achieved via the UN negotiating process.


11. (C) Marcoullis next turned to PM Erdogan's November 5
visit Washington, urging that no similar, Cyprus-related
statement emerge from the leaders' meeting. "We certainly
want you to succeed in lowering tensions regarding the PKK in
northern Iraq," the FM continued, "but we also ask that you
resist any Turkish effort to make Cyprus a bargaining chip on
other issues." RoC Ambassador to the United States Kakouris
would be making similar demarches in the Department, DoD, and
NSC, she informed, and perhaps employing Cyprus's "friends"

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on Capitol Hill as well. The Ambassador promised to pass on
her concerns about possible references to Cyprus, but also
reminded her that the U.S. continued to support measures
designed to ease the isolation of the T/C community and
upgrade their human and economic capacities as a means of
facilitating reunification.


12. (C) Taking advantage of an opportunity to press our
counter-terrorism agenda, the Ambassador suggested that
Kakouris's representations be prefaced by him detailing
whatever efforts Cyprus was taking against PKK sympathizers
on the island. The minister herself might coordinate with
her law-enforcement colleagues to crack down further on
PKK-friendly fundraising possibly taking place on the island.
Marcoullis replied that Cyprus considers the PKK a terrorist
organization, as does the EU as a whole, but that, contrary
to "malicious" press reporting of PKK training camps in the
Troodos Mountains, there was zero evidence that PKK
operations are hatched in or launched from Cyprus.

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Comment
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13. (C) Few incidents better put into perspective the danger
of inappropriate Cyprus terminology than this latest UK-RoC
dust-up. MFA officer Michael put it best, arguing "it
doesn't matter that the accord contained nothing new. It's
on paper, so it's important." Politically, Cypriots' outrage
seems to be boosting the President's fortunes. His polling
continues to stay strong, according to recent surveys.
Further, the opposition's attempts to use Britain's call to
reduce T/C isolation as additional proof of Papadopoulos's
misguided foreign and CyProb polices generally have failed.
We would thus expect the President to milk this conflict for
all its electoral worth. Such a strategy negatively affects
U.S. interests, however, especially if Cyprus moves in some
way against the SBAs, which provide the USG with vital
support for the War on Terrorism and operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Post will provide thoughts on helping
the UK (and us) to mitigate this fallout septel.
SCHLICHER