TURKISH ELECTORATE GRANTS "TRNC GOVERNMENT" WISH

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NICOSIA 000619

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/25/2017
TAGS: CY PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: TURKISH ELECTORATE GRANTS "TRNC GOVERNMENT" WISH

REF: NICOSIA 00610

NICOSIA 00000619 001.3 OF 002


Classified By: Ambassador Ronald L. Schlicher for reasons 1.5 (b) and (
d).


1. (C) Summary: The resounding win of the Justice and
Development Party (AKP) in Turkey was a surprise to most
Turkish Cypriot contacts of the Embassy and has stabilized
the wobbly CTP-OP "TRNC Government". The post-election
euphoria, though, will not dispel the allegations of
corruption that plague the OP "ministers," and the road
ahead, though clearer, is not without its perils. End
Summary.


CTP GOT LUCKY...
--------------


2. (SBU) The CTP-OP "government" of the "TRNC," battered by
allegations of corruption on the part of OP "ministers," was
hoping that Turkish voters would return the AKP government to
power with a solid majority. The result of the elections --
47 percent of the Turkish population voted for AKP, giving it
a preliminary 340 of the 550 seats in Parliament -- exceeded
CTP's hopes. Even observers who were expecting an AKP
victory were surprised by just how large the margin of that
victory was.



3. (C) Ozdil Nami, an "MP" affiliated with the CTP, told
poloff in a meeting on July 24 that the AKP victory has
restabilized the previously precarious CTP position. AKP has
a solid endorsement to continue its policies, which will
translate into support for the CTP-OP "government". With the
wind taken out of the opposition's sails, the public will
pardon OP's flirtation with corruption. He was less
sanguine, however, on the future of Cyprus talks. Certainly,
the AKP win means that Turkey will continue to support CTP's
pro-solution policies, but, he claims, the Greek Cypriot side
is unlikely to be cooperative. Even if Christofias or
Kasoulides wins the Cypriot presidential election, the moment
the new president begins to move in a direction toward
solution -- particularly on the issue of ending the isolation
of the north -- he will be crucified by the Greek Cypriot
public as a traitor and forced to stop.



4. (S) Kudret Akay, an advisor to Democrat Party leader
Serdar Denktash (strictly protect),made similar comments to
poloff in a July 25 meeting. According to Akay, the AKP
victory was so great that the political situation in the
"TRNC" has completely reversed. The CTP-OP coalition is
solid, whereas the opposition partes are now potentially
unstable, with their usual supporters dejected and perhaps
considering abandoning them. Moreover, with no need to be
conciliatory toward the opposition, CTP's position on reforms
to the "constitution", "election" laws, and "parliamentary"
laws has become more firm. CTP still believes these reforms
are desirable, but will be less willing to offer compromises
to the opposition to secure them. Finally, Mr. Akay said
that, assuming no further surprises, the CTP-OP coalition
will last well into next year and early "elections" will not
take place until at least 2009. Mr. Akay did concede that
five more years of AKP governance should provide a good
environment for further movement toward a Cyprus solution.


...BUT IS NOT YET HOME FREE
--------------


5. (C) CTP's luck could turn for the worse again, however.
Ahmet Ozcag, the businessman who alleged that his
Turkey-based company had transferred some $2 million to OP
officials, is still a wild card. Having turned himself over
to the Turkish Cypriot "justice system", he has continued to
make cryptic and contradictory statements. As the
investigation into his claims unfolds, pressure could once
again mount against OP's "ministers" to resign. Whereas Asim
Vehbi, the "Environment Minister" appointed from outside
"parliament," would be relatively easy to replace, the
resignation or dismissal of "Deputy Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister" Turgay Avci would almost certainly rupture
the "governing" coalition and leave CTP with few political
options (ref A).


NICOSIA 00000619 002.4 OF 002




6. (C) Events in Turkey could also make life difficult for
"PM" Soyer's "government". Although the Turkish election
results probably signal a return to stability, an acrimonious
dispute over Turkey's coming presidential election could lead
to another round of legislative elections and all the
political uncertainty that was the hallmark of the past few
months. Likewise, a Turkish military more actively resistant
to AKP policies could try to manipulate the political
situation in the "TRNC" as a way to exert leverage on Prime
Minister Erdogan.



7. (C) A final possible destabilizing factor would be
discontent with the current coalition from within CTP itself.
Although the political situation had stabilized in CTP's
favor, CTP's reputation has still suffered somewhat as a
result. The willingness of CTP to tolerate OP's alleged
corruption may alienate grassroot voters and more idealistic
members who could pressure CTP from the inside. While
internal pressure alone will probably not be enough to force
a "government" realignment, it could compound the pressure of
any of the above external events.



8. (C) Comment: CTP's position may be less solid than our
contacts let on. The situation now looks stable, but too
many possible disruptions loom in the background to make the
survival of the "government" a certainty. "PM" Soyer would
be well-advised to take this opportunity to prepare in
advance for possible shocks -- by planning responses to
future revelations in the corruption investigations, for
example, or taking the initiative to reassure possible
pockets of discontent within the party. There is no
indication as of yet that such planning is in the works, and
with the height of summer -- and vacation season -- arriving,
the opportunity to do so will probably be missed until fall,
leaving CTP's new position of strength somewhat vulnerable.
End Comment.

SCHLICHER