LEADERS' MEETING BRINGS NO BREAKTHROUGHS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NICOSIA 000729 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, IO/UNP E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2017 TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU SUBJECT: LEADERS' MEETING BRINGS NO BREAKTHROUGHS REF: A. NICOSIA 685 ¶B. NICOSIA 583 ¶C. 06 NICOSIA 1088 Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d) ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: Fourteen months after concluding a framework arrangement to restart stalled Cyprus Problem negotiations -- the July 8 or Gambari Agreement, which envisioned regular tete-a-tetes of the island's community leaders -- RoC President Tassos Papadopoulos and Turkish Cypriot "President" Mehmet Ali Talat conducted their first follow-on meeting September 5 in the presence of UN Special Representative Michael Moller. At the conclusion of the three-hour gathering, Moller issued a terse statement claiming the two men had conversed constructively, concurred that "the process" needed to commence ASAP, and would reunite "at an appropriate time" in the future. The leaders, too, grabbed the microphones, with Papadopoulos first praising the constructive tone of the meeting and assuring that further contacts would occur. It was interlocutor Talat's insistence in abandoning July 8 principles, the President argued, that had prevented the leaders from reaching a real breakthrough, however. Expectedly, Talat's comments differed dramatically. The passage of time worked against a settlement, he explained, and the sides' dithering had wasted fourteen months. Talat had presented to Papadopoulos and Moller a fast-track proposal in line with the spirit of July 8; Greek Cypriots were not "psychologically prepared" for real negotiations, he regretfully concluded. ¶2. (C) Media in both communities deemed the meeting a substantive failure and expectedly placed blame on the other sides' pigheadedness. Their arguments echoed those of key political leaders on both sides: G/C editorials argued the Turkish Cypriot leadership aimed to torpedo July 8 in hopes of reviving the "undemocratic and doomed to fail" Annan Plan, while T/C columnists disparaged Papadopoulos for seeking only electoral gain, and not actual progress toward a settlement, from the Gambari framework. We expect the President will attempt to derive benefit from this meeting taking place, and predict a Palace attempt to manage the timing and content of future gatherings for maximum political bounce. As to Talat, who so feared providing Papadopoulos that edge that he seriously considered refusing the gathering, his proposal for a time-limited preparations period leading to full-fledged negotiations did not represent a complete abandonment of July 8, since he has been under significant international pressure to live up to his earlier commitment to the agreement. He still faces an uphill battle to convince the international community, much less his counterparts across the Green Line, of his seriousness toward the arrangement he and Papadopoulos agreed to last year. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- July 8 Agreement: One Step Up and...Three Steps Back -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) For two years following the failed 2004 Annan Plan referendum, both Turkish and Greek Cypriots engaged in a unseemly blame game, and constructive engagement ground to a halt. Few on either side expected much from the July 2006 visit of UN Political Under Secretary Ibrahim Gambari. The UN official notched a notable victory, then, in brokering a deal on July 8 that committed the communities to work toward an eventual Cyprus solution by establishing working groups to prepare the ground for settlement negotiations and technical committees to tackle daily life issues (Ref C). Papadopoulos and Talat also agreed to meet occasionally to review the work of the bi-communal entities. Like much in Cyprus, however, the devil was in the details -- and in the implementation. For fourteen months after Gambari's departure, the impasse continued and the blame game reached Olympic standards. Despite each leader issuing invitations, for example, not a single "summit" occurred, due mainly to Papadopoulos's insistence that the groups and committees must first be up and running. As to those bodies, despite dozens of meetings of the tripartite coordination committee (Moller, plus negotiators Tasos Tzionis and Rashit Pertev),the sides failed to reach final agreement on their number, names, composition, and terms of reference (Ref B). ¶4. (C) It soon became obvious the communities viewed the July 8 agreement through different prisms, and sought to implement it in varying degrees and speeds. To Papadopoulos, the process represented an opportunity to bury the hated Annan Plan, craft a solution "based on different principles," and shuck the "intransigent" label that neutral observers believed he merited. Through Tzionis, the G/C side lobbied NICOSIA 00000729 002 OF 004 to create a dozen working groups and committees whose agendas were incredibly complex (one, "Governance," included nearly sixty items, such as "study federal models currently used in Germany, Switzerland, and Belgium"). Turkish Cypriots immediately cried foul, claiming the tactics aimed to delay the process indefinitely, a point shared by many in the international community but ignored by most G/C media and opinion leaders. ¶5. (C) Despite Talat signing his name last summer, he and the other Turkish Cypriot leaders never knew quite how to manage the July 8 process (on September 6, close advisor Hasan Ercakica claimed the T/Cs had wanted something different in July 2006 -- Papadopoulos to make public the changes his side sought to the Annan Plan -- but they had bowed to U.S., UK, and UN "pressure" and approved the framework arrangement in a last-gasp attempt to spur movement toward a final CyProb solution. A version closer to the truth is that Talat made the July 8 agreement, then got slapped by Ankara for reaching a deal that did not pay ritual obeisance to the Annan Plan as the touchstone for all CyProb diplomacy.) Frustrated by G/C go-slow tactics, the Turkish Cypriots reacted with public statements and later, formal letters, essentially seeking the abrogation of the process and the immediate resumption of full-fledged negotiations. In the arrangement they sought, the Annan Plan would provide a basis for talks, which would feature international arbitration and timetables. Greek Cypriots considered the proposed changes complete non-starters. -------------- Recent Events Bring Hope for Movement -------------- ¶6. (C) By late spring, few here believed any July 8 progress was possible. Buoyed by his hard-line Cyprus Problem strategy, Papadopoulos looked a shoo-in for reelection in 2008 and seemed unlikely to change tactics soon. North of the Green Line, Talat, in the cross-hairs of the resident Turkish military, facing a suddenly emboldened opposition, and with his AKP supporters involved in their own battles at home, was hamstrung from adopting a more flexible and/or conciliatory position. Two developments portended a possible unfreezing, however. Papadopoulos's governing coalition ruptured in July, with one-time collaborator and AKEL General Secretary Dimitris Christofias declaring his presidential SIPDIS candidacy. His re-election no longer assured, the President suddenly faced the need to justify that his uncompromising positions were bearing fruit. Talat derived benefit with Recep Tayyip Erdogan's convincing win in July's Turkish parliamentary elections. With the Turkish nationalist/secularist parties' poor performance, his north Cyprus opposition lost confidence and cohesion and the military seemed to tone down its rhetoric, giving Talat some room to maneuver. Talk around the water cooler changed to the possibility the leaders might actually meet. ¶7. (C) Moller returned to Denmark for an August vacation, but UNFICYP staff took advantage of the small opening and pressed community representatives Tzionis and Pertev to re-establish their coordination committee meetings. On August 21, they gathered in Moller's offices. Evidently under orders to say "yes," neither had an objection to the leaders meeting September 5. Besides setting the date, the two sides' representatives briefly discussed a broad agenda. Tzionis reiterated points that Papadopoulos had made in his July letter to Talat: the leaders must focus on reinvigorating the barely-breathing July 8 process. Pertev added "and focus as well on any/all other aspects of the Cyprus Problem." UNFICYP sought to keep the gathering as free-flowing as possible, deliberately avoiding mention of any modality likely to cause either man to object or wrangle. ¶8. (C) A short burst of optimism quickly gave way to reality, however, as the two communities voiced their aims and redlines for the upcoming meeting. In the Turkish Cypriot community, only Talat's CTP saw potential progress stemming from the meeting, with General Secretary Omar Kalyoncu telling us September 5 that "we always want to negotiate, and never shy from a meeting. Let's see what this one brings." Opposition figures adopted a more pessimistic, even combative stance. Democratic Party (DP) Number 2 Ertugrul Hasipoglu the same day blasted Papadopoulos's sincerity, claiming the President was unlikely to cede an inch. "What will he want to discuss? Minority rights for Turkish Cypriots? Osmosis? They'll never give up absolute authority over the RoC, so what's the point?" ¶9. (U) Greek Cypriot media also downplayed the September 5 NICOSIA 00000729 003.2 OF 004 meeting's likelihood for success, focusing on "unreal" Turkish Cypriot expectations. While Papadopoulos sought to implement the July 8 agreement by establishing the envisaged committees and working groups, Talat allegedly would seek regular leaders' meeting regardless of progress at the working level. In so doing, he would "downgrade the process without burying it." Timetables and international arbitration also topped Talat's wish list, G/C media claimed, a recipe for further deadlock. -------------- And They're Off...Sides Meet September 5 -------------- ¶10. (C) UNFICYP had real fears that non-substantive modalities, such as the order of arrival and flying of flags on the leaders' limos, might derail the meeting. A flurry of telephone diplomacy evidently resolved the tiffs, and the men arrived at Moller's official residence the afternoon of September 5. After three-plus hours, the SRSG emerged and issued a short statement. "Constructive engagement" best characterized the leaders' conversation, Moller claimed. The two men had concurred that "the process" (not the July 8 process) must commence immediately, and had discussed other topics related to a final CyProb settlement. Finally, Talat and Papadopoulos had agreed to continue to meet under the auspices of the United Nations, and would reunite at an "appropriate time" to continue the talks. ¶11. (U) Upon returning to their respective HQs, the leaders applied their spins. While the Greek Cypriot side had insisted on a strict interpretation of the July 8 agreement and its fundamental aim of "preparing the ground for future negotiations," Papadopoulos asserted, Talat had proposed deviations from the agreement that sought to minimize the roles of the committees and working groups. Attempts by the T/C side to speed the process would result only in reaching dead-ends more quickly. The RoC President voiced his intention, however, to continue meeting with Talat in hopes of breaking the impasse, the end goal being a CyProb solution "built on a different base." The passage of time reduced hopes of finding a workable federal solution, Talat countered publicly. Instead, he proposed "fast-track" preparations, with a handful of committees deliberating key issues like governance, security, and EU relations for a period of two months. Afterward, the leaders would commence face-to-face discussions aimed at a final solution. Explaining his failure in winning Papadopoulos's buy-in for the re-worked process, Talat claimed the G/C side was not psychologically prepared to negotiate in earnest. -------------- Truth Somewhere in the Middle -------------- ¶12. (C) UNFICYP Political Officer (and official notetaker) Tim Alchin confirmed the leaders had behaved cordially and professionally during the three-hour get-together, a positive in itself. While expressing a common desire to move forward, they had failed to agree on next steps, however. No follow-up looked imminent, since Papadopoulos soon would depart for New York and UNGA. Talat had focused on modifying the process (his own words) by introducing the aforementioned deadlines for the committee work. In his view, the fact that 14 months had passed without visible progress was proof the "bottom-up" approach -- driven by the working-level groups -- could not successfully drive the negotiations. Talat also sought Papadopoulos's commitment to aim for a solution by the end of 2008. ¶13. (C) Conversely, Papadopoulos had lobbied for a stricter following of the July 8 process and follow-on (November 2006) Gambari bridging proposal. He rejected any and all fixed timeframes, insisting that subsequent leaders' meetings depended on progress at the working level. A 2008 solution presented no problems to the President, but Papadopoulos argued that Talat's two-month preparation period was insufficient to tackle re-unification's numerous and complex components. The minimalist statement Moller issued characterized well the inability of the sides to reach any real agreement, Alchin concluded. -------------- Meeting to Prove Politically Beneficial? -------------- ¶14. (C) Embassy contacts within the G/C community were unsure whether Papadopoulos would score electoral points from the meeting. Polakis Sarris, who shepherded the President's NICOSIA 00000729 004 OF 004 successful 2003 run and plays a similar part now, claimed it was still too early to gauge its impact. If the public perceived the process was leading nowhere, Papadopoulos might even lose votes. He personally thought he could spin the results positively, however. DIKO President Marios Karoyian, a Papadopoulos protege who nonetheless has butted heads with the President lately, called the September 5 gathering an electoral non-event. If it led to progress in the negotiations, Papadopoulos benefited, but if it failed, the President would receive no blame. It was crystal-clear that Talat deserved credit for the current impasse, Karoyian reasoned, a "fact" the G/C electorate understood. ¶15. (C) "TRNC Spokesman" and Talat adviser Hasan Ercakica confirmed that Talat had feared providing the hated Papadopoulos an electoral boost by agreeing to the meeting. Eventually, however, his "President" had determined that the negatives of refusing the get-together outweighed the negatives of boosting Papadopoulos's chances. While Turkish Cypriots undoubtedly hoped Christofias or Ioannis Kasoulides would unseat Papadopoulos in February, they saw a possible backfire in attempting to influence the G/C elections, and would "play our own game, not theirs" in the run-up. Ercakica revealed Talat's unhappiness with the meeting's outcome, and later argued that only a renewed U.S. or "Western" push could dislodge the Greek Cypriots from their hardened positions. -------------- What Comes Next? -------------- ¶16. (C) COMMENT: While hesitant to rubbish the leaders' meeting -- their first get-together in 14 months IS cause for some rejoicing -- we're equally reluctant to claim it represents much more than the first of a thousand steps. The sides, after all, proved unable even to schedule a follow-on meeting or issue a serious statement. In looking for positives, we're left with Talat's latest plan for a handful of working groups to tackle substantive issues over a time-limited preparation phase. It would seem he received a taste of reality, of what the Greek Cypriots, UN, and international community might actually expect (in comparison, his April 2007 letter to incoming UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon, in which he sought immediate recommencement of full-fledged negotiations on the basis of the Annan Plan, complete with strict timetables and international arbitration, won derision from all parties.) We would hope Papadopoulos and company give consideration to the proposal and seek changes that meet their needs while also addressing Talat's. ¶17. (C) Much more likely is the President continuing to insist on a stricter interpretation of the July 8 agreement, seeking to control the negotiation's timing and progress for maximum political gain. To that end, we expect Papadopoulos to trumpet the leaders' meeting and "active political process" at his UNGA speech in two weeks. SCHLICHER