Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
07NICOSIA651
2007-08-08 12:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nicosia
Cable title:  

TALAT FINALLY BLINKS; DEMINING TO RESTART IN CYPRUS

Tags:  PREL UNFICYP MOPS MASS CY TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHNC #0651/01 2201207
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 081207Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8054
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0917
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000651 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2017
TAGS: PREL UNFICYP MOPS MASS CY TU
SUBJECT: TALAT FINALLY BLINKS; DEMINING TO RESTART IN CYPRUS


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000651

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2017
TAGS: PREL UNFICYP MOPS MASS CY TU
SUBJECT: TALAT FINALLY BLINKS; DEMINING TO RESTART IN CYPRUS


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b),(d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: European Commission and UN Development
Program officials July 30 signed an agreement that allows
humanitarian demining activities in the Cypriot Buffer Zone
to continue, hopefully to their conclusion. Financing for
operations, approximately four million euro, will come from
the European Union's 259 million euro assistance package for
the Turkish Cypriot community. The agreement ended a
lengthy, acrimonious impasse that had threatened the EU-led
demining mission which, along with Committee for Missing
Persons, represents one of the few Cyprus Problem-related
bright spots of recent years. In backbriefs with Embassy
personnel, UNFICYP officials recounted tough negotiations to
break the logjam, with the UN and EU arrayed against T/C
leadership and the local Turkish Forces command; only the
international side's brinkmanship convinced Turkish Cypriot
leader Mehmet Ali Talat to drop opposition to utilizing the
four million -- "money the EU had intended solely to benefit
the T/C community" -- for the bi-communal project. Deminers,
who were to depart Cyprus the week of August 6, instead will
deploy to "unowned" (by neither the Greek Cypriot National
Guard nor the Turkish Forces/Turkish Cypriot Forces)
minefields and commence preparatory work immediately.
Meanwhile, UNFICYP will continue efforts to negotiate a
protocol extension with the TF/TCF to allow remediation of
Turkish-lain minefields in the Buffer Zone. While hesitant
to read too much into Talat's about-face on the four million,
we nonetheless hope the move signifies a renewed willingness
to move forward and make "sacrifices" that benefit both
Cypriot communities. END SUMMARY.

-------------- --------------
Minefields a Vivid Reminder of Unresolved Conflict
-------------- --------------


2. (U) Minefields dot and abut the 120-mile-long Buffer Zone
that divides Cyprus east to west, planted by both Greek
Cypriot and Turkish/Turkish Cypriot forces. In its

most-recent (2006) country report, the influential journal
"Landmine Monitor" (icbl.org/lm) published historical UNFICYP
statistics that revealed 101 mined areas on the island at the
cease-fire of hostilities in August 1974, 53 within the BZ.
Two mine action centers currently operate on Cyprus. One
functions under the command of the GCNG Engineer Corps, and
has responsibility both for clearing fields outside the
Buffer Zone and for implementing Cypriot obligations under
the international Mine Ban Treaty.


3. (U) Demining within the Buffer Zone falls under the
supervision of the Mine Action Center in Cyprus (MAC-C),
founded in 2004. MAC-C is part of the EU's Partnership for
the Future Program (PFF) and is implemented by UNDP. In
2004, the European Commission allocated four million euro to
fund land mine removal and later added another million.
MAC-C operations commenced in late 2004 with the clearance of
a dozen GCNG-lain fields; its successes allowed the opening
of the BZ crossing point at Astromeritis/Bostanci, 40 miles
west of Nicosia. After UNFICYP inked an accord with the TF,
MAC-C commenced demining Turkish-lain fields in August 2005,
concentrating in and around the capital. UNFICYP declared
the Nicosia vicinity mine-free in a widely-attended ceremony
in November 2006. According to MAC-C Project Manager Michael
Raine, as of August 2007 his teams had cleared a total of 25
fields and 2.2 million square meters of terrain.

--------------
This Money's Not Bicommunal
--------------


4. (C) Along with the UN Committee for Missing Persons --
which last month began returning to families the remains of
individuals going missing during the span of the Cyprus
conflict -- we can think of few bicommunal initiatives
enjoying greater success than demining. Despite this, the
program faced a terminal threat from funding shortfalls in
late 2006. Its operations having drawn down the European
Commission's initial allotment, MAC-C halted minefield
clearance in January 2007 and demobilized most of its
sappers, retaining only limited staff to respond to priority
tasks such as unexploded ordnance (UXO)
inspection/remediation work at the proposed Ledra Street BZ
crossing. Local EU and UN officials believed they had found
a solution, however, after winning Brussels's approval to
utilize for demining four million of the 259 million euro
assistance package for Turkish Cypriots.


5. (C) Talat was not buying, however. Brussels intended the
long-delayed direct aid package to benefit the T/C community

NICOSIA 00000651 002 OF 003


solely, he protested; the money should not fund bicommunal
programs like demining. Sensing most Turkish Cypriots felt
similarly, he went public with his complaints. EU member
state diplomats we consulted claimed that Talat had dubious
legal or procedural grounds to dictate or prohibit discrete
disbursements from the 259m fund. Nonetheless, a donor body
that functions on consensus and harmony plainly was hamstrung
by its obstinate recipient, and the proposed four million
euro transfer sat. Subsequent hard lobbying by UNFICYP
staff, local EU personnel, the European Commission, and even
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon proved incapable of budging
Talat an inch.

--------------
A Change Afoot
--------------


6. (C) There had seemed little cause for optimism when, on
July 27, UNFICYP chief Michael Moller telephoned the
Ambassador with good news. That morning, Talat had notified
Moller that, "after deep consideration," he had agreed the EU
could fund demining ops from the EU-T/C aid package. UN
military leaders were rushing to conclude arrangements with
local TF commanders to allow activities to commence, Moller
revealed, hoping the Turks would erect no further roadblocks.


7. (U) UNDP and PFF signed an accord on July 30, elements of
which broke publicly two days later. According to media
accounts, the additional four million euro would allow the
completion of demining activities in the BZ. UNFICYP
welcomed the arrangement in an optimistically-worded press
release. "We commend the ongoing financial support provided
by the European Commission to continue the important task of
rendering the Buffer Zone free of all mines and ultimately
returning the land to civilian use," the communication read.

--------------
Finger of Blame Brings Change of Heart
--------------


8. (C) "This was not the generals here backing off, but
rather a political decision from Ankara," deduced UNFICYP DCM
Wlodek Cibor August 1. Uncertain what had driven the change,
Cibor surmised that the AKP's big victory July 22 might have
given Turkish PM Erdogan some wiggle room to allow Talat more
flexibility. Some uncharacteristic EU and UN brinkmanship
also had played a great part, however. At the highest
levels, European Union officials had pressed Turkey and the
Turkish Cypriots that, should Talat not accept the funding
transfer, the deminers would close shop completely, an
embarassing development. On the UN track, UNFICYP elevated
the issue to Assistant SYG for Peacekeeping Operations Hedi
Annabi's level. Annabi recently summoned Turkish Permanent
Representative Baki Ilkin to discuss demining, Cibor
continued. "Should the program be suspended, there would be
far-reaching consequences, and the UN would be forced to
publicly lay blame on the Turkish side" headlined Annabi's
message. Ilkin initially responded by pleading for more
time; evidently, his subsequent report to bosses in Ankara
underpinned the eventual about-face.


9. (C) The majority of remaining minefields in the Buffer
Zone belonged to the TF/TCF, Cibor noted. Yet MAC-C
attention to these fields could not commence until UNFICYP
secured extension of the governing protocol from local
commanders. He did not expect an easy negotiation. While
UNFICYP's mandate in the BZ as laid out in its 1989 aide
memoire lay in returning property to its original use, the
Turkish side believed this departure from the status quo
potentially hazardous. They pointed to repeated incidents of
Greek Cypriots "provocatively" farming their plots in the
zone north of UNFICYP's own "Farming Security Line," actions
that had sometimes sparked confrontations. Nonetheless,
UNFICYP was not about to backtrack its mandate, Cibor argued.
Despite worries of a tough fight, he thought the sides
eventually would reach agreement.


10. (C) Meanwhile, MAC-C experts would begin preparatory
work on remediating the six or seven "unowned" BZ minefields.
Three lay close to the G/C cease-fire lines; they would
receive attention first. UNFICYP intended to alert the
Turkish side of the work; there was no legal/procedural
necessity to seek the TF's express clearance, but Cibor
expected to receive protests nonetheless. MAC-C chief Raine
asserted that his Mozambican sappers would deploy en masse
the moment that UNFICYP landed the agreement with the Turkish
side.

--------------

NICOSIA 00000651 003 OF 003


Sign of Better Times Ahead?
--------------


11. (C) COMMENT: Talat's latest tirade over demining
funding, thankfully OBE'd, was but one of a series of
tantrums that have left us wondering where the grownups went
in northern Cyprus. His ungrateful behavior towards
benefactors and allies in Brussels appeared particularly
egregious and self-damaging, however. Still miffed over the
European Union's inability to pass a direct trade regulation
owing to Greek Cypriot opposition, Talat has chosen to view
the direct aid package -- at 1000 euro per capita, generous
beyond belief -- as the booby prize, the "least the EU could
do." And by attempting to dictate what Brussels could and
could not fund, he showed a not unexpected naivete of how
real countries do assistance (mostly, Turkey just signs
checks). The optimists hope Talat has realized that western
aid comes with strings attached, and that intransigence and
bluster won't buy him scissors. More broadly, we hope this
too-long-delayed but sensible turn on demining presages his
abandonment of at least some of the self-defeating
obstructionism he has displayed over the prior eight months.
SCHLICHER