DIKO CHIEF CONFIDENT OF PARTY GROWTH, PAPADOPOULOS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000856 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2017 TAGS: PGOV PREL CY SUBJECT: DIKO CHIEF CONFIDENT OF PARTY GROWTH, PAPADOPOULOS RE-ELECTION REF: A. NICOSIA 849 ¶B. NICOSIA 839 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In trumpeting his party's double-digit growth and asserting that "his" presidential candidate -- incumbent President Tassos Papadopoulos -- would win easy re-election in February 2008, Democratic Party (DIKO) chief Marios Karoyian oozed confidence in his October 22 meeting with the Ambassador. Karoyian that day was celebrating his one-year anniversary at DIKO's helm, and he boasted of recent polls showing the party narrowing the gap with leading parties AKEL and DISY. Once the party implemented his long-sought social programs, the difference might disappear completely, he added. Turning to the presidential race, the DIKO leader predicted Papadopoulos would face AKEL Secretary General Dimitris Christofias in the February 24 run-off, with DISY-sponsored candidate Ioannis Kasoulides failing to advance. Nearly 20 percent of AKEL supporters would support the incumbent, Karoyian argued, owing both to the President's proven competence and to the respect he earlier showed AKEL during its four-plus years in government. Socialist EDEK and nationalist EUROKO constituted the coalition's weaker links, Karoyian admitted, but the President should still secure two-thirds of their votes, enough to advance and win office in February. A re-elected Papadopoulos would not shut the door to participation from oppostion parties, however, even AKEL. END SUMMARY. -------------- Fortunes Rising, One Year In -------------- ¶2. (C) Party business had Karoyian away from his desk often, he informed the Ambassador, visiting the provinces in hopes of building more grass-roots DIKO support. One year exactly after defeating rival Nikos Kleanthous for the party presidency, he had good news to report: recent polling in widely-read daily "Politis" showed DIKO the party of choice for 22 percent of Cypriot voters, a significant jump from year-earlier totals. The figure might rise further with the implementation of his pet project, a type of "social contract" with the Cypriot electorate. ¶3. (C) In comparison to leading Cypriot parties DISY and AKEL, DIKO lacked a definable ideology, Karoyian admitted. Its support came mainly for its hard-line stance against the 2004 Annan Plan reunification effort, and President Papadopoulos's vows never to permit similar plans to take effect. Karoyian aimed to create a party identity with his nascent (and still very fuzzy) "contract," which would target Cyprus's elderly population, youth, and other, underserved groups. Responding to the Ambassador's follow-up query, the DIKO leader insisted the initiative did not ape AKEL policies nor was intended to co-opt that party's voters. "With this effort my dreams will become reality," Karoyian proclaimed (Comment: his dreams are to grow the party, not serve Cyprus's underprivileged, we think.) -------------- Smiles and Confidence Regarding Elections -------------- ¶4. (C) Spawning similar positive vibes were internal studies showing DIKO cohesion rates running at 84-86 percent (Media have reported figures in the 71-74 percent range, however.) Such performance was surprising, Karoyian revealed, since the presidential elections lay four months ahead. DIKO staff already had identified dissatisfied supporters and developed action plans to return them to the fold, meaning cohesion might rise even higher come February. ¶5. (C) Handicapping the presidential race, Karoyian thought Papadopoulos would face Dimitris Christofias in the run-off February 24. DISY-supported candidate Ioannis Kasoulides looked increasingly weak, he asserted. Elaborating, nice-guy Kasoulides lacked the toughness necessary to succeed at this level. Further, DISY President Nikos Anastassiades, who viewed a successful Kasoulides campaign as a threat to his party position, regularly withheld key support (Ref A). DISY ought now to be considering which opponent to support in Round 2, Karoyian offered. ¶6. (C) Asked to comment on AKEL's traditionally sky-high cohesion and the advantages it wrought, the DIKO leader confidently predicted his candidate could steal 20 percent of Christofias's rank-and-file (Ref B). During four and 1/2 NICOSIA 00000856 002 OF 002 years in the government coalition, a sizable swath of AKEL voters had become accustomed to the trappings of power. They considered their Secretary General's decision to abandon Papadopoulos and run alone a quixotic affair destined to return the party to opposition status; as such, they preferred to support the President, albeit quietly. Worse, Christofias had presented his candidacy as a fait accompli, imperiously at that. Papadopoulos had "treated AKEL with respect during the period of co-governance," Karoyian countered, winning him additional party goodwill. ¶7. (C) Karoyian acknowleged a couple of weak spots in the re-election campaign. Socialist EDEK, the second-largest party backing Papadopoulos, lagged far behind DIKO in terms of cohesion, for example. Partisans thought EDEK might eventually convince 80 percent of its base to support the President, but Karoyian dismissed the figure as overly optimistic. Another small party allied with Papadopoulos, EUROKO, controlled just 50-55 percent of its voters, with the remainder likely to back Kasoulides. Still, Karoyian liked the President's re-election chances. -------------- AKEL to Return Some Day? -------------- ¶8. (C) A student of mainland politics, Karoyian wondered if AKEL might soon face an accession struggle similar to that plaguing Greek Socialist party PASOK in the wake of its latest defeat at the hands of New Democracy. Seemingly loyal lieutenants likely would confront Christofias with "you've had your chance, now give us ours" demands. If he were smart, Karoyian ventured, Christofias would cover his internal flanks now, re-assigning certain challengers, sacking others, and generally adopting a divide-and-conquer strategy. ¶9. (C) Karoyian even envisioned a limited role for AKEL in a second-term Papadopoulos administration, especially if post-election polling were to show that party's supporters backing the President in high numbers. Despite its newcomer status -- AKEL never before had participated directly in Cypriot cabinets -- AKEL-affiliated ministers (there had been four) had acquitted themselves well during Papadopoulos's tenure, Karoyian emphasized. Divergent political ideologies never posed problems, as the officials "had been Communists in name only." -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶10. (C) With a booming economy to exploit, an electorate comfortable with the Cyprus status quo, and a Teflon shell impervious to scandal, Papadopoulos looks tough to defeat in February; Karoyian's confidence over his boss's re-election prospects seems spot-on to us. Less convincing was his depiction of DIKO as a rising political force capable of challenging AKEL and DISY for supremacy here. A shared ideology still draws individuals to parties and ensures their long-term survival, and here the Big Two are miles ahead of DIKO, popularly known as the "party of opportunists." Karoyian's organization continues to stake its reputation on then-leader Papadopoulos's "saving of the Republic" via the Annan Plan "No," but how long can this message remain relevant? Further, in the post-1974 era, a large, fickle tranche of Cypriot voters have "followed the power" by buoying the sitting president's party's performance in parliamentary and municipal elections, only to abandon the organization once he leaves office. We would expect that pattern to repeat in the post-Papadopoulos era, whenever that occurs, with DIKO returning to its familiar third-wheel role. SCHLICHER